International Organizations (Fall Semester 2012: Wednesday 9:00 AM 12:00 PM, BD 140-1, Room 202)

International Organizations (Fall Semester 2012: Wednesday 9:00 AM 12:00 PM, BD 140-1, Room 202) Ambassador In-kook Park (Ret.) Visiting Professor Former Deputy Foreign Minister, Ambassador to the UN (2008 11) Course Description This course will provide an opportunity to increase understanding of the concept, functions and roles of International Organizations. It will analyze the historical and theoretical backgrounds of International Organizations in general and then explore how these concepts and roles have been evolving in contemporary international society. The course may delve into details on who is doing what in specific International Organizations, and whether they are effective in contributing to solutions for the current international challenges and crises. Students will be expected to explore various key International Organizations, including the United Nations, and will be encouraged to make their own observations on the performance and relevance of each regime, as well as formulate recommendations for feasible reform. Course Format Every class will begin with a short lecture introducing background information on key elements of the weekly topic (or, this introductory lecture will be presented at the end of the previous class). Then, two or three students will give 15-20 minute presentations each (or, one 40-minute integrated presentation) of the main points or arguments of the weekly readings and raise questions, to be followed by active discussion among the students. Requirements and Grading (1) Weekly Memo and Participation (20 %) - Every student is expected to post a memo raising 2-3 questions about the weekly readings on the ETL site no later than 5 PM on Tuesday, each week. (2) Presentation (30%) - Every student will give 2 presentations (depending on class size) and submit by e- mail a written summary of the presentation by noon the day before his or her presentation (ie, Tuesday, 12 pm). (3) Midterm Quiz (2 to 3 Take-Home Questions) (15 %) (4) Final Paper (35%) 1

Reading Material The reading material list will be available through the course website as soon as possible. Class Schedule (Tentative) Week 1 Introduction - Brief introduction to the major topics to be discussed during the semester and overview of the organization of the class Week2 Theoretical Issue I (Realism and Liberalism) *Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. Chapter 3: Realism and Chapter 4: Liberalism. International Relations: Theories and Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 58-126. *John J. Mearshimer. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3), Winter 1994-95, pp.5-49. *Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security 20 (1), Summer 1995, pp. 39-51. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. Chapter 2: The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp. 35-50. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization 52(4), Autumn 1998, pp. 729-757. Robert O. Keohane. The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36(2), 1982, pp. 325-355. Kenneth Oye. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. World Politics 38, 1986, pp. 1-24. 2

Week 3 Theoretical Issue II (Constructivism & Other Issues) *Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. Chapter 5: International Society and Chapter 6: Social Constructivism. International Relations: Theories and Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 127-180. *Alexander Wendt. Constructing International Politics. International Security 20, Summer 1995, pp. 71-81. *Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. Chapter 1: The Challenges of Global Governance. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp. 3-34, pp. 63 93. Beth A.Simmons. Compliance with International Agreements. Annual Review of Political Science 1, 1998, pp. 75-93. Michael Barnett, and Martha Finnemore. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53 (4), Autumn 1999, pp. 699-732. Sashi Tharoor. Why America Still Needs the United Nations. Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2003. Robert Kagan. America s Crisis of Legitimacy. Foreign Affairs 83(2), Mar/April 2004, pp. 65 87. Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney. Delegation to International Organization: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. International Organization 57(2), 2003. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, 1998, pp. 3-32. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp. 50 60. Week 4 The United Nations *Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. Chapter 4. The United Nations: Centerpiece of Global Governance. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp.95-143 *Inis Claude. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the UN. International Organization 20(3), 1966, pp. 367-379. *Erik Voeten. Clashes in the Assembly. International Organization 54 (2), 2000, pp.185-3

215. *Jochen Prantl. Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council. International Organization 59, 2005, pp. 559-592. *Erik Voeten. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review 95, 2001, pp. 845-858. *Chinmaya R. Gharekhan. Chapter 1. Procedures and Practices. The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council. Ramesh Thakur. Chapter 13. Reforming the United Nations. The United Nations, Peace and Security. Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 291 342. Ilyana Kuziemko, and Eric Werker. How much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy 114(5), 2006, pp. 905-930. Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 53(7), 2009, pp. 742 757. Leslie Johns. A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats International Organization 61, 2007. Daniel Yew Mao Lim, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2011. Regional Organizations and International Politics: Trading Asian Development Bank Loans for United Nations Security Council Votes. Mortara Center Working Paper, 2011. Week 5 Peace and Security *Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. Chapter 8. The Search for Peace and Security. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp.289-354. *Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science Review 94 (4), 2000, pp. 779-801. *David Mozersky and John Prendergast. Love Thy Neighbor: Regional Intervention in Sudan s Civil War. Harvard International Review, 2004. *Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman. Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? International Studies Review 5 (4), 2003, pp. 37-54. 4

Shin-hwa Lee. Preventive Diplomacy and UN Peacekeeping in Conflict Regions: Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide. Korea Review of International Studies, 2002, pp. 71-91. Virginia Page Fortna. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. International Studies Quarterly 48, 2004, pp. 269 292. Week 6 Non-Proliferation of WMD *David S. Yost. Analyzing International Nuclear Order. International Affairs 83 (3), 2007, pp. 549-574. *Scott Sagan. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security 21(3), Winter 1996/97, pp. 54-86. *Joseph F. Pilat. The End of the NPT Regime? International Affairs 83(3), 2007, pp. 469-482. *Rebecca Johnson. Rethinking the NPT s Role in Security: 2010 and Beyond. International Affairs 86(2), 2010, pp. 429-445. *Victor Cha. Chapter 7. Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Disarmament. Impossible State: North Korea, Paste and Future. pp. 247-314. The *Joseph F. Pilat and Kory W. Budlong-Sylvester. The Future of IAEA Safeguards: Challenges and Response. Los Alamos National Laboratory. *Pierre Goldschmidt. Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Arms Control Today 40(1), Jan/Feb 2010. *Larry Niksch. When North Korea Mounts Nuclear Warheads on Its Missiles. Institute of National Security Strategy, 2011. Ronald B. Mitchell. International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots and Sticks. The Nonproliferation Review 5(1), 1997, pp. 40 52. Nina Tannenwald. Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. International Security 29 (4), Spring 2005, pp. 5-29. Gregory L. Schulte. Stopping Proliferation Before It Starts. Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 2010. Daniel Horner. IAEA Board Approves Fuel Bank Plan. Arms Control Today 41, Jan/Feb 2011. 5

Week 7 Trade *Andrew K. Rose. Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" American Economic Review 94 (1), 2004, pp. 98-114. *Paul R.Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics 2 (1), 1990, pp. 1-23. *Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International Organization 61, Winter 2007, pp. 37-67. Edward D.Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. 2000. Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes. The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 143, 2002. Week 8 World Bank & IMF <World Bank> *Romain Wacziarg. Review of Easterly's 'The Elusive Quest for Growth. Journal of Economic Literature XL, 2002, pp. 907-918. *William Easterly. 2003. Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (3), 2003, pp.23-48. *Ngaire Woods. Whose aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance. International Affairs 84(6), 2008. Christopher Kilby. 2006. Donor Influence in Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Development Bank. Vassar College Economics Working Paper 70, 2006. <IMF> *Devesh Kapur & Moises Naim. The IMF and Democratic Governance. Journal of Democracy 16(1), 2005, pp. 89 102. *Bob David. Along With New Money, IMF Gets Politically Perilous Tasks. Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2009. (http://online.wsj.com/article/sb124078041608357051.html) 6

*Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee. IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects? NBER Working Paper 8951, 2002. *Phillip Y. Lipscy. Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3 (1), 2003, pp. 93-104. *Kaushik Basu. Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict. CAE Working Paper 03 04, 2003, pp. 885-99. *Beth A. Simmons. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review 94(4), December 2000, pp.819-835. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss. 2001. Toward Global Parliament. Foreign Affairs 80(1), Jan/Feb 2001, pp. 212 220. Erica R. Gould. Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality. International Organization 57 (3), 2003, pp. 551-586 Week 9 Human Rights Regimes *Oona A. Hathaway. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 839, 2002, pp. 1935 2041. *Andrew Moravcsik. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54(2), 2000, pp. 217-252. * Dawn of a New Era? Assessment of the UN Human Rights Council and Its Year of Reform. UN Watch, 2007. *Diane Ethier. Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives. Democratization 10(1), 2003, pp. 99-120. *Eric Neumayer. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6), 2005, pp. 1 29. *James H. Lebovic and Eric Voeten. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNHRC. International Studies Quarterly 50 (4), 2006, pp. 861-888. James R. Hollyer and B. Peter Rosendorff. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2011. David P. Forsythe. Chapter 3. Global Application of Human Rights Norms. Human Rights 7

in International Relations (Third Edition). Cambridge 2012, pp. 71 116. Week 10 Environment *Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach. Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange. International Organization 55(4), 2001, pp. 891-917 *Elizabeth DeSombre. The Evolution of International Environmental Cooperation. Journal of International Law and International Relations 1 (1-2), Winter 2004/Spring 2005, pp. 75 87. *Garrett Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, 1968, pp. 1243-48. *Nicholas Stern. The Global Deal. New York: Public Affairs, 2009, Chapter3, 4, 6 and 8. *Kerry Emanuel. Phaeton s Reins: The Human Hand in Climate Change. Boston Review January/February 2007. *IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, IPCC, 2007. Dan Nielson and Michael Tierney. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. International Organization 57, 2003, pp.241 276. Week 11 Humanitarian Intervention and Universal Jurisdiction *Judith Kelley. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements. American Political Science Review 50(3), 2007, pp.379 406. *Michael J. Gilligan. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Crime Regime. International Organization 60 (4), 2006, pp. 935 967. *Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. United Nations General Assembly 63 rd Session, Agenda Items 44 & 107, January 12, 2009. *Gareth Evans and Sahnoun Mohamed. The Responsibility to Protect. Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2002. *David J.Scheffer. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The American Journal of International Law 93 (22). 8

*Henry Kissinger. The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction. Foreign Affairs 80 (4), July/August 2001, pp. 86 96. John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan. Toward Postconflict Reconstruction. The Washington Quarterly 25(4), Autumn 2002, pp. 85 96. Erik Voeten. The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. American Political Science Review 102, 2008, pp. 417-433. Gary J. Bass. Milosevic in the Hague. Foreign Affairs 82(3), May/June 2003. Harold Hongju Koh. Why Do Nations Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal 106, 1997, pp. 2599 2659. Nils Peter Gleditsch & Havard Hegre. Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (2), April 1997, pp. 283 310. Week 12 Collective Security and Democracy *Strobe Talbott. 2002. From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk. Foreign Affairs 81(6), Nov/Dec 2002. *Celeste Wallander. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. International Organization. 54(4), 2000, pp. 705-735. *Christopher Hemmer & Peter J. Katzenstein. Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, And The Origins Of Multilateralism. International Organization 56(3), 2002, pp. 574 607. *Dan Reiter. Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy. International Security 25(4), 2001, pp. 41-67. *Bruce Russett and Allan Stam. Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China. Political Science Quarterly 113, 1998, pp.361-382. *Michael McFaul. Democracy Promotion as a World Value. The Washington Quarterly 28(1), Winter 2004-5, pp.147-163. *Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan. The Promise of Collective Security. International Security 20 (1), 1995, pp. 52-61. Andrew Kydd. Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement. International Organization 55(4), 2001, pp. 801-28. Jon C. Pevehouse. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and 9

Democratization. International Organization 56(3), 2002, pp. 515-549. Brett Ashley Leeds. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. American Journal of Political Science 47 (3), 2003, pp. 427 439. Week 13 Regional Integration *Alexander Wendt. Collective Identify Formation and The International State. The American Political Science Association 88(2), 1994, pp. 384 396. *Kenichi Ohmae. The Rise of Region State. Foreign Affairs 72(2), 1992-93, pp. 78-81. *Kathleen R.McNamara. A Rivalry in the Making? The Euro and International Monetary Power. International Political Economy 15 (3), 2008, pp. 439-459. *Edward D.Mansfield,, Helen V. Milner, & Jon C. Pevehouse. Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration. The World Economy 31(1), 2008, pp. 67-96. *John McCormick. Understanding the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 162 171. *William Grimes. Currency and Contest in East Asia. Cornell University, 2009, Conclusion: Currency and Contest in East Asia, pp. 204 218. *Amitav Acharya. Asia is Not One. The Journal of Asian Studies 69 (4), November 2010, pp. 1001 1013. Frederik Ponjaert. European and Asian Integration in the Era of Globalization: A Comparative Analysis. Regional Integration in Europe and Asia. Ed. Sung-Hoon Park & Heungchong Kim. Baden-Baden Nomos, 2009, pp. 81 105. Peter J. Katzenstein. A World of Regions. Cornell University Press, 2005, Chapter 4. Regional Orders in Economy and Security, pp. 104-148. Carel C. A. van den Berg. Checks and Balances for the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks. Proceedings of OeNB Workshops NO. 7/2006. T.J. Pempel. The Race to Connect East Asia: An Unending Steeplechase. Asian Economic Policy Review, 2006, pp. 239 254. 10

Week 14 Future of International Organizations <UN System> *Donald J. Puchala, Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Roger A. Coate. "Reconsidering the United Nations." United Nations Politics: International Organization in a Divided World. Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007, pp. 181 199. *Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. Chapter 12. Innovations in Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, pp.537 553. *Martin Wolf. Why a New Bretton Woods is Vital and So Hard. Financial Times November 5, 2008. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/43bf3e3a-aadc-11dd-897c-000077b07658.html) <Democratic Deficit> *Joseph Nye. Globalization s Democratic Deficit. Foreign Affairs 80(4), July/August 2001, pp. 2 6. <Rise of Civil Society> *Jessica T. Mathews. Power Shift. Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1997, pp. 50 66. *Michele M. Betsill & Elisabeth Corell. NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis. Global Environmental Politics 1(4), 2001, pp. 65 85. *Kal Raustiala. States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions. International Studies Quarterly 41, 1997, pp. 719-740. <New Multilateralism and Governance> *John Gerard Ruggie. Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. International Organization 46(2), Summer 1992. *Ngaire Wood. Governing the Global Economy: Strengthening Multilateral Institutions. International Peace Institutions, 2008. *Nancy Birdsall & Francis Fukuyama. The Post-Washington Consensus. Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2011. *Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer. A G-Zero World, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011. *Bruce Jones. Making Multilateralism Work: How the G-20 Can Help the United Nations. Policy Analysis Brief. The Stanley Foundation, April 2010. 11

*Francis Fukuyama. The End of History? The National Interest, Summer 1989. (http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm) *Michael Schuman. Can the G-20 Solve the World s Economic Problems? Time, February 21, 2011. Liaquat Abamed. Currency Wars, Then and Now. Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2011, pp. 92 103. Francis Fukuyama. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21 st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004. 12