THE STATE & MARKET IN THE GLOBAL POL. ECONOMY

Syllabus THE STATE & MARKET IN THE GLOBAL POL. ECONOMY - 58564 Last update 06-11-2014 HU Credits: 4 Degree/Cycle: 1st degree (Bachelor) Responsible Department: International Relations Academic year: 3 Semester: Yearly Teaching Languages: Hebrew Campus: Mt. Scopus Course/Module Coordinator: Lior Herman Coordinator Email: lior.herman@mail.huji.ac.il Coordinator Office Hours: 13:15-14:45 Teaching Staff: Dr. Lior Herman page 1 / 6

Course/Module description: The seminar discusses major theories of political economy through empirical examination of case studies, serving as a laboratory for the relationships between the state and the market. The first part of the seminar addresses fundamental questions concerning the structure of political economy, and the way in which changes take place. Questions explored are both cognitive (why things are the way they are?) and normative (how things ought to be?). First, we investigate the relationship between "economic" and "political" major approaches to political economy. Relevant issues and questons in this investigation include: to what extent economics and politics are separate spheres? What is the extent to which different approaches base their relationships to each other (for example, whether they are independent of each other or each other hierarchies?)? Are the ways in which economic approaches (classical economics, neo-classical or Keynesian) view the capitalist economy, rely on early conceptions of the nature of politics? Are there different political approaches have preconceptions or notions concerning the manner in which the economy functions or where the location of the market? Subsequently, we will discuss three main economic approaches (Classical Economics, Neoclassical Economics and Keynesianism), while investigating whether these approaches can be taken as political economy or those originating from political economy. Some of the questions, which will be discussed are: what makes these economic approaches also political? In what ways do the concept of the capitalist economy designs, structures and determines the role of the state, politics and government? How can we explain the "homecoming" of the economy of international relations and political science to its political-economic roots (international political economics / public choice / analytical politics)? Then we will discuss the way in which political theory challenges the hegemony of the economists in the study of political economy. We will engage with questions such as, how political theories base the autonomy and primacy of the political sphere? What is the meaning of the concept of a democratic political order as regards firms and market competition? Following, we will discuss various explanations for order formation and transformations in the political economy, such as whether political order of a market society is possible, and if so, how? To what extent needs authority to be broad or absolute for civil society to exist and flourish? Given the existence of political authority, how far possible can a capitalist democracy exist? What makes collective action possible? and does gender play a formative role in political economy? During the course of the seminar will also discuss the process of research and essay writing. Over the second term, students will present their research and writing progress. Please note that the most updated (and binding) version of this syllabus is posted on the course Moodle website. page 2 / 6

Course/Module aims: The aim of the course is to provide students of international relations (and others interested students) advanced, broad and critical understanding of political economy, both domestic and international. Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to: See course aims and description Attendance requirements(%): Participation is compulsory Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: Class Seminar Refer also to the full syllabus on the Moodle Website for further details. Course/Module Content: Topic 1: Introduction, What is (international) political economy? Topic 2: Classical political economy and its Marxist criticism Topic 3: Neo-classical political economy and Keynesian criticism Topic 4: Economic approaches to politics and their criticism coming from the economics Topic 5: International Political Economy and International Relations paradigms Topic 6: The Power Paradigm Topic 7: The State Paradigm Topic 8: Justice Topic 9: What are the sources of legitimacy in the market? Topic 10: Why do rational governments limit their powers or share it? Topic 11: How do civil society and the public voice themselves? Topic 12: Can Capitalism and Democracy peacefully intertwine? Topic 13: The logic of collective action and the problem of the agency capture Topic 14: Bargaining problems, cooperation and joint decision traps Topic 15: Reliability, commitment and conditionality Topic 16: Economic Regulation Topic 17: Gender Topic 18: Development and international political economy Topic 19: Economic instruments of foreign policy: economic sanctions and foreign aid Required Reading: page 3 / 6

Required reading is marked by (*). Optional reading is unmarked: (*) Sassen, Saskia. (2003): Globalization or denationalization?, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 10, No.1, pp.1 22. (*) Beck, U. and Sznaider, N. (2006): Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, No.1, pp.1-23 (*) סמית, אדם. (1996). עושר העמים, תל אביב: האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, עמ' 95-107. (*) Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. (1888). The Communist Manifesto. (*) Williamson, Oliver, E. (1979): Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, vol.22, pp.233261. Coase, R. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, (October): 1-44. (*) קיינס, ג'ון מ. (2006). התאוריה הכללית של תעסוקה, ריבית וכסף / ג'ון מיינרד קיינס ; מאנגלית: יצחק טישלר. ירושלים: הוצאת ספרים ע"ש י"ל מאגנס, האוניברסיטה העברית, תשס"ז, 2006, הקדמה ופרק 24. (*) פרידמן, מילטון. (2002). קפיטליזם וחירות, ירושלים: הוצאת שלם, עמ' 23-36. (*) Levi, M (2000): The Economic Turn in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies No.33, vol.6/7, pp.822-844. (*) Oatley, Thomas. (2010). International Political Economy, 4th edition, pp. 1-14. (*) Lukes, Steven. (1974). Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan, pp. 11-31. (*) Galbraith, John. K. (1980): American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Oxford: Blackwell, ch. 9-10. (*) Giddens, Anthony. (1979): Power: Relations of autonomy and dependence, in: idem, Central Problems in Social Theory, London: Macmillan, pp.88-94. (*) הובס, תומס. (2009). לויתן, או, החומר, הצורה והכוח של מדינה כנסייתית ומדינתית.+ ירושלים : שלם. חלק א: פרקים יז'-יט', עמ' 117-138. (עידו גרינבלום), (*) Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice: Revised Version, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ch. 2, pp. 47-101. Dworkin, R. (1977): Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, ch.7. Nozick, R. (1974): Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, chs.1 and 7.II (on Rawls) (*) Milward, A.S. (2000): The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Routledge: London & New York (second edition), ch. 2, pp. 21-45. (*) Majone, Giandomenico. (1997), The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems, West European Politics vol.22, No.1, pp.1-24. (*) Giavazzi, G., and Pagano, M. (1988): The Advantage of Tying Ones Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility, European Economic Review, 32: 1055-1082. Putnam, R. (1988): Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, International Organization 42 (3): 427-60 Elster, J. (1979): Ulysses and the sirens: studies in rationality and irrationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (*) Hirschman, A.O. (1992): Exit and Voice: an expanding sphere of influence, in: A.O. Hirschman, Rival views of market society and other recent essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ch. 4 (*) Olson, M. (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven and London: Yale page 4 / 6

University Press, chs. 2, 3 (*) Arrow, K.J. (1951): Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, chs. 1, 5. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510. Schumpeter, J. A. (1965). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London: Allen & Unwin, chs. 7, 21-23. [Optional also chs. 11-12] Downs, A. (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, chs.1, 2, 3, 14. [subject to changes] (*) Olson, M. (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, chs. 2, 3. (*) Lohmann, S. (2003): Representative Government and Special Interest Politics (We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us), Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol.15: 299-319. Hirschman, A.O. (1992): Exit and Voice: an expanding sphere of influence, in: idem, Rival views of market society and other recent essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ch.4. Ostrom, E. (2000). "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137-158. Sabatier, P.A. (1992): Interest Group Membership and Organization: Multiple Theories, in: Petracca, M.P. (Ed.): The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed, Boulder, CO: Westview, ch.5. (*) Putnam, R. (1988): Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, International Organization 42 (3): 427-60. (*) Scharpf, F. W. (1988). "The Joint-decision trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration." Public Administration 66: 239-278. Scharpf, F.W. (2006): The joint-decision trap revisited, Journal of Common Market Studies vol.44, No.4, pp.845-864 Tsebelis, G. (2002): Veto Players - How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, chs.2, 6, 8, 11. (*) Giavazzi, G., and Pagano, M. (1988): The Advantage of Tying Ones Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility, European Economic Review, vol. 32, pp.1055-1082. (*) Lohmann, S. (2003) Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience-cost Theory of Institutional Commitment, Governance, vol.16, No.1, pp.95-110. Rodrik, D. and Zeckhauser, R. (1988): The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol.7, No.4, pp.601-620. Cukierman, A. (1992): Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, ch.2. Blinder, Alan S. (1999), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McCallum, B. T. (1995), Two fallacies concerning central bank independence, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 85 (May), pp. 207-211. Stigler, G. J. (1971). "The Theory of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of page 5 / 6

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3-21. Peltzman, S. (1976). "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics 19(2): 211-240. Herman, L. (unpublished). Neither Takers, nor Makers: The Big-4 Accountancy Firms as Domestic and Transnational Accountancy Rules Intermediaries. (*) Bair, Jennifer Bair. (2010). On Difference and Capital: Gender and the Globalization of Production, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol 36(1), pp. 203-226. (*) Oatley, Thomas. (2010). International Political Economy, 4th edition, pp. 114-163. Sally, R. (2008). The Political Economy of Trade-Policy Reform: Lessons from Developing Countries, The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 2 (2), Winter 2008: 55-96 Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, chs: 1,2,5. (*) Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J J. and Elliot, K.N. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Institute for International Economics, 1990, Chs. 5-6. (*) Newnham, R. (2011). "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool." Journal of Eurasian Studies 2(2): 134-143. (*) Alessina, A. and D. Dollar (2000). "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic Growth 5: 33-63. Additional Reading Material: As specified in the required reading material. Course/Module evaluation: End of year written/oral examination 0 % Presentation 0 % Participation in Tutorials 25 % Project work 0 % Assignments 0 % Reports 75 % Research project 0 % Quizzes 0 % Other 0 % Additional information: Please note that the most updated (and binding) version of this syllabus is posted on the course Moodle website. page 6 / 6