Richard S. Beth Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process Betsy Palmer Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process January 31, 2011 Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees Congress 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32878
Summary is the only means by which the Senate can vote to limit debate on a matter, and thereby overcome a possible filibuster. It would be erroneous, however, to assume that cases in which cloture is sought are the same as those in which a filibuster occurs. may be sought when no filibuster is taking place, and filibusters may occur without cloture being sought. Until 1949, cloture could not be invoked on nominations, and before 1980 this action was attempted only twice. From the 96 th Congress (1979-1980) through the 102 nd (1991-1992), cloture was never sought on more than three nominations in a single Congress, but in four the nine Congresses since then a dozen or more nominations were subjected to cloture attempts. From 1949 through 2010, cloture was sought on 89 nominations, and invoked on 41. The Senate voted to reject cloture on 22 the remaining 48 nominations, and on the final 26 nominations no cloture motion received a vote. Eighteen the 89 nominees failed confirmation, and 11 these 18 were considered during the 108 th Congress (2003-2004). In the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), the 109 th Congress (2005-2006), and the 111 th Congress (2009-2010) most the cloture attempts were to executive branch nominations, but in all other Congresses nominations to the federal bench predominated. has been sought on four nominations to the Supreme Court. In 1968, a cloture vote on the motion to proceed to consider the nomination Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice failed. In 1971, when he was first appointed to the court, and again in 1986 when he was nominated to be Chief Justice, opponents William H. Rehnquist mounted a filibuster. Though the cloture vote in 1971 was unsuccessful, Rehnquist was to the court; in 1986, the cloture vote was successful. In 2006, the Senate successfully invoked cloture on the nomination Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an associate justice on the Supreme Court. This report is to be updated after each Congress in which additional nominations are subjected to cloture attempts. Filibusters and cloture are discussed more generally in CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and in the Senate, by Richard S. Beth, Valerie Heitshusen, and Betsy Palmer. The process by which the Senate considers nominations is discussed more generally in CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure, by Elizabeth Rybicki, and CRS Report RL31948, Evolution the Senate s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: A Brief History, by Betsy Palmer. Congressional Research Service
Contents, Filibusters, and How They Differ...1 Frequency...2 Historical Development...3 Positions in Relation to Which Was Sought...5 Tables Table 1. Attempts and Action on Nominations...3 Table 2. Frequency and Success, by Time Period, 1949-2008...4 Table 3. Action on Judicial and Executive Nominations, by Time Period, 1967-2008...5 Table 4. Nominations Subjected to Attempts, 1968-2010...6 Contacts Author Contact Information...10 Congressional Research Service
, Filibusters, and How They Differ Senate Rules place no general limits on how long consideration a nomination (or most other matters) may last. Owing to this lack general time limits, opponents a nomination may be able to use extended debate or other delaying actions to prevent a final vote from occurring. Although a voting majority Senators may be prepared to vote for a nominee, the nomination cannot be as long as other Senators, presumably a voting minority, are able to prevent the vote from occurring. The use debate and procedural actions for the purpose preventing or delaying a vote is a filibuster. The motion for cloture is the only procedure by which the Senate can vote to place time limits on its consideration a matter. It is, therefore, the Senate s most usual means attempting to overcome a filibuster. When the Senate adopts a cloture motion on a matter, known as invoking cloture, further consideration the matter is limited to 30 hours. 1 By invoking cloture, the Senate may be able to ensure that a question will ultimately come to a vote, and can be decided by a voting majority. The cloture rule permits Senators to move for cloture repeatedly, if necessary. The Senate, however, can impose the constraints cloture only by a super-majority vote. For most matters, including nominations, three-fifths the full Senate, normally 60 votes, is required to invoke cloture. As a result, even if a majority Senators support a nomination, opponents may still be able to prevent a vote on it by defeating any attempt to invoke cloture. Although the nomination itself can always be approved by a simple majority Senators present and voting, the support a super-majority may be required to limit consideration and enable the Senate to reach a vote. While cloture affords the Senate a means overcoming a filibuster, it is erroneous to assume that cases in which cloture is sought are always the same as those in which a filibuster occurs. may be sought when no filibuster is taking place, and filibusters may occur without cloture being sought. The reason is that cloture is sought by supporters a matter, while filibusters are conducted by its opponents. Leaders the majority party, or other supporters, may move for cloture even when opponents do not assert that they are attempting a filibuster, or when no extended debate or delaying actions have actually occurred. They may do so in response to a threat or perceived threat a filibuster, or simply in an effort to speed action. It is also possible for opponents a matter to engage in a filibuster without supporters deciding to move for cloture. Supporters may refrain either because they think they lack the votes to obtain cloture, because they believe they can overcome any delaying actions and reach a vote without cloture, or because they hope to resolve the matter in dispute by some negotiated accommodation. This situation may be less common today, but does seem to have occurred in relation to nominations in earlier times. If cloture is not an automatic indicator a filibuster, neither is any other specific procedural action. A filibuster is a matter intent; any course action by opponents a matter may be a 1 Senate Rule XXII, paragraph 2. U.S. Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual, Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business the United States Senate, S.Doc. 110-1, 110 th Cong., 2 nd sess., prepared by Matthew McGowan under the direction Howard Gantman, Staff Director (Washington: GPO, 2008), sec. 22.2. During the 30 hours, no single Senator, other than the party floor leaders and the managers the debate, may occupy more than one hour in debate. Congressional Research Service 1
filibuster if it is undertaken with the purpose blocking or delaying a vote. Yet any the procedural actions that might be used to delay or block a vote might also be used for other purposes. As a result, filibusters cannot simply be identified by explicit or uniform criteria, and there is no commonly accepted set criteria for doing so. Instead, determining whether a filibuster is occurring in any specific case typically requires a degree subjective judgment. For these reasons, it would be a misuse the following data, identifying nominations on which cloture was sought, to treat them as identifying nominations subjected to filibuster. It would equally be a misinterpretation to assume that all nominations on which cloture was not sought were not filibustered (especially for periods before 1949, when it was first made possible to move cloture on nominations, as described in the next section). This report provides data only on nominations on which cloture motions were fered. It is not to be taken as providing systematic data on nominations that were or were not filibustered. It would not be feasible to develop a list measures filibustered unless a commonly accepted single standard for identifying what constitutes filibustering could first be established. 2 At most, the data presented here may be regarded as identifying some potentially likely cases in which a filibuster (by some appropriate definition) may have occurred. Frequency The Senate first adopted a cloture rule in 1917. Until 1949, cloture could be moved only on legislative measures, and nominations could not be subjected to cloture attempts. 3 From 1949 through 2010 (81 st -111 th Congresses), cloture was sought on 89 nominations. 4 Table 4, following the text this report, identifies the 89 nominations, the number separate cloture motions filed on each, the ultimate outcome the cloture attempt in each case, and the disposition each nomination. As shown by the summary in Table 1, the Senate invoked cloture on 41 these 89 nominations. On another 26 nominations, cloture motions were fered, but never came to a vote, because the motions fell, were withdrawn or vitiated. On the remaining 22 nominations, the Senate voted against imposing cloture. 5 2 These questions method are discussed in more detail in Richard S. Beth, What We Don t Know About Filibusters, paper presented at the annual meeting the Western Political Science Association, Portland, Ore., March 1995 (available from the author). 3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Rule: Limitation Debate in the Congress the United States and Legislative History Paragraph 2 Rule XXII the Standing Rules the United States Senate ( Rule), S.Print 99-95, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library Congress, 99 th Cong., 1 st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 17, 21, 38-39, 105-112. 4 For these purposes, five State Department nominations considered concurrently are counted as one, and each instance in which a single individual was simultaneously nominated to two positions is counted as one. 5 The data include all cloture action in relation to a nomination, whether the motion is fered to close debate on the nomination itself or on a debatable motion to proceed to its consideration (which does not occur in practice after 1980). Congressional Research Service 2
Table 1. Attempts and Action on Nominations Action on Nomination Action Confirmed Not Total Invoked 41 0 41 Rejected 5 17 22 Withdrawn/Vitiated/Fell a 25 1 26 Total 71 18 89 Source: Table 4. a. This category only includes situations in which there was no vote on any cloture motion. Of the 89 nominations on which cloture was sought, 71 ultimately won confirmation. The 71 nominations include all 41 on which the Senate invoked cloture and 25 those on which the Senate did not vote on the cloture motions, as well as five on which the Senate rejected cloture. The remaining 18 nominations were not, either because the Senate voted to reject cloture or because they did not receive a final vote. On 17 these nominations, 11 which occurred in the 108 th Congress (2003-2004), the Senate rejected cloture. In the final case, in the 109 th Congress (2006-2007), the cloture motion was withdrawn and the nomination was not. Before the 108 th Congress, only three the 35 nominations on which cloture was sought were ultimately rejected. These were Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice the United States in 1968; Sam Brown to be Ambassador during his tenure as Head Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1994; and Dr. Henry Foster to be Surgeon General the United States in 1995. Historical Development Attempts on Nominations Even after Senate rules began to permit cloture on nominations in 1949, cloture was sought on none until 1968, when a motion to proceed to consider the nomination Supreme Court Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice was debated at length. After the Senate rejected cloture on the motion to proceed, 45-43, President Lyndon B. Johnson withdrew the nomination at Fortas request. In 1969 and 1970, the nominations Clement F. Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court were defeated after lengthy debate, but no cloture motion was filed on either. When the Senate considered the nomination to the Supreme Court William H. Rehnquist late in the 1971 session, however, cloture was quickly sought. Though the Senate did not invoke cloture (52-42), the nomination was subsequently. In 1975, the majority required for invoking cloture on most matters, including nominations, was changed from two-thirds Senators present and voting to three-fifths the full membership Congressional Research Service 3
the Senate (60 votes, assuming no more than one vacancy). 6 This change in the rules generally meant that the threshold for invoking cloture was lowered; if all 100 Senators participated in the vote, the previous rule required the votes 67 to invoke cloture, the new rule normally required 60 votes, regardless how many Senators participated. was sought on no other nomination until 1980. That occurrence was the first in which cloture was sought on a nomination to an executive branch position, that William G. Lubbers to be General Counsel the National Labor Relations Board. was invoked, and the nomination was. Table 2. Frequency and Success, by Time Period, 1949-2008 Nominations on which cloture was: Moved Invoked Congresses and (years) Number Average per Congress Number Percent moved 81 st -89 th (1949-1966) 0 0 0 90 th -102 nd (1967-1992) 12 0.9 9 75% 103 rd -111 th (1993-2010) 77 8.6 32 42% Source: Table 4. As Table 2 illustrates, the frequency with which nominations have been subjected to cloture attempts has increased in recent years (a development that reflects the trend in the overall frequency cloture motions). Before the 103 rd Congress, cloture was sought on as many as three nominations only in the 96 th Congress (1979-1980) and the 99 th Congress (1985-1986). Since then, however, this level has been exceeded five times. was sought on 12 nominations in the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), five in the 107 th (2001-2002), 14 in the 108 th (2003-2004), 18 in the 109 th Congress (2005-2006) and 21 in the 111 th Congress (2009-2010). These five Congresses were also the only ones since 1981 in which the presidency, Senate, and House were all controlled by the same political party. 7 In addition, the 103 rd, 107 th and 111 th Congresses were each the first a new presidential administration, so that the number nominations to be considered was presumably large. Table 2 also indicates that, although the frequency nominations with cloture attempts has increased, the frequency with which cloture has succeeded has decreased. This pattern appears to suggest that in recent Congresses, cloture has been sought even when it is unlikely to be invoked. This shift was evident especially in the 103 rd Congress, when cloture was successfully invoked on only four the 12 nominations where attempted, and in the 108 th Congress, when it was invoked on none the 14 nominations on which it was attempted. In other Congresses, the proportion nominations with cloture attempts on which cloture succeeded has generally been much higher. In the 108 th Congress (2003-2004), the pattern Senate action on nominations on which cloture was sought displayed several distinctive features. First, the maximum number cloture motions fered on any nomination was higher than in any other Congress. In other Congresses, as many 6 Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Rule, pp. 30-32, 53-54, 119-121. 7 The Republican Party lost control the Senate during the 1 st session the 107 th Congress. Congressional Research Service 4
as three cloture motions had been fered on a single nomination only on three occasions (two in 1980 and one in 1994). In the entire 111 th Congress, cloture was not attempted more than once on any nomination on which it was sought. In the 108 th Congress, by contrast, one nomination was subjected to seven cloture motions and another to four. Second, when the Senate sought cloture on a nomination but was unable to confirm it, the Senate in the 108 th Congress retained the nomination on its calendar until final adjournment. In earlier Congresses, nominations that were not after cloture attempts were typically either withdrawn or returned to the President. Both these shifts may represent indications an increased intensity with which supporters these nominations were attempting to secure Senate votes on them. Table 3. Action on Judicial and Executive Nominations, by Time Period, 1967-2008 Judicial Executive Congresses and (years) Invoked Rejected Fell, Vitiated or Withdrawn a Invoked Rejected Fell, Vitiated or Withdrawn a 90 th -102 nd (1967-1992) 5 2 1 4 0 0 103 rd (1993-1994) 1 0 1 3 3 4 104 th -107 th (1995-2002) 5 1 1 3 1 0 108 th (2003-2004) 0 10 2 0 1 1 109 th (2005-2006) 6 0 0 3 2 7 110 th (2007-2008) 1 0 0 0 0 0 111 th (2009-2010) 2 0 3 8 2 6 Total 20 13 8 21 9 18 Source: Table 4. Notes: All nominations on which cloture was invoked were. Five the nominations for which cloture was rejected were. All but one the nominations on which the cloture motion fell, was vitiated, or was withdrawn were ultimately. See Table 1. a. This category includes only situations in which there was no vote on any cloture motion. Positions in Relation to Which Was Sought Few the nominations on which cloture has been attempted have been to the Supreme Court or Cabinet-level positions. Only four have been to the Supreme Court, and five to fices at the level the President s Cabinet. Until the 111 th Congress, a majority the nominations on which cloture was sought had been to positions on the federal bench. This circumstance perhaps reflected the Senate s traditional inclination to permit the President generally wide latitude in selecting ficials to serve under him in executive branch positions. Only in the 103 rd, 109 th and 111 th Congresses was cloture sought in more cases nominations to positions in the executive branch than the judicial branch. Of the 12 nominations on which cloture action occurred during the 103 rd Congress, 10 were for executive branch positions. Of the 19 nominations on which cloture was sought in the 109 th Congress, 12 were for executive branch Congressional Research Service 5
positions. Of the 21 nominations on which cloture was sought in the 111 th Congress, 16 were for executive branch positions. Table 3 summarizes the outcomes cloture action on executive and judicial nominations, broken down into seven periods that display distinct patterns. Table 4. Nominations Subjected to Attempts, 1968-2010 Congress and Year Nominee Position Number Attempts a Final Outcome Attempt b Disposition Nomination 90 th, 1968 Abe Fortas Chief Justice 1 rejected, 45-43 92 nd, 1971 William H. Rehnquist Associate Justice 2 rejected, 52-42 withdrawn 96 th, 1980 William A. Lubbers General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board 96 th, 1980 Don Zimmerman Member, National Labor Relations Board 3 invoked, 62-34 3 invoked, 63-31 96 th, 1980 Stephen G. Breyer Circuit Judge 2 invoked, 68-28 98 th, 1984 J. Harvie Wilkinson Circuit Judge 2 invoked, 65-32 99 th, 1986 Sidney A. Fitzwater District Judge 64-33 99 th, 1986 Daniel A. Manion Circuit Judge 1 withdrawn 99 th, 1986 William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice 68-31 100 th, 1987 Melissa Wells Ambassador 64-24 100 th, 1987 C. William Verity Secretary Commerce 85-8 102 nd, 1992 Edward Earl Carnes, Jr. Circuit Judge 66-30 103 rd, 1993 Walter Dellinger Assistant Attorney General 2 rejected, 59-39 103 rd, 1993 five nominations c State Department 2 rejected, 58-42 103 rd, 1993 Janet Napolitano U.S. Attorney 72-26 103 rd, 1994 M. Larry Lawrence Ambassador 1 fell d 103 rd, 1994 Rosemary Barkett Circuit Judge 1 withdrawn 103 rd, 1994 Sam Brown Ambassador 3 rejected, 56-42 103 rd, 1994 Derek Shearer Ambassador 2 invoked, 62-36 returned to president 103 rd, 1994 Ricki Tigert Board Member and Chair, 2 invoked, Congressional Research Service 6
Congress and Year Nominee Position Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation c Number Attempts a Final Outcome Attempt b 63-32 Disposition Nomination 103 rd, 1994 H. Lee Sarokin Circuit Judge 85-12 103 rd, 1994 Buster Glosson Air Force Lieutenant 1 withdrawn General (retired) 103 rd, 1994 Claude Bolton, Jr. Air Force Brigadier General 1 vitiated f 103 rd, 1994 Edward P. Barry, Jr. Air Force Lieutenant 1 vitiated f General (retired) 104 th, 1995 Henry Foster Surgeon General 2 rejected, 57-43 105 th, 1997 Joel I. Klein Assistant Attorney General 78-11 105 th, 1998 David Satcher Surgeon General 75-23 106 th, 1999 Brian Theadore Stewart District Judge 1 rejected, 55-44 106 th, 2000 Marsha L. Berzon Circuit Judge 86-13 106 th, 2000 Richard A. Paez Circuit Judge 85-14 107 th, 2002 Lavenski R. Smith Circuit Judge 94-3 107 th, 2002 Richard R. Clifton Circuit Judge 97-1 107 th, 2002 Richard H. Carmona Surgeon General 98-0 107 th, 2002 Julia Smith Gibbons Circuit Judge 89-0 107 th, 2002 Dennis W. Shedd Circuit Judge 1 vitiated f 108 th, 2003 Victor J. Wolski Judge, Court Claims 1 vitiated f 108 th, 2003 Miguel A. Estrada Circuit Judge 7 rejected, withdrawn 55-43 108 th, 2003 Michael O. Leavitt Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency 1 withdrawn 108 th, 2003 Charles W. Pickering, Sr. Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 54-43 108 th, 2003 William H. Pryor, Jr. Circuit Judge 2 rejected, 51-43 108 th, 2003 Priscilla Richman Owen Circuit Judge 4 rejected, 53-42 Congressional Research Service 7
Congress and Year Nominee Position Number Attempts a Final Outcome Attempt b Disposition Nomination 108 th, 2003 Carolyn B. Kuhl Circuit Judge 2 rejected, 53-43 108 th, 2003 Janice R. Brown Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 53-43 108 th, 2003 Thomas C. Dorr Undersecretary Agriculture for Rural Development and Board Member, Commodity Credit Corporation e 2 rejected, 57-39 108 th, 2004 Marcia G. Cooke District Judge 1 withdrawn 108 th, 2004 William Gerry Myers III Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 53-44 108 th, 2004 David W. McKeague Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 53-44 108 th, 2004 Henry W. Saad Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 52-46 108 th, 2004 Richard A. Griffin Circuit Judge 1 rejected, 54-44 109 th, 2005 Thomas C. Dorr Undersecretary Agriculture for Rural Development 1 withdrawn 109 th, 2005 Peter Cyril Wyche Flory Assistant Secretary Defense 1 rejected, 52-41 109 th, 2005 Priscilla Richman Owen Circuit Judge 81-18 109 th, 2005 William H. Pryor, Jr. Circuit Judge 67-32 109 th, 2005 Janice R. Brown Circuit Judge 65-32 109 th, 2005 John R. Bolton U.S. Representative to the United Nations 109 th, 2005 Stephen L. Johnson Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency 2 rejected, 54-38 61-37 109 th, 2005 Robert J. Portman U.S. Trade Representative 1 vitiated 109 th, 2006 Gordon England Deputy Secretary 1 withdrawn Defense 109 th, 2006 Eric S. Edelman Under Secretary Defense 1 withdrawn for Policy 109 th, 2006 Benjamin A. Powell General Counsel, Office the Director National Intelligence 1 withdrawn 109 th, 2006 Richard Stickler Assistant Secretary Labor 1 withdrawn Congressional Research Service 8
Congress and Year Nominee Position for Mine Safety and Health 109 th, 2006 Dorrance Smith Assistant Secretary Defense 109 th, 2006 Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Associate Justice, Supreme Court Number Attempts a Final Outcome Attempt b Disposition Nomination 1 withdrawn 72-25 109 th, 2006 Brett M. Kavanaugh Circuit Judge 67-30 109 th, 2006 Andrew von Eschenbach Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration 89-6 109 th, 2006 Dirk Kempthorne Secretary the Interior 85-8 109 th, 2006 Kent A. Jordan Circuit Judge 93-0 110 th, 2007 Leslie Southwick Circuit Judge 62-35 111 th, 2009 Hilda Solis Secretary Labor 1 withdrawn 111 th, 2009 Austan Dean Goolsbee Member, Council Economic Advisers 1 withdrawn 111 th, 2009 Cecilia Elena Rouse Member, Council 1 withdrawn Economic Advisers 111 th, 2009 David W. Ogden Deputy Attorney General 1 withdrawn 111 th, 2009 David J. Hayes Deputy Secretary the Interior 1 rejected, 57-39 111 th, 2009 Christopher R. Hill U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 73-17 111 th, 2009 David F. Hamilton Circuit judge 70-29 111 th, 2010 Lael Brainard Under Secretary, Treasury Department 111 th, 2010 Harold Hongju Koh Legal Advisor, Department State 111 th, 2010 Marisa J. Demeo Associate Judge, Superior Court, District Columbia 111 th, 2010 William K. Sessions III Chair, United States Sentencing Commission 111 th, 2010 M. Patricia Smith Solicitor, Department Labor 111 th, 2010 Cass R. Sunstein Administrator, Office Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office Management and Budget 84-10 65-31 1 withdrawn 1 withdrawn 60-32 63-35 111 th, 2010 Robert M. Groves Director the Census, Congressional Research Service 9
Congress and Year Nominee Position 111 th, 2010 Martha N. Johnson Administrator, General Services Administration Number Attempts a Final Outcome Attempt b Department Commerce 76-15 82-16 Disposition Nomination 111 th, 2010 Thomas J. Vanaskie Circuit Judge 1 withdrawn 111 th, 2010 Barbara Milano Keenan Circuit Judge 99-0 111 th, 2010 Ben S. Bernanke Chairman, Board Governors the Federal Reserve System 77-23 111 th, 2010 Denny Chin Circuit Judge 1 withdrawn 111 th, 2010 Craig Becker Member, National Labor Relations Board 111 th, 2010 Christopher H. Schroeder 1 rejected, 52-33 Assistant Attorney General 1 withdrawn Sources: Compilations by CRS and Senate Library; Legislative Information System the U.S. Congress; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Rule, committee print 99-95, 99 th Congress, 1 st session (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 44-70, 78-85; Congressional Record (Daily Digest); and Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1986, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1999. Notes: Executive branch nominations in roman; Judicial nominations in italic. Final outcome cloture attempt is in bold when cloture was rejected. Disposition nomination is in bold when the nominee was not. a. Category includes both cloture motions filed and votes the Senate to reconsider a cloture vote. b. On several the nominations, the Senate held more than one cloture vote. This vote represents the final cloture vote that Congress on the nomination. c. These five nominations to various positions in the State Department received consideration and cloture action concurrently, and are counted as one case in the tables. d. motion became moot and received no action. e. The individual was nominated simultaneously for the two positions specified, and cloture action took place on each nomination in turn. The table counts all actions on one nominee as one case. f. By unanimous consent, the Senate treated the cloture motion as having no effect. Author Contact Information Richard S. Beth Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process rbeth@crs.loc.gov, 7-8667 Betsy Palmer Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process bpalmer@crs.loc.gov, 7-0381 Congressional Research Service 10