Political Science Field Survey (2018)

Political Science Field Survey (2018) Kerim Can Kavaklı 1 Course overview This course offers an in-depth overview of many of the central debates in contemporary political science. I have three main goals: (1) familiarize students with the theories and empirical approaches that are most widely-used in published research currently, (2) familiarize students with Bocconi professors and their research interests, (3) enable students to actively contribute to the literature. The choice of readings emphasizes recent work, but some more dated classics are also included because of their paradigm-defining importance. To avoid duplication with the material you might read in political economics courses, priority has been given to work that can be characterized as political science proper either because it was published in a political science journal or because it was authored by political scientists (or both). In some cases, contributions that could be classified as political economics (i.e., published by economists in economics journals) are included because of their influence on the political science discipline. In the class meetings, we will unpack each of the readings, put their claims in context, discuss the shortcomings, and explore directions in which the discipline can and should move. By the end of the course, students will be able to think like a political scientist. Given that a knowledge of political systems at the undergrad level is assumed by most of the readings, students should consult an undergrad comparative politics textbook (e.g., the Clark, Golder and Golder one) if they have specific holes in their knowledge. Needless to say, such a textbook is not a substitute for the assigned readings. 2 Grading 60%: term paper. This should be the first draft of a substantive publishable research paper. Writing a paper like this requires asking a meaningful research question, placing it in the context of the literature, and providing an answer of reasonable quality using either deduction (e.g., a formal model) or evidence (e.g., statistical or historical analysis). Paper topics are to be discussed with the instructor by the third week of the course. Deadline: to be announced. 10% each: two short in-class presentations. Starting from week 3 ( Autocracies ) we will feature one or two short presentations (with slides) lasting no more than 10 minutes each. The presentation will be timed (exactly like a research seminar) and interrupted after 10 minutes. The presentation will introduce the setting, content, and main findings of one or two of the assigned readings. 20%: course participation. This is a Ph.D. level seminar: fast-paced and in-depth at the same time. Students are going to be doing most of the talking: the instructor will mostly 1

ask questions to give the discussion some degree of direction. Needless to say, this is not going to be a set of brainstorming sessions: students are expected to carefully read all the assigned material before the seminar meeting. In particular, students are expected to be able to summarize the main points and describe the methodological approach of any of the assigned pieces marked with [study]. The instructor might also ask a student to defend the argument in a paper, or to discuss its shortcomings: in this case, students do not get to choose whether they argue in favor or against an argument/paper. Students are also expected to actively contribute to the discussion of the papers marked with [read]. When reading the papers marked with [study], students are encouraged to take extensive notes of the most important points made. Papers marked with [read] must be read, but extensive note-taking is not required. 3 Topics and readings 1. The state, institutions, governance, state formation. Olson (1993) [study] Tilly (1992) ch. 3 [read] Mann (1984) [study] Sanchez de la Sierra (2014)[read] Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)[read] 2. Regimes: democracy vs. autocracy; regime transitions Linz and Stepan (2011), ch.4 [study] Przeworski et al. (2000) ch. 1 and 2 [study] Brancati (2014)[study] Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) ch. 6[read] Marinov and Goemans (2014)[read] 3. Autocracies Linz and Stepan (2011) ch.3 [study] Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) [study] Boix and Svolik (2013) [study] 2

Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) [read] Malesky and Schuler (2010) [read] Wright (2008)[read] 4. Elections and their consequences Huber and Powell (1994) [study] Cox (1997), chapters 3-5,11 [study] Somer-Topcu (2009)[read] Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2011)[read] [Bocconi prof.] Bhavnani (2009)[read] 5. Representation: accountability; redistribution; special interests; vote-buying Fearon (1999) [study] Olson (2008), ch 2-3[study] Ferraz and Finan (2008) [read] Paler (2013) [read] Stanig (2013) [read] [Bocconi prof.] 6. Legislatures: why parties; varieties of parties and party systems; polarization; party discipline Aldrich (1995), ch.2 [study] Tsebelis (1999) [study] Carey (2007) [study] Dewan and Myatt (2007) [read] Heller and Mershon (2008) [read] 7. Executives: types of executive head; coalitions; delegation to bureaucrats Stepan and Skach (1993) [study] Huber (1996)[study] 3

Huber and McCarty (2004) [study] O Brien (2015)[read] Martin and Vanberg (2015) [read] [Bocconi prof.] 8. Far-right parties; media capture; social media Golder (2016)[study] Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009) [study] Prat and Strömberg (2013)[study] King, Pan and Roberts (2013) [read] Munger (2017)[read] Colantone and Stanig (2018)[read] [Bocconi prof.] 9. Bargaining and interstate conflict Fearon (1999)[study] Jackson and Morelli (2011)[study] [Bocconi prof.] Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014)[study] Caselli, Morelli and Rohner (2015)[read] [Bocconi prof.] McManus (2018)[read] Kavaklı, Chatagnier and Hatipoglu (2017)[read] [Bocconi prof.] 10. Civil conflict Fearon and Laitin (2003)[study] Kalyvas (2006)[study] Blattman and Miguel (2010)[study] Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010)[read] Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)[read] 11. To be determined 4

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