NEW APPROACH FOR MACEDONIA Andreja Stojkovski Bojan Marichikj Goran Lazarov

NEW APPROACH FOR MACEDONIA Andreja Stojkovski Bojan Marichikj Goran Lazarov I. The Barrel Bomb of the Balkans This Policy Brief will focus on the current state of affairs in Macedonia, the political crisis, the Przhino Accord and its implementation, and will try to argue for the role the EU and the International Community could/should play in the negotiations that could lead to Przhino 2. The Brief will try to draw conclusions and recommend a new approach for Macedonia s EU Accession in the Post-Przhino period. Macedonia has been living in a state of permanent political crisis since the Black Monday on 24 December 2012 that was extended throughout the whole of 2013 and fortified with the early parliamentary and presidential elections in April 2014. These elections resulted in a government formed by a coalition between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, while Gjorge Ivanov was elected President of Macedonia. The opposition lead by SDSM refused to take up their mandates and boycotted the work of the parliament alleging that the elections were not legitimate due to electoral fraud, intimidation of citizens and inadequate separation of state and party activities. To be completely honest, the OSCE-ODIHR Electoral Monitoring Mission did conclude that the elections were efficiently administered, including on election day 1, but failed to mention, thus credit the elections with the four key components: Free, Fair, Democratic and Credible. The political crisis deepened in February 2015 when the opposition leader started releasing audios of wiretapped conversations that were made by the Secrete Police 2 and implicated government and 1 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/118078?download=true 2 Although the investigations are still ongoing, and there has never been a formal Executive Summary Macedonia has been living in a state of permanent political crisis since the Black Monday, 24 December 2012. The political crisis deepened in February 2015 with the outbreak of the wiretapping scandal when the European Union facilitated a political agreement between the four major political parties, the so called Przhino Accord, which calls for a transitional period, urgent reforms, investigations and early elections in 2016. According to the Przhino Accord the early elections were scheduled for 24 April 2016. However, the International Community through the EU and US Ambassadors to Macedonia did an assessment stating that there are no conditions for elections. The new date for elections is 5 June 2016 and although the situation did not change, the International Community failed to show consistency in it policies and >>

>> approach to Macedonia. Not only that there were no conditions for elections, but the ruling party has made many detours and finally a complete departure from its implementation. Przhino is dead and there is a need for Przhino 2, one that will be sponsored by the EU, but facilitated by the High Representative Federica Mogherini. Transferring the Macedonian Case from DG NEAR to the EEAS is due to the deteriorated situation, the explosive potential that could involve other countries from the region. The EU cannot continue speaking about the need for stability and security and afford to have an unstable and potentially explosive Macedonia. As the situation is one needs to ask the question is Macedonia NEAR enough? The EU needs to reestablish its leverage as a mediator and take few important steps: >> public officials in corruption, election fraud and abuse of power 3. European Commission and European Parliament facilitated a political agreement between the four major political parties, the so called Przhino Accord, which calls for a transitional period, urgent reforms, investigations and early elections in 2016. According to the Przhino Accord the early elections were scheduled for 24 April 2016. However, the International Community represented by the EU and US Ambassadors to Macedonia did an assessment of the state of affairs and wrote a letter to Prime Minister Emil Dimitriev stating that there are no conditions for elections. At the same time, the letter pointed out to three baskets of issues: 1) cleaning of the voters registry and strengthening the capacities of the State Election Commission; 2) media reforms; and 3) division of state from party, as preconditions for Free, Fair, Democratic and Credible elections. The new date for elections is 5 June 2016 and although the situation did not change, the International Community failed to show consistency in it policies and approach to Macedonia. Parliament dissolved on midnight, 6 April 2016, with 9 days later the President of Parliament calling upon the next elections. The next benchmark is the date the State Election Commission is expected to present the supposedly clean voters registry on 25 Apri 2016. This, the Voters Registry, should bear the signatures of all members of the State Election Commission, including the President, however he has already declared that should he feel the registry has not been cleaned properly he will not sign 4. At the same time, two members of the Commission are not participating in what they say will be another electoral fraud 5. As if the situation was not complicated enough, on 12 April 2016 President Ivanov decided to pardon 56 individuals implicated in the wiretapping scandal. This, on the other hand, provoked an outburst of emotions and protests on the streets in Skopje and other cities in Macedonia in what is now called Colourful Revolution where people are demanding the return of democracy and the rule of law. With protests threatening to escalate, the eventual boycott of the elections announced by the opposition, and the strengthening of the Anti-Western and Pro-Russian rhetoric between the Macedonian nationalistic voters of VMRO-DPMNE, Macedonia might be moving towards its explosive phase. The EU and NATO perspectives will move further on the horizon and the conflict will move court ordered expert witness statement on the wiretapped conversations, the European Commission commissioned a group of Senior Experts that issued a report (Priebe Report) pointing out to the Macedonian Secrete Police as the source of the releases. For more details from the report please follow this link: http://goo.gl/ytvw4y 3 For the whole development of the Political Crisis in Macedonia, please read s 25 th Accession Watch Quarterly Report Tick-Tack, in the nick of time 4 http://novatv.mk/chichakovski-na-izborniot-spisok-ne-smee-da-ima-nieden-sporen-glasach/ 5 http://www.libertas.mk/dik-go-izglasa-rokovnikot-chlenovite-od-sdsm-nedojdoa-chichakovski-dojde-tehnichki/ 2

to being between the Macedonian and the Albanian communities. Thus, the Barrel Bomb of the Balkans will require more attention by the International Community. In order to prevent this, the time frame is rather limited and both the EU and the US should show a fuller and more consistent approach under a refurbished EU Enlargement Policy. II. Long live Przhino From our past experiences we know that there are many traps, and many chances to resolve the political crisis in Macedonia. Avoiding the traps and utilizing the chances was like navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis, but the EU had to be more careful not to make yet another mistake in its relations to Macedonia. Of course, the situation with this political crisis was far more different from what we were used to in the past. Additionally, the EU had to take into account the Migrant Crisis and the threat it poses to the stability and security of the region and of the EU. 1. Listening to the people The outbreak of the wiretapping scandal in Macedonia coincided with the strengthening of the Pro-EU and Pro-Western sentiments among many of the citizen. This was due to the fact that many of the citizens understood better the transformative power of the EU and saw clearer the previous engagement of the Union in supporting democracy in the country. On the other hand side, among the supporters of the government the Pro-Russian sentiment was growing. Macedonia does not traditionally have strong feelings about Russia; nevertheless, there are still some who sympathize with the similar language, culture and joint Slavic heritage although this is not part of official governmental policy. What started with one of the prominent pro-governmental Eurosceptic journalist, Mirka Velinovska, asking in her columns: What have the EU and the USA ever done for us!? 6 continued with the propaganda criticizing the EU s approach towards Ukraine, and presenting it as yet another proof for the Union s inevitable dissolution and the birth of a new world order, and advocating the replacement of the Euro-Atlantic integration. This story was further advocated through another success story : Turkey of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. >> 1) Transform the Priebe Report and the Urgent Reform Priorities into Rule of law Action Plan. The implementation of this Action Plan should be treated as part of the new Approach of the European Commission for early opening of the Pre- Accession Negotiations for Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) for Macedonia; 2) Reopening of the name issue negotiations at UN level, but with EU involvement and without hindering the Rule of Law Action Plan for overcoming the deep systemic political, institutional and economic crisis of the country; and 3) Establish a parallel of the EU Rule of law (Article 7) mechanism for the Enlargement process and the candidate countries. Namely, it should be a system to pressure the candidate countries breaching the Rule of Law principle permanently and severely having arrogant political elites refusing to make any concessions on the top of it. What is the actual opinion of the citizens regarding Macedonia s EU Accession and how important is the EU to the citizens? Should the European Union be involved and stay involved in the resolution of the political crisis? To answer best we would use the data from the last survey research #EUROMETER2015 7. The survey was con- 6 http://novamakedonija.com.mk/newsdetal. asp?vest=82712656434&id=9&setizdanie=22665 7 The survey was conducted in the period between 4th of May through phone interviews on a national representative sample of 1201 citizens aged 18+ years. 3

ducted the period that represents the peak of the crisis through a phone interview on a national and regional representative sample. When asked whether the European Union should play an important role in resolving the current political crisis in Macedonia? A large majority of exactly 60% of the citizens agree that the European Union must play a key role in resolving this political crisis, whilst only 24% of the citizens have a negative view. However, the opinions concerning this question differ drastically when the party ideology or the ethnic affiliation are analysed. The support with the Albanian political parties is bigger and stands in the higher 80s and 90s, going down to 72% among those that see themselves as closer to SDSM and dropping to 48% among those supporting the ruling party VMRO- DPMNE. The reason behind those 60% can be found in a different question that refers to the public trust/support in the institutions with the trust in the three branches of government, the Parliament, the Government and the Judiciary being the lowest, while trust in the EU, NATO and NGOs stands on the higher end 8. Therefore, in conclusion, despite the differences there is a great amount of support for the EU and the international community in general to play an important role in resolving the political crisis as the citizens are aware that the institutions in Macedonia don t have the capacity to resolve a crisis with such intensity. For further support on the involvement of the EU in the resolution of the political crisis we need to look at the fact that with the outbreak of the wiretapping scandal the citizens started understanding more and saw the reality in the EU Progress Reporting, as well as the EU s contribution to democracy development. At the question if the EU reports reflect the actual state of affairs in the country, nearly 41% were in agreement as opposed to 26.5% that think the EU Progress Reports don t reflect the situation, while at the question if the EU is actively involved in the improvement of democracy in the country 42% of the surveyed citizens agreed. Opposite to the governmental propaganda and the rhetoric that Macedonia cannot join the EU because of the Name Issue and the Greek veto, and that the country should look for other alternatives more than 50% of the surveyed citizens see the European Union as the best alternative that Macedonia has, while nearly 44% of the surveyed citizens don t see eye-to-eye to the Govern- 8 The #EUROMETER2015 found out that only 32% of the citizens surveyed trust the government, whilst the trust in the Public Prosecution and the Judiciary is at only 17% i.e. 17.2%. On a different research project of, asked how they assess the institutions, with 1 being the lowest, and 5 being the highest the participants in the survey assessed the work of all three branches of government at the lowest, while the Government has actually the lowest public support with the average mark of 1.55. The Government was assessed with 1, by 55% of participants. The second lowest is the Parliament with an average mark of 1.66 and 50% of the participants assessing its work with 1, and the third lowest is for the Judiciary with an average of 1.72 and 44.4% of the participants assessing its work with 1. For the three lowest there was no one to assess their work with 4 or 5. On the higher end were the EU, NATO and Civil Society, with average marks of 2.82, 2.81, and 3.18 respectively. 4

ment rhetoric and think that it is using the name issue with Greece only as an excuse. Finally, the moment that is the strongest support to the EU playing a more prominent role in the resolution of the political crisis, and at the same time the potential for the explosiveness of the crisis is the general support that the citizens express to Macedonia s EU Accession standing at nearly 70%. This support although at a historically lower end is still rather high and prevents the ruling party and the Government from completely dropping out of the process. Here, as well as with the first question there is a big difference between the different ethnic communities and the supporters of different political parties. Support for EU Accession is greatest with the Albanian and the Roma with above 90 %, whilst the support among the Macedonian stands at 61% of the surveyed citizens. At the level of political party affiliation support is greatest with DPA, standing at 98%, while 93% of those that support DUI support EU Accession. On the Macedonian side of the political spectrum 74% of those that support SDSM, whereas amongst the supporters of VMRO-DMPNE support for EU Accession is significantly lower. Should the crisis continue, with the inconsistency in the EU s approach and if we have in mind the development and the propaganda so far, it can be expected that EU Accession will be postponed indefinitely leading to the Albanian feeling disenchanted by their political representatives and disenfranchised from the Government and opening up the doors to the potentially explosive phase of Macedonia. 2. On Traps and Chances in the EU-Sponsored Talks Under the circumstances of the country s most severe political crisis since 2001 9 we suggested that the European Union should assume special approach to the political dialogue and mediation, in particular because it has not been faced with such government in any Candidate Country. Additionally, the EU promotes itself as a Global Player thus being able to resolving the political crisis in its own back yard, Macedonia, was and still is a must. In order to assist the Union in developing adequate and just approach we provided key traps and chances 10 under the previous approach applied by the European Commission to put an end to the political crisis in Macedonia, which did not yield satisfactory results. Often, those traps that we were pointing towards were used as arguments by the EC to justify its approach. Andreja STOJKOVSKI, LL.M. (Becario de AECI), Senior Researcher, and President of. He graduated law at the University Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje and Master Studies in EU Law at the Universidad Carlos III in Madrid. His research interest includes the fields: EU Constitutional and Political System, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Relations between the EU and Macedonia, Spain and Spanish Foreign and EU Policy, International and European Environmental Law, etc. Since October 2009 he is elected Teaching Assistant in EU Structures and Institutions at the University American College Skopje. Andreja Stojkovski is part of the team of since 2007. Trap #1: This is only struggle between political elites (conservatives vs. social-democrats) and therefore it should be solved by means of political dialogue. 9 EC Country Report 2015 on Republic of Macedonia, page 4, political criteria: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_ the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf 10 Ibid 3 5

Recommendation/chance: The EU and the international community must break the balanced treatment of the government and the opposition as equal sides in the political conflict, and insist on the introduction of the concept of political responsibility. Trap #2: The EU should maintain its current approach to calming down political passions by pressuring those that would make concessions first. It is important to maintain the course of stability and EU integrations. Recommendation/chance: The EU should essentially approach the crisis by addressing the roots and rebuilding of the oversight and check-and-balance mechanisms between different branches of government. Such approach would give the EU a chance to demonstrate that European values and standards hold greater significance than declarative tenants. Trap #3: The interim government should be led by Gruevski, because he had won at the elections recognized by the European Commission and, in general, verified by OSCE/ODIHR. Recommendation/chance: The Caretaker Government must not include current members of government that are direct participants in and triggers of the current political crisis. The EU should make consideration of damages that might be caused by leaving Gruevski or any of his closer collaborators in the interim government, and that it would mean repetition of such practices and another round of compromised elections. Trap #4: Macedonia is key point on the geopolitical map and authorities should be assisted not to reorient the country strategically towards Russia. Recommendation/chance: The EU must not demonstrate decreasing interest for the future of Macedonia, because only by doing so it could heat up geo-strategic plans that might change the course of the state and its society set as early as 1990s. Discussing the chances and traps and the recommendations we elaborated, we included such that refer to what we saw as an effective mediation format, and concept and tasks of the Interim Government. Under the tasks of the Interim Government our proposals included instruments to tackle the burning issues in the following areas: 1) Electoral Reforms; 2) Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary; 3) Separation of State from Party and De-politicisation of the public administration; 4) Freedom of Speech and Expression; and 5) Re-Establishment of Check-and-Balance Mechanisms. 3. The Turning point and the Way out The New Approach adopted for the resolution of the political crisis in Macedonia including coordination between the European Commission and the European Parliament 11 ; strengthened presence on 11 The negotiations were under the patronage of European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, in coordination and with involvement from MEPs Ivo Vajgl, Eduard 6

the ground in Macedonia 12 ; becoming more vocal and taking position upon important occasions and periodical involvement of the Member States 13 ; and joining hands with the partners from across the Atlantic 14. This approach helped the EU successfully evade traps 1 and 4, but was not so successful when it came to traps 2 and 3. The negotiations through several rounds brought to what was seen as the way out of the political crisis and is known as the Przhino Accord. The first agreement was signed on 2 June 2015, in the residence of the EU Ambassador in the neighbourhood bearing the same name, thus the name of the Accord. Approximately 40 days later, and some more dialogues the final agreement was reached, on 15 July 2015. The way out of the political crisis contained a concrete 23 step pathway, the last being the organisation of free, fair, democratic and credible elections. The following are the steps 1. Organizational set-up of Government for Organization of Elections; 2. New and Modified Composition of the State Electoral Committee; 3. Opposition to return to Parliament 4. No further releases of wiretapped conversations 5. Adopt Law on protection of privacy 6. Adopt Law on protection of whistle-blowers 7. Wiretapped conversations and other materials submitted to Special Prosecutor 8. Strengthening the mandate of the State Electoral Committee for free, fair, democratic and credible elections 9. Appointment of Special Public Prosecutor 10. Establishment of a Parliamentary Enquiry Committee for the Wiretapping Scandal 11. Parliamentary oversight of Secrete Police and Intelligence Agency 12. Media Reforms Bojan MARICHIKJ, LL.M. M.A. (MTEC Fellow, Chevening Fellow), Executive Director of. He graduated law at the University Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje and Master Studies in EU Law at the University of Amsterdam. He obtained a second Master Degree in Contemporary European Studies at the University College London. His research interest includes the fields: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, EU Constitutional and Political System, EU Law into the National Legal Order, EU in Multilateral External Relations, the Europeanization of Politics, Policies and Societies of Candidate Countries, EU Conditionality, etc. Bojan Marichikj is part of the team of since October 2011, and Executive Director since November 2013. Kukan and Richard Howitt. This was later, during the debate in AFET on the EP Resolution on Macedonia, confirmed by MEP Howitt that there is a consensus on Macedonia between the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the EU. From the three, only the Council of the EU was not represented in the negotiations, contrary to our original recommendation. 12 The EU through the European Commission had engaged a mediator set on the ground in Macedonia to facilitate further political dialogue and the resolution of the open issues. The mediator was former Belgian MP and representative democracy expert Peter Vanhoutte. 13 EU Delegation in Macedonia, as well as EU Member States represented through their embassies in Macedonia expressed significant support to the work of the Special Prosecutor, and reacted upon many occasions when the Przhino Accord was breached or some of the parties to it demonstrated actions that were not in compliance. 14 The United States was ever present in the resolution of the political crisis, on the ground through its ambassador to Macedonia, Jess Bailey, as well as with periodical involvement by officials from the State Department, DAS Hoyt Brian Yee, and others, as well as with personal involvement by Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Euro-Asia, Victoria Nuland. 7

13. Appointment of a new Minister of Interior 14. Appointment of a new Minister of Labour and Social Policy 15. Appointment of a new Special, Additional Deputy Minister for Finance 16. Appointment of a new Special, Additional Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy 17. Appointment of a new Special, Additional Deputy Minister for Information Society and Administration 18. Resignation of PM Nikola Gruevski 19. Procedure for election of new Government and proposal for new candidate for PM 20. Election of new Government for Organization of Elections 21. Clean Voters Registry as pre-condition for credible elections 22. Division of State from Party 23. Free, Fair, Democratic and Credible Elections As explained above, the negotiations were not easy, but the New Approach and especially the part where the EU becomes more vocal and takes positions upon important matters was the turning point in the negotiations. This came approximately 1 week after the first agreement was reached on 2 June 2015 in the form of the Priebe Report 15. The report focused on systemic issues and pointed out to the most burning issues under five fields, such as: 1) Interception of Communications; 2) Judiciary and Prosecution; 3) Other Oversight Institutions; 4) Elections; and 5) Media. 4. Desperately looking for a detour The Przhino Accord brought about a set of measures that were supposed to establish conditions for fair, free, democratic and credible elections, with credible being the key word. The ruling party being in a desperate position, and after its president realised that he signed his eventual and inevitable demise, started to desperately look for a detour. Through the accord a caretaker government was to be formed, where new Ministers and Deputy Ministers from SDSM will be appointed to portfolios that are closely related to providing conditions for elections. The proposed organisational set-up strived to enhance transparency, decrease corruption among top government officials and provide institutional support for the State Election Commission and the Special Public Prosecutor. By virtue of Governmental Resolution, all acts of the new ministers were abol- 15 For the purpose of clarification of the issues, and familiarization with the sources of the political crisis, the European Commission commissioned a group of Senior Experts led by former Director General, Reinhard Priebe to perform a field assessment mission and prepare the report. The group published the report in mid-june 2015 and the public accepted their report as Priebe Report, from the Group Chairman. 8

ished, with the ministers being stripped of their competencies and authorities. 16 As a core institution, one that has a central role for setting the legal and technical standards for the elections the accord brought a reformed and strengthened State Election Commission. The new and modified composition of the SEC was implemented only on 16 December 2015, but what is more, currently three of its members, including the President don t participate on the meetings. Their absence was preceded by establishing majority within the Commission and the signing of the Voters Registry by the Deputy Minister of the Interior Chavkov. This benevolent autocratic maneuver totally undermines the efforts of the international community and of the SEC, and brings into question the credibility of the elections. With the signing of the Przhino Accord disclosure of any wiretapped materials was supposed to stop. Furthermore, it was agreed that all cases and materials should be transferred to the Special Public Prosecutor, while Parliament adopted a Law on the Protection of Privacy that should be amended upon the recommendation from the Venice Commission. On 15 March 2016, the Venice Commission issued an Opinion on the Law, dealing extensively with the conflict of public interest and private life recommending that the State cannot create special closed forums or institutions which would have an exclusive right of accessing, examining and using such information 17. Although the Accord prescribed the observance of the recommendation by the Venice Commission, its opinion has not been introduced as amendment to the Law on Protection of Privacy and the Law on Protection of Whistle-blowers. Goran LAZAROV, Researcher/Analyst at. He graduated law at the University Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. His research interest includes the fields: Europeanisation of Member States National Policies, Democracy, Human Rights, EU Enlargement Policy, etc. Goran Lazarov is part of the team of since March 2013. Key point from the Przhino Accord was the establishment of a Special Public Prosecutor s (SPP) Office, and appointment of Special Public Prosecutor to reaffirm the principle of responsibility and rule of law. However, by virtue of the Decision of the Constitutional Court, the 2009 Law on Amnesty was repealed, thus giving the President the opportunity to grant pardons freely including to those committing electoral frauds, while on 12 April 2016, President Ivanov decided to grant pardon to 56 suspects and or indicted and future suspects from cases of the Special Prosecutor. Finally, the Constitutional Court has still not processed the initiative to assess the constitutionality on the Law on Special Public Prosecutor. The other key point and the second pillar to the principle of responsibility and rule of law was the establishment of a Parliamentary Enquiry Committee with the task to investigate, organise hearings, question top government officials and determine their responsibility and political accountability. However, only former PM Nikola Gruevski appeared before the committee, while others refused show up. The hearing with Gruevski was organised behind closed doors, and neither the transcript, nor the audio/video of the 16 http://vlada.mk/node/12005 17 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=cdl-ad(2016)008-e p.8 9

hearing was released since. Other Parliamentary Oversight Committees failed to be more effective in their work, and according to former Minister of Interior and MP Pavle Trajanov, besides the scandal the Secret Police is still illegally intercepting communications of selected individuals. Finally, the working groups established under the Przhino Accord with the objective to negotiate the final formats of many of the reforms stopped working in the middle of the negotiations for the media reforms in early March 2016, thus putting an end to whole process. Furthermore, the contract of the EU Mediator, Peter Vanhoutte, expired at the end of February 2016, and the European Commission decided not to extend it, nor to look for a new mediator. This inconsistency in its approach was a critical mistake on the side of the EU in strictly evading trap 4, which was used by the ruling party not just to detour, but to fully depart from the implementation of the Przhino Accord. At this point in time, whatever effort the EU and the International Community may employ will have to be significantly bigger than the ones required if the EU was more consistent. III. Przhino is Dead long live Przhino Being observers, in a few limited cases even participants in the work of the working groups established under the Przhino Accord, Civil Society Organisations were able to observe the many detours and the final departure from its implementation that the ruling party took. To be completely honest CSOs were the only consistent actor, if they can be considered an actor at all, in the resolution of the Political Crisis. Since the beginning of the crisis and the signing of the Accord the position of Civil Society was that setting a date for elections prior to creating the necessary conditions is wrong. However, taking into account the state of affairs with the implementation of the Accord meant that CSOs insist on the reforms prior to elections, and that those elections should be free, fair, democratic and credible 18. 1. The road to Przhino 2 Thou we can argue what the final departure of the ruling party from the Przhino Accord is, for many it was the moment when President Ivanov came for a press-conference announcing that he has personally decided to pardon all politicians and other involved citizens in cases stemming from the released wiretapped conversations and the investigations started by the Special Public Prosecutor. With protests being organised independently from any of the political parties, by many civic movements with the use 18 A bigger group of CSOs, approximately 80, on three different occasions addressed the International Community demanding proper implementation of the reforms prior to the elections: http://goo.gl/9khvhq; http://goo.gl/x9ygk6; http://goo.gl/mue4ar; while a group of nine CSOs performed two assessments of the conditions for elections and presented their findings: http://goo.gl/ VaUUNy; and http://goo.gl/i2vf6k. was a participant in every of the effort of the Civil Society, taking at some point even a leadership role. 10

of social media, and threatening to escalate, the eventual boycott of the opposition, and etc. the need for a new Przhino Accord grows bigger by the moment. However, this time, the negotiations cannot have the format of a political dialogue, but of actual negotiations with the involvement/participation of Civil Society. Civil Society involvement/participation will not only serve as a chilling point for the rather emotional Colourful Revolution but also as a guarantee for full implementation of the new Accord. 2. Democracy and Rule of Law are absolutely nonnegotiable The negotiations leading to Przhino 2 have to start with all participants being on equal footing, thus meeting some preconditions is a reasonable and understandable request. The following three should be seen as such, foundation makers, for new negotiations: 1. The decision granting blanket pardon to all persons that are under investigation and are facing criminal charges by the Special Public Prosecutor to be immediately withdrawn; 2. George Ivanov to immediately submit irrevocable resignation from the office President of the Republic of Macedonia; 3. The decision on holding parliamentary elections on June 5, 2016, to be immediately withdrawn; Furthermore, as we were able to read above and witness on so many occasions the ruling party has successfully transformed many of the reached political agreements into toilette paper 19, therefore, Civil Society considers that none of the political leaders has the right to negotiate democracy or rule of law. Democracy and Rule of Law are absolutely non-negotiable they are the foundation of modern society and core value of the European Union. However, seeking to resolve the crisis and reinstitute these core values in the country, Civil Society considers that any negotiation sponsored by the EU needs should include the following five conditions: 1. The Constitutional Court to deliver its opinion and decision upon the petition challenging the SPP s constitutionality; 2. Special Judicial Unit to be established within the Criminal Court residing in the cases falling under SPP s jurisdiction; 3. Independent representatives of Civil Society to be statutorily included in the process for crisis resolution; 4. The process for crisis resolution to take place on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia; 5. Transitional Government to be established and tasked with complete implementation of the urgent reform priorities enlisted in the Priebe Report. 19 When resolving the political crisis of the Black Monday, December 24, 2012, the participant in the Inter-Pary Committee and MP for VMRO-DPMNE, Ilija Dimovski called the report toilette paper: http://goo.gl/4wkfvv 11

3. Are we NEAR enough New mediation or Przhino 2 should be facilitated by several actors holding relevant influence and credibility in terms of addressing the political crisis in Macedonia. Hence, we propose, that the existing consensus on Macedonia that MEP Richard Howitt spoke of 20 is represented and that High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini is involved as sponsor to the new Accord. The involvement of High Representative Federica Mogherini s will bring to questions such as: Is Macedonia NEAR enough? However, it is exactly her involvement that will give greater political weight to the overall process, and through her negotiations will include two EU institutions (the Council of the EU and the European Commission). In the capacity of High Representative, she serves a specific double role as Vice President of the European Commission and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, which is a standing formation of the Council where she chairs meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU Member States. This is logical order of involvement of EU institutions, having in mind that, previous sponsorship has failed the expectations and has allowed the process to deteriorate and go in reverse. Furthermore, the transfer of the Macedonian Case from DG NEAR to the EEAS could be explained with the deterioration of the situation, the potential for explosiveness and for the involvement of other countries from the region, as well as the impact that the Migrant Crisis and the Fight against terror and ISIS have and could have if the political crisis in Macedonia continues. The EU cannot continue speaking about the need for stability and security and afford to have an unstable and potentially explosive Macedonia. As the situation has been developing Macedonia will soon become a country for EEAS, as there will be nothing left for DG NEAR to do. In addition to Mrs. Mogherini, the European Parliament needs to be involved through its MEPs Vajgl, Howitt and Kukan, for the purpose of making a political climate agreeable to the negotiation format. Having in mind the fact that in the case of Macedonia Member States can do more, and did more along the implementation of Przhino 1 through their national influence, the four most influential EU Member States need to be involved. The ambassadors of Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy posted in Macedonia need to take the role of leading the negotiation process on the ground in Macedonia. To complete the group a representative of the United States of America should be added and at the moment it is the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Jess Bailey. USA and the EU are already responsible for Macedonia s stability and democratization, after having played a major role in 2001 and being considered mediators and guarantors of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. USA s role would only increase chances for agreement and crisis resolution. 20 http://goo.gl/79femo 12

The group will need to first lay the ground, i.e. Mrs. Mogherini in her capacity as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States will have to make a resolution to take negotiations enabling measures. Such measures should include, but not be limited to: 1) blacklisting several of the 56 pardoned politicians that are suspects or are indicted in the cases brought by the Special Public Prosecutor and ban them from traveling to the EU and partner countries; 2) establish an asset freeze for all blacklisted politicians throughout the EU and the partner countries; and 3) establish a funds freeze for most of the projects funded through the IPA funds. Blacklisting President Ivanov might be an option for consideration. At the same time, the Sextet of Ambassadors, EU, Germany, UK, France, Italy and US should prepare the field for the actual negotiations by working with the involved parties, creation of working groups according to areas and dividing the areas where each Member State will act as major sponsor, such as: 1) Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary; 2) Separation of State from Party and De-politicisation of the public administration; 3) Freedom of Speech and Expression; and 4) Re-Establishment of Check-and-Balance Mechanisms. Finally, the EU and US Ambassadors should act as primary facilitators for the political dialogue of the ground negotiations. IV. Between the stick and the carrot The EU and US have had special responsibility in managing the crisis and brokering the deal between the political parties- signatories of Przino Agreement hitherto. In addition, these two actors have always been in a position to make proposals for either upgrading the current instruments of the EU Enlargement Policy, or be innovative and introduce new tools with the purpose of pushing for further institutional, legislative and democratic reforms in the country. The usual instrument for creating the reform agenda for the EU membership candidate countries is the Accession Partnership (AP). This AP contains the principles, priorities and measures that a candidate country should work on in the next year or two. Practically, AP is the main reference point in the reform agenda setting process in a candidate country. The successful candidate countries, usually get a new AP each year or two after they have done all the job implementing the reforms laid down in the AP document. The monitoring of the AP implementation takes place through the normal instruments of the Stabilization and Association Process, notably through the annual Progress Reports 21 compiled by the European Commission for each country aspiring for EU membership. 21 Last year, these reports were rebranded to Country Reports not pretending that they score a progress but only scan the actual situation. See details on http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/package/index_en.htm 13

Macedonia got its first Accession Partnership in 2006 right after the European Council granted the candidate status without opening the accession negotiations 22. The next Accession Partnership was drafted by the Council of the EU in 2008 23 after the country had contested elections which undermined its compliance with the political criteria from the Copenhagen enlargement criteria package 24. This AP had the purpose of putting Macedonia back on the track to get the negotiations recommendation by the EC and to finalize the process of visa liberalization. The next and so far the last, revised version of the AP was presented in 2009 and was never publicly exploited for reform purposes 25. Seven years already there is no new Accession Partnership for Macedonia. This is partially because since 2009 Macedonia has turned to a dead end having the bilateral issue with Greece over the name Macedonia as the key obstacle for opening the accession negotiations. The main question, however, is how the EU and Macedonia determine the reform agenda if not through the AP? The answer is that EU for the sake of the reform agenda, bridging the name issue and endorsing the system of stick and carrot introduced new instrument called High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD) that started to work in 2012 and never produced significant outcomes. The first HLAD session held in March 2012 established a dialogue between the political elite of Macedonia and the European Commission with taking the Government of Macedonia as the key partner from the country, minimizing the role of the opposition and the civil society. This exclusive approach brought an Action Plan for implementing the key reform priorities in technical manner, ticking the boxes, with no substantial assessment of an actual political and policy change. The only visible achievement of all the five sessions of HLAD was in the area of media freedoms. Namely, the Law on civic responsibility for defamation classified defamation as a misdemeanor that warrants civic responsibility with financial sanctions instead of the previous classification as a criminal act that entailed prison sentence as an option 26. However, no significant change was made in other policy areas covered by HLAD (Rule of law and fundamental rights, Public Administration Reforms, Electoral Reforms, Strengthening the Market economy). Moreover, there was neither clear responsibility nor any pressure over the Government for not making progress or honoring the promises made in this dialogue at high level. Such approach of the EU was transferred in the next round of negotiations over the incident in the Macedonian Parliament that took place on 24th December 2012 when the ruling party ordered police intervention to expel all the opposition MPs from the Parliament Hall in order 22 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=celex%3a32008d0212 23 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=uriserv%3ar18013 24 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html 25 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mk_ rapport_2010_en.pdf 26 https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2014/07/07/the-high-level-accessiondialogue-and-macedonia/ 14

to prevent extensive parliamentary debate over the State Budget and adopt the Budget the same day with no opposition in the Hall and no discussion at all. This conflict was superficially resolved by forming multy-party Inquiry Commission chaired by an EU mediator 27 that made conclusions and recommendations that were never implemented. No one was held neither politically nor legally responsible for those events. If we follow the line of the EU crisis management in Macedonia in the last couple of years one constant feature dominates: The ruling party VMRO-DPMNE rarely takes the EU mediation seriously and they rarely honor the agreements, they sign. This was only proven with the implementation of the Przhino Agreement (See above) in 2015 and 2016. Therefore, in the final part of this document we propose several specific measures EU should introduce as a system of sticks and carrots for the sanctions and/or the incentives for the political actors involved in the EU crisis management negotiation process and the country as a whole. 1. The sticks! One of the main issues is how to make irresponsible partners (political actors) to honor the agreements and stick to the deadlines and obligations brokered by the EU. EU most not refrain for both individual pressure and wider country pressure in order to make the partners to take their obligations seriously. Targeted sanctions and political isolation of the irresponsible partners should be a final step to pressure the actors that breach the agreements and undermine the democratic principles, the principle of rule of law and endorse corruptive behavior. The wide range of targeted sanctions must make direct and personal pressure on the specific actors and their associates. Those sanctions might encompass travel restriction to the EU Member States, asset restriction or asset freeze within the EU Member States and firm political isolation from regional and EU-level Summits relevant for Western Balkans and meetings of the European ideological families. Sanctions affecting the country as a whole might involve withdrawal of the negotiation recommendation that is anyway frozen for seven years now, exclusion of the political representatives from the upcoming EU- Western Balkans Paris Summit, suspension of some of the IPA funds (except the contracted funds). These measures will affect the country as a whole and are not very recommended as their effect might be negative in the popular approval of the EU efforts. Either way, such set of measures, especially those having individual targeting are already proposed by serious factors at EU-level, and have been discussed in Brussels especially after the decision The Macedonian Center for European Training () is a non-profit, non-partizan, think-tank founded in September 2002. Organized as an association of citizens has 23 members. The members are Certified EU Trainers of InWEnt Bonn and the Institut für Europäische Politik in Berlin, Germany, and Certified Trainers on Public Policy Writing of the Local Government Initiative in Budapest, Hungary, or professionals who contribute to Macedonia s EU Accession and the Europeanisation of Society. supports Macedonia s EU Accession and the Europeanisation of society through the development of evidence based public policies, regional cooperation and advocacy for change, vocational education and training and consultancy. Determining its research topics, continuously participating in the ongoing debate, and improving its research and products managed to establish itself as the dominant think tank on EU Affairs in Macedonia and the region. Recently, some of s donors and partners said that: the Macedonian Center for European Training is one of the most promising think-tanks in the Balkans. Since January 2014 is a member of >> 27 http://www.mia.mk/en/inside/rendersinglenews/61/132059511 15

>> EPIN - European Policy Institutes Network. Since its inception in 2002, has delivered approximately 3,500 days of training for more than 12,000 representatives of public administration, the media, civil society organizations, judges and prosecutors, members of political parties, local administration, etc. monitors Macedonia s EU Accession Process, while its research focuses on the political criteria, chapter 23 - Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, and the use of EU funds. So far, the organization published a number of publications that are available in electronic form through its portal. works also with the media in order to improve reporting on Macedonia s EU Accession Process and elaborates tools to help them understand that EU Accession is actually internal, and not foreign policy. of President Ivanov to pardon 56 people, vastly belonging to the VMRO-DPMNE political elite 28. Such political isolation, economic pressure, targeted sanctions for the politicians blocking the agreements and the organization of free and fair elections would change the current, called by James Ker-Lindsay soflty-soflty approach 29 by the EU that completely undermined its credibility to deliver results in the mediation efforts. 2. The carrots! On the other hand, what is crucial for the EU leverage as a mediator is making set of benefits and incentives that will open for Macedonia if the crisis is resolved according to the agreed principles and duties with free and fair elections as a crown of the process. First and foremost, the Priebe Report and the Urgent Reform Priorities must transform into Urgent Rule of law Action Plan for Macedonia with specific tasks, duties and datelines. The implementation of this Rule of Law Action Plan should be treated as part of the new Approach of the European Commission for early opening of the Pre-Accession Negotiations for Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) for Macedonia. This would only endorse the long-standing position of the EC to open the accession talks with Macedonia in a parallel process with the name issue resolution instead of imposing the latter as a precondition for opening these talks. The Rule of Law Action plan might affect the programming of the IPA II financial framework for assistance of Macedonia s EU accession and direct the assistance for the priorities set-up by Priebe and Urgent Reform Priorities. The name issue negotiations might be reopened at UN level but with EU involvement and without hindering the Rule of Law Action Plan for overcoming the deep systemic political, institutional and economic crisis of the country. On a long run, EU must consider establishing a parallel of the EU Rule of law (Article 7) mechanism for the Enlargement process and the candidate countries. Namely, that system must work to pressure the candidate countries breaching the Rule of Law principle permanently and severely having arrogant political elites refusing to make any concessions on the top of it. MACEDONIAN CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN TRAINING Majakovski 2/4, 1000 Skopje mcet.org.mk New Approach of the EC towards the Rule of Law (encompassing democracy, anti-corruption, judiciary and fundamental rights protection) will increase the leverage of the EU and clear consequences for breaching these values will make the Union credible player wielding specific instruments for implementing the principles in practice. 28 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/21410166-07d3-11e6-b6d3-746f8e9cdd33. html#axzz46uvqfynv 29 Ibid 28 16