S e n t e n c i n g P a r t n e r s

Published By Joaquin & Duncan, L.L.C.; A Law Firm of Federal Sentencing Attorneys July 2016 S e n t e n c i n g P a r t n e r s About Sentencing Partners: Sentencing Partners is published by Joaquin and Duncan, L.L.C., 1240 Souridge Ct. #105, Hurst, Texas 76053; telephone (817) 282-9050; facsimile (817) 282-9070; E-mail: sentenceptrs@hotmail.com. Sentencing Partners is published monly and attempts to report e most recent cases at can aid you in effectively representing your clients at sentencing and in keeping you advised of e developments in e United States Sentencing Guidelines. If ere is an issue of particular interest at you would like discussed in Sentencing Partners, please feel free to contact us. About Joaquin & Duncan, LLC: Joaquin and Duncan, L.L.C. is a law firm of federal sentencing attorneys who work on a contract basis wi criminal defense attorneys assisting in pre-plea advisement; review of presentence reports; preparation of objections and motions for downward departure; preparation of motions for bond; preparation of appellate briefs; preparation of 2255 petitions; and assistance in obtaining choice of prison or drug treatment program. Note: Articles and summaries contained herein are based on information obtained rough research using a variety of sources. While every effort is made to insure accuracy, e firm of Joaquin & Duncan, L.L.C. its employees, agents, and associates cannot be held liable for any errors, omissions, or oversights contained herein. Readers are responsible for furer research of any case cited in is publication for which furer information is required. Inquiries are welcome via telephone, facsimile, e-mail, or U.S. mail Supreme Court Granted Cert on Johnson Application to Career Offender Guidelines The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544. The issues are: (1) Wheer Johnson v. United States applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under e residual clause in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining crime of violence ); (2) wheer Johnson s constitutional holding applies to e residual clause in 4B1.2(a)(2), ereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review; and (3) wheer mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a crime of violence only in commentary to 4B1.2, remains a crime of violence after Johnson. Sentencing Commission Issues Overview of Federal Criminal Cases, Fiscal Year 2015 The Commission summarized e Overview as follows: The United States Sentencing Commission received information on 71,184 federal criminal cases in which e offender was sentenced in fiscal year 2015. Among ese cases, 71,003 involved an individual offender and 181 involved a corporation or oer organizational offender. The Commission also received information on 24,743 cases in which e court resentenced e offender or modified e sentence at had been previously imposed. Certain excerpts revealed: For more an a decade, cases involving drugs, immigration, fraud, or firearms constituted e vast majority of federal felonies and Class A misdemeanors. This trend continued in fiscal year 2015, as ese crimes accounted for 81.6 percent of all cases reported. Most criminal offenders are men, and eir proportion of e total offender population has remained constant for more an a decade. In fiscal year 2015, 52.7 percent of all federal offenders were Hispanic, while 23.5 percent were White, and 19.8 percent were Black. A majority of federal offenders are United States citizens (58.5%). Most non-citizen offenders committed an immigration offense (66.0%). The next most common offense type among non-citizen offenders was drug trafficking (17.8%). The average age of offenders in fiscal year 2015 was 36 years old. The Overview is available on e Commission s website: http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publi cations/2016/fy15_overview_federal_criminal_cases.pdf

Case Summaries Sentencing Partners July 2016 U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Mais v. United States 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) Prior Iowa burglary conviction did not qualify as generic form of predicate offense under ACCA Petitioner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because of his five prior Iowa burglary convictions, e government requested an ACCA sentence enhancement. Under e generic offense, burglary requires unlawful entry into a building or oer structure. The Iowa statute, however, reaches any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle. Iowa Code 702.12. The district court applied e modified categorical approach, found at Mais had burgled structures, and imposed an enhanced sentence. The Eigh Circuit affirmed. While acknowledging at e Iowa statute swept more broadly an e generic statute, e court determined at, even if structures and vehicles were not separate elements but alternative means of fulfilling a single element, a sentencing court could still invoke e modified categorical approach. Because e record showed at e petitioner had burgled structures, e court held at e prior convictions were ACCA predicates. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, explaining at e Iowa statute did not list multiple elements disjunctively, but instead enumerated various factual means of committing a single element. The issue was wheer e ACCA treated is kind of statute as it does all oers, imposing a sentence enhancement only if e state crime s elements correspond to ose of a generic offense or instead wheer e Act makes an exception for such a law, so at a sentence can be enhanced when one of e statute s specified means creates a match wi e generic offense, even ough e broader element would not. The Court explained at e elements of e crime of conviction (Iowa burglary) covered a greater swa of conduct an e elements of e relevant ACCA offense (generic burglary) and at a state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader an ose of a listed generic offense. How a defendant committed a particular crime makes no difference; even if his conduct fits wiin e generic offense, e mismatch of elements saves e defendant from an ACCA sentence. Those longstanding principles, and e reasoning at underlies em, apply regardless of wheer a statute omits or instead specifies alternative possible means of commission. The itemized construction gives a sentencing court no special warrant to explore e facts of an offense, raer an to determine e crime s elements and compare em wi e generic definition. In e analysis, [t]he first task for a sentencing court faced wi an alternatively phrased statute is us to determine wheer its listed items are elements or means. If ey are elements, e court should do what we have previously approved: review e record materials to discover which of e enumerated alternatives played a part in e defendant s prior conviction, and en compare at element (along wi all oers) to ose of e generic crime. But if instead ey are means, e court has no call to decide which of e statutory alternatives was at issue in e earlier

3 Sentencing Partners July 2016 prosecution. Because e ACCA analysis involves only comparing elements, a court may not ask wheer e defendant s conduct his particular means of committing e crime falls wiin e generic definition. And at rule does not change when a statute happens to list possible alternative means of commission. Because e elements of Iowa s burglary law are broader an ose of generic burglary, [e petitioner s] convictions under at law cannot give rise to an ACCA sentence. Offense Conduct (Chapter 2) United States v. Velasquez 2016 WL 3199634 (5 Cir. 2016) Enhancements for trafficking firearms and for anoer felony offense not plain error The defendant pled guilty to one count of making a false statement or representation wi regard to firearm records. She was recruited by anoer individual to purchase firearms and fraudulently complete ATF forms at accompanied e purchases. Several of e weapons she purchased were discovered later in Mexico. The district court sentenced her to 46 mons, which included four-level offense enhancements under bo 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6). Alough e defendant objected in e district court to e factual basis underlying each enhancement, she did not raise any argument regarding possible double counting. On appeal, e defendant argued at under United States v. Guzman, 623 Fed. Appx. 151 (5 Cir. 2015), applying bo enhancements amounted to double counting because e trafficking offense underlying e enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(5) was e felony offense underlying e enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6). Reviewing for plain error, e Fif Circuit found at e imposition of e enhancements under 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6) was clear and obvious error. However, e defendant did not show a reasonable probability at, but for e district court s error, she would have received a lesser sentence, she has failed to show at e error affected her substantial rights. At sentencing, e district court noted at some [of e objections] may be academic because e 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) cross-reference would apply and maintain her offense level at 26. In addition, e district court specifically adopted e factual findings of e PSR, which set for e applicability of e 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) crossreference. The sentence was affirmed. United States v. Davis 2016 WL 3124838 (8 Cir. 2016) Enhancement for possessing stolen handgun not warranted The defendant was riding in e back seat of a vehicle at was stopped by law enforcement. During e stop, anoer passenger (Hicks) rew a loaded handgun from e front seat into e back. The officers found e gun and later discovered had been stolen during a home burglary. Hicks was detained on charges of possession of stolen property, carrying weapons, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The defendant provided a statement to e police, but was released wiout charges. Later, e defendant was called to testify before a federal grand jury investigating Hicks. The defendant refused to testify and invoked his right to counsel, even after e government secured an order under 18 U.S.C. 6002 requiring him to testify, but providing at his testimony would not later be used against him. As a result, he was indicted on one count of criminal contempt of court, to which he later pled guilty. The parties agreed at e most

4 Sentencing Partners July 2016 analogous guideline was for obstruction of justice, under 2J1.2. The PSR indicated at 2X3.1 applied, which set e base offense level 6 levels lower an e offense level for e underlying offense. The PSR concluded at e underlying offense was Hicks conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, wi an offense level of 26, which included two-level enhancement for e stolen handgun under section 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). This resulted in a offense level of 20 and a sentencing range of 46 to 57 mons. The court sentenced him to 46 mons. On appeal, e defendant claimed at e government failed to prove at he knew at e firearm was stolen; erefore, e 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) enhancement was error. The Eigh Circuit explained at because e enhancement was a specific offense characteristic, e knowledge requirement applies. See 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), 2X3.1, app. note 1. Here, e only evidence relating to e defendant s knowledge about e stolen handgun was in e PSR which stated: auorities later determined at e revolver had been stolen during a home burglary. The court found at is was not sufficient because it merely referred to e auorities knowledge, not e defendant s. Since e government did not prove at [e defendant] knew or should have known at e handgun was stolen, e district court erred in applying e two level enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). United States v. Barcenas-Yanez 2016 WL 3408889 (4 Cir. 2016) State statute setting out alternative mens rea did not render it divisible for purposes of crime of violence analysis The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering e United States and was sentenced to 60 mons. The sentence was based on a finding at e defendant s prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code 22.02(a) constituted a crime of violence under 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The district court determined at 22.02(a) was divisible and utilized e modified categorical approach, concluding at e conviction was a crime of violence. Wiout such a finding, e defendant s sentencing range would have been 24 to 30 mons, instead of 77 to 96 mons. On appeal, e dispositive question was wheer e Texas legislature, in setting out alternative means of satisfying e mens rea element of e Texas statute, rendered e statute divisible such at e state law can be said to have created two offenses, one involving a reckless mens rea, e oer involving a knowing or intentional mens rea. The Four Circuit noted at e Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had determined at jury unanimity as to mens rea was not required for an aggravated assault conviction under 22.02(a)(1), (2). See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Accordingly, e Texas aggravated assault offense created in 22.02(a) is broader an e federal generic aggravated assault offense qualifying under e reentry guideline [ 2L1.2] as supporting an enhanced sentencing range, is not divisible, and erefore cannot support e application of a 16-level enhancement. We acknowledge at it is understandably tempting to examine Shepard approved documents earlier raer an later in e sentencing process. As is case demonstrates, however, when such documents are examined too early, a risk arises at e divisibility analysis required under Descamps and our Circuit precedent may be skewed. It should be clear at e modified categorical approach may not be employed to determine wheer e modified categorical approach may be employed.

5 Sentencing Partners July 2016 United States v. Clinton 2016 WL 3349257 (7 Cir. 2016) Four-level enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) reversed The defendant pled guilty to being in possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In return for e plea agreement, e government dismissed a charge of possession wi intent to distribute crack cocaine. The defendant told police at he had purchased e firearm from a drug addict. The PSR determined a base offense level of 24 based on his two prior felony controlled-substances convictions. The PSR furer recommended a four-level enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because e defendant had possessed e firearm in connection wi anoer felony offense - e drug offense. The district court adopted e PSR and sentenced e defendant to 76 mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at e fourlevel enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) did not apply. The Seven Circuit explained at e defendant may be found to have used a firearm in connection wi anoer felony offense if he used or possessed e firearm in connection wi (1) his general drug dealing activities in his home or (2) e purchase of e firearm, which he allegedly bought wi drugs. Here e district court relied on bo prongs to find e enhancement applied. However, ose findings were not supported by e record. The underlying discovery and e factual proffer in [e defendant] plea agreement establish only at e person from whom he purchased e weapon was a drug addict. Alough it is possible at e person could have conveyed e firearm to [e defendant] in exchange for drugs, ere is no evidence of at, and mere speculation is insufficient to support a four-level enhancement. In addition, e court was unable to identify any evidence at e firearm was in close proximity to e drugs, such at e proximity alone could trigger e enhancement. The evidence indicated at e firearm was kept in e closet in e bedroom, and ere was no evidence at any drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in at closet or even in e rest of e bedroom. The only drug evidence was found under e couch in e living room. The proximity of e weapon to e drugs erefore was not close such at e distance alone warranted e enhancement. The sentence was vacated and e matter remanded. Post-Conviction/Habeas/2255 United States v. Cuero 2016 WL 3563660 (9 Cir. 2016) Relief granted in 2254 petition based on breach of plea agreement The defendant pled guilty in state court to one felony count of causing bodily injury while driving under e influence and one felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm. In exchange, e state prosecutor dismissed a misdemeanor count, ereby guaranteeing e defendant a maximum sentence of 172 mons. The day before e scheduled sentencing, e state prosecutor moved to amend e criminal complaint to allege an additional prior strike conviction, which, if allowed, would result in an indeterminate 64 years to life sentence under California s ree strikes law. The trial court permitted e amendment, but allowed e defendant to widraw his guilty plea and enter a new plea agreement calling for an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence. After exhausting his state appeal remedies, e defendant filed a habeas petition under 2254, which was denied by e district court. The Nin Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and reversed, finding at e defendant had entered a binding, judicially

6 Sentencing Partners July 2016 approved plea agreement and stood convicted, and e prosecutor had breached at agreement. The agreement became binding e moment e trial court accepted e defendant s guilty plea. A plea of guilty is more an a confession which admits at e accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction. And [w]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of e prosecutor, so at it can be said to be part of e inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. While e prosecution initially honored its promise to dismiss e misdemeanor charge, it en breached e plea agreement by moving to amend e complaint to charge a prior assault conviction as a second strike. The Superior Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law by permitting e amendment and refusing to enforce e original plea agreement. In addition, allowing e defendant to widraw his guilty plea was no remedy at all. Instead, specific enforcement required e e prosecutor to fulfill e original bargain. Accordingly, e district court s order judgment denying e petition for a writ of habeas corpus was reversed wi instructions to issue a conditional writ requiring e state to resentence e defendant in accordance wi e original plea agreement. United States v. Adams 2016 WL 3269704 (11 Cir. 2016) Motion for successive 2255 granted under Johnson The defendant was sentenced under e ACCA, based on ree prior felonies: (1) a 2001 Florida robbery-carjacking ; (2) a 2005 Florida burglary of an unoccupied dwelling; and (3) a 2008 Florida possession of cocaine wi intent to sell or deliver. Alough he argued at sentencing at e prior burglary conviction was not an ACCA predicate offense, e district court, wiout stating under which clause of e ACCA e burglary conviction fell, sentenced him under e ACCA. In his motion to file a successive 2255 petition, e defendant contended at his ACCA-enhanced sentence was void in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). Specifically, he asserted at his Florida burglary conviction could not serve as a predicate offense for e ACCA enhancement in light of Johnson. The Eleven Circuit noted at it was unclear which clause of e ACCA e district court used in concluding at e prior burglary conviction qualified as a predicate offense, but ere is at least some suggestion at e district court considered [e defendant s] burglary conviction a residual clause offense. Furer, at e time e defendant was sentenced, a conviction under Florida s burglary statute was deemed an ACCA predicate under e residual clause, raer an e elements clause or e enumerated crimes clause. Because e sentencing court may have relied on e residual clause in imposing [e defendant s] sentence based on his prior Florida burglary conviction, his sentence may be invalid under Johnson. As a result, e court found at e defendant had made a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant fuller exploration by e district court of his Johnson claim. The court granted e application to file a successive 2255 motion. United States v. Arnick 2016 WL 3383487 (5 Cir. 2016) Motion for successive 2255 petition under Johnson denied The defendant moved for auorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. His original sentence was based in part on 2K2.1(a)(1), under which one of his prior

7 Sentencing Partners July 2016 convictions was deemed a crime of violence pursuant to e residual clause of 4B1.2(a)(2). He argued at e Supreme Court s decision in Johnson, which held at e residual clause of e Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. applied to e identically worded residual clause of 4B1.2(a)(2). The Fif Circuit recognized at Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law at was been made retroactive by e Supreme Court to cases on collateral review in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). However, Johnson did not address 4B1.2(a)(2) of e Guidelines. Nor has e Supreme Court held at a Guidelines enhancement at increases e Guidelines range implicates e same due process concerns as a statute at increases a statutory penalty. Furer, even if Johnson does implicate 4B1.2(a)(2), e Supreme Court has not addressed wheer is arguably new rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Consequently, e defendant did not show at he was entitled to auorization to proceed based on Johnson. The motion for auorization was denied. Justice Elrod dissented, noting at e defendant s burden was to make a prima facie showing at his claim relied on e rule announced in Johnson. Citing ree decisions from oer circuits involving e same issue, Justice Elrod believed at e defendant had met his burden and at his motion should have been granted. See In re Hubbard, 2016 WL 3181417 (4 Cir. 2016); In re Pinder, 2016 WL 3081954 (11 Cir. 2016); and In re Encinias, 2016 WL 1719323 (10 Cir. 2016). Because [e defendant] seeks a non-frivolous extension of Johnson, I would let him make his case to e district court. I erefore respectfully dissent. Reasonableness Review United States v. Collins 2016 WL 3583999 (6 Cir. 2016) Judge s consideration of jury poll was permissible part of determining sentence Investigators used peer-to-peer software to download child pornography from defendant s computer. They later confiscated his computer and found 19 videos and 93 images depicting child pornography. He was found guilty of receiving and distributing child pornography and possessing child pornography. The PSR calculated a sentencing range of 262 to 327 mons, above e statutory 240-mon maximum. The district judge revealed at, after e verdict, he had polled e jury and asked em for what ey believed would be an appropriate sentence. The responses ranged from zero to 60 mons, wi a mean of 14.5 mons and median of 8 mons. Over e government s objection, e district judge considered e jury poll as one factor in fashioning defendant s sentence and imposed a sentence of 60 mons, e mandatory minimum. The government appealed arguing at e district court erred by relying on e jury poll. The Six Circuit noted at it had considered a similar issue in United States v. Martin, 390 Fed. Appx. 533 (6 Cir. 2010), where it concluded at e district judge had properly carried out his sentencing function because he had not relied solely, or even primarily, upon e juror surveys and en ignored e [ 3553(a) factor] results. Contrary to e government s argument, e district judge s use of a jury poll as one factor in formulating defendant s sentence did not conflate e respective duties of judge and jury. In addition, e jury poll was not an impermissible factor for e district judge to consider. Finally, e court found at e

8 Sentencing Partners July 2016 sentencing judge oerwise properly carried out his sentencing function, and at e resulting downward variance was not unreasonable. The judge cited defendant s lack of prior convictions, absence of alcohol or drug abuse, possession of a college degree, regular employment, close family ties, and financial responsibility as considerations favoring a lighter sentence, as well as deterrence and protection of e public, unwarranted sentence disparities, and restitution to two identified victims. We are satisfied wi e district court s discussion of e sentencing factors in granting defendant a downward variance. Defendant s sentence erefore was not substantively unreasonable. Restitution United States v. Sawyer 2016 WL 3125986 (6 Cir. 2016) Violation of Clean Air Act was an offense against property for restitution purposes In 2006, e defendant, Sawyer, and four codefendants formed A&E Salvage and purchased e salvage rights to a former industrial site in eastern Tennessee in order to demolish e buildings on site and obtain salvageable material. Despite e presence of large amounts of regulated asbestos-containing material, A&E Salvage knowingly failed to comply wi e National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for asbestos. The EPA eventually intervened and cleaned up e site at a total cost of over $16 million. The defendant eventually pled guilty to one count of conspiring to violate e Clean Air Act and e district court sentenced him to 60 mons and held him jointly and severally liable for $10,388,576.71 in restitution to e EPA. On appeal, e defendant challenged e district court s restitution award, first arguing at restitution was not mandatory pursuant to e Mandatory Victim s Restitution Act (MVRA). The issue was wheer a federal governmental agency forced to expend funds to remedy e harm caused by a criminal offense can be properly deemed a victim of an offense against property under [MVRA] when e government has no possessory interest in e land? The Six Circuit noted at e defendant s offense of conviction, which resulted in e asbestos contamination of nearly 300 acres of land, certainly qualified as an offense against property wiin e meaning of MVRA. What is equally clear from e case law is at a government agency can be a victim to whom restitution is owed, regardless of wheer it has a possessory interest in e affected property. See United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846 (9 Cir. 2004); United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231 (10 Cir. 2002). The district court properly concluded at restitution was mandatory under [MVRA] because [edefendant s] offense of conviction is a qualifying offense against property and e EPA is an identifiable victim of at offense. Miscellaneous Issues United States v. Thompson rd 2016 WL 3163078 (3 Cir. 2016) No violate Ex Post Facto Clause violation The defendants, Gibson and Thompson, pled guilty in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Bo were sentenced as career criminals, but Gibson was granted downward departure to 162 mons (reduced from 262 to 327 mons), and Thompson was sentenced to 151 mons under a Rule 11 agreement (a reduction from 262 to 327 mons). In 2011, e Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 759, which included an amendment to e Application Notes to e policy statement in

9 Sentencing Partners July 2016 1B1.10. Section 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) provides at a district court is not auorized to reduce a sentence under 3582(c)(2) unless an amendment to e Guidelines has e effect of lowering e defendant s applicable guideline range. The amendment also defined e phrase applicable guideline range to be e guideline range at corresponds to e offense level and criminal history category determined... before consideration of any departure provision in e Guidelines Manual or any variance. The amended Notes us precluded a defendant from obtaining a 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction if he had been designated a career offender but was actually sentenced wiin a subsequently-lowered, non-career offender guidelines range based on a departure or variance. In 2014, e Commission promulgated Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced e drug base offense levels by two. Believing at eir sentences were determined by e drug guidelines, e defendants bo filed 3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reduction pursuant to e amendment. The district court denied e motions. On appeal, e Third Circuit explained at section 3582(c)(2) permits a district court to reduce a sentence only if: (1) e sentence is based on a guidelines range at has subsequently been lowered; and (2) a sentence reduction would be consistent wi e Commission s policy statements. Bo defendants argued at ey satisfied e first prong because eir sentences were based on guidelines ranges calculated using e subsequently-lowered base offense levels in 2D1.1. However, even if ey are correct, Amendment 759 forecloses relief for Appellants, under e second prong of 3582(c)(2), because eir pre-departure/prevariance applicable guideline ranges were calculated using e base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. The defendants en argued at since Amendment 759 came into effect after ey committed eir crimes, Amendment 759 was an invalid ex post facto law. We now hold at, alough Appellants sentences were based on Guidelines ranges calculated under 2D1.1, Amendment 759 is not an ex post facto law and operates to bar a sentence reduction for Appellants. We will erefore affirm e District Court s judgment in bo cases denying Appellants motions for sentence reduction. Cases In This Issue Mais v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) United States v. Adams, 2016 WL 3269704 (11 Cir. 2016) United States v. Arnick, 2016 WL 3383487 (5 Cir. 2016) United States v. Barcenas-Yanez, 2016 WL 3408889 (4 Cir. 2016) United States v. Clinton, 2016 WL 3349257 (7 Cir. 2016) United States v. Collins, 2016 WL 3583999 (6 Cir. 2016) United States v. Cuero, 2016 WL 3563660 (9 Cir. 2016) United States v. Davis, 2016 WL 3124838 (8 Cir. 2016) United States v. Sawyer, 2016 WL 3125986 (6 Cir. 2016) rd United States v. Thompson, 2016 WL 3163078 (3 Cir. 2016) United States v. Velasquez, 2016 WL 3199634 (5 Cir. 2016)