CHAPTER VI EXPOSURE. CONTACT AMD LINKAGE OF RURAL ELITE

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CHAPTER VI EXPOSURE. CONTACT AMD LINKAGE OF RURAL ELITE The previous chapter has examined the modernity profiles of the rural elites and discussed how their power resources contribute positively toward attainment of their sociops#ychological modernity in rural communities. This chapter focuses on the degree of intersystemic participation of the rural elites, and its association with their power resources and modernity orientation. The concept of "intersystemic participation" has been adopted from Jetley (1977) and the variables considered in our study are the elites' (1) mass media exposure and urban connection, (2) contact with extension agents and government officials, and (3) linkage with local notables and political leaders. Also, it is one of our objectives to examine the association between modernity orientation of the rural elites, and their participation through these intersystemic processes. An analysis of elites' patterns of intersystemic participation not only focuses on their increasing interest toward getting things done for the fellow villagers but also assess the situation in which they realize their importance in decision-making process in rural development

activities. Sometimes mere presence or association of an elite with some official or political leader brings him additional respect or authority in his local community. In the colonial period these modern resources of power of the rural elites were either absent or purely unidimensional in character. Nowadays, insofar as government and political functionaries are coming closer to the people their local leaders are expected to be in more contact with them. An individual desiring to keep himself abreast of the current happenings at the local, national or international situations is more active both in his personal and social affairs than the one who does not. This exposure is the predisposition of his personality which directs him toward making active effort not only for self-satisfaction but for the betterment of others. Several studies have shown that the innovativeness of a target system is directly related to the extent to which that target system utilizes the mass media (e.g., see Coughenow 1964; Dasgupta 1965; Frey 1968; Polgar et al. 1963). Preedman et al.(l964) have found that married couples in Taiwan who read newspaper were more likely to use birth control than were married couples who did not read newspaper. The works explicitly indicate that those who are exposed to mass media have developed a viewpoint favourable to change. However, in this chapter we examine the hypothesis that the higher the

211 modernity orientation of the rural elites the higher their mass media expasure and urban connection, contact with extension agents and officials, and linkage with local notables and political leaders. For the present purpose we have constructed a scale of "mass media exposure and urban connection", which includes a battery of questions on seven items! (1) read newspaper, (2) listen to radio, (3) go to movie, (4) visit nearest town, (5) visit district town or city, (6) relatives working in urban organizations, etc. and (7) friends/ neighbours working in urban organizations, etc..respondents were asked to give their answers to each of the first five items either as 'often' 'sometimes' or 'rarely'; and 'many' 'some' or 'none' to the last two items; responses were scored as '3' '2' and '1', respectively. Then a total score for each elite was calculated. Table 6.1 Mags Media gxposu e_ and JJrban Cpnnection aad by_levels of Operation (in percentages ) Mass media exposure level and urban connection Village Union Thana Total low 32 19 5 24 Medium 59 67 54 61 Hi e h 9 14 41 15 fo 100 (N) (172) 100 100 100 (114) (325) 33.49 df=4 p^.001 # =.43

21 i Table 6.1 shows the distribution of elites by their levels of operation and by mass media exposure and urban connection. It reveals that slightly less than one-fourth of them have low level of mass media exposure and urban connection, whereas 61 and 15 percents are found to have medium and high levels of exposure, respectively. However, there is a significant statistical difference between elites 1 levels of operation and their extent of mass media exposure and urban connection. While 32 per cent of the village level elites have low level of exposure, the percentage decreases to only five for those of the thana level ones. On the other hand, while nine per cent have high level of exposure, the percentage rises to 4-1 for those of the thana level ones. This 'Shows a perceptible trend that the higher the levels of operation of elites the greater the extent of their mass media exposure and urban connection. The difference between the levels of elites and the extent of their mass media exposure and urban connection.is clear mainly because of differences between the levels of elites and their power resources. Data pertaining to these aspects can be analysed in the following tables. As Table 6.2 shows, while 24 per cent of the rural elites have low level of mass media exposure and urban connection, the percentages are 61 and 15 for those of the

252 medium and high level of exposure, respectively. There is a significant statistical difference between elites' exposure to mass media and their social resources of power. While 35 per cent with low possession of social resources have low mass media exposure and urban connection, the Table 6.2 Elites by Mass Media ExposureflfidUrban Connection and, by gocial Resources ( in percentages ) Mass media exposure and urban connection Social low resources high Total Low 35 12 24 Medium 57 66 61 High 8 22 15 1* (H) 100 (170) 100 (155) 100 (325) X 2 =32.20 df=2 p ^.001 $ =.56 percentage declines to 12 for those with high possession of social resources. On the contrary, while eight per cent with low possession of social resources have high exposure, the percentage rises to 22 for those with higher social resources of power. It shows the trend that the higher the social resources of elites the higher their mass media exposure and urban connection.

6 The above difference can be explained mainly by the fact that among others, the elites with more years of schooling are likely to have higher mass media exposure and urban connection than those of others. As already evidenced in Chapter 4 that, elites of the higher levels of operation have more years of schooling. Thus, the level of exposure to mass media and contact with urban centres are likely to be higher than their counterparts at the lower levels. This finding has confirmed the stand that, among other things, elites' possession of social resources directly contribute toward their higher exposure to mass media and more connection with urban areas. Mass media exposure and urban connection are valued resources which are not generally available for all segments of village population. Poorer sections have no easy access to mass media, or cannot always afford to visit urban localities. Moreover, the economically prosperous sections may have more business to do in urban centres than the poorer ones. Therefore, the extent of association between economic resources of rural elites and their exposure to mass media and urban connection should be examined. As in the preceding case, Table 6.3 shows that while about one-quarter of elites have low level of mass

254 media exposure and urban connection, only 15 per cent of them have high level of exposure. There is a difference between elites' possession of economic resources and the level of their mass media exposure and urban connection. Table 6.3 Slitfis by Hags Media Exposure and Urban Connection and by_.econq.mic Resources (in percentages) Mass Media exposure and urban connection Economic resources low medium high Total low 29 15 20 24 Medium 58 75 53 61 High 13 10 27 15 * 100 00 (185) (80) 100 100 100 (60) (325) X 2 = 16.00 df=4 P <(.01.24 While 29 per cent with low possession of economic resources have low level of exposure, the percentage declines to 20 for those with high economic resources. On the contrary, while 13 per cent with low possession of economic resources are found to have high level of exposure, the percentage rises to 27 for those with high possession of such resources of power. Though as in the preceding table, the association between the two variables has not been found very strong, yet it shows a trend that the

m higher the possession of economic resources of elites the greater the extent of their mass media exposure and urban connection. The difference between the two variables is primarily because of higher possession of social and economic resources of elites of the higher level of operation. As already indicated^the elites of the higher levels of operation have better social and economic positions than the lower level ones. As in other developing societies, Bangladesh politics is still urban based. Political organizations and their directives, by and large, flow from the urban localities to rural areas. Those who are more interested in politics have connection with urban centres, and normally are in touch with national dailies. During our field investigation, we noticed that a handful of our respondents who have political party affiliation regularly visit their party offices in the subdivisional town, mainly to meet their political colleagues and read newspapers. Some of them regularly visit particular restaurants of the town; they come all the way from their villages in the evening either to attend political gossip or to read newspapers retained by the restaurant managers. As in the earlier cases, Table 6.4 shows that while nearly one-quarter of the rural elites are found to have low level of mass media exposure and urban

SM connection, 61 and 15 per cents have medium and high levels of exposure, respectively. However, there is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' possession of political resources and their mass media exposure and urban connection. While 32 per cent with low political resources have low level of exposure, the percentage declines to only five for those with high Table 6.4 Elites by Mass Media Exposure and Urban Connection?iTn percentages? 8S Mass media exposure Political resources Total and urban connection low medium high low 32 22 5 24 Medium 59 69 62 61 High 9 9 33 15 fo 100 100 100 100 (N) (188) (59) (78) (325) political resources. X 2 =42.10 df=4 P.001 =.51 On the contrary, while only nine per cent with low political resources have high mass media exposure and urban connection, the percentage rises to 33 for those with high political resources of power. As in the case of social and economic resources of power, it also shows a perceptible trend that the higher the political

217 resources of elites the greater the extent of their mass media exposure and urban connection* Thus as in social and economic ones, the political resources of power of elites also contribute toward their higher mass media exposure and urban connection. Elites of the higher level of operation are likely to have more mass media exposure and urban connection because of their higher possession of political resources of power in local communities. Apart from examining the extent of mass media exposure and urban connection of elites in terms of their levels of operation and power resources, an attempt is also made to examine its association with their modernity orientation. Though the attainment of modernity and mass media exposure and urban connection are mutually influencing, yet for the present purpose, we examine the extent of the latter depending upon the level of modernity, simply because the modernity scale as constructed in this study is more than that of simply incorporating the variables of mass media exposure and urban connection. Table 6.5 shows that while nearly one-quarter of the rural elites are found to have low level of mass media exposure and urban connection 61 and 15 per cents have medium and high levels of exposure, respectively. There is a highly significant statistical difference between

218 elites' level of modernity orientations and their level of mass media exposure and urban connection. While 77 per cent with the lowest modernity orientation have low Table 6.5 Elites bv Mas acedia Exposure and Urban Connection (.in percentages ) Mass media exposure and urban connection - ' low Modernity* low- high medium medium high Total Low 77 36 10 4 24 Medium 23 57 77 48 61 High - 7 13 48 15 7 100 U; (39; (85) 100 U57; 100 100 100 U4) C325) * The columns are collapsed into two for applying the chi-square test. r2 X =74.04 d±=2 p^.001 75 level of mass media exposure and urban connection, the percentage declines to only four for those with the highest modernity orientation. On the contrary, while 48 per cent with the highest modernity orientation have high level of mass media exposure and urban connection, none is found in this group who has the lowest modernity orientation. This finding reveals a clear trend that as the modernity

12 orientation of the rural elites goes up their level of mass media exposure and urban connection also increases. As we have found in Chapter 5> the higher the levels of operation of the rural elites the higher their modernity orientation. The stronger association between elites' exposure and modernity orientation is also a function of this reality. It refers to the fact that the elites of the higher levels of operation not only have higher modernity orientation but also have high level of mass media exposure and urban connection than those of their counterparts at the lower level ones. So far we have examined elites' mass media exposure and urban connection in terms of their levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation. It would be also useful to examine to what extent these independent variables affect their mass media exposure and urban conne ction. Table 6.6 gives the result of partial correlation and stepwise regression analysis of elites' mass media exposure and urban connection on five independent variables. The table shows that more than 36 per cent variance in elites' mass media exposure is explained by the levels of operation, power resources ana modernity orientation, giving a multiple correlation coefficient.61. This

Stepwise Regression of Mass Media Exposure and Urban Connection of Rural Elites on Five Selected Independent Variables (with partial correlation Social resources.28 1 9.10 19.10.25.20 Modernity orientation.40 31.66 12.56 1.07.21 Political resources.11 34..82 3.16.11.07 level of Operation.40 35..49 0. 67 1.14 2.79* Economic resources -.06 36,.61 1. 12 -.06 -.05 Table 6.6 Variables Partial r R 2 R 2 Change Beta N. b Multiple R =.61 % variation explained Constant =4.08 = 36.61 * Significant at the.05 level

211 shows a high association among them. The stepwise regression analysis reveals that, in terms of the amount of variance explained, the variable of social resources emerges as the most important one, followed by the modernity orientation. The variable of political resources stands third in importance. But the standardized Beta coefficients for the levels of operation and modernity orientations are higher than those of the other three variables. However, the b coefficient for the levels of operation is significant at the.05 level. We find from the partial correlation also that the variables of levels of operation and modernity orientation are more important. Since education and organizational affiliation are the most important variables considered in the social resources of elites, it is more likely that those who score high on the social resources scale have also higher mass media exposure and urban connection. While the emerging rural elites can acquire the social and political resources of power, and attain modernity orientation, there is more likelihood of their mass media exposure and urban connection. This trend reveals an interesting picture in relation to rural development in Bangladesh. in summing up, this section shows to what extent the mass media exposure and urban connection of the rural

212 elites are associated with their levels of operation, power resources, and modernity orientation. There is a perceptible trend that as the levels of operation of elites rise their mass media exposure and urban connection also broaden. Similar trend is also discernible in case of their power resources and modernity orientation. however, elites' social resources of power, followed by the modernity orientation emerges as the most important variable leading to their higher mass media exposure and urban connection. while the variable of political resources of elites stands third in importance, the economic one has the last impact on their mass media exposure and urban connection. Gaat&st witk-sxtension Agents and Government Ofiicials Traditionally the average villagers in Bangladesh do not have many contacts with extension agents and government officials. In the past, they generally perceived them as tax collectors, law and order enforcing authority, and sometimes as oppressors when the latter forced them to cultivate or not to cultivate a particular crop in their own lands. Even as of today, the common people are afraid not only of the government officials but also the village "chowkidars" with "khaki" dress, who are employed by the local self-government authority and mostly paid from the

283 direct tax of the rural population. Most villagers do not dare to talk with the officials, at best they go upto the corridor of the government offices and take middlemen to make contacts with them. Even for loan repayment they ask somebody to accompany them to the banks. However, with the extension of government services down to the interior villages, and particularly after the national independence these situations appear to have improved. New extension and development programmes as entrusted with different nation-building departments at the village levels call for more and more participation of the local people. In view of these circumstances, it is the rural elites who first come forward to cooperate with the change agents and officials. The latter groups also find it safer to cooperate with them. A change agent or official visiting the rural areas usually seeks cooperation of the village leaders, he takes rest in their house and sometimes dines with them. As for average villagers, this situation has not much broadened; they still approach officials through the village leaders. The contact and cooperation between ^jad" the rural elites and the officials are crucial factors in the interest of development of village communities. Therefore, it would be rewarding to find the factors affecting the contacts of the rural elites with the extension agents and government officials.

294 Table 6.7 shows the association between elites' levels of operation and. their degree of contact with extension agents and officials. While 22 per cent have low level of contact, the percentages for medium and high Table 6.7 Elites bv Contact with Extension Agents and Government Officials and by Levels of Operation (in percentages) Contacts with Level Total officials village Union Thana Low 27 18 10 22 Medium 57 48 39 52 High 16 34 51 26 - % 100 100 100 100 (N) (172) (114) (39) (325) X 2 =27.44 df =4 p <.001 $ =.40 level ones are 52 and 26, respectively. However, there is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' levels of operation and their level of contact with the officials. While 27 per cent of the village level elites have low level of contact, the percentage declines to ten for those of the thana level ones. On the contrary, while 16 per cent of the village level elites have high level of contact, the percentage rises to 51 for those of

18 the thana level elites. This shows a clear trend that the higher the levels of operation of elites the greater their degree of contacts with extension agents and officials. The finding may be explained in regard to variations of elites' power resources and modernity orientation. Apart from these, the most important factors remain is that of elites' different levels of operation. Most of the nation-building agencies in Bangladesh are expanded at the thana level, the extension agents and the officials normally execute programmes from these offices. Thus, it is more likely that the union and mostly the thana level elites can maintain direct contacts with, them than t^hose of the village level ones. The extension agents and officials also know the higher level elites better than those of the lower level ones. Some of the extension agents and development officers are also supposed to attend regularly the union parishad meetings, which provides both the officials and the nonofficials a forum for easy contacts. Village level elites can hardly avail this chance, first they approach to their counterparts either at the union or thana level to get things done by the officials. This also further facilitates the higher level elites to have better contacts with the government functionaries. Data in the following tables indicate how

2ft elites 1 power resources and modernity orientation Table 6.8 Elites by Contact with Extension Agents and government Officials and by Social Resources tin percentages) Contact with officials Social low resources high Total low 32 11 22 Medium 50 53 52 High 18 36 26 "/a U) 100 (170) (155) 100 100 (325) X 2 =65.44 df=2 p^.001 = contribute toward establishing varying degrees of contacts with the extension agents and officials. Table 6.8 portrays the association between elites' social resources and the degree of contact with officials. As shown in the preceding table, while 22 per cent report to have low level of contact with officials, 26 per cent have high level of contact with them. There is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' social resources of power and their degree of contact with officials. While 32 per cent with low social resources have low degree of contact the percentage declines to 11 for those

2S7 with high social resources. Un the contrary, while 18 per cent with low social resources are found to have high degree of contact, the percentage rises to 36 for those with high social resources of power, ihis shows a clear trend that as the social resources of power of the rural elites go up their degree of contact with the officials also broadens. Association between elites' social resources and contact with ofxicials is clearly discernible chiefly because of their varying degrees of organizational affiliation and attainment of education, which are also the components of their social resources. More organizational affiliation create more facilities for them to come into contact with officials, because the latter too have greater stake with rural organizations, namely local government, cooperatives and so on. Education plays the most important role to this context. An educated elite strives not only to have unhesitating contacts with officials, but also knows better when, how and what to contact with them. Moreover, the possession of higher social resources itself creates among the elites a conducive psychological atmosphere in which they are more confident in contacting the officials than those having lower social resources of power in the rural communities. It is rather difficult for an illiterate to make effective contact with an

218 educated stranger for simple reasons of his inferiority complex and lack of confidence. Table 6.9 Elites bv Contact with Extension Agents and Government Officials and bv Economic Resources (in percentages) Contact with officials low medium high Total low 28 15 11 22 Medium 48 60 52 52 High 24 25 37 26 i 100 100 Or) (1 85) (80) (60) 100 100 (325) X 2 = 12.34 df=4 p <^.05 ^ =.25 We have examined also the association between elites' economic resources and their level of contact with extension agents and officials. An analysis of data in Table 6.9 reveals that while more than half the elites respond to have medium level of contact, the percentages for low and high level contact groups are 22 and 26, respectively. However, the finding shows a difference. While 28 per cent of elites with low economic resources are found to have low contact with officials, the percentage lowers down to only 11 for those with high economic resources of power. On the

Iff contrary, while 24 per cent with low economic resources are found to have high contact with officials, the percentage rises to 37 for those with high economic resources of power. This apparently shows a trend that the higher the economic resources of elites the higher is their contact with officials. But compared with the variable of d> social resources, the gamm^ coefficient portrays a weaker association between elites 1 economic resources and their contact with officials. Though the present finding depicts the picture that an overwhelming majority of the rural elites with higher economic resources of power have better degree of contact with officials but this difference may not be solely due to their better economic resources rather due to their higher possession of social and political resources. A rural elite may be economically rich but not necessarily an educated man or a politically conscious citizen. Education and political consciousness are more conducive toward establishing his contacts with the extension agents and officials than mere his better economic position in community. As in the foregoing two analyses, we have examined also the association between elites' political resources of power and their contacts with officials. Unlike their

2?# economic resources, in this case also we notice that more than half the elites have medium level of contact with officials, whereas 22 and 26 per cents have respectivelylow and high level of contacts with them. However, there Table 6.10 Contact with Extension Agents and Government Officials and by Political Resources (in percentages) Contact officials Political resources low medium high Total Low 29 14 10 22 Medium 54 61 40 52 High 17 25 50 26 % (N) 100 (188) 100 (59) 100 (78) 100 (325) X =37.36 df =4 p^.001 2?=. 47 is a difference between elites' political resources of power and their contacts with officials. While 29 per cent with low political resources are found to have low contact with officials, the percentage lowers down to ten for those with high political resources of power. On the contrary, while 17 per cent with low political resources are found to have high contact with officials, the percentage rises to 50 for those with high political resources

271 of power. This shows a perceptible trend that the higher the political resources of the rural elites the greater their degree of contact with officials. Association between elites' political resources of power and their degree of contact with officials maybe explained by the fact that the politically active citizens are more aware of their local and regional problems as well as the government programmes and functionaries available to meet them. Their more interaction with officials over issues of rural development programmes is considered as part of their political activities in rural areas. Also, they can speak the modern political idioms and possess the necessary political skillst The so called "political interference" in the realms of governmental activities is well known in all developing societies During our field investigation, we experienced such an interference by a handful of aggressive young people. Most of them belonged to the then ruling-bangladesh Nationalist Party and now dissolved youth complex. In a thana council meeting they were forcing and at times shouting at the circle officer demanding the total hand over of all the bags of wheat to them, which was basically sanctioned as rainy season relief for distribution among the poor families. However, all such official contacts by the political elites cannot be called as political interference

272 More often than not these are legitimate for the greater interest of public welfare. The rural political elites feel themselves obliged to maintain better contact with officials which gives them not only political legitimacy in their communities, but also by doing so they affirm their greater credibility to their respective political parties. One way this contact with official is highly desirable but at times it becomes painful when it takes the shape of serious political interference. In the disguise of such contacts, sometimes the rural politicians indulge themselves in unholy collusion with officials, which altogether defeat the basic purpose of their contacts with them. Table 6.11 Elites by Contact with Extension Agents and Government Qjff j oiaj-fil and... by Mp d ernity_ori ent at ion (in percentages) Contact with Modernitv* officials low low-medium high-medium high Total low 69 26 13 2 22 Medium 31 65 54 39 52 High 9 33 59 26 100 100 100 100 100 (*) (39) (85) (157) (44) (325) * The columns are collapsed into two for applying the chi-square test. X 2 =59.21 df=2 p^.001 $=.70

273 So far we have examined the association between elites' social, economic and political resources and their degree of contacts with officials. It is also our purpose to analyse the association between their level of modernity and the degree of contacts with officials. Table 6.11 reveals that while 26 per cent of elites have high level of contacts with officials, 52 and 22 per cents of them are found to have medium and low levels of contact respectively. However, there is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' modernity orientation and the degree of contact with officials. While 69 per cent with the lowest modernity orientation have low contact, the percentage declines to only two for those with the highest modernity orientation. On the contrary, while 59 per cent with the highest modernity orientation have high level of contact, none is found in this group who has the lowest modernity orientation. This reveals the trend that the higher the modernity orientation of elites''the more intense their degree of contacts with officials. As found in Chapter 5, compared with the lower level ones, elites of the higher level of operation have more modernity orientation, and as elsewhere in this section we noticed that those of the higher level ones have more contacts with officials than their counterparts in the

274 lower levels. In fact, because of this reality we also find a sharp difference and association between their level of modernity and corresponding degree of contacts with officials. A man who believes in scientific ways of dealing with things and has positive attitude toward efficacy of modern systems will naturally take advantage of the facilities available within his reach; governmental functionaries both in the rural and urban areas are such facilities from which he can derive benefits by his contacts and direct participation. So far we have independently examined elites' extent of contacts with the extension agents and government officials in terms of their levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientations. It would be worthwhile to focus to what extent these independent variables affect their contacts with extension agents and officials. Table 6.12 gives the result of partial correlation and stepwise regression analysis of elites' contact with extension agents and officials on five independent variables. The table shows that more than 30 per cent variance in elites' contact with extension agents and officials is explained by the levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation, giving a multiple correlation coefficient.55. This shows a fairly high association

Stepwise Regression of Elites' Contact with Extension Agents and Officials, on Five Selected Independent Variables (with partial correlation. Variables Partial r R 2 2 R Change Beta b Social resources.29 21,.45 21,.45.28.15 Modernity orientation.24 25..95 4,.50.64.09 Political resources.15 29..01 3..06.14.06 level of operation.27 30,.25 1.24,.75 1.23 Economic resources -.03 30,.31 *.06 -.03 -.02 Js3 Table 6.12 Multiple R =.55 variation explained = 30.31 Constant =2.94

29 among them. The stepwise regression analysis reveals that, in terms of the amount of variance explained, the variable of social resources emerges as the most important one. This is followed by the variables of modernity orientation and political resources. But the Beta coefficients for the levels of operation and modernity orientation are higher than those of the other three variables. Also, we find from the partial correlation that the variable of social resources is more important, followed by the levels of operation and modernity orientation. Within social resources of power education and organizational affiliation of the rural elites are considered as important variables. Thus, those who score high on the social resources scale are more likely to have greater extent of contacts with extension agents and officials. Therefore, while the emerging rural elites can acquire the social and political resources of power, and attain modernity orientation, there is more likelihood of their contacts with extension agents and officials. This trend reveals an optimistic picture in relation to development in rural Bangladesh. In summing up, this section has analysed elites' extent of official contacts in terms of their levels of

277 operation, power resources and modernity orientation. It is interesting to note that the higher the possession of elites' social and political resources of power and modernity orientation the greater their extent of contacts with extension agents and officials. It indicates a shift in the importance of resources; the economic one does not seem to play any dominant role. Modernity oriented social and political elites have higher official contacts than those of the economic ones. As already noticed that the economic elites have been mainly drawn from the landed gentry which is more a traditional resource of power in rural communities. Linkage with Local Notables and Political Leaders Politics of rural development is always a group effort. Rural elites desirous to participate in development activities have to maintain linkage with other local notables and political leaders. While getting elected to a local office one maintains linkage with other elites. The higher level political functionaries sometimes have greater reliance on the local elites to gain support from the grassroot level, though the reverse phenomenon has yet to take firm roots in Bangladesh politics. To the extent that the rural elites maintain linkage with the local notables and political leaders, they are successful in local affairs. In the event of local crisis, an elite

278 extends his support to other colleagues as integral part of such linkage. structure exists in this reality. The very concept of power The linkage structure is an important power resource for a modern elite depending upon his capacity as to what extent he can manipulate the same. In order to examine this linkage structure, we have constructed a scale by considering four items, whether the elites have linkage with: (1) people holding positions in local self-government bodies; cooperative societies, or in gram sarkar organizations either at village or union levels; (2) those holding positions with such bodies as in above at thana level; (j) political leaders at thana level; and (4) political leaders at district or national level. We have recorded their responses to each item in one of the three possible ways as high, medium and low. Then by adopting an appropriate scoring technique we have devised a three-point scale in the high, medium and low continuum. Table 6.13 shows an association between elites of the different levels of operation and their linkage with local notables and political leaders. It reveals that while only 19 per cent have high linkage, the percentages are 54 and 27 for those of, the medium and low linkage groups, respectively. There is a significant statistical

32 difference between the levels of elites and their linkage with notables. While 31 per cent of the village level elites have low linkage with notables, the percentage Table 6.13 Elites by linkage with Local Notables and Political Leaders and bv Levels of Operation (in percentages) Linkage with Level Total notables Village Union Thana Low 31 23 15 27 Medium 55 58 41 54 High 14 19 44 1.9 % 100 100 100 100 (H) (172) (114) (39) (325) X 2 = 19.91 df =4 P ^.001 ^=.30 decreases to 15 for those of the thana level ones. On the contrary, while 14 per cent of the village level elites are found to have high level of linkage, the percentage rises to 44 for those of the thana level ones. This shows a clear trend that the higher the levels of operation of the rural elites the higher the extent of their linkage with the local notables and political leaders. Elites' levels of operation as such can determine their varying degree of linkage with the local notables

2SI and political leaders. As indicated in Chapter 4, most positions in the higher levels are filled-in bydirect election and are highly competitive in nature compared with the lower level ones. The whole process of election and competition provide them additional facilities toward maintaining both vertical and horizontal linkages with local notables and political leaders. view of this fact, compared with the lower level ones, it is more likely that the higher level elites can establish better linkage not only with their colleagues at the horizontal level but also with the lower level ones. Apart from this, the difference between the two variables may be because of differences in their power resources and levels of modernity orientation. them in the following pages. In We examine Table 6.14 Elites bv Linkage with local Notables and Political leaders and_social RggourciLS (in percentages) Linkage with Social resources* notables low lowmedium highmedium high Total Low 65 31 14 17 27 Medium 35 56 62 26 54 High - 13 24 57 19 % 100 100 100 100 100 (N) (34) (136) (132) (23) (325) *The columns are collapsed into two for applying the chi-square test. X 2 =31.46 df=2 p</.001 =-52

281 Table 6.14 shows an association between elites' social resources of power and their level of linkage with local notables and political leaders. As we noticed in the preceding table, while 27 per cent have low level of linkage with the notables, the percentages are 54 and 19 for those who have medium and high levels of linkage, respectively. There is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' social resources and their level of linkage. While 65 per cent of the rural elites with the lowest social resources have low level of linkage, the percentage lowers down to 17 for those with the highest social resources of power. On the contrary, while 57 per cent with the highest social resources are found to have high level of linkage, none with the lowest social resources reports to have high linkage with notables. This shows a perceptible trend that the higher the social resources of elites the greater the extent of their linkage with local notables and political leaders. The difference and a closer association between the above two variables can be explained by the fact that the better education and higher organizational strength of elites are instrumental for them to maintain closer linkage with notables. Family lineage may be one more factor leading to their linkage with them; elites from the influential families with large lineage may have more

282 linkage with the notables simply because of their traditional reputation, and their capabilities of capturing village traditional organizations, namely, samaj, shalish. and madrasha and mas L iid committees, and so on. itahman i. 1981J reports, "most of the leaders tend to marry the daughters of rural influentials" (p.31) 'fable 6.15 Elites by Linkage with local Notables and Political_Leaders and_by_.economic Resources (in percentages) Linkages with notables Economic resources low Medium high Total Low 32 19 20 27- Medium 55 60 43 54 High 13 21 37 19 100 100 100 100 Uj (185) (80) (60) (325) X 2 =19.95 df =4 p ^.001 $=.32 As in the foregoing analysis, we have also examined the association between elites' economic resources of power and their degree of linkage with the local notables ana political leaders. Also, as we noticed in the preceding two tables, while 27 per cent of elites are found to have low level of linkage, only 19 per cent have high

283 level of linkage with notables. However, Table 6.15 shows a significant statistical difference between elites' economic resources and their degree of linkage. While 32 per cent with low economic resources have low degree of linkage, the percentage declines to 20 for those with high economic resources. This reveals a trend that the higher the possession of economic resources of elites the higher the level of their linkage with the local notables and political leaders. The difference between the two variables may not be so wide simply because of their possession of economic resources but because of high concentration of economically rich elites in the higher levels of their operation, whose social and political resources are also equally higher. The mild association between their economic resources and linkage confirms this stand. In this context, it would be also worthwhile to examine the association between elites' political resources and the linkage with local notables and political leaders. Table 6.16 shows that while 27 per cent have low linkage with the notables, the percentages are 54 and 19 for those who have respectively medium and high political resources. However, there is a significant statistical difference between elites' political resources and

284 the degree of linkage with the local notables and political leaders. While 36 per cent of elites with low political resources are found to have low linkage Table 6.16 Elites bv linkage with the Local Notables and Political leaders and bv Political Resources (in percentages) linkage with notables Political resources low Medium high Total Low 36 14 13 27 Medium 54 71 41 54 High 10 15 46 19, 100 100 100 100 (N.) (188) (59) (78) (325) =60.22 df=4.001 =.55 with notables, the percentage declines to 13 for those with high political resources. On the contrary, while ten per cent with low political resources have high linkage rises to 46 for those with high political re- A sources. This shows the clear trend that the higher the possession of political resources of the rural elites the higher the level of their linkage with the local notables and political leaders.

285 It is not far to seek the reason for the difference and closer association between the two variables. The fundamental resource of the political elites is link-politics; without the support and cooperation of other elites a political elite cannot entrench his position to an active polity. A rural political elite has two linkage functions: on the one hand, he maintains links with other rural elites for deriving support for his own political position, and on the other, he is in constant touch with the higher-ups to receive political directives and translate them into practice in the countryside. Thus he has also to serve as two-way traffic to receive and transmit communication between the rural influentials and the political leaders o± the higher levels. As far linkage structure is concerned, the political elites, for all these reasons, are more likely to be active than the social and economic ones. Our data have affirmed this proposition. As in power resources of the rural elites, it would be useful to examine the association between their attainment of modernity and the level of their linkage with local notables and political leaders. It is highly expected that those who score high in the modernity scale would also have wide linkage structure with other elites.

2M As in the foregoing, Table 6.17 shows that while 27 per cent have low level of linkage, 54 and 19 per cents have respectively medium and high level of linkage with the notables. However, there is a highly significant statistical difference between elites' modernity orienta tion and their level of linkage with the local notables Table 6.17 Elites bv Linkage with local Notables and Political Leaders am_by_. M Qdernity Orientation ( in percentages) Linkage with Modernity* notables low lowmedium highmedium high - Low 67 34 17 11 27 Medium 33 55 65 32 54 High - 11 18 57 19 % (N) 100 (39) 100 (85) 100 (157) 100 (44) 100 (325) * The columns are collapsed into two for applying chi-square test. X 2 = 40.70 df=2 p ^.001 <?=.60 and political leaders. While 67 per cent with the lowest modernity orientation have low level of linkage, the percentage decreases to only 11 for those with the highest

287 level of modernity orientation. This shows a perceptible trend that the higher the modernity orientation of elites the higher the level of their linkage with the local notables and political leaders. The association between the two variables confirms that the elites 1 individual modernity orientation has direct impact on their degree of interaction with other elites. To the extent that an elite is modern, his linkage with others is also broader. The sharp difference and a close association between the variables are also due to the fact that the social, political and to some extent the economic resources of the rural elites, and their modernity orientation go together, especially for those of the higher levels of operation. So far this section has discussed elites' extent of linkage with local notables and political leaders in terms of their levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation. It would be useful to examine to what extent these independent variables affect their linkage with the notables. Table 6.18 gives the result of partial correlation and stepwise regression analysis of elites' linkage with the local notables and political leaders on five independent variables. The table shows that more than 33 per cent variance

Stepwise Regression of Elites' linkage with local Notables and Political L <?aders Selected independen _Variables (with partial correlation) Social resources.22 23.38 23.38.25.13 Political resources.22 28.75 5.37.21.09 Modernity orientation.22 32.28 3.53.56.07 Economic resources.06 32.96 0.68.07.04 Level of operation.23 33-20 0.24.61.98 cm <x> Table 6.18 Variables Partial r R 2 2 R Change Beta b Multiple R =.33 variation explained = 33.20 Constant =2.61.

42 in elites' linkage with local notables and political leaders is explained by the levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation, giving a multiple correlation coefficient.33* This, of course, shows a weak association among them. The stepwise regression analysis reveals that, in terms of the amount of variance explained, the variables of social resources emerges as the most important one. This is followed by the variables of political resources and modernity orientation. But the standardized Beta coefficients for the levels of operation and modernity orientation are higher than those of the other three variables. Also, we find from the partial correlation that except economic resources, the other four variables are equally important affecting elites'extent of linkage with local notables and political leaders. Within social resources of power education and organizational affiliation of the rural elites are considered as important variables. Thus, those who score high on the social resources scale are more likely to maintain higher linkage with the notables. Therefore, while the emerging rural elites can acquire the social and political resources of power, and attain modernity orientation, there is more likelihood of their linkage

290 with local notables and political leaders. This trend is interesting in context of rural development in Bangladesh. In summing up, this section has examined elites' extent of linkage with local notables and political leaders in terms of their levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation. As in the preceding two findings, it is also satisfying to note that the higher the possession of elites' social and political resources of power and modernity orientation the greater their extent of linkage with local notables and political leaders. It also indicates a shift in the importance of resources; the economic one does not appear to jplay any dominant role. Modernity oriented social and political elites have higher linkage with the local notables and political leaders. Summary This chapter has dealt with three intersystemic participation variables of the rural elites, namely, the mass media exposure and urban connection, contact with extension agents and government officials, and linkage with local notables and political leaders. They are examined with respect to elites' levels of operation, power resources and modernity orientation. The findings are revealing.

211 Of all the rural elites about three-quarters have at least medium level of participation through these intersystemic process. However, there are significant differences between elites' levels of operation and each of these variables. It conclusively suggests that the higher the levels of operation of elites the wider their dimension of participation through these processes, albeit in each case the association does not seem to be significantly high. One more trend emerges from the finding is that the higher the power resources of elites the broader their scope of participation in them. Compared with their social and political ones, the economic resources appear to have portrayed a lower level of association with all these variables. As regards individual modernity, the study shows a perceptible trend that the higher the sociopsychological modernity the greater the scope of their participation through these intersystemic processes. However, if we compare the strength of associations between each of these variables and the social, economic and political resources of elites, and also that of their level of modernity orientation, the latter associations are found much more higher than the former. As is indicated in Chapter 5» the social and political elites are more modern than the economic ones.

292 Here also we have noticed, compared with economic elites, the social and political ones have higher level of mass media exposure, official contact and linkage with other elites. Other than the social and political resources of power, it is also more of elites' modernity orientation which contributes significantly toward their participation in them. Therefore, the modernity oriented social and political elites seem to have highly participated through these intersystemic processes. However, the process of development and democratization bring the rural communities into closer participation in the social and political lives. The participation of the rural elites through the intersystemic processes could affect their attitudes, behaviour and action. Jetley (1977) has found that such intersystemic variables are significantly correlated with innovativeness of the villagers. Therefore, those of the rural elites with higher levels of mass media exposure and urban connection, contact with extension agents and officials, and linkage with local notables and political leaders are likely to be more development oriented than others.

21$ REFERENCES Coughenow, C. Milton 1964 Dasgupta, Satadal 1965 Freedman, Ronald, John I, Taklshita, and T.H. Sun. 1964 Frey, Frederick. 1969 Jetley, Surinder. 1977 Polgar, Steven, Howard Dumphy, and Bruce Cox. 1963 Rahman, Atiur 1981 "The rate of technological diffusion among locality groups', 1 Ameripan Journal of Sociology 69: 325-39 "Communication and innovation in Indian villages 1,' Social Forces 43 : 330-37. "Fertility and family planning in Taiwan: A case study of the demographic transaction 1,' American Journal of Sociology 70:16-27. "Socialization to national identification among Turkish peasants',' Journal pf Politics 30 : 934-65. Modernizing Indian Peasants 1 A Study of Six Villages in Eastern Uttar Pradesh New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. "Diffusion and farming advice: A test of some current notions',' Social Forces 42: 104-11. Rural Power Structure: A Study of local level leaders in Bangladesh" Dacca : Bangladesh Books International.