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Package nopp February 15, 2013 Type Package Title Nash Optimal Party Positions Version 1.0.3 Date 2012-10-20 Author Luigi Curini, Stefano M. Iacus Maintainer Stefano M. Iacus <stefano.iacus@unimi.it> Estimation of party/candidate ideological positions that correspond to a Nash equilibrium along a one-dimensional space. License GPL (>= 2) Depends R (>= 2.10), mlogit, MASS Repository CRAN Date/Publication 2012-10-22 08:48:42 NeedsCompilation no R topics documented: nopp-package........................................ 2 equilibrium......................................... 2 italy2006.......................................... 5 italy2006.lin......................................... 6 italy2006.wide....................................... 8 noppnews.......................................... 9 plot.......................................... 9 Index 11 1

2 equilibrium nopp-package Nash Optimal Party Positions Estimation of party/candidate ideological positions that correspond to a Nash equilibrium along a one-dimensional space Package: nopp Type: Package Version: 1.0 Date: 2012-06-26 License: GPL (>= 2) nopp is a package for R which enables to compute party/candidate ideological positions that correspond to a Nash Equilibrium along a one-dimensional space. It accommodates alternative motivations in (each) party strategy while allowing to estimate the uncertainty around their optimal positions through two different procedures (bootstrap and MC). Author(s) Luigi Curini, Stefano M. Iacus Maintainer: Luigi Curini <luigi.curini@unimi.it>, Stefano M. Iacus <stefano.iacus@unimi.it> References Adams, James F., Samuel Merrill III, and Bernard Grofman (2005). A Unified Theory of Party Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Merrill, Samuel III, and James Adams (2001), Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components, Political Analysis, 9, 347 61 equilibrium Nash Optimal Party Positions Nash Optimal Party Positions equilibrium(start, model, data, tolerance = 1e-05, max.iter = 100, coal = 0, alpha = 0, margin = NUL prox.var="prox", position=null, votes=null, quadratic=true)

equilibrium 3 Arguments start model data initial party positions. Numerical vector. Optional. the mlogit model analysis the data set tolerance tolerance in the convergence of Nash equilibrium. Default 1e-5 max.iter max iteration to convergence in Nash equilibrium. Default 100 coal alpha margin fixed gamma boot MC Value Note self.var prox.var position votes quadratic See vignette. an object of class a list specificing electoral coalitions. See. the weight of coalition vote-share in party utility function. Default = 0. See. a list specifing the vote share margin to be maximized of a party/coalition against other party/coalition. See. a list of fixed party positions. See. the weight among nash and fixed arty position. Default=0. See. number of boostrap replications. See. number of Monte Carlo replications. See. character: name of self-placement of respondent. See. character: name of party-placement variable. See. a named list: of perceived position of parties. See. a named list: of actual vote share at election. See. a logical value: if FALSE the linear utility function is used to calculate the proximity. See. See the vignette for detailed explanations and other working examples. Author(s) Luigi Curini, Stefano M. Iacus References Adams, James F., Samuel Merrill III, and Bernard Grofman (2005). A Unified Theory of Party Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Merrill, Samuel III, and James Adams (2001), Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components, Political Analysis, 9, 347 61

4 equilibrium See Also See Also as plot. Examples ## Not run: data(italy2006) str(italy2006) italy2006[1:2,1:14] election <- mlogit.data(italy2006, shape="wide", choice="vote", varying=c(5:14), sep="_") str(election) m <- mlogit(vote~prox+partyid gov_perf+sex+age+education, election, reflevel = "UL") summary(m) true.pos <- list(fi=7.59, UL=3.50, RC=1.95, AN=8.08, UDC=5.66) true.votes <- list(fi=.24, UL=.40, RC=.10, AN=.18, UDC=.08) # model 1: comparison against true votes and party positions <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, pos=true.pos, votes=true.votes) par(mfrow=c(3,1)) plot() par(mfrow=c(1,1)) # model 2: colation behaviours coal1 <- list(fi=1, UL=2, RC=2, AN=1, UDC=1) alpha1 <- list(fi=0.5, UL=0.5, RC=0.5, AN=0.5, UDC=0.5) <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, coal=coal1, alpha=alpha1) # model 3: colation behaviours coal1 <- list(fi=1, UL=2, RC=2, AN=1, UDC=1) alpha1 <- list(fi=0.7, UL=0.8, RC=0.1, AN=0.5, UDC=0.9) <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, coal=coal1, alpha=alpha1) # model 4: rivals tends to separate each other <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, margin=list(fi="ul", UL="FI")) # model 5: fixed position averaged with Nash equilibrium solution <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, fixed=list(rc=1), gamma=0.2) # model 6: rivals tends to separate each other with fixed position averaged with Nash equilibrium solution <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, margin=list(fi="ul", UL="FI"), fixed=list(rc=1), gamma=0.2) # model 7: coalition and fixed position averaged with Nash equilibrium solution

italy2006 5 coal1 <- list(fi=1, UL=2, RC=2, AN=1, UDC=1) alpha1 <- list(fi=0.7, UL=0.8, RC=0.5, AN=0.5, UDC=0.5) <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, coal=coal1, alpha=alpha1, fixed=list(rc=1), gamma=0.2) # model 8: Bootstrap analysis <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, boot=10) # model 9: Monte Carlo simulation <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, MC=10) ## End(Not run) italy2006 2006 Italian General Election survey 2006 Italian General Election survey, with quadratic ideological proximity. data(italy2006) Format A data frame with 438 observations on the following 18 variables. country country name id id of respondent vote a factor with levels FI UL AN UDC RC for each party voted self self-placement of respondent on a 0 to 10 left-right scale prox_fi see. prox_ul see. prox_an see. prox_udc see. prox_rc see. partyid_fi see. partyid_ul see. partyid_an see. partyid_udc see. partyid_rc see.

6 italy2006.lin sex gender variable 1 = female age see. education see. gov_perf see. In this survey respondents were asked to indicate which party they voted for in the 2006 Election. The data concerns 5 parties: UL (Ulivo), RC (Communist Refoundation party), FI (Forza Italia), AN (National Alliance) and UDC (Union of Christian Democrats). prox_* quadratic ideological distance between the respondent and a party * placement partyid_* binary variable equals to 1 if the respondent declares to feel herself close to party * age : 1 = "18-24 years", 2 = "25-34", 3 = "35-44", 4 = "45-54", 5 = "55-64", 6 = "65 +" education : 0 = "up to primary school", 1 = "incomplete secondary", 2 = "secondary completed", 3 = "post-secondary trade", 4 = "university undergraduate degree inc", 5 = "university undergraduate degree comp" gov_perf : 1 = "very good job", 2 = "good job", 3 = "bad job", 4 = "very bad job" Source CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: http://www.cses.org/). Examples data(italy2006) head(italy2006) italy2006.lin 2006 Italian General Election survey 2006 Italian General Election survey, with linear ideological proximity. data(italy2006.lin)

italy2006.lin 7 Format Source A data frame with 438 observations on the following 18 variables. country country name id id of respondent vote a factor with levels FI UL AN UDC RC for each party voted self self-placement of respondent on a 0 to 10 left-right scale proxlin_fi see. proxlin_ul see. proxlin_an see. proxlin_udc see. proxlin_rc see. partyid_fi see. partyid_ul see. partyid_an see. partyid_udc see. partyid_rc see. sex gender variable 1 = female age see. education see. gov_perf see. In this survey respondents were asked to indicate which party they voted for in the 2006 Election. The data concerns 5 parties: UL (Ulivo), RC (Communist Refoundation party), FI (Forza Italia), AN (National Alliance) and UDC (Union of Christian Democrats). prox_* linear ideological distance between the respondent and a party * placement partyid_* binary variable equals to 1 if the respondent declares to feel herself close to party * age : 1 = "18-24 years", 2 = "25-34", 3 = "35-44", 4 = "45-54", 5 = "55-64", 6 = "65 +" education : 0 = "up to primary school", 1 = "incomplete secondary", 2 = "secondary completed", 3 = "post-secondary trade", 4 = "university undergraduate degree inc", 5 = "university undergraduate degree comp" gov_perf : 1 = "very good job", 2 = "good job", 3 = "bad job", 4 = "very bad job" CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: http://www.cses.org/). Examples data(italy2006.lin) head(italy2006.lin) ## maybe str(italy2006.lin) ; plot(italy2006.lin)...

8 italy2006.wide italy2006.wide 2006 Italian General Election survey Format 2006 Italian General Election survey - wide format data(italy2006.wide) A data frame with 524 observations on the following 15 variables. country country name id id of respondent vote a factor with levels FI UL AN UDC RC for each party voted self self-placement of respondent on a 0 to 10 left-right scale FI see. DS see. AN see. DL see. UDC see. RC see. pid see. sex gender variable 1 = female age see. education see. gov_perf see. In this survey respondents were asked to indicate which party they voted for in the 2006 Election. The data concerns 5 parties: UL (Ulivo), RC (Communist Refoundation party), FI (Forza Italia), AN (National Alliance) and UDC (Union of Christian Democrats). The dataset is in wide format. variable from FI to RC identify the placement of those parties, on a 0 to 10 left-right scale, as perceived by the respondent. pid is a variable that identifies the partisanship of the respondent (where 0=stands for no partyid, 1 = FI partyid, 23 = UL partyid, 3 = AN partyid, 4 = UDC partyid, 6 = RC partyid) age : 1 = "18-24 years", 2 = "25-34", 3 = "35-44", 4 = "45-54", 5 = "55-64", 6 = "65 +" education : 0 = "up to primary school", 1 = "incomplete secondary", 2 = "secondary completed", 3 = "post-secondary trade", 4 = "university undergraduate degree inc", 5 = "university undergraduate degree comp" gov_perf : 1 = "very good job", 2 = "good job", 3 = "bad job", 4 = "very bad job"

noppnews 9 Source CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: http://www.cses.org/). Examples data(italy2006.wide) head(italy2006.wide) ## maybe str(italy2006.wide) ; plot(italy2006.wide)... noppnews Show the NEWS file Show the NEWS file of the nopp package. noppnews() Value None. plot. Plot function for Nash equilibrium object Plot function for Nash equilibrium object ## S3 method for class plot(x,...) Arguments x a object... additional arguments passed to the inner plot function See vignette.

10 plot. Author(s) See Also Luigi Curini, Stefano M. Iacus See Also as equilibrium Examples ## Not run: data(italy2006) election <- mlogit.data(italy2006, shape="wide", choice="vote", varying=c(5:14), sep="_") m <- mlogit(vote~prox+partyid gov_perf+sex+age+education, election, reflevel = "UL") true.pos <- list(fi=7.59, UL=3.50, RC=1.95, AN=8.08, UDC=5.66) true.votes <- list(fi=.24, UL=.40, RC=.10, AN=.18, UDC=.08) # comparison against true votes and party positions <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, pos=true.pos, votes=true.votes) par(mfrow=c(3,1)) plot() # bootstrap confidence intervals <- equilibrium(model=m, data=election, boot=10) plot() par(mfrow=c(1,1)) ## End(Not run)

Index Topic datasets italy2006, 5 italy2006.lin, 6 italy2006.wide, 8 Topic package nopp-package, 2 equilibrium, 2, 10 italy2006, 5 italy2006.lin, 6 italy2006.wide, 8 nopp (nopp-package), 2 nopp-package, 2 noppnews, 9 plot., 4, 9 11