Tbilisis da qutaisis saqalaqo sasamartloebis sisxlis samartlis saqmeta monitoringis angarisi

MONITORING CRIMINAL TRIALS IN TBILISI AND KUTAISI CITY COURTS Monitoring Report #4 Period Covered: January - June, 2013 October, 2013 Tbilisi, Georgia Tbilisis da qutaisis saqalaqo sasamartloebis sisxlis samartlis saqmeta monitoringis angarisi monitoringis angarisi #4 periodi: ianvari - ivnisi, 2013 oqtomberi, 2013 Tbilisi, saqartvelo

1 Georgian Young Lawyers Association MONITORING CRIMINAL TRIALS IN TBILISI AND KUTAISI CITY COURTS REPORT NO. 4 (January June 2013) The monitoring project is made possible by the generous support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Georgian Young Lawyers` Association and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government or EWMI.

2 The author s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. GYLA thanks Georgian Court System for its cooperation in the process of court monitoring. Author: Editor: Tech. Editor: EKA KHUTSISHVILI KHATUNA KVIRALASHVILI IRAKLI SVANIDZE Responsible of publication: The following GYLA monitors took part in the preparation of the monitoring and research results: EKATERINE POPKHADZE TAMAR GVARAMADZE MARIAM NIKOLASHVILI GIORGI POPANDOPULO VLADIMER BEKISHVILI LEVAN VEPKHVADZE ANA SIGUA Was edited and published in the Georgian Young Lawyers Association 15, J. Kakhidze st. Tbilisi 0102, Georgia (+99532) 293 61 01, 295 23 53 Coping or Disseminating of publication for commercial purpose without GYLA s written permission is prohibited -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2013, The Georgian Young Lawyers Association

3 CONTENTS The Main Trends Revealed in Trial Monitoring Process... 5 First Appearance Hearings (preventive measures)... 5 Pre-trial Hearings... 6 Plea Agreement Hearings... 6 Other Key Findings... 6 Introduction... 8 Methodology... 9 Structure of the Report... 10 A. Observations Regarding Specific Stages of Criminal Proceedings... 11 I. First Appearances... 11 1.1. General Trends... 12 1.2. Specific Preventive Measures... 14 1.2.1. Bail... 14 1.2.2. Imprisonment... 20 1.2.3. Personal Guarantee... 24 1.2.4. Agreement on Not Leaving the Country and Proper Conduct... 24 1.2.5. Military Command s Supervision over a Military Servant s Behavior... 25 1.3. Publishing Information about Hearings in Advance... 26 II. Pre-Trial Hearings... 27 III. Plea Agreement Hearings... 29

4 B. Observations Regarding Specific Rights... 32 I. Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process... 32 II. Right to Defense... 34 III. Prohibition against Ill-Treatment... 35 IV. Right to a Motivated (Reasoned) Decision... 37 V. Right to Public Hearing... 39 C. Timeliness of Court Proceedings... 43 Conclusions... 43 Recommendations... 44 Annexes... 46

THE MAIN TRENDS REVEALED IN TRIAL MONITORING PROCESS (January-June, 2013) 5 First Appearance Hearings (preventive measures) Compared to the previous monitoring period (July-December 2012): o The percentage of defendants for whom the prosecution requested imprisonment as a preventive measure decreased from 50% to 41%. o The percentage of defendants given imprisonment as a preventive measure decreased from 37% to 30%. o The percentage of defendants ordered bail as a preventive measure increased from 63% to 69%. For the first time since the start of monitoring, the court let one defendant go on his own recognizance and did not order any preventive measure. This however was a high profile case involving Tbilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava. As in previous monitoring periods, the courts almost exclusively used two types of preventive measures: imprisonment and bail. There were only two exceptions: 1 case of agreement not to leave the country and 1 case of leaving defendant without any preventive measure under his own recognizance. The court adequately substantiated higher percentage of its rulings on imprisonment (81%) than its rulings on bail (51%) respectively. Judges appeared to give more consideration when imposing preventive measures, instead of doing it automatically upon the request of the prosecution: o In 28% of cases where the prosecution requested imprisonment, the court ordered bail. o In 51% of the cases where the prosecution requested bail, the court ordered less amount than requested by the prosecution. o In two high-profile cases where the prosecution requested bail, the court ordered either lesser or no preventive measures.

6 Current and former high government officials were treated more favorably than the general public when courts determined preventive measures. As in previous monitoring periods, the courts failed to publish any information about first appearances in advance. However, in Kutaisi Criminal Court the bailiffs verbally announced information concerning the first appearance hearings. Pre-trial Hearings Similar to previous reporting periods, courts seems predisposed to granting all of the prosecution s motions seeking the submission of evidence. In only one fifth of cases defense submitted motions to submit evidence. It often failed to submit a list of proposed evidence or object to evidence submitted by prosecution. As in previous monitoring periods, there was not a single case where the court terminated the prosecution at the pre-trial hearing on the grounds that there was a high probability that the defendant had not committed the offence. Plea Agreement Hearings As in previous reporting periods judges were too passive in plea agreement hearings, automatically approving the prosecution s motion to approve the plea agreement. The percentage of plea agreements imposing fines dropped, from 57 % to 50%. Also, the amount of the average fine dropped to only 36% of the average fine during the prior period. Compared to previous reporting periods, the instances of applying community labor in plea-agreements increased from 1% to 7%. Other Key Findings Although the defense continued to be passive in typical cases, in high-profile cases the defense was often more active than the prosecution.

Of the 84 cases finalized (69 with a plea agreement and 15 after hearing the case on merits) only in one case was the defendant acquitted. During the current monitoring period, judges did a much better job of informing defendants of their right to be free of ill-treatment and inquiring as to whether plea agreements were the result of ill-treatment. Of 30 search and seizures hearings monitored by GYLA, only one search was performed with a court s warrant; the remaining 29 searches were justified based on urgent necessity and legalized later by the court. This engenders doubt as to the compliance of law enforcement authorities and the court with their obligations not to conduct or legalize searches that are not appropriately justified on the basis of urgent necessity. Althought the public s right to attend hearings was usually observed, significant short-comings were observed. There continues to be a problem with the timeliness of court proceedings. Of the hearings that did not involve first appearances, 39% started with more than five minutes delay. 7

8 INTRODUCTION Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) has been carrying out its court monitoring project since October 2011. GYLA initially implemented its monitoring project in Tbilisi City Court s Criminal Chamber. On December 1, 2012, GYLA broadened the scope of the monitoring project to also include Kutaisi City Court. Identical methods of monitoring are utilized both in Kutaisi and in Tbilisi. 1 GYLA presented to the public and stakeholders its first and second trial monitoring reports (covering October 2011 to March 2012) in June 2012. Presentation of GYLA s third report (covering July to December 2012) was held in April 2013. This is GYLA s fourth trial monitoring report, covering the period from January 2013 to June 2013. Similar to previous reporting periods, the purpose of monitoring criminal case proceedings was to increase their transparency, reflect the actual process in courtrooms, and provide information to the public. In addition to reporting its findings during the reporting period, this report also presents recommendations for improving the criminal justice system based on observations GYLA has made since it began monitoring project. Between January and June 2013, GYLA monitored 600 court hearings, including: 99 first appearance hearings; 70 pre-trial hearings; 71 hearings where plea agreements were discussed; 359 main hearings; and One appellate hearing. Of these 600 hearings, 371 took place in Tbilisi City Court (TCC), 228 took place in Kutaisi City Court (KCC), and one was held in Kutaisi Appellate Court. The only significant difference between the procedures in TCC and KCC concerned the advance publication of the first appearance hearings. 2 1 Due to the smaller number of cases in Kutaisi, monitoring is conducted by a single observer. In Tbilisi City Court monitoring was conducted by three observers, as in the previous reporting periods. 2 In KCC, the court bailiff verbally announced the name of a defendant, the charge against him/her, and the judge; in TCC, no information concerning first appearance hearings was provided in advance.

In its previous monitoring report, GYLA noted that certain improvements took place during the period after the 2012 parliamentary elections (October-December 2012). However, these improvements were largely in cases involving former governmental officials. Because of this, and because of the short period of observation after the election, it was impossible to assess whether the court s general approach had improved, or whether the court was merely treating former officials more favorably than other defendants. GYLA is pleased to report that the current monitoring revealed certain general improvements by the court that extended beyond cases involving high-profile defendants. Specifically, judges appear to give more consideration when imposing preventive measures, instead of automatically imposing the preventive measure requested by the prosecution. 9 METHODOLOGY All of the information in this report was obtained by monitors through their direct monitoring of hearings. GYLA s monitors do not communicate with the parties, and do not review case materials or decisions. However, unlike in previous reporting periods, during this monitoring period GYLA requested individual court decisions to determine whether judges in first appearance hearings based their rulings on facts not presented orally by the parties. GYLA s experienced lawyers and analysts performed the analysis of the obtained information. Similar to previous reporting periods, GYLA s monitors utilized questionnaires prepared especially for the monitoring project. Information gathered by the monitors was evaluated, and the courts compliance with international standards, the Constitution of Georgia and applicable procedures and laws was determined. The questionnaires included both close-ended questions requiring a yes/no answer and open-ended questions that allowed monitors to explain their observations. Further, similar to the previous reporting period, GYLA s monitors made transcripts of trial discussions and particularly important motions in certain cases, giving more clarity and context to their observations. Through this process, monitors were able to collect objective, measurable data, while at the same time record other important facts and developments. The annexes to this report may not fully reflect this more subjective information; however,

10 GYLA s conclusions are based on its analysis of all of the information gathered by the monitors. In view of the complexity of criminal proceedings, GYLA s monitors typically attended individual court hearings rather than monitoring one trial from start to finish. However, there were some exceptions. High-profile cases cases selected by GYLA s monitors and analysts according to criteria elaborated beforehand were monitored from beginning to end, to the extent possible. GYLA observed five such cases. These cases were selected because of allegations of blatant violations of rights, high public interest, or other distinguishing characteristics. GYLA will monitor such cases in the Appellate Court as well. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT This report first presents key observations related to three stages of criminal proceedings: the first appearance of defendants before the court, pre-trial hearings, and hearings to confirm plea agreements. The report then provides an evaluation of the basic rights that defendants have in criminal proceedings, regardless of the stage of the proceeding. These rights include the right to public hearing, equality of arms, the prohibition against ill-treatment, and the right to reasoned judgment. The report s conclusion highlights the key issues identified during the reporting period. GYLA remains hopeful that the information obtained through the monitoring process will help create a clearer picture of the current situation in Georgia s courts, and serve as a useful source of information for the ongoing debates on judicial reform.

11 A. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC STAGES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS I. First Appearances According to Article 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia (CPC), during a defendant s first appearance the court considers what measure should be used to ensure that the defendant will return to court for later hearings and does not either commit a crime while awaiting resolution of the case or obstruct investigation. This preventive measure must be substantiated, meaning that the preventive measure imposed must correspond to the goals of a preventive measure. Many different types of preventive measures are available to the court. These include: imprisonment, bail, agreement of residence and appropriate conduct, and supervision of the conduct of a military serviceman by commanders in-chief. Code of Criminal Procedure (CPC) Article 198(3) provides: When filing a motion to apply a preventive measure, the prosecutor must justify the reason behind his/her choice of preventive measure and the inappropriateness of a less restrictive preventive measure. Accordingly, the burden of justifying a preventive measure is on the prosecution; the defense does not need to submit evidence in opposition to a preventive measure. Further, CPC Article 198(5) imposes obligations on the court before it can impose a preventive measure: When deciding on the application of a preventive measure and its specific type, the court shall take into consideration the defendant s character, scope of activities, age, health condition, family and financial status, restitution made by the defendant for damaged property, whether the defendant has violated a preventive measure previously applied, and other circumstances. The decision of the court as to preventive measures must be substantiated, as a substantiated decision at each stage of the proceedings is part of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Criminal Procedure

12 Code 3 and reinforced by a number of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court). 4 1.1. General Trends During this reporting period, GYLA monitored 99 first appearance hearings (66 in TCC, 33 in KCC) concerning 121 defendants. 5 Compared to previous monitoring periods, some significant improvements were observed. However, other troubling practices remained unchanged. During the first and second court monitoring periods, courts granted all of the prosecution s motions for preventive measures, indicating apparent bias in favor of the prosecution. During the third monitoring period the situation changed to some extent, particularly in the period after the October 2012 elections, with courts sometimes rejecting the prosecution s motion for preventive measures. During the current monitoring period, this trend in favor of the defense continued. Courts were relatively active in examining motions for preventive measures, and were not merely bound by the prosecution s demand. Another positive trend was that the prosecution less frequently requested imprisonment as a preventive measure. However, the prosecution s motions for preventive measures usually still lacked support. For example, when requesting bail as a preventive measure the prosecution typically did not submit information about the defendant s financial condition. On its side, the defense also failed to substantiate its position although it is not obliged to. For example, when a bail motion is examined, the defense provides only general information about defendant s financial condition and does not submit supporting documents or other evidence. The defense, however, was more active in so called high-profile cases which involved former government officials (discussed below in detail). As in previous reporting periods, two preventive measures were used almost exclusively: imprisonment and bail. There appeared to be several reasons for this. First, prosecutors never requested a preventive 3 Article 194.2 of the Criminal Procedural Code of Georgia. 4 E.g., Hiro Balani v. Spain, no. 18064/91, Para. 27 (9 December 1994). 5 More than one defendant participated in some first appearance hearings.

13 measure other than imprisonment or bail. Second, judges appeared indifferent when hearing the motions, and not concerned with applying preventive measures proportionate to the charges. Although obligated to do so, judges hardly ever attempted to investigate the possibility of ordering other preventive measures. Third, the passive position of the defense appeared to be a contributing factor. The defense rarely asked for alternative preventive measures, and when they did (14 of 121 defendants asked for alternative preventive measures; 13 for personal guarantee, and 1 for the military command s supervision over a military servant s behavior) the requests were not accepted by the courts. In response to GYLA s prior criticism that imprisonment and bail ordered as preventive measures lacked substantiation, the judiciary stated that when imposing preventive measure judges consider not only the information presented orally at court hearings, but also written information not discussed at the hearing. Therefore, the judiciary argued, GYLA s monitoring of first appearance hearings is insufficient for determining the proportionality of the imposed preventive measures. 6 GYLA does not agree with this position. The procedural law requires that the judge s decision on first appearance motions be based on only facts and information publicly discussed at the hearing, which were submitted to both parties on equal footing. Nonetheless, although GYLA does not agree that the court may base its decision on evidence not discussed at the hearing, GYLA requested from the courts written decisions from preventive measure hearings so that it could determine whether they were based on evidence that had not been examined at the hearing. 7 Comparing 24 written court decisions with GYLA s monitoring questionnaires revealed that none contained evidence supporting the appropriateness of the ordered preventive measures beyond what was publicly discussed at the hearing. Therefore, the judiciary s claim appears to lack support. 6 The Chair Judge from Tbilisi City Court expressed his position during the presentation of GYLA s Monitoring Report #3, on April 2, 2013. 7 GYLA requested random court rulings on applications for preventive measure during the current monitoring period. In all, 14 rulings were requested from TCC, and 10 from KCC.

14 1.2. Specific Preventive Measures 1.2.1. Bail Bail is a preventive measure by which the court achieves its goals of assuring the defendant s return and preventing the commission of future crimes or interference with the prosecution by requiring that the defendant deposit funds in order to be released until judgment is delivered. The defendant or the person who posted bail in favor of the defendant shall be repaid the amount of the bail in full (with consideration of the rate at the time when bail was posted), or lien which was imposed on shall be lifted from property, within one month from execution of the court judgment, provided that the defendant has fulfilled his/her obligation precisely and honestly, and a preventive measure applied against him/her has not been replaced by a more restrictive preventive measure. As a type of a preventive measure, bail is subjected to all of the obligations under the Criminal Procedure Code for the application of a preventive measure. As a result, the prosecutor must justify the reason behind his/her choice of preventive measure, and the court must take into consideration a variety of factors, including the defendant s character, financial status and other significant characteristics, even where the prosecutor does not provide such circumstances. The defense is not obligated to present information about these circumstances, as it is the prosecution that must justify the relevance and proportionality of the preventive measure sought. 8 Hence, the appropriateness of bail depends on substantiation of its necessity. Findings GYLA s monitoring revealed significantly different results regarding bail from the previous monitoring period. Most notably, bail was ordered for a higher percentage of defendants than in previous monitoring periods (in previous report it was 63% while in the current it is 69%), and bail was sometimes ordered even though the prosecution 8 Under CPC Article 200.2, the amount of bail is determined according to gravity of crime committed and financial position of defendant.

15 requested imprisonment. However, courts still failed to adequately consider lesser preventive measures. a. Of 121 defendants for whom preventive measures were ordered, 69% had bail imposed, whereas 30% were sentenced to imprisonment as preventive measure. In addition, one defendant was released under the obligation not to leave the territory and maintain proper conduct, and another defendant was released without any preventive measure. 9 The chart below illustrates the situation over the entire monitoring (since October 2011) chart #1 b. Bail was ordered as a preventive measure in 28% of the cases where the prosecution requested imprisonment (14 of 50 individuals). Until October 2012, the court always granted the prosecution motions on imprisonment. Only after October 2012 did the judicial practice change when despite the prosecution s requests of imprisonment, court started ordering bail as a preventive measure. The chart below illustrates the situation over the entire monitoring (since October 2011) 9 This was in the high-profile case of Giorgi Ugulava, Mayor of Tbilisi and Davit Kezerashvili, the former Minister of Defense. (see details on this case, below).

16 chart #2 c. Where the prosecution requested bail, in half of the cases (36 of 71) the amount of bail imposed was less than requested by the prosecution. In 33 cases, the imposed amount of bail was equal to the requested by prosecuion. In two additional cases, the court rejected the prosecution s request for bail. In particular, the court refused to impose any preventive measure in relation to one high-ranking official, and imposed another defendant the obligation of not leaving the country and proper conduct. d. The maximum amount of bail ordered during this monitoring period was GEL 35000, and the minimum was GEL 1000. Current statistics differ significantly from those observed during previous monitoring periods, with courts no longer automatically upholding the prosecution s motion for preventive measures. This indicates a step forward in terms of a strengthened role of judges, and that judges are making more reasonable decisions on preventive measures. Despite these positive developments, significant shortcoming was observed regarding the use of bail as a preventive measure. Similar to imprisonment, bail as the preventive measure must be proportional and substantiated; this means that the property serving as bail must be commensurate to the defendant s financial status and alleged crime. All relevant circumstances must be examined during a

17 hearing on preventive measures so that a judge is assured of the defendant s ability to pay the bail. In case of not paying the imposed amount, bail is changed to the more severe preventive measure, imprisonment, thus causing the same legal condition for the defendant. Of the 83 defendants who were ordered bail, GYLA determined that 41 bail decisions (49%) were unsubstantiated; this was an improvement from the initial monitoring periods but worse than the prior monitoring period 10. The chart below illustrates the situation over the entire monitoring (since October 2011) chart #3 These decisions were unsubstantiated for the following reasons: Judges ruled on the prosecution s motions for bail without requiring that the prosecution provide proper reasoning for the request or investigating the defendant s financial status. On the other hand, the defense usually confined itself to making the incorrect legal argument that the defendant pleads not guilty, so no preventive measure should be imposed, or a defendant who is not represented by a lawyer simply disagrees with the prosecution s proposal. 10 GYLA deems bail decisions substantiated whenever: 1) the bail amount was agreed to by both parties (except for three cases where the facts of the case were clearly incommensurate with the bail agreed upon); 2) the judge agreed to the defenseproposed amount of bail; or 3) the amount of bail only slightly exceeded the amount proposed by the defense.

18 In overruling the prosecution s request for imprisonment and ordering bail instead in 14 cases, judges did not investigate the defendant s financial circumstances in 10 of those cases. In one additional case, however, the judge was unusually lenient to the defendant 11. In only the remaining three of 14 cases did the court investigate the financial status of the defendant. Examples of cases where unsubstantiated bail was ordered include the following: Defendant was charged under Article 260(2). 12 The prosecution requested imprisonment, and the defense stated he could pay up to GEL 5,000 as bail. The judge ordered bail of GEL 10,000 without any investigation. In a case involving two defendants, the prosecution demanded GEL 5,000 for the first defendant and GEL 7,000 for the other defendant. The judge inquired whether the prosecution had investigated the defendant s financial status, and was told it did not have enough time to do so. Though judge imposed a lesser amount of bail on each defendant (5000 GEL instead of 7000 GEL requested and 3500 GEL instead of 5000 requested GEL) this case still can be demed as a good example where judge imposes a bail without any investigation thus makes unsubstantiated decision. In another case, the prosecution itself motioned for replacing imprisonment with a bail of GEL 5,000, because the defendant was charged with only a property crime and needed surgical intervention for gangrene on his face that made him unable to eat or drink. Although the defense agreed to the proposed amount of bail, the judge was required to determine the amount of bail that the defendant was capable of paying. The judge did not do so, despite the fact that it appeared that the bail was disproportionate to the defendant s financial status. By contrast, in high-profile cases courts appeared unusually lenient towards former government officials regarding preventive measures. In one, case, the former executive of Vani, a member of the National 11 See below the case of Davit Kakabadze, Gamgebeli of Vani Municipality. 12 Illegal manufacturing, production, purchase, storage, transportation, dispatch or sale of narcotic drugs.

19 Movement, was charged with inflicting less serious bodily injury in an aggravating circumstance 13, persecuting an individual through abusing official powers, 14 and official forgery. 15 Imprisonment was imposed as a preventive measure, and the defense brought a motion that it be replaced with bail in the amount of GEL 5,000, arguing that some of the crimes that the defendant was charged with fell within the scope of the Amnesty Law. The prosecution objected, stating that the defendant had received bail as a preventive measure and then committed a new crime. KCC nonetheless largely upheld the defense s motion, replacing imprisonment with bail of GEL 7,000. GYLA believes the defense argument was not sufficiently strong to warrant a change in preventive measures. Another case of concern involved Giorgi Ugulava, the mayor of Tbilisi. Ugulava was charged with serious crimes: misappropriation committed by an organized group in large amounts by abusing official status (two counts) 16 and legalization of unlawful income committed by an organized group in large amounts. 17 In one of the misappropriation counts, Ugulava was accused of committing the crime with Davit Kezerashvili, former Defense Minister. The prosecution demanded that the court impose bail of GEL 1,000,000 as a preventive measure; as an additional measure, the prosecution demanded that the court prohibit the defendant from leaving the country and oblige the defendant to register at the investigation authority once a week. The prosecution s demands were based on the following arguments: 1) Seriousness of the crimes, which were punishable only with imprisonment, giving motivation to flee; 2) Proportionality, because defendant s salary for the past five years equaled GEL 500,000, his father owned land, and GEL 10 million had been spent from the state budget for defendant s personal expenses; and 3) The defendant did not appear at the investigation authority several times despite receiving summons, and provided inaccurate information during his questioning by police officers. 13 Article 118.3 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. 14 Ibid., Article 156(2)(b). 15 Ibid., Article 341. 16 Ibid., Articles 182(2)(d)(3)(a,b); 182(2)(d)(3)(b); 194(3)(a,g). 17 Ibid., Article 194(3)(a, g).

20 The defense demanded that the court either not impose any preventive measure or order Ugulava released under personal guarantee, with 34 members of Parliament and 24 members of the Tbilisi Sakrebulo (legislature) acting as personal guarantors. The defense emphasized that the requested amount of bail was incommensurate with the defendant s financial status and his role as breadwinner for five underage children. The defendant also said he could not agree not to leave the country because of his official position and upcoming visits abroad. In response to these arguments, the court asked the prosecution about the defendant s financial status and obtained only the information provided in the prosecution s prior arguments. The prosecution also stated that personal guarantee should not be used as a preventive measure because the potential guarantors were members of the same political party as the defendant and the charges in this case could affect them, too. In ruling on the motion, the court did not impose any preventive measure. GYLA believes the court s decision completely inappropriate, even thought the prosecution s motion was not supported with appropriate evidence concerning the defendant s financial status. The defendant faces serious charges with severe penalties. In addition, as a high-ranking official, defendant could negatively influence the progress of the investigation. Significant preventive measures were warranted in that case. The failure to impose such measures indicates bias on the part of the court. 1.2.2. Imprisonment Imprisonment is a deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, application of this measure particularly before a determination of guilt has been made must be considered in relation to an individual s right to liberty, one of the most important rights in a democratic society. The right to liberty is guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, 18 the European Convention on Human Rights, 19 and the Criminal Procedure Code. 20 18 Para.1 and 2, Article 18 of the Constitution of Georgia. 19 Article 5.1. of the European Convention on Human Rights. 20 Article 205.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia.

21 Under these provisions, the grounds for imprisoning a defendant before a final determination of guilt are: a) a threat that the individual would flee; b) to prevent obstruction in obtaining evidence; and c) to avoid the commission of a new crime; even then imprisonment may only be used when other measures are insufficient. Under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 21 and national procedural legislation, 22 a court is obliged to review the imprisonment upon the party s request, and the denial to consider such request is also a deprivation of the right to liberty. Findings Positive trends were observed this monitoring period regarding the use of imprisonment as a preventive measure. First, the prosecution requested imprisonment as a preventive measure less frequently than it did in the past. Second, the prosecution s requests for imprisonment as a preventive measure were significantly more substantiated. Finally, when the prosecution s requests for imprisonment as a preventive measure were not substantiated, courts less frequently granted those requests. 23 Of 121 defendants observed at first appearances, the prosecution requested imprisonment for only 50 (41%). Of those 50 defendants, the court upheld the prosecution s motion as to only 36 (72%). The charts below illustrate the situation over the entire monitoring: 21 Jėčius v. Lithuania; The Right to Liberty and Security of the Person, A Guide to the Implementation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Monica Macovei, Human Rights Handbooks, No.5, Council of Europe, p.60-61. 22 Article 206 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia. 23 It was only during the previous monitoring period that GYLA observed the first case since it began monitoring in October 2011, when the court did not grant prosecution s motion to order imprisonment as a preventive measure.

22 chart #4 chart #5 Of the 36 imprisonment decisions during this monitoring period, GYLA considers only seven (19%) unsubstantiated, with the prosecution not having enough evidence to show the necessity of imprisonment. For example, in one case TCC upheld the prosecution s motion for imprisonment of an individual charged with theft. The prosecution stated that the individual had been amnestied after previous convictions, and had tried to flee after committing a new crime. The prosecution provided no evidence to support the statement, which the defendant disputed, but the court nonetheless ordered imprisonment.

23 Nonetheless, this figure differs significantly from the results of the previous reporting periods. The charts below illustrate the situation over the entire monitoring: chart #6 One of these seven unsubstantiated imprisonment decisions demonstrates an inconsistent approach to similar cases. In that case, KCC upheld the prosecution s motion for imprisonment as a preventive measure, even though the same preventive measure had already been imposed upon the defendant for other charges, and despite defendant s argument that there was no need for an additional preventive measure. By contrast, during the previous monitoring period, TCC rejected the prosecution s motion for applying a preventive measure to the former Chief of Joint Staff (Giorgi Kalandadze), stating that no preventive measure was necessary because the same type of preventive measure had been imposed in connection with other charges. GYLA believes courts must develop a uniform approach to deciding applications on preventive measures in similar circumstances. Justice will be served only if uniform approach and certainty is ensured so that selective justice is prevented.

24 1.2.3. Personal Guarantee Of the first appearance hearings observed this monitoring period, the defense proposed a personal guarantee as the preventive measure for 13 of 121 defendants. 24 In one of the cases, there was an interesting opportunity for applying a personal guarantee as a preventive measure but this chance was not used: 2 females together with 2 male accomplices were charged with theft. The defense provided a document corroborating that the 2 females were on the list of individuals below the poverty line and they were thus unable to pay the bail of GEL 5,000 proposed by the prosecution office. As an alternative, the defense motioned for a bail of GEL 1,000. The judge satisfied himself that the defendants owned a residential house where they lived and considered this circumstance enough to impose a bail of GEL 1,000 upon the two female defendants. GYLA deems that the aforementioned decision cannot be considered proportional; in particular, the judge could, on his own initiative, find out from the defense whether a personal guarantee could possibly be used as a preventive measure and decide based on that information. This particular case best describes the need for applying other alternative measures (such as a personal guarantee) in criminal justice. 1.2.4. Agreement on Not Leaving the Country and Proper Conduct An agreement to not leave the country and behave properly may be used as a preventive measure if the defendant is charged with a crime that envisages imprisonment for less than one year. 25 During this monitoring period GYLA observed 13 defendants who were eligible for such a preventive measure, but the court only utilized this preventive measure once. 26 In two similar cases, both involving consumption of a small amount of a narcotic substance, this preventive measure was imposed in one case and rejected in another: 24 Six of the 13 requests involved high-profile cases. 25 Article 202, of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia. 26 It was the first time GYLA observed this preventive measure being used.

25 In one case, the defendant objected to the prosecution s demand of GEL 1,000 as bail, stating that he lived in extreme poverty. The defendant did not have a defense counsel. The judge then assumed an active role, appropriate for a preventive measure hearing. The judge explained to the defendant that it was possible to apply a less severe preventive measure, and then assured himself of impossibility of using a personal guarantee. The judge then ordered an agreement on not leaving the country and behaving properly to be applied to the defendant as a preventive measure. In the other case, the defendant objected to the prosecution s demand of GEL 2,000 as bail, stating that he lived with his sick father and his family was dependent on his father s pension. The judge asked the defendant: What do you think, should we not use any preventive measure at all or what do you say? This indicates that the judge deemed bail the only possibility and did not want to consider alternative, more appropriate measures. The judge ordered bail of GEL 1,000, which GYLA thinks was excessive. 1.2.5. Military Command s Supervision over a Military Servant s Behavior Military command s supervision over a military servant s behavior is a preventive measure that may be applied to military servants. 27 During this monitoring period, GYLA observed its first instance of this preventive measure being requested by a defendant. The defendant was a military servant accused of committing theft in aggravating circumstances. The prosecution requested imprisonment as a preventive measure, and the defense requested that defendant be put under his military command s supervision. The judge, however, found that the defense had not furnished the court with the relevant military command s consent to exercise supervision over the defendant and ordered bail of GEL 10,000. GYLA is of the view that the court s ruling was not proportional. Although the judge did question the defendant about his financial status, defendant earned only GEL 700 per month. Although defendant also stated that he owned immovable property in his village, the judge did not inquire as to the value of the property. Furthermore, defendant s 27 Article 204, of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia.

26 failure to furnish the court with the military command s consent to supervise is not a legal obstacle for applying the preventive measure, 28 which would have been proportional in this case. 1.3. Publishing Information about Hearings in Advance The monitoring of first appearances also confirmed an ongoing procedural problem that defeats a defendant s right to a public hearing, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia 29, the European Convention on Human Rights, 30 and the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia. 31 To make this right effective, it is not sufficient for the public to merely have the right to attend a criminal proceeding; the public must also have the right to be informed in advance about the proceeding so that it has the opportunity to attend. Therefore, the right to a public trial obligates the court to publish in advance the date and place of the first appearance hearing, the full name and surname of a defendant, and the articles with which s/he has been charged. Findings In none of the 99 first appearances monitored by GYLA (33 hearings held in KCC, 66 held in TCC) did the Court publish information about those hearings in advance. This complete failure to publish information on first appearance hearings in advance has been observed since GYLA began monitoring in October 2011. Despite GYLA s active involvement in raising the awareness of the judiciary about this situation, it remains unchanged. Representatives of the judiciary previously claimed that this was because of technical limitations associated with the fact that first appearances are held within 24 hours of the arrest, and expressed readiness to settle the technical problems. However, no changes have been implemented in TCC. 28 Ibid. 29 Article 85 of the Constitution of Georgia. 30 Article 6.1 of the ECHR. 31 Article 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia.

27 The situation at KCC is somewhat better. Although KCC does not publish information about dates of hearings on electronic monitors, as TCC does for most hearings other than first appearances, a court bailiff announces information in the hall some time before the start of the hearing and informs interested individuals about the place of an upcoming hearing and the name of the defendant. He does not, however, announce the charges to be submitted. GYLA is of the opinion that the method of publishing information on anticipated hearings in KCC is not comprehensive, since an individual wanting to attend a hearing is not able to determine the time or place of the hearing a reasonable period in advance. Moreover, the public is not informed about the charges. However, GYLA believes this is a reasonable temporary solution until the court administration resolves the technical issue. II. Pre-Trial Hearings At a pre-trial hearing, the court considers the admissibility of evidence that will be considered at the main hearing. This stage is of extreme importance, as only evidence deemed admissible by the court at the pre-trial hearing may be considered at the main hearing, and the verdict at the main hearing will be based on that evidence. In addition, the issue of whether to terminate the prosecution or continue the proceeding for an examination on the merits is decided at this stage. 32 The court s rulings on pre-trial motions must be impartial and without bias to either side. The right of a defendant to impartial proceedings has been recognized by Article 84 of the Constitution of Georgia, Article 6 of the ECHR, and is guaranteed by the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia. Although pre-trial hearings typically concern admissibility of evidence, parties can also submit other motions. 32 The court is to terminate a prosecution if it determines that, with a high probability, the evidence submitted by the prosecution fails to establish the committing of an offence by the defendant.

28 Findings The results of GYLA s observation of pre-trial hearings this monitoring period are almost identical to the previous monitoring period. For the most part, the court seems predisposed to granting all of the prosecution s motions seeking the submission of evidence, while the defense mainly agrees to the prosecution s motions. When the defense does object the arguments are mostly irrelevant, such as that the defendant has not committed offence and that the court should therefore not recognize the evidence as admissible. 33 The defense was, however, active in high-profile cases, requesting the submission of evidence and asking that certain of the prosecution s evidence be held inadmissible. 34 Cases involving multiple charges against a single defendant should, by definition, involve submission of a large volume of evidence. Monitoring, however, revealed at least one case where the defense was exceedingly passive. For example, in one multi-count case where the defendant was accused of attempted murder, illegal acquisition of firearms and undetermined health damage, the defense failed to submit any evidence. As in previous monitoring periods, there was not a single case where the court terminated the prosecution at the pre-trial hearing because there was a high probability that the defendant had committed the offence. Specific observations at pre-trial hearings included the following: Twelve of the 70 pre-trial hearings observed were postponed. In the remaining 58 hearings, the court fully granted the prosecution s motions to submit evidence except in three high profile cases, even though the defense objected to seven of those motions. In the three prior periods combined, the court granted all 191 of prosecution s motions, even though the defense objected to 23 of them. 33 According to procedural legislation, the parties should focus on the method by which evidence was obtained, since evidence is admissible if it is obtained in observance with the law. 34 In the cases against Mayor Giorgi Ugulava and former Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, the defense submitted 22 volumes of evidence and demanded the right to question between 100 to 200 witnesses.

29 In three of the seven cases where the defense objected to the prosecution s evidence, the court partially held the prosecution s evidence inadmissible. All three involved high-profile defendants (Giorgi Kelbakiani 35, Giorgi Kalandadze 36 and Giorgi Ugulava 37 ). The defense submitted motions to submit evidence in only 12 of 58 (21%) cases; four of these were high-profile cases. Of the 12 cases, the prosecution partially agreed to five motions. The court fully granted nine of the defense motions to submit evidence, and partially granted three motions. All of the defense motions to submit evidence in the four high-profile cases were partially agreed to by the prosecution. In each of these cases, the motions were partially granted. Of the 58 pre-trial hearings observed, non-evidentiary motions were submitted in only eight cases (two of which were high-profile), all of which were submitted by the defense. Three motions requested that the preventive measure be annulled, three requested an alternative preventive measure, one sought termination of the prosecution due to the amnesty law, and one sought audio-video broadcasting. The prosecution objected to all of the motions. The court only partially granted the motion for audio-video broadcasting on Akhalaia case. GYLA considers the decisions reasonable. III. Plea Agreement Hearings A plea agreement is a type of expedited proceeding at which the defense and prosecution present to the court an agreement as to punishment if the defendant pleads guilty to a particular charge. Under Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a plea agreement is reached the judge must verify whether the charges brought against the defendant are lawful and whether the agreed-to punishment set out in the prosecutor s motion for acceptance of the plea agreement is fair. 35 Gegi Kelbakiani was known to be close friend of Tbilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava. His company he led construction and rehabilitation activities in Tbilisi on government contracts. 36 Giorgi Kalandadze was the Chief of Joint Staff of Georgia. 37 Giorgi Ugulava is Tbilisi Mayor.

30 In order to ensure that the punishment is fair, a judge must consider the circumstances involved, taking into consideration the individual characteristics of the defendant, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, and the agreed to punishment. 38 The law does not specify how to ensure that the punishment is fair. However, in view of general principle of sentencing, for example, where the agreedto punishment is a fine the judge should determine: What is the defendant s financial condition? Can s/he afford to pay the fine? Is the amount of the fine commensurate to the damage inflicted, the circumstances under which crime was committed, and the likely punishment if the defendant is convicted after a main hearing? In addition, according to the law, if the judge believes that a plea agreement does not meet the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code, the judge may offer to the parties a plea agreement with altered conditions. 39 This confers upon the judge a limited, yet certain, lever to influence the fairness of punishment. Findings: As in the prior court monitoring period, plea agreement hearings were routine with the court taking a passive role. At the hearings, the judge limited his/her activity to only procedural obligations and asking the defendant a pro-forma question as to whether the defendant agrees with plea agreement. There were only three cases, discussed below, where the judge asked additional questions to determine whether the punishment was fair. Compared to the prior monitoring period, the percentage of plea agreements in which a fine was imposed decreased significantly. During the previous period (July December 2012), 57% of defendants (47 of 82) entering into plea agreements paid a fine; during this monitoring period, only 50% of plea agreements (39 of 77) resulted in a fine. In addition, the amount of fines imposed was greatly reduced. During the current monitoring period, 39 plea agreements resulted in a total of GEL 128,500 in fines (an average of GEL 3, 295 per plea agreement); 38 Article 53.3 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. 39 Article 213.5 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia.