The Military and Politics

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The Military and Politics Dr Jesse Dillon Savage dillonsj@tcd.ie Office Location: Rm 406 College Green Office Hours: Mon 10-12 Course Description One of the key strategic dilemmas raised by the military is that an organization that has the power to protect a polity from external threats has the potential to threaten the polity itself. The goal of this module is to help understand how this dilemma has been resolved in a variety of contexts. This course explores how civilian control over the military is institutionalised or breaks down, how the military affects domestic competition and conflict, and how the military can affect foreign policy. These issues are examined cross-nationally, including developing and developed countries, democracies and non-democracies. Assessment Participation 15% Student participation and discussion is a central aspect of the seminar. This means that it is necessary to do the readings. Students should come prepared with topics of discussion and questions. The assessment of participation will be based on the quality of input into class discussions. To prepare for discussion you should: identify the theory or argument of the readings; identify the method used by the authors in the readings to test their arguments, and evaluate the strength of these method for testing the authors argument; and you should think of possible extensions or alternatives to the arguments put forward in the readings. Along with participation in class, there will be a discussion board on Blackboard. All students are expected to make at least one comment or raise a question for discussion on this board by the day before class. Higher levels of participation are welcome. Response Papers (800 words each) 20% Students are required to submit two 800-word response papers each worth 10% of the student s total mark. Students must submit one paper during the first 3 weeks and one from the remaining two weeks. These response papers should critically evaluate the readings. This means identifying a weakness or limitation in the articles and offering suggestions on how to improve the research. The critical evaluation may focus on the empirical or theoretical aspects of the readings or both. Presentation 15% Each student will be required to provide a 5 minute presentation on one of the readings. These presentations are intended to stimulate discussion. To this end, the presentation should provide a brief over view of the reading, highlighting the main points. Students should emphasise potential questions for discussion and, critically, why these questions are of interest. There should be no or 1

minimal summary of the readings. Grading will be based on the quality of content and presentation of the argument. A sign up list for the presentations will be distributed in the first week of term. Research Design Paper (2500 words) 50%, Due April 16 2017 The research design paper focuses on a potential research project related to the military and politics. Based on the course materials or other knowledge related to the topic, students should identify a question of interest or puzzle that they do not feel is adequately answered in the literature. Students should define their research question, outlining the variation they hope to explain, develop a preliminary theory to explain the variation, then detail the methods they would use to test the theory. When outlining the methods students should pay close attention to issues such as how they conceptualise their key variables (both independent and dependent variables) and the data they would use to measure them and how the methods they propose can be used to falsify their theory. Academic Honesty and Plagiarism Policy Plagiarism is a serious matter and must be avoided. Students should be familiar with what constitutes plagiarism. Please see http://www.tcd.ie/undergraduate-studies/general-regulations/plagiarism.php for further information regarding plagiarism and the university s policy regarding it. Course Outline The weekly coverage might change as it depends on the progress of the class. Week 1: General Issues Feaver, P. D. (1999). Civil-military relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1):211 241 McMahon, R. B. and Slantchev, B. L. (2015). The guardianship dilemma: Regime security through and from the armed forces. American Political Science Review, 109(02):297 313 (The McMahon and Slantchev reading contains a formal, mathematical model of military behaviour. It is not necessary to understand the details of the models. Pay attention to the introduction, the discussion of the model and how the model relates to empirical research in the field) Desch, M. C. (2001). Civilian control of the military: The changing security environment. JHU Press Feaver, P. (2009). Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Harvard Feaver, P. D. (1996). The civil-military problematique: Huntington, janowitz, and the question of civilian control. Armed Forces & Society, 23(2):149 178 2

Finer, S. E. (2002). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. Transaction Publishers Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations. Harvard Janowitz, M. (1960). The professional soldier: A social and political portrait, volume 91618. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press Schiff, R. L. (2008). The military and domestic politics: a concordance theory of civil-military relations. Routledge Week 2: The Military and Foreign Policy Brooks, R. (2008). Shaping strategy: the civil-military politics of strategic assessment. Princeton, Chapters 1 and 2 Caverley, J. D. (2014). Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War. Number 131. Cambridge,, Chapters 1 and 2 Snyder, J. (1984). Civil-military relations and the cult of the offensive, 1914 and 1984. International Security, 9(1):108 146 Cohen, E. A. (2012). Simon and Schuster Supreme command: Soldiers, statesmen and leadership in wartime. Gelpi, C. and Feaver, P. D. (2002). Speak softly and carry a big stick? veterans in the political elite and the american use of force. American Political Science Review, 96(04):779 793 Heginbotham, E. (2002). The fall and rise of navies in east asia: Military organizations, domestic politics, and grand strategy. International Security, 27(2):86 125 Recchia, S. (2015). Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: US Civil-military Relations and Multilateral Intervention. Cornell Van Evera, S. (1984). The cult of the offensive and the origins of the first world war. International security, 9(1):58 107 Week 3: Coups and Military Interventions in Domestic Politics Singh, N. (2014). Seizing power: the strategic logic of military coups. JHU Press, Chapters 1 and 2 and 3 Powell, J. (2012). Determinants of the attempting and outcome of coups d état. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(6):1017 1040 3

Piplani, V. and Talmadge, C. (2015). When war helps civil military relations: Prolonged interstate conflict and the reduced risk of coups. Journal of Conflict Resolution Belkin, A. and Schofer, E. (2003). Toward a structural understanding of coup risk. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(5):594 620 item Casper, B. A. and Tyson, S. A. (2014). Popular protest and elite coordination in a coup d état. The Journal of Politics, 76(02):548 564 Egorov, G. and Sonin, K. (2011). Dictators and their viziers: Endogenizing the loyalty competence trade-off. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(5):903 930 Harkness, K. A. (2014). The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(4):1 30 Londregan, J. B. and Poole, K. T. (1990). Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. World Politics, 42(2):151 183 Powell, J. M. and Thyne, C. L. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010 a new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2):249 259 Roessler, P. (2011). The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in africa. World Politics, 63(2):300 346 Svolik, M. W. (2012b). Which democracies will last? coups, incumbent takeovers, and the dynamic of democratic consolidation. British Journal of Political Science, pages 1 24 Week 4: The Military and Regime Change Marinov, N. and Goemans, H. (2014). Coups and democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 44(04):799 825 Lee, T. (2009). The armed forces and transitions from authoritarian rule explaining the role of the military in 1986 philippines and 1998 indonesia. Comparative Political Studies, 42(5):640 669 Barany, Z. (2011). The role of the military. Journal of Democracy, 22(4):24 35 Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2012). Coercive capacity and the prospects for democratization. Comparative Politics, 44(2):151 169 Albrecht, H. and Ohl, D. (2016). Exit, resistance, loyalty: Military behavior during unrest in authoritarian regimes. Perspectives on Politics, 14(01):38 52 Bell, C. (2016). Coup d état and democracy. Comparative Political Studies, page 0010414015621081 Geddes, B., Frantz, E., and Wright, J. G. (2014). Military rule. Annual Review of Political Science, 17:147 162 4

Nepstad, S. E. (2013). Mutiny and nonviolence in the arab spring exploring military defections and loyalty in egypt, bahrain, and syria. Journal of Peace Research, 50(3):337 349 Pion-Berlin, D., Esparza, D., and Grisham, K. (2014). Staying quartered civilian uprisings and military disobedience in the twenty-first century. Comparative Political Studies, 47(2):230 259 Svolik, M. W. (2013). Contracting on violence the moral hazard in authoritarian repression and military intervention in politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(5):765 794 Svolik, M. (2012a). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge, London Tansey, O. (2016). The limits of the democratic coup thesis: International politics and post-coup authoritarianism. Journal of Global Security Studies, 1(3):220 234 Week 5: Politics and Military Effectiveness Castillo, J. (2014). Endurance and war: the national sources of military cohesion. Stanford, Chaps 1 and 2 Reiter, D. and Stam, A. C. (1998). Democracy and battlefield military effectiveness. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3):259 277 Narang, V. and Talmadge, C. (2017). Civil-military pathologies and defeat in war: Tests using new data. Journal of Conflict Resolution, page 0022002716684627 Avant, D. D. (1993). The institutional sources of military doctrine: Hegemons in peripheral wars. International Studies Quarterly, 37(4):409 430 Biddle, S. (2010). Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton Farrell, T. (2001). Transnational norms and military development: Constructing ireland s professional army. European Journal of International Relations, 7(1):63 102 Horowitz, M. C. (2010). The diffusion of military power: Causes and consequences for international politics. Princeton Brooks, R. (2007). Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. Stanford Rosen, S. P. (1995). Military effectiveness: Why society matters. International Security, 19(4):5 31 5