HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ISLE OF MAN CHANCERY DIVISION BAINES, petition of 14 May 2009 His Honour Deemster Kerruish Introduction [1] By Petition of Doleance, John Trevor Roche Baines seeks that a certificate issued by Her Majesty's Attorney General of the Isle of Man on 15 th February 2008 (the Certificate) under section 2(5) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 (the 1993 Act) is quashed or in the alternative an order requiring the Attorney General to reconsider the issue and maintenance of the Certificate in the light of all material considerations including the consequence of a judgment of His Honour Deemster Doyle of 24 th November 2008 in criminal proceedings brought by the Attorney General against Mr. Baines and Wendy Nicolau De Almeida Baines (Mrs. Baines) [CRIM 2008/09] which proceedings are continuing before the Court of General Gaol Delivery. [2] By his Petition, Mr. Baines claims that the Attorney General's decision to issue the Certificate was ultra vires and/or took into account fundamentally irrelevant considerations because it relied substantially upon evidence which proved to be inadmissible in the criminal proceedings brought against Mr. Baines and Mrs. Baines, and/or that, following Deemster Doyle's ruling of 11 th November 2008, the Attorney General's refusal to reconsider the issue of the Certificate was perverse, took into account fundamentally immaterial considerations, failed to take into account highly material considerations, was inadequately reasoned, and demonstrated that the Attorney General approached the exercise of his powers with a closed mind. [3] The Petition was brought with notice to the Attorney General. Representation [4] Mr. William Clegg QC, Mr. James Ramsden and Miss J Holt appeared for Mr. Baines. Mr. David Farrer QC and Mrs. L Bermingham appeared for the Attorney General. Brief Statement of Background facts [5] The information in the criminal proceedings contains two counts: the first which is profferedagainst Mr. Baines is a charge of money laundering contrary to section 17A(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1990; the second count which is proffered against Mr. Baines and Mrs. Baines equally is a charge of false accounting contrary to section 19(1) of the Theft Act 1981. [6] The first count charges that Mr. Baines from about 1 st June 2001 to about 3 rd October 2001 in the Isle of Man and elsewhere knowing or suspecting that Roys Spyros Poyaidjis was and had been engaged in criminal conduct was concerned with others in an arrangement whereby the retention and control by or on behalf of Mr. Poyaidjis of the proceeds of his criminal conduct was facilitated by the deposit of approximately US$195,000,000 into accounts with banks in the Isle of Man, by transfers from such accounts to another bank in the Isle of Man and by other withdrawals from such accounts.
[7] The second count charges that Mr. and Mrs. Baines on or about 31 st May 2001 dishonestly with a view to gain for themselves and with intent to cause loss to another falsified a document required for an accounting purpose namely an invoice from Mainstreet Limited to Quantum Group Management Limited in the sum of US$920,000. [8] In essence, the counts relate to the affairs of Mr. Poyaidjis who is alleged to have engaged in criminal conduct as an officer of AremisSoft Corporation, a company incorporated in Delaware in the United States of America. On the charge of money laundering, Mr. Baines is said to have knowingly facilitated the retention and control by Mr. Poyaidjis of the proceeds of criminal conduct by depositing substantial sums of money in bank accounts on the Isle of Man and transferring and withdrawing money from those accounts. On the charge of false accounting, Mr. and Mrs. Baines are alleged to have dishonestly with a view to gain for themselves and causing loss to another falsified an invoice for payment of US$900,000 between two companies as part of an arrangement to pay third parties in connection with false statements about the value of a contract between AremisSoft and the Bulgarian Ministry of Health. [9] Mr. and Mrs. Baines strenuously deny the allegations made against them. [10] The information was laid against Mr. and Mrs. Baines on 19 th February 2008 following the issuing of the Certificate which read:- " IN PURSUANCE OF the powers vested in me under Section 2(3)(c) and 2(5) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 and having considered the evidence in respect of the offences charged against the Defendants and contained in the Information hereto annexed and being of the opinion that such evidence would be sufficient for the above named Defendants to be committed for trial and further being of the opinion that the [evidence] reveals cases of such seriousness or complexity that their management should without delay be taken over by the Court of General Gaol Delivery I HEREBY CERTIFY pursuant to Section 2(5) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993 that it is appropriate that such Information relating to the prosecution of the above Defendants for the offences set out therein be proferred by me as Attorney General of my own motion pursuant to Section 2(3)(c) of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1993." [11] In his affidavit of 16 th February 2009 in support of his Answer, the Attorney General stated that the power to institute proceedings by use of a certificate under section 2(3)(c) and (5) of the 1993 Act had been exercised on only two occasions and it is far from a routine procedure. [12] The evidence which the Attorney General certified was sufficient for Mr. and Mrs. Baines to be committed to trial included the evidence of a deposition (the Deposition) by Mr. Baines and an affidavit sworn on 30 th May 2007 by Mrs. Baines. [13] The Deposition is a transcription of an interview of Mr. Baines on 25 th and 26 th May 2005 conducted by United States attorneys instructed by the liquidators of AremisSoft in accordance with an agreement of 18 th January 2005 settling Civil proceedings in this jurisdiction which, after the collapse of the share price of AremisSoft on the New York Stock Exchange had been brought by the liquidators of AremisSoft against several defendants, including Mr. Baines. The latter had no knowledge at the time he made the Deposition that he was under criminal investigation or that the contents of the interview would be used against him in criminal proceedings.
[14] Mrs. Baines also had no knowledge when she made her affidavit that she was under criminal investigation, and that the evidence she gave without any caution might be used against her in criminal proceedings. She had sworn her affidavit in support of an application to strike out a civil claim issued in the Isle of Man by the liquidators of AremisSoft against Mr. Baines and others in December 2005, which civil proceedings were subsequently settled. [15] On 14 th August 2008 Mr. and Mrs. Baines applied to the Court of General Gaol Delivery to rule on the admissibility of the Deposition and Mrs. Baines' affidavit and to dismiss or stay the information on the basis that there was no admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict. [16] On 11 th November 2008 Deemster Doyle, sitting in the Court of General Gaol Delivery, ruled that both the Deposition and Mrs. Baines' affidavit were inadmissible against Mr. and Mrs. Baines. He gave his reasons in his reserve judgment of 24 th November 2008. As to the Deposition I refer to paragraphs 107 to 109, and 111 of such judgment and to paragraph 116 relevant to the affidavit: "107. I reached the conclusion having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained that the admission of the Deposition would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 108. In arriving at my decision to exclude the Deposition I took into account all the circumstances including the fact that the Deposition was taken in a context other than the context of a criminal investigation and criminal proceedings where Mr Baines would have had certain safeguards to his rights including the right of silence and the privilege against self incrimination. The Deposition was obtained in the context of a settlement of civil legal proceedings. A requirement of the Settlement Agreement was that Mr Baines provide information and answer questions at interview. I accept Mr Baines was a party to the Settlement Agreement and no doubt entered into it to protect his civil rights. His answers to the questions at interview cannot in reality however be regarded as the unfettered exercise of his own will. If Mr Baines had not agreed to give answers at interview the Settlement Agreement may not have been executed and Mr Baines would have faced continuing civil legal proceedings. If Mr Baines had prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement been informed that his answers would be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution against him it may well be that Mr Baines would not have entered into the Settlement Agreement or if he had he would have insisted that his right of silence and the privilege against self incrimination be respected. Mr Baines was not cautioned prior to the questions being put to him. When he was cautioned prior to the police conducting interviews in the criminal investigation he elected, as is his right, to remain silent and to provide no comment. 109. In effect to permit the prosecution to rely on the Deposition and admit the Deposition into evidence in these criminal proceedings would be to deprive Mr Baines of his fundamental right of silence and his privilege against self incrimination which would have been available to him in the context of a criminal investigation and criminal proceedings but which were not available to him in the context of the Settlement Agreement and civil proceedings.
111. Put simply it would be unfair in the circumstances of this case to allow the prosecution to admit into evidence the Deposition in these criminal proceedings against Mr Baines. 116. Put simply it would have been unfair in the circumstances of this case to allow the prosecution to admit into evidence the Affidavit in these criminal proceedings against Mrs Baines." [17] In the same judgment, Deemster Doyle dismissed the application by Mr. and Mrs. Baines for the court to dismiss or stay the information on the basis that the Court of General Gaol Delivery did not have jurisdiction to do so before the prosecution case was closed. [18] The Attorney General conceded in argument before Deemster Doyle that the wording in section 2(5) of the 1993 Act, that is "and a certificate under this subsection shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court", does not confer upon the Attorney General's certificate an absolute immunity from judicial scrutiny. However, the Attorney General considered that such words place significant limits upon the court's power to examine the merits of the decision to certify. [19] In the immediate aftermath of Deemster Doyle's ruling on 11 th November 2008, Mr. and Mrs. Baines requested the Attorney General to reconsider his issuing of the Certificate and thus whether to maintain the criminal proceedings against them on the basis of it. [20] The following morning less than 24 hours from the making of such request, the Attorney General, through Mrs. Bermingham, responded thus:- " H.M. Attorney General v John Trevor Roche Baines & Wendy Nicolau De Almeida Baines Following the ruling of Deemster Doyle that the Deposition of Mr Baines should not be admitted in evidence, his leading counsel Mr William Clegg Q.C. invited Mr David Farrer Q.C. representing the Attorney General to ask the Attorney General to review his certificate under section 2(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, on the ground that it had been issued on the basis of evidence, one element of which was inadmissible. H.M. Attorney General will not reconsider the issue of his Certificate for the reasons given below. The significant matter as to which the Deposition would have provided additional evidence is the question of Mr Baines' involvement in the creation of the false invoice which forms the subject matter of count 2 and which is evidence as to his knowledge or suspicion for the purposes of count 1. However, when certifying, H.M. Attorney General was alive to the possibility that the evidence would be excluded but took account of other evidence tending to show that Mr Baines was so involved, that is to say: That the request to create the invoice came from his fellow trustee, Roger Meyer; That Mr Baines was a director of Mainstreet Ltd;
That a fee of US$20,000 was paid by Roys Poyaidjis for the false invoice; That such fee was deposited in the bank of Mr Baines' principal business vehicle, Baines International Limited, a fact of which he was unlikely to be unaware; That, given the evidence as to the roles of the two Defendants in the conduct of Poyaidjis' affairs and the Atlas and Trident Trusts, a jury is fully entitled to infer that Mrs Baines did not act without consulting her husband; That it is further entitled to infer that she would not so act when asked to create a blatantly false document, to make bank transfers which were evidently designed to conceal the source of payment of [US$]900,000 to Sisco and to do so for a substantial reward; That this business was clearly linked to Poyaidjis, given the involvement of Meyer and the source of the payment to Mainstreet Limited. Mr Baines was "his" trustee; That, when interviewed, Mr Baines did not choose to answer any questions hence to deny involvement with the creation of the invoice, as he could easily have done. Quite apart from this additional evidence, H.M. Attorney General did not act irrationally, unreasonably or in any way improperly in relying on the Deposition. Indeed, neither Defendant has suggested that he did. Accordingly, there will be no review of the Certificate, even if such a course were open to H.M. Attorney General." Arguments [21] Mr. Clegg submitted that the Attorney General had acted ultra vires in issuing the Certificate and thus this court ought to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the decision to issue the Certificate. He supported such submission by arguing that the reference to 'evidence' in section 2(5) of the 1993 Act must mean admissible evidence and that it would be absurd for such statutory provision to call upon the Attorney General to form an opinion as to the sufficiency of inadmissible evidence as a basis for committal to trial. Evidence inadmissible in a trial could never be a basis for committal to trial. The evidence which the Attorney General purported to certify would be sufficient for Mr. and Mrs. Baines to be committed for trial included the Deposition and Mrs. Baines' affidavit which could not lawfully be adduced as evidence. Deemster Doyle ruled that the Deposition was inadmissible in the criminal proceedings and thus such evidence was always inadmissible. Mr. Clegg contended that the Deposition was the only direct evidence which indicated that Mr. Baines was aware of any aspect of the Mainstreet transaction at the material time and that he participated in the creation of the alleged false invoice upon which count two of the information is based. [22] Mr. Farrer responded to such arguments that Mr. Baines' complaint that when making his decision to issue the Certificate the Attorney General had had regard to evidence which was later excluded by Deemster Doyle was a matter which neither went to the vires or jurisdiction nor supported an argument that the Attorney General had had regard to matters irrelevant to his decision. He submitted that the Deposition was relevant and potentially admissible evidence. He continued that as stated in paragraph 5 of his affidavit of 16 th February 2009, the Attorney General had rightly had regard that such evidence might be successfully challenged under section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
Further, it was commonplace for evidence served by the prosecution for the purposes of committal to be excluded at trial. Mr. Farrer submitted that the contention that the Deposition was direct evidence of Mr. Baines' involvement or the only direct evidence against him relevant to the second count on the information was immaterial to the claim that the Attorney General's decision was unlawful. If the decision was unlawful, such did not derive in the least degree from the weight which might have been attached to the evidence excluded. [23] Mr. Farrer further submitted that the test to be applied by the Attorney General pursuant to section 2(5)(a) of the 1993 Act was evidential sufficiency for committal. The sole difference between the statutory powers of the committing court and a certificate of the Attorney General was that the court's power to scrutinise a decision to commit was not limited by any power corresponding to section 2(5). There was no sensible reason to approach the exercise of discretion differently when reviewing a certificate issued by the Attorney General from reviewing a committal. [24] Mr. Clegg submitted that consequent upon Deemster Doyle's judgment of November 2008 the Attorney General had power to reconsider his decision to issue the Certificate. He stated that there is no specific provision within the 1993 Act which rendered the Attorney General functus officio after the issuing of a certificate. Mr. Clegg further argued that the Attorney General had the right to withdraw a prosecution or an information at any time and thus he had the power to review his decision to issue a certificate. [25] Mr. Clegg stated that since the 1993 Act did not prohibit this court from reviewing a refusal by the Attorney General to reconsider the issuing and maintenance of the Certificate the court could do so. A refusal to review was in itself a decision capable of review. Mr. Clegg submitted that the Attorney General's refusal to reconsider the Certificate in the aftermath of Deemster Doyle's judgment was unlawful. He argued that there were five grounds which supported such submission. Firstly, the Attorney General had failed to consider whether consequent upon such judgment it was appropriate and lawful that in the discretion of the Attorney General the Certificate should continue to be maintained. In making his original decision to issue the Certificate and apparently reviewing the same from issue to November 2008, the Attorney General had weighed in the balance evidence some of which he recognised might be excluded but following Deemster Doyle's judgment he would be required to weigh in the balance the prosecution without benefit of either the Deposition or Mrs. Baines' affidavit. Secondly, the Attorney General's refusal to reconsider the Certificate in November 2008 was based exclusively upon his approach to the Certificate in February 2008. Thirdly, the Attorney General failed to pay any regard at all to Deemster Doyle's exclusion of Mrs. Baines' affidavit which was simply ignored in the Attorney General's stated reasons for his refusal as set out in his letter of 12 th November 2008. Fourthly, the speed with which the Attorney General through Mrs. Bermingham had responded, being less than 24 hours from Mr. Baines' request, demonstrated that the Attorney General had approached such request with his mind firmly closed. Fifthly, in all the circumstances the Attorney General could not possibly contend that he had taken into account all material considerations and only relevant considerations, or acted rationally and fairly in response to Mr. Baines' request unless he had duly reconsidered his issue of the Certificate, taking into account both Deemster Doyle's ruling that the Deposition and Mrs. Baines' affidavit be excluded and the effect that those exclusions might have on the sufficiency of such other evidence as remained admissible.
[26] Mr. Clegg invited the court to order the Attorney General to review the issue and maintenance of the Certificate taking into account all material facts including the consequences of Deemster Doyle's judgment. He reminded the court that it should consider granting such relief on the cumulative impact of the grounds cited even if the court is not persuaded to do so considering the same individually. [27] Mr. Farrer submitted that such arguments were wholly misconceived. The court could either quash the Certificate or refuse to do so. The court could not say that the Certificate should stand but the Attorney General should reconsider it. Still less could it find that the Certificate was lawfully issued but must be revisited by the authority which lawfully issued it. [28] Mr. Farrer argued that the effect of certifying is to transfer the case immediately to the Court of General Gaol Delivery just like a committal. If, thereafter, the Attorney General concludes that the evidence available to the prosecution does not warrant a conviction, he must offer no evidence. The Court of General Gaol Delivery is seised of the case. It is not open to the Attorney General any more than to the High Bailiff or the magistrates, who have committed for trial, to withdraw the case from that court in order to look further at the evidence. As committing court or certifying authority they are functus officio. The only authority which can remove the case from the jurisdiction of the Court of General Gaol Delivery is this court, which would do so by quashing the Certificate or committal as the case may be. [29] Mr. Farrer continued that before certifying and following discussions with his advisors, the Attorney General had taken a view as to the sufficiency of the evidence, absent the Deposition. Such view did not require to be revisited on a regular basis thereafter when the expected challenge was made nor was there any reason to change it after 11 th November 2008 since Deemster Doyle's decision did not affect it. Cases cited [30] During the hearing, I was referred to In the Matterof Winnell [1993-95] MLR 285; Re Fredericksen and Seven others [1996-98] MLR 286; Re Richardson [2DS 1997/6 judgment delivered 2 nd October 1997]; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited- v- Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 1KB 223.; Neill-v- North Antrim Magistrates' Court and Another [1993] 97 Cr. App. R 121; 1KB Regina-v- Bedwellty Justices ex parte Williams [1997] AC 225; and The Queen on the application of Thompson v- The Central Criminal Court and the Crown Prosecution Service [2005] EWHC 2345 [Admin]. I was also referred to but for the sake of brevity do not cite those parts of the judgments of Lord Reed and Lord Wilberforce in Anisminic Limited v- Foreign Compensation Commission and Another [1969] 2 AC 147 respectively at 171B-E and 210 C-E. Conclusions [31] The Attorney General issued the Certificate pursuant to section 2(3)(c) and 2(5) of the 1993 Act which read:- "2 Commencement of proceedings on information
(3) An information may be preferred by the Attorney General - (c) of his own motion. (5) An information may not be preferred under subsection (3)(c) unless the Attorney General certifies in writing that in his opinion the evidence of the offence charged (a) would be sufficient for the defendant to be committed for trial; and (b) reveals a case of such seriousness or complexity that its management should without delay be taken over by the court; and a certificate under this subsection shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court." [32] I also refer to section 10 of the High Court Act 1991 in particular section 10(2). Section 10 reads:- "10 Petitions of doleance (1) The High Court shall, in accordance with section 6(2), have all such jurisdiction in relation to petitions of doleance as it had immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions of doleance in respect of any matter in, or proceeding of, the Court of General Gaol Delivery." [33] It was common ground, relying upon In the Matterof Winnell, that the provisions of section 10(2) do not oust this court's jurisdiction to determine the Petition. It was also common ground that the words "and a certificate under this subsection shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court" in section 2(5) of the 1993 Act do not confer upon the Attorney General's certificate an absolute immunity from judicial scrutiny. [34] I find that this court has jurisdiction to determine the Petition, but I do not consider that such jurisdiction is without restriction. With reference to a certificate issued by the Attorney General under section 2(5) of the 1993 Act, I find that this court is empowered to review a certificate issued without jurisdiction, that is, although the Attorney General had jurisdiction to issue a certificate, in issuing the relevant certificate he went outside his jurisdiction that is the Certificate was ultra vires, or the decision, and thus the issuing of the Certificate was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited - v- Wednesbury Corporation. [35] I refer to section 2(2) of the 1993 Act which reads:- "2 Commencement of proceedings on information
(2) The information shall be lodged in the General Registry, and 14 clear days before the date on which the defendant is arraigned (a) a certified copy shall be served on the defendant or sent to him by registered post or the recorded delivery service, and (b) a certified copy shall be sent to his advocate (if any) " [36] I agree with Mr. Clegg and Mr. Farrer that the Court of General Gaol Delivery becomes seised of a case when an information has been filed in the General Registry, or to be more precise when the information has been processed with the first appearance date and time having been endorsed thereon. [37] Thus before arraignment a defendant and, if he is represented, his advocate have fourteen clear days to consider the information. I consider that such period not only provides a defendant with the opportunity to duly consider his position and the advantages of an early plea whatever that plea may be, but also in the case where the Attorney General has issued a certificate under section 2 of the 1993 Act to consider whether such certificate ought to be challenged. To determine whether a certificate ought to be challenged may, not must, lead to inquiry of the Attorney General as to what evidence he considered was sufficient for the defendant to be committed for trial. To issue a certificate, the Attorney General must have considered, inter alia, that the evidence of the offence charged would be sufficient for committal for trial. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Attorney General would be able to respond to such an inquiry without undue delay. I pause to record that in this case there was no challenge under section 2(5)(b) of the 1993 Act. [38] If it is anticipated that a petition of doleance will be issued or reasonable time is required for a defendant to consider the Attorney General's response to an inquiry, then application can be made to the Court of General Gaol Delivery for that court to adjourn proceedings before arraignment. Provided the defendant acts in timely fashion, he will not expose himself to challenge to a petition of doleance on the ground of delay. However, a defendant must act with due expedition. If he does not, then a petition of doleance could be successfully challenged on the ground of delay which could be determined, but not necessarily, as a preliminary issue in early course. I record that in this case, Mr. Farrer did not challenge the Petition on the ground of delay. [39] I consider that the wording of section 10(2) of the High Court Act 1991 supports the view that whilst this court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition of doleance by way of judicial review of the issuing of a certificate, such jurisdiction is restricted not only on the basis of challenge, but also in time. The time to subject the Attorney General's issuing of a certificate under section 2 of the 1993 Act to judicial review by this court is confined to within a reasonable time after the certificate has been issued. [40] In this case, Mr. Baines challenges the sufficiency of evidence for him to be committed for trial. I refer to paragraphs 3 to 6 of the Attorney General's affidavit, which read:-
"3. I concluded that there was ample evidence to justify committal of both defendants as charged and that, given the complex nature of the case and the fact that much of the evidence, including the most important evidence, involved witnesses from the U.S.A. and Cyprus, this was a proper case for the use of my certificate. 4. As to the petitioner's deposition under the Settlement Agreement, I was, of course, well aware when certifying, that it contained answers constituting cogent evidence of the petitioner's involvement in and knowledge of the falsity of the Mainstreet invoice. 5. It was obvious, furthermore, that the petitioner was likely to challenge the admissibility of those answers, invoking s.13 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1991, on the ground that they were not freely given. I reviewed the issue with my advisors and concluded that, whilst there was a significant chance that they would be excluded in the exercise of the Learned Deemster's discretion, there were powerful arguments in favour of admission. 6. More importantly, I was in no doubt that there was other evidence from which a jury could properly infer the knowing involvement of the petitioner and that the certificate could properly have been issued in the absence of any evidence from the deposition. The general nature of that evidence is contained in the Prosecution Case Statement and summarised in bullet point form in my letter of 12 th November, 2008." [41] In a challenge to the issuing of a certificate under Section 2(5)(a) of the 1993 Act, this court must be careful not to trespass upon the jurisdiction of the Court of General Gaol Delivery. This court will be slow to interfere with the Attorney General's decision to issue a certificate. In this case in reaching his decision to issue the Certificate, the Attorney General took into account the Deposition and Mrs. Baines' affidavit. I agree with Mr. Farrer that it is commonplace for evidence served by the prosecution for the purposes of committal to be excluded at, or before trial. I find that in taking into account the Deposition, and Mrs. Baines' affidavit, the Attorney General did not act outside his jurisdiction or "Wednesbury" unreasonable. The admissibility of such evidence depended upon a successful challenge under section 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, and required the exercise of judicial discretion following proper enquiry by the court, and argument. Whilst the Attorney General recognised that such evidence might be successfully challenged, it was not obviously inadmissible. [42] The challenge by Mr. Baines that the Attorney General acted ultra vires is unfounded, his challenge on the grounds of unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense cannot be sustained. I, therefore, dismiss that part of the Petition by which Mr. Baines seeks that the Certificate is quashed. [43] Upon the Attorney General deciding to issue a certificate, and the consequent information being processed by the General Registry, the relevant case is transferred to the Court of General Gaol Delivery. As with the High Bailiff, and magistrates upon a case being committed to the Court of General Gaol Delivery, the Attorney General is functus officio so far as transfer, or committal to that court is concerned. Once the Court of General Gaol Delivery is seised of a case the committing, or transferring authority, whether the High Bailiff, the magistrates, or the Attorney General cannot withdraw the case from the Court of General Gaol Delivery to reconsider the evidence. However, unlike the High Bailiff, and the magistrates, the Attorney General will have a continuing role, but that role is confined to that of prosecutor. In such capacity, the Attorney General has a discretion
whether to proceed or not with the prosecution. Also, a defendant may challenge the continuance of a prosecution. [44] I agree with Mr. Farrer that, if a certificate has been lawfully issued, this court does not have jurisdiction to subsequently review the Attorney General's maintenance of such certificate, or to require him to re-consider the maintenance of such certificate. In this case, the Certificate was lawfully issued. I, therefore, dismiss that part of the Petition by which Mr. Baines seeks an order that the Attorney General reconsider the issue and maintenance of the Certificate in the light of all material considerations including the consequence of the judgment of Deemster Doyle of 24 th November 2008. [45] I dismiss the Petition. Crown Copyright