Globalization of the Commons and the Transnationalization of Local Governance

Globalization of the Commons and the Transnationalization of Local Governance Magnus Paul Alexander Franzén, Eduardo Filipi Magnus Paul Alexander Franzén Stockholm University, Sweden E-mail: franzen_magnus@yahoo.com Eduardo Filipi Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil E-mail: edu_292000@yahoo.com.br Abstract The process of globalization provokes a set of problems of which global climate change is arguably the most pressing and severe. As climate change constitutes a classic commons problem it is often assumed that solutions have to be found in global agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol. However, by focusing only on all-compassing treaties and international conferences, other important scales are overlooked. Even though being a global problem, most action to mitigate and adapt to climate change will and does inevitably take place on the local scale. Efforts are being made to cross scales and connect local authorities through transnational networks. This article leaves the global solutions aside for a moment and concentrates on these networks. An eclectic approach to environmental governance is taken. Using economic theories of governing the commons together with theories of multi-level governance and participation, the objective is to describe a framework for decision-making that enables the (global) commons such as the atmosphere to be administered on a subglobal or subnational level. Empirical evidence shows that local governments are willing to take action to mitigate climate change. However, local level governance of the environment does encounter two impediments. First, the local government might be financially, institutionally, and jurisdictionally insufficient. And second, when it comes to global commons, such as the atmosphere, local governments are caught in a classic prisoner s dilemma. The theoretical discussion suggests that the right institutional setting can facilitate local governance of global issues and the conclusion of this article is that networks between local governments can help remove obstacles and give incentives for cooperation. Keywords: Governance, climate change, local, city, transnational networks, scale, globalization Introduction "Nobody makes a greater mistake than he who does nothing because he could only do a little" Edmund Burke To be able to mitigate climate change, the governing of the global commons is essential. As the international attempts to address the issue of climate change are failing, more innovative approaches are called for. Using economic theories of governing the commons, the objective is to describe a framework for decision-making that enables the (global) commons 49

such as the atmosphere to be partly administered with the help of transnational networks between local governments. The article is divided into three parts. After this introduction, we describe the theoretical framework for governing the commons. In the second section, we move on to present the local alternative together with some empirical evidence of local action to mitigate climate change, and how local governments cooperate in transnational networks. We end by providing some concluding remarks. Multi-Level Governance, Institutional Economics, and Local Governments When it comes to an issue such as climate change it is not enough to look at only the actions of nation states or international organizations. Several authors have shown how measures are being applied on many different levels; cooperation is being conducted underneath the national level and between actors across national borders. To be able to comprehend these activities there is a need for a multi-level framework. Hooghe and Marks (2003) divide multi-level governance into two different types: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 is used to describe governance that follows a typical federal structure. That is, governance with several functions bundled together within jurisdictions on a limited number of levels, typically international, national, regional, state, municipal, and so on. Type 2, on the other hand, is governance that is more issue-specific. It is often much leaner and flexible than Type 1 and can transform or change according to the demand for the specific function (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 236). When it comes to economic theory of the environment, classical thinking, presented by Hardin (1968), refers to the idea of the prisoner's dilemma game where all players are aware of the potential defect of the other players. Rules and agreements made by the players are assumed to be useless, since there is no mechanism to enforce them. In the game, it is also assumed that all players have complete information of the game tree and the payoffs derived from the outcomes, and can, therefore, rationally choose their strategy. However, the rational choices made by the players do not result in an optimal strategy for the collective, since, given the assumptions made, their individual strategies will produce a less than best result, and incentives for the players to change their preferred strategy independently of the other players' strategies do not exist. However, another point of view that has surged in the last years, which is largely built on the work of Elinor Ostrom, argues for cooperation on four principal requirements. First of all, there has to be a wide-spread acknowledgement of the need for action. Second, the information about the issue has to be reliable and frequently updated. Third, actors have to have knowledge about who is taking action and these actions have to be followed in an efficient and transparent manner. And finally, there has to be a line of communication between the actors (Ostrom 1990, Dietz et al. 2003). In earlier work on the governance of commons, Ostrom describes eight design principles that are key to the endurance of the governance of commons (1990: 90-102): clear definition of the users of the resource; rules that are adapted to the specific resource, or case; participation of the individuals affected by the rules in the creation of the same; effective monitoring; a graduated sanctioning system, which starts at a low level making users feel secure, adhering to what has been called 'quasi-voluntary compliance' (Levi 1988 cited in Ostrom 1990: 94); a mechanism for conflict or controversy resolution; a recognition on behalf of government of the right to organize the commons voluntarily; and, 50

all the aspects of the governance of the commons appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers. If we now turn to the local or subnational as an actor, several benefits can be identified. First of all, as the world is becoming increasingly urbanized, the cities stand for an increasing share of the world's GHG emissions (Grimmond et al. 2010). Some subnational administrative units have such high emissions that they compare easily with some of the world's biggest countries. For example the state of California if counted as a country would rank in the 20th place when it comes to emissions. The state of São Paulo, Brazil, would rank 39th (Reid et al. 2005). This means that most of the action taken to reduce GHG emission would inevitably have to be implemented on the local scale in the end. Second, as suggested by Puppim de Oliveira (2009), the local has often jurisdiction over a series of issues that are of utmost importance to emission reduction, as for example waste management, public transport, building and construction codes, land-use, and sometimes energy. Add to this the fact that in many cases the local government is the principle buyer of services and products with great environmental impacts, for example through energy use of public buildings. Third, there are benefits to distributing action between different levels. The local level could work as an important complement to action on the national and international level. The idea of spill-over is important here. If action were taken broadly on the local scale, there would be a myriad of different solutions to problems. These solutions could then be proliferated as best practices to other local governments, or even other levels, such as regional or national governments (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Puppim de Oliveira 2009). Ultimately, the local government is often leaner and a somewhat faster-working organization than national bureaucracies (Puppim de Oliveira 2009) which makes it easier to adopt more progressive policies. What local governments can do depends to a great degree on the national context. In some countries, such as Brazil, the municipalities enjoy much autonomy, granted to them by the federal constitution. In other countries, such as the United States, the municipal autonomy is largely at the will of the states. However, previous studies (Otto-Zimmermann 2011; Alber and Kern 2008) show that local governments often have as their responsibility public transport, waste handling, building and construction codes, and energy issues, all of which have much relevance for greenhouse gas emission reduction. The local alternative: empirical evidence Local governments are implementing policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions. Cities in the United States and Europe are often going further than their countries when it comes to reduction targets and implementation of policies. Stockholm for example has set ambitious targets of being free of fossil fuel by 2050 and reaching 3 tons of CO2/person emissions by 2015, which would mean a 40 percent decrease from 1990 levels. Policies are being concentrated in areas such as energy efficiency, district heating, public transports, and cleaner vehicles for the municipal fleet (Stockholm 2010). Policies are implemented and actions are taken also outside the Annex-1 countries. São Paulo, Brazil, is one example of this. Both the state and the city of São Paulo have legislated on GHG reduction targets. Until 2020 the state of São Paulo should cut their emissions by 20 percent compared to the baseline year 2005 (Lucon and Goldemberg 2010). The city of São Paulo similarly should cut its emissions by 30 percent by 2012 compared to 2005. Among the policies adopted to achieve these targets São Paulo city works within six areas: energy, waste, transport, construction, land-use, and health (São Paulo 2010). Compared to Stockholm, São Paulo city enjoys a bit more autonomy. However, the city is still in many cases dependent on federal funding, especially for larger investments. 51

A significant component of local engagement in the climate change debate has been the emergence of new transnational network organizations, existing independently of national governments. A transnational network can be defined as regular interaction across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of national government or intergovernmental organization (Risse-Kappen 1995). There are many examples of these organizations: ICLEI, the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, C40, Bonn Center for Local Climate Change Action and Reporting, Climate Alliance, Cities for Climate Protection, Energie-Cités, and many more. Let us take a closer look at the first network ICLEI Local Governments for Climate Protection. The network comprises approximately 1200 local and subnational governments, and tries to promote sustainable development at the local level through information sharing, consulting, and capacity building. The network is completely voluntary and members are allowed to enter or leave as they please, and engagement is not obligatory. Many of the members are passive and do not engage in much work outside individual programs. When it comes to climate change, most importantly the network helps the cities to implement a five-step plan. First, to make a reliable inventory of emissions (measure). Second, to get the local government to set targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction (commit). Third, to work out an action plan for reductions (plan). Fourth, to implement the plan (implementation). And finally, to monitor achievements (ICLEI 2011). Much of the work of ICLEI is based on international agreements and action plans, and targets are often aligned with established goals and conventions, such as the UNFCCC and Agenda 21. A transnational network like ICLEI has many benefits for climate protection, and if it is designed correctly could have even more. First of all, the network can provide a certain possibility for an institutional and financial structure to take on the issue of climate change. Institutionally, it creates connections between cities allowing for mutual learning and knowledge transfer between cities in different socio-economic contexts. Financially, the network can constitute a framework for helping cities in less developed regions by transferring some of the membership costs to more affluent cities. Also, even though local governments still depend to a great degree on their national governments for financial and institutional aid, a network can work (a) as a means of affecting national governments and international negotiations, and (b) as a source of both financial and institutional resources, alleviating the local government from its dependence on national government policy. Second, although the ICLEI being voluntary, membership often means the statement of commitment to climate change mitigation. As commitments are being clearly stated it is easier for local governments to find sufficient partners to make action rational. Third, the issue of prisoner s dilemma might be addressed by a collective, voluntary action through a global network of local entities. A network such as ICLEI provides a forum for these actors to find partners in their activities, thus further mitigating the negative effects on cooperation of the prisoner s dilemma game. It provides reliable and updated monitoring of achievements through the dissemination of information. By helping members to fulfill the five-step plan, all other members have easy access to the monitoring information. Fourth, the network allows for a multi-layer approach, integrating agreements and treaties made on the global, regional, and national level; as well as, integrating different levels where the issues are best approached, for example, regional, national, or transnational activities; and finally, integrating different issues. The issues that are most pressing for one city might be unimportant for another. The needs of developed and developing regions can be quite different, and a participatory framework within a voluntary network such as the ICLEI can be helpful to create an understanding between actors. In addition, since the network is fundamentally Type-2 in its nature, being concentrated around a specific function rather than 52

jurisdiction, it can more easily evolve, transform, and develop as the context of the problem changes. Fifth, if we use Ostrom s design principles, we can see that a network such as ICLEI could be designed to provide a forum for local governments to engage in a participatory process to create rules for emission of greenhouse gases. The rules would be specific instead of generic, and as all cities would participate in their creation, local issues and answers could be brought into consideration. The network itself could provide a monitoring system, where the collection of data and estimates could be undertaken collectively. A gradual sanctioning system could be used, which makes it more probable for users to accept it. One of the most important aspects is the installation of a mechanism for conflict resolution. The network could provide a mechanism that, through the consent of all members, could engage in sanctioning activity and conflict resolution. Finally, it is necessary to mention that the ICLEI cannot circumvent restrictions in local jurisdiction. The seventh of Ostrom s design principles, which states that a minimum of government recognition is crucial, is key here and certainly out of control for the network. However, the network might help to spread policies to other levels above the local government. Conclusions This paper has argued that local governments are taking action and adopting policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that transnational networks between local governments if designed correctly can play an important role in the governance of the global climate. If we use a framework of institutional economics and multi-level governance, we see that these networks potentially can overcome many of the barriers to cooperation. As the network is function specific (Type 2) it will more easily adapt to new situations and knowledge. It can be transformed and transcend different levels. By integrating international agreements and conventions into its own targets, it can operationalize them on the local scale. Furthermore, we have shown that these networks can be designed according to Ostrom's eight principles and thereby considerably facilitate cooperation. Most importantly networks can be crucial in disseminating information, and thus reduce the negative effects which the lack of information concerning the actions of other actors has on cooperation. References Alber, G. and Kern, K. 2008. Governing Climate Change in Cities: Modes of urban climate governance in multi-level systems. 2nd Annual Meeting of the OECD Roundtable Strategy for Urban Development. October 9-10. Milan. Betsill, M.M. and Bulkeley H. 2006. Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change. Global Governance 12: 141-159. Dietz T., Ostrom E. and Stern P. C. 2003. The Struggle to Govern the Commons. Science 302: 1907-1912. Grimmond, C.S.B. et al. 2010. Climate and More Sustainable Cities: Climate Information for Improved Planning and Management of Cities (Producers/Capabilities Perspective). Procedia Environmental Sciences 1: 247-274. Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243-1248. 53

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