E-Filed Document Jan 20 2016 16:02:50 2015-KA-00770-COA Pages: 18 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JUSTINE LYNN NATIONS APPELLANT VS. NO. 2015-KA-00770 STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE APPELLEE DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO. 104233 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205-0220 TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3680
Table of Contents Table of Authorities............................................................ iii Statement of the Case............................................................ 1 Statement of the Facts........................................................... 1 Summary of the Argument........................................................ 4 Argument..................................................................... 5 I. The trial court did not err when it amended Nations indictment................................................. 5 a. Amendment to charge Nations as a Habitual Offender............................................ 5 b. Amendment that changed the description of one item, and omitted some items................................ 6 II. The State was required to aggregate the values of the items that Nations was accused of stealing............................... 9 III. Nations did not receive an illegal sentence............................... 9 IV. Nations was not entitled to a plea deal, she did not accept a plea deal, and there is no evidence in the record to support her claim that the State s plea offers were above the statutory maximum sentence; therefore, she is not entitled to a new trial...................................................... 12 Conclusion................................................................... 14 Certificate of Service........................................................... 15 i
Table of Authorities Federal Cases Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)... 13 State Cases Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 1990)... 12, 13 Daniels v. State, 742 So. 2d 1140 (Miss. 1999)... 4, 10, 11 Ellis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1256 (Miss. 1985).... 9 Grimsley v. State, 60 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1952)... 8 Jackson v. State, 450 So. 2d 1081 (Miss. 1984).... 7 Kelly v. State, 463 So. 2d 1070 (Miss. 1985).... 12 Ladd v. State, 87 So. 3d 1108 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)... 8 Lee v. State, 944 So. 2d 35 (Miss. 2006)... 8 Newberry v. State, 85 So. 3d 884 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).... 5 Patterson v. State, 156 So. 595 (Miss. 1934).... 9 Swington v. State, 742 So. 2d 1106 (Miss. 1999).... 5 West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1998)... 4, 10, 11 Wilson v. State, 967 So. 2d 32 (Miss. 2007).... 4, 10 Statutes Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63 11 30.... 6 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-17-13... 7 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-17-41(1)... 10 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-33... 4, 10, 11 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-81... 5, 6 Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 99-19-1... 4, 11, 12 Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-17-41... 1, 8, 9 ii
Statement of the Issues I. The trial court did not err when it amended Nations indictment. II. III. IV. The State was required to aggregate the values of the items that Nations was accused of stealing. Nations did not receive an illegal sentence. Nations was not entitled to a plea deal, she did not accept a plea deal, and there is no evidence in the record to support her claim that the State s plea offers were above the statutory maximum sentence; therefore, she is not entitled to a new trial. Statement of the Case The Grand Jury of Rankin County indicted Justine Lynn Nations for Grand Larceny in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated 97-17-41. (Indictment, CP 5). Prior to trial, the State filed two motions to amend Nations indictment: once to charge her as a habitual offender, and once to amend the description of an item and to strike certain items from the original indictment. (CP 17 and 40). After a hearing on these motions, the trial court granted the State s motions to amend. (TR 12 and CP 55-57). After a trial by jury, Circuit Judge John Huey Emfinger, presiding, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. (Verdict, CP 74). The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. (CP 79). The trial court also ordered Nations to pay court costs and fees, and to pay restitution in the amount of $550 to USA Pawn, and $60 to DJ s Silver Mine. (CP 79). Statement of the Facts After Carolyn Baldwin s husband died in late 2013, and while Mrs. Baldwin spent some time in the hospital after a fall for a hip replacement, she hired Justine Nations to live in her home, and care for her animals. (TR 90-91). Nations continued to live with and work for Baldwin, even after Mrs. Baldwin was released from the hospital. (TR 91). In exchange for her services, Baldwin 1
provided Nations with room and board, and would occasionally pay some of Nations bills. (TR 91). Nations lived with, and worked for Mrs. Baldwin until either February or March of 2014. (TR 107 and 174). However, in March of 2014, Mrs. Baldwin noticed that some of her personal belongings were missing, including multiple pieces of jewelry. (TR 91-92). Once she realized that her jewelry was missing, Mrs. Baldwin contacted the police. (TR 92). In order to show what jewelry was missing, and that it belonged to her, Mrs. Baldwin provided photographs of herself wearing the jewelry. (TR 92). These photographs were entered into evidence. (TR 93-97). Mrs. Baldwin explained that she had given Nations one cheap ring (which her husband had found in a parking lot), but that she did not give her any other jewelry, and she did not report the cheap ring as being stolen. (TR 97). Brad Smith, an investigator with the Rankin County Sheriff s Office, searched through an online pawnshop database, and discovered that Nations had pawned multiple items of jewelry at nearby pawn shops. (TR 127-128). Smith went to the pawn shops and found that Nations had pawned items that had been described by Mrs. Baldwin. (TR 130-132). Smith was able to recover several of the items that Mrs. Baldwin had reported missing, and returned them to Mrs. Baldwin. (TR 130-132). Mrs. Baldwin identified her jewelry, at trial. (TR 93-96). Representatives from several pawn shops testified that Nations had pawned a bracelet, and a gold ring, in exchange for $120; a pair of hoop earrings, and a heart pendant, in exchange for $100; and another bracelet, in exchange for $450. (TR 110-111, 115-116, and 122-123). All of the witnesses testified that the pawn amount did not represent the actual value of the property, but that the items were worth at least the amount that Nations received for them. (TR 111-113, 117-120, and 122-124). Ebony Gator, a representative from USA Pawn, who testified that Nations had pawned the bracelet for $450, explained that USA Pawn lends money based on 75% of the price of what a 2
jewelry s weight in gold is worth, and they give 25 cents per point of diamonds that a piece of jewelry contains. (TR 123). Therefore, although Nations only pawned the bracelet for $450, Gator testified that it was definitely worth more than $500. (TR 123-124). After Smith recovered the items from the pawn shops, Smith attempted to locate Nations, but was only able to speak to her mother. (TR 135). He informed her mother that Nations was wanted for questioning, and Nations later self-reported. (TR 135). During her interview, Nations waived her Miranda rights, and stated that she had not taken any of Mrs. Baldwin s jewelry, but claimed that Mrs. Baldwin had given her some bunk jewelry. (TR 137). She explained that she described the jewelry as bunk because it was not valuable. (TR 137). When Smith asked whether Nations had pawned any jewelry, she said that she had, but that it all belonged to her. (TR 152). Smith then confronted her with the fact that he knew that some of the jewelry she had pawned actually belonged to Mrs. Baldwin. (TR 152). Nations denied that she had pawned any of Mrs. Baldwin s jewelry, but after Smith showed Nations the pictures that Mrs. Baldwin had provided, Nations stated that Mrs. Baldwin had given her a lot of jewelry. (TR 152-153). When Smith asked Nations how she was able to pawn jewelry that (according to Nations) was bunk, or not valuable, she had no response. (TR 153). At the conclusion of her interview, Smith placed Nations under arrest. (TR 154). And Nations was indicted by the Grand Jury. (CP 5). Although Nations was originally indicted for stealing one (1) diamond ring with diamond clusters, one (1) gas generator, one (1) pair of diamond cross earrings, one (1) pair of gold hoop earrings, two (2) tool boxes with tools, two (2) pair of dog grooming scissors, two (2) tennis bracelets, one (1) ruby diamond necklace and one (1) horse shoe ring crafted into a necklace, the State filed a pre-trial motion to amend the indictment in order to eliminate some of the items, and to change the description of one of the necklaces. (CP 5 and 40). The trial court allowed these 3
amendments. (CP 55). At trial, the State presented evidence to show that Nations stole, and pawned, one pair of diamond cross earrings, one pave heart diamond necklace, one diamond ring, and two tennis bracelets. (Exhibits 1-12 and 115-18: TR 93-98, 112, 117, 124, 128, 130, 132, 134, 139, 149, and 151). The State also proved that the items that she pawned were worth, at least, $670 total. (TR 110-113, 117-120, and 123-124). Therefore, the State proved that Nations was guilty of Grand Larceny. Summary of the Argument The trial court did not err when it amended Nations indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, or when it amended the indictment to eliminate some of the items listed, and to re-describe one of the items listed. At trial, Nations conceded that she was a habitual offender, and did not object to the amendment of her indictment. On appeal, she has not argued that she was surprised by the habitual-offender amendment, or that she was denied the opportunity to present a defense. Therefore this issue is barred, and is without merit. The trial court also did not err when it eliminated some of the items described in the original indictment because they were surplusage, and were not necessary elements of the crime of Grand Larceny. The trial court did not err when it allowed the State to aggregate the value of the items listed in Nations indictment, because the State was statutorily required to do so. Contrary to the Supreme Court s holdings in Wilson v. State, 967 So. 2d 32, 42 (Miss. 2007), Daniels v. State, 742 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (Miss. 1999), and West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1998), Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 99-19-1 and 99-19-33 do not require a trial court to impose a more lenient sentence if the sentence for a crime is amended prior to the time that an offender is sentenced. At the time that Nations committed the offense, the maximum sentence for Grand Larceny was ten years. Although the Legislature reduced this sentence, prior to Nations 4
sentencing, the trial court was entitled to sentence Nations under the statute as it existed at the time of the offense. Nations claim that her rights were violated during plea negotiations are barred and are without merit. Nations does not explain which rights were violated; therefore, the argument is barred. Furthermore, the argument is without merit because, although District Attorneys are encouraged to participate in the plea bargaining process, Nations did not have a right to receive a plea bargain. And Nations was not harmed by the allegedly excessive plea offer because she did not accept it. Argument I. The trial court did not err when it amended Nations indictment. a. Amendment to charge Nations as a Habitual Offender For the first time on appeal, Nations complains that the State did not inform her that, if she did not accept its plea deal, it would seek to amend her indictment and charge her as a habitual offender. Based on this complaint, she argues that she was not fully informed of the State s intent to amend her indictment. (Appellant s Brief p. 5). However, Nations did not object to the amendment, and actually conceded that she was a habitual offender. (TR 12). Therefore, this Court should not consider this issue on appeal. See Newberry v. State, 85 So. 3d 884, 888 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)(finding that failure to object in the trial court to a motion to amend an indictment bars the issue for appeal)(citing Swington v. State, 742 So. 2d 1106, 1112 (Miss. 1999)). Waiver notwithstanding, her claim that she was surprised by the amendment is belied by the record, and is without merit. On January 6, 2015 91 days prior to trial the State filed a motion to amend Nations indictment to charge her as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-81. (CP 17 and TR 22). The trial court held a hearing on the State s motion, and defense counsel conceded that Nations was a habitual offender. (TR 12). Accordingly, the trial court 5
granted the State s motion to amend. (CP 56-57). Rule 11.03 of the URCCC instructs that all indictments must include both the principal charge and a charge of previous convictions. The indictment must allege with particularity the nature or description of the offense constituting the previous convictions, the state or federal jurisdiction of any previous conviction, and the date of judgment. URCCC 11.03(1). However, Rule 7.09 provides that All indictments may be amended as to form but not as to the substance of the offense charged. Indictments may also be amended to charge the defendant as [a ] habitual offender or to elevate the level of the offense where the offense is one which is subject to enhanced punishment for subsequent offenses and the amendment is to assert prior offenses justifying such enhancement (e.g., driving under the influence, Miss. Code Ann. 63 11 30). Amendment shall be allowed only if the defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and is not unfairly surprised. URCCC 7.09 (emphasis added). Nations was not unfairly surprised by the amendment to her indictment. She was notified, well before trial, that the State intended to charge her as a habitual offender. She also knew that she was considered a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-81. (TR 12). Her claim that she was not made aware, during plea negotiations, that the State intended to seek habitual offender sentencing is not supported by the record. The notice that the State did provide gave Nations ample time to allow her to prepare a defense against the charge that she was a habitual offender. It is clear from the record that she had no defense. (TR 12). For the foregoing reasons, this issue is procedurally barred, and is without merit. b. Amendment that changed the description of one item, and omitted some items The State also moved, prior to trial, to amend Nations indictment to correct the description of items that were stolen, and to remove some of the items that had been listed in the original indictment. The original indictment specified that the following items had been stolen: 6
one (1) diamond ring with diamond clusters, one (1) gas generator, one (1) pair of diamond cross earrings, one (1) pair of gold hoop earrings, two (2) tool boxes with tools, two (2) pair of dog grooming scissors, two (2) tennis bracelets, one (1) ruby diamond necklace and one (1) horse shoe ring crafted into a necklace. (CP 5). The State moved to amend the indictment, as follows: one (1) diamond ring with diamond clusters, one (1) gas generator, one (1) pair of diamond cross earrings, one (1) pair of gold hoop earrings, two (2) tool boxes with tools, two (2) pair of dog grooming scissors, two (2) tennis bracelets, [and] one (1) ruby [pave heart] diamond necklace and one (1) horse shoe ring crafted into 1 a necklace. (CP 40-41). At the hearing on the State s motion, defense counsel stated that it had no problem with the 2 change in description of the heart necklace. (TR 13-15). However, defense counsel argued that the State should not be permitted to eliminate items, because that would be a substantive change. (TR 14). On appeal, Nations contends that the indictment no longer resembles that which went before the Rankin County Grand Jury, and suggests that, because items were whittled away, it is possible that the grand jury may have refused to indict her for grand larceny. (Appellant s Brief p. 5). It appears, based on the argument that was raised before trial, and the argument that is now presented on appeal, that Nations counsel is (and was) concerned that the value of the items contained in the amended indictment did not constitute grand larceny. However, this concern should 1 For the sake of clarity, the changes are indicated by strikeouts (omissions) and brackets (additions). 2 Although it does not seem that Nations argues that the change in description was erroneous, the issue (if any) was waived when the amendment was accepted at trial, without objection. (TR 13-14). Furthermore, the amendment of this description was permissible, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 99-17-13; therefore, this amendment was not erroneously made. See also Jackson v. State, 450 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Miss. 1984)(noting that mis-described property can be amended). 7
have been alleviated when the State proved, and the jury found, that Nations was guilty of stealing items that were valued at more than $500. Despite the fact that certain items were removed from Nations original indictment, the State always had the burden to prove that Nations stole items from Baldwin that had the aggregated value of $500 or more. Miss. Code Ann. 97-17-41 (Rev. 2006). The State had the burden to prove all of the essential elements of the crime of grand larceny, including the value of the property that Nations was accused of stealing. See Ladd v. State, 87 So. 3d 1108, 1116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). However, because the individual items were not essential elements of the crime, or, in other words, were unnecessary elements of proof, they were surplusage, and the trial court had authority to grant the State s pre-trial request to remove some of the items. See Lee v. State, 944 So. 2d 35, 38-39 (Miss. 2006). Although the State had to inform Nations, through the indictment, which items she was accused of stealing, the State did not have to prove that Nations stole every item that was listed in the indictment. The Supreme Court has held that, where an indictment charges theft of a certain number or quantity of things, the State is not bound to prove that the accused stole the exact number of items in the indictment; and the State can meet its burden to prove that the accused is guilty by proving that the value of at least one of the items brings the theft within the grade of the offense for which the accused was charged. Grimsley v. State, 60 So. 2d 509, 511 (Miss. 1952). In the present case, the State could prove that Nations committed grand larceny, even if it did not present evidence as to all of the items listed in the original indictment. The State only had to prove that Nations stole some of the items, and that the items were valued at $500, or more. In fact, the State proved that Nations committed grand larceny just by stealing one of the items (one of the diamond bracelets). (TR 122-124). The amendment of Nations indictment did not disadvantage Nations, and it did not alleviate the State s burden to prove that Nations committed grand larceny. 8
At all times, Nations was charged with stealing items that were worth more than $500, and the State had the burden to prove that she stole items listed in the indictment, and that they were worth at least $500. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted the State s pre-trial request to remove some of the items from the original indictment. II. The State was required to aggregate the values of the items that Nations was accused of stealing. Nations argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to aggregate the value of the items that were taken, to prove that she committed grand larceny. (Appellant s Brief p. 6)(citing Ellis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Miss. 1985) and Patterson v. State, 156 So. 595 (Miss. 1934)). However, the Grand Larceny statute, which has been amended since the decisions in Ellis and Patterson, provides that [t]he total value of property taken and carried away by the person from a single victim shall be aggregated in determining the gravity of the offense. Miss. Code. Ann. 97-17-41 (emphasis added). The aggregation of the items values did not harm Nations, in fact, it helped her. The State proved that one of the items that Nations stole and pawned was worth more than $500. Therefore, if the statute did not require the State to aggregate the value of personal property taken from a single victim, the State actually could have charged her with several counts of petit larceny, in addition to her charge for grand larceny. Because the State was statutorily required to aggregate the value of the property that was stolen, the trial court did not err when it allowed the State to do so. III. Nations did not receive an illegal sentence. Nations was convicted for committing grand larceny, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-17-41. At the time that she committed the crime, the statute provided that a person was guilty of grand larceny if they feloniously carried and took away the personal property 9
of another, if the value of the property was $500.00 or more. Miss. Code Ann. 97-17-41(1). The maximum sentence that a person convicted under the statute could receive was 10 years. Miss. Code Ann. 97-17-41(1). In July 2014, an amendment to the statute took effect, and the value of the property increased to $1,000, and the maximum possible sentence decreased to 5 years. Nations concedes that the elements of the crime that were in place at the time that she committed the crime control, in her case. (Appellant s Brief p. 8). However, for the first time on appeal, she argues that she should have received the benefit of the more lenient sentence, because the statute was amended prior to the time that she was sentenced. (Appellant s Brief p. 8)(citing Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-33, Wilson v. State, 967 So. 2d 32, 42 (Miss. 2007), and Daniels v. State, 742 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (Miss. 1999)). Based on the Supreme Court s holding in Wilson, Nations was properly convicted based on the grand larceny statute, as it existed on the date that she committed the crime. Wilson, 967 So. 2d at 42. However, based on the Supreme Court s opinion in Daniels, because the grand larceny statute was amended to provide for a more lenient sentence, prior to the time that Nations was sentenced, Nations argues that the trial court was bound to sentence Nations under the amended statute. (Appellant s Brief p. 8)(citing Daniels, 742 So. 2d at 1145). In West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1998), the Supreme Court overruled its previous ruling in Allen v. State, 440 So. 2d 544 (Miss. 1983), and held that, although Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-33 appears to provide the trial judge with discretion in sentencing, when the sentence for a crime has been amended prior to sentencing, it actually does not. West, 725 So. 2d at 881. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-33 provides: If any statute shall provide a punishment of the same character, but of milder type, for an offense which was a crime under pre-existing law, then such milder punishment may be imposed by the court but no conviction, otherwise valid, shall be 10
set aside and new trial granted merely because of an error of the court in fixing punishment. Such error shall only entitle the party injured to vacate or reverse the judgment as to the punishment, and the legal punishment shall then be imposed by another sentence based on the original conviction or plea of guilty. Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-33 (emphasis added). In West, the Supreme Court held that the statute means that, if a judge fails to impose a lighter sentence, he has committed error, and if such error is committed, the offender is entitled to be re-sentenced. West, 725 So. 2d at 881. This interpretation was adopted, again, by the Supreme Court in Daniels, 742 So. 2d at 1145 (Miss. 1999). Therefore, the State acknowledges that the Supreme Court has found that when a more lenient sentence is provided through statutory amendment, prior to sentencing, defendants are entitled to receive the more lenient sentence. However, the State respectfully requests that this Court find that the Supreme Court s interpretation of Section 99-19-33 was not correct. The plain language of the statute relates to two separate matters: (1) what sentence a trial judge may impose if the sentence for the crime that an offender committed is amended, prior to the offender s sentencing, and (2) the remedy an offender is entitled to if he claims that he has been erroneously sentenced. Under the first part of this statute, the Legislature specifically provided that, if it creates a new, lesser sentence for a crime, any offender who committed the crime, prior to the amendment, can still be sentenced under the statute as it existed at the time he committed the offense. The Legislature also explained that, if an offender claims that he has been wrongfully sentenced, his conviction should remain intact, and only his sentence may be affected by this type of claim. The Legislature did not provide that it would be error for a trial court to sentence an offender under the statute that existed at the time that the offense was committed. Furthermore, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19- 1 provides that 11
No statutory change of any law affecting a crime or its punishment or the collection of a penalty shall affect or defeat the prosecution of any crime committed prior to its enactment, or the collection of any penalty, whether such prosecution be instituted before or after such enactment; and all laws defining a crime or prescribing its punishment, or for the imposition of penalties, shall be continued in operation for the purpose of providing punishment for crimes committed under them, and for collection of such penalties, notwithstanding amendatory or repealing statutes, unless otherwise specially provided in such statutes. This statute also supports the State s position that the trial judge does not err when he sentences an offender under the statute as it existed at the time that the crime was committed. At the time Nations committed the offense, the maximum sentence was 10 years. Based on her status as a habitual offender, this is the sentence that Nations received. And based on Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 99-19-1 and 99-19-33, the trial court did not err when it imposed this sentence. Therefore, the State of Mississippi respectfully requests that this Court find that Nations sentence is not illegal. IV. Nations was not entitled to a plea deal, she did not accept a plea deal, and there is no evidence in the record to support her claim that the State s plea offers were above the statutory maximum sentence; therefore, she is not entitled to a new trial. Nations argues that the State violated her rights when it offered her a plea deal that exceeded the maximum punishment allowed by statute. (Appellant s Brief p. 9). But Nations did not accept a plea offer, nor did she plead guilty. Therefore, even if her claims are true, she was not harmed as a result. Nations does not specify which of her rights were violated, and does not cite any relevant authority to support her argument. Therefore, this Court need not address the issue on appeal. See Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 254 (Miss. 1990)(citing Kelly v. State, 463 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Miss. 1985)(finding that arguments that are not supported with legal authority should not be considered on appeal)). Nations does cite to Rule 8.04 of the URCCC, which provides that [t]he prosecuting 12
attorney is encouraged to discuss and agree on pleas which may be entered by the defendant. (Appellant s Brief p. 9)(citing URCCC 8.04 (B)(1)(emphasis added)). However, the rule does not require prosecutors to engage in plea bargaining, and does not create a right to a plea offer. In fact, there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain. Allman, 571 So. 2d at 254 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 43 (1977)). There is also not a right to be offered a sentence less than the maximum, in exchange for a guilty plea. However, because Nations did not accept the State s plea offer, and because she was not entitled to a plea bargain, at all, Nations rights were not violated, and this issue is without merit. 13
Conclusion Nations arguments are either barred or are without merit. Accordingly, the State of Mississippi respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm Nations conviction and sentence. Respectfully submitted, JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: s/ Barbara Byrd BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO. 104233 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205-0220 TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3680 14
Certificate of Service I hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed (and mailed by United States Postal Service) the foregoing pleading or other paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notification of such filing to the following: Honorable John Huey Emfinger Circuit Court Judge Post Office Box 1885 Brandon, MS 39043 Honorable Michael Guest District Attorney Post Office Box 68 Brandon, MS 39043 Kevin D. Camp, Esquire Attorney At Law The Camp Law Firm, PLLC 1764 Lelia Drive Jackson, MS 39216 This the 20th day of January, 2016. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205-0220 TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3680 s/ Barbara Byrd BARBARA BYRD SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 15