Ideologically motivated violence How have we approached it? PETER ROMANIUK GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY (PROMANIUK@GLOBALCENTER.ORG) AND JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CUNY (PROMANIUK@JJAY.CUNY.EDU)
Our work on CVE and evaluation
From CT to CVE Evolving responses to terrorism and violent extremism Towards a shared language What is CVE?
From CT to CVE Evolving responses to terrorism and violent extremism Towards a shared language Violent extremism : draws attention to the role of ideology; not terrorism CVE: use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives" (Khan, 2015)
From CT to CVE Evolving responses to terrorism and violent extremism Towards a shared language CVE: from definition to typology (measures vary by scope, causal mechanism, implementing agents and activities undertaken)
From CT to CVE Evolving responses to terrorism and violent extremism Towards a shared language How CVE (ought to) work
Does CVE Work? Our approach Evaluation research on the public record (N=27); wide variety of programs evaluated; diverse methods used Practitioner survey (N=13) and interviews (>30; including several evaluators) Desk research (primary and secondary sources) Ottawa workshop (April 2015)
Does CVE Work? Substantive lessons learned Evaluation remains underutilized but existing evaluation research shows that it is feasible and valuable As a body of research, past evaluations highlighted missteps and unintended consequences in engaging communities States should use soft power softly know your audience avoid stigmatization send clear messages engage broadly, partner strategically
Does CVE Work? Substantive lessons learned Policy learning in the field of CVE; distinguish first wave and second wave programming Convergence among second wave programs: Communications and online measures (macro level) Community engagement better targeted to behavioral radicalization (meso level) Intervention programs (micro level)
Recent developments Building a professional community Further lessons learned exercises New evaluations Key points: Montgomery County Model may travel well (or may not) Data-driven, methodologically rigorous Focus on recruitment and retention, and metrics Findings: sometimes, CVE works Further evaluations from pilot programs expected; further investment in domestic CVE
Looking forward A proportional response: VE as a low base rate social problem Moderate our expectations of CVE (it is slow [and] not easy or cheap ) Integrate lessons from past evaluation research, especially regarding community engagement Regularize policy processes to enhance coherence, improve outcomes and our advance our ability to know whether CVE works
Peter Romaniuk Senior Fellow promaniuk@globalcenter.org WASHINGTON DC OFFICE 1101 14th Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005 USA NEW YORK OFFICE 747 Third Avenue 4 th Floor New York, NY 10017 USA LONDON OFFICE 11 12 Tokenhouse Yard London EC2R 7AS United Kingdom GOSHEN INDIANA OFFICE 129 South Main Street Suite 1 Goshen, IN 46526 USA www.globalcenter.org