CENS 2017 PAPER SERIES Shifts in Poland s alliances, Ph.D. The Polish Institute of International Affairs November, 2017
This paper was delivered in the context of the international conference entitled: Old and new EU engines: Shifting Power and Strategic Alternatives for EU and V4 after Brexit?, organized on October 9 th, 2017 by the (CENS), at the Central European University, with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Budapest Office. The year 2015 marked a reorientation of Poland s European policy, including a shift of European alliances. After the Law and Justice (PiS) party came to power, Poland s relations with Germany and France cooled as the new Polish government rejected the strategy of the previous Civic Platform Polish People's Party (PO-PSL) governing coalition to join the mainstream of European politics. Instead, the PiS government took the course of strengthening alliances in Central Europe and cooperating with the United Kingdom. However, Brexit itself and post-brexit EU reform plans pose a challenge for the PiS government s choice of allies. EU coalition-building: Shifting from Germany to Britain and Visegrad states During its eight years in office, the strategic goal of Polish foreign policy under the PO-PSL government was to become a key player and a leading EU Member State. Both coalition parties are members of the European People s Party (EPP), the biggest group in the European Parliament. This enabled them to cooperate smoothly with other mainstream ruling political parties across Europe. The government prioritized cooperation with the largest states, primarily Germany and France, including through the Weimar Triangle format. Germany was perceived as the key player in Europe and Poland's best EU ally. This view was expressed in the 2011 Berlin speech of then-polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who said: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity. You have become Europe s indispensable nation. Unlike its predecessor, the Law and Justice government does not appreciate German activity in the European Union. The party criticizes the domination of Germany in Europe s construction and of the development of the EU integration process under German leadership. Germany s activity in the EU is perceived by party members as being driven by national interests, not the wider European good. According to PiS, the European Commission s legislative proposals far too often reflect German interests, or those of other large Member States, in contradiction to the Commission s role according to the treaties, and, it consequently undermines smaller countries trust in the EU. Criticism towards Germany and France led the Law and Justice government to reorient Poland s alliances within the EU. In January 2016, in his first major foreign policy speech addressing parliament, Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski pointed to the UK as Poland s main partner in the EU. 1
The Polish-British alliance was to be the driving force of non-eurozone members in the face of the planned deepening of the monetary union. Apart from belonging to the non-euro group, the alliance with the UK was to be based on the convergence of both countries views on the overall character and development of the European integration process. The new government in Warsaw shares the traditional British attitude towards the European Union, questioning the deepening of integration and emphasizing the role of nation-states in the EU. With regard to the institutional set-up, PiS opts for intergovernmental democracy based on a "principle of democratic unanimity". This means strengthening the European Council and national parliaments, weakening the influence of the European Commission in the EU s political processes, and limiting qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union. According to Waszczykowski, Poland should seek to strengthen its ties with other Central and Eastern European countries. The Visegrad Group (V4) was to be the core of regional cooperation. Poland taking over the annually rotating presidency of the group in the second half of 2016 provided an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of cooperation on migration, defense, energy security, cohesion policy and infrastructure. Brexit as a challenge to Poland's alliances in the EU The British decision to leave the EU is a considerable challenge for Poland, as the country is losing an important European ally. Moreover, the Brexit referendum started the debate on differentiated integration, raising fears of Poland s exclusion from some integration circles and testing the country s alliances in the CEE region. Since the referendum, the government has intensified bilateral cooperation with the UK. During Brexit negotiations, Poland emphasizes the need to maintain close economic and political ties with the UK, opposing any idea of punishing Britons for their decision to leave the bloc. At the same time, the Polish government points out that any future arrangements for UK to access to the common market require its acceptance of all four freedoms. The key objectives of Polish diplomacy in the negotiations with the UK are to protect the rights of Poles living there, to maintain the highest level of trade liberalization between Poland and Britain, and to reach assurance that the UK will continue to contribute to the EU budget so financial flows to Poland will not be significantly altered or interrupted. After the Brexit referendum, consultations on reform of the EU started. The Polish government has tried to influence the debate about the future of the EU together with its partners from Central Europe. In their input to the Rome declaration, the V4 countries outlined their vision of further EU integration. The contents of the document reflect, however, differences in views among the V4 on many issues related to European policies the focus of the document is on security and migration issues, only broadly referring to other issues, including institutional reform of the EU. The postulate of treaty reform, maintained by the Polish authorities after the Brexit referendum, was not mentioned in the declaration. The other V4 countries expressed distance from this idea, recognizing, like Germany and France, that in the context of rising divisions between Member States about the further development of the EU, it would be better to avoid long and difficult treaty negotiations. 2
Options for post-brexit Poland s European policy Although the differing attitudes of Central European states towards European integration (and the planned reform of the European Union after Brexit) influence the deepening of divisions within the region, nothing indicates that the PiS government intends to change allies in the EU, the style of policymaking at the European level, or the main directions of Poland s European policy. In November 2017, in summarizing the achievements of the government in European politics, Prime Minister Beata Szydło pointed out that the Visegrad Group, including the Visegrad Plus formula, the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest Nine each in its own area have become important participants in political processes in Europe. In outlining the future of Poland s European policy, the leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, stressed the importance of the Three Seas Initiative (which he calls Intermarium ), pointing out that the developing trade, infrastructure, energy, environmental protection, and political cooperation among the countries involved will strengthen them, and thus guarantee the balance of power in Europe. The issue of balance of power is important for the future of Poland s European policy, as the absence of the UK in the EU will strengthen the Franco-German axis in the decision-making process. In these changing circumstances, the new ambition of Polish foreign policy is to advocate the rights of small and medium states with regard to proposals on which they may be easily outvoted by the big players. The Polish prime minister confirmed this during her speech at the 15th International Policy Forum, stressing that for the future of the Union it is important that the voice of smaller countries is heard, that citizens of these countries have the feeling of having a real impact on the direction of European integration. Although Poland s assertive approach towards the EU is often criticized by large EU members and EU institutions, nothing indicates that the ruling party intends to change its rhetoric. Putting national interest first will remain a staple of the PiS-led government s European policy, and the principal attitude towards the EU may even deepen. This does not mean, however, that the government will boycott all new integration initiatives. Notification on joining the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), on the one hand, and not participating in the European Public Prosecutor s Office (EPPO), on the other, are proof that the government takes a selective approach towards new integration projects, stressing that the decision on joining them is dependent every time on the shape of the proposed cooperation and the government s conviction that they will serve the national interest. Thus, Poland s accession to the Eurozone mainly will depend on the situation inside the zone. Given many questions related to Eurozone functioning, a decision on joining is thus considered premature. 3
About the author Jolanta SZYMAŃSKA is a researcher at the Polish Institute for International Affairs. In 2012 she obtained her PhD in Political Science from the University of Warsaw. She also works as a lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jan Kochanowski, and is also an academic at the Institute of European Studies of Warsaw. Previously, she worked at Polityka Insight, Polish Confederation Lewiatan and TVN 24. Impressum 2017 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Büro Budapest H-1056 Budapest, Fővám tér 2-3 Hungary Tel.: +36-1-461-60-11 Fax: +36-1-461-60-18 E-Mail: fesbp@fesbp.hu www.fesbp.hu Central European University H- 1051 Budapest, Nádor u. 9, Hungary Tel.: +36-1-327-30-00 Fax: +36-1- 328-34-44 E-mail: cens@ceu.edu https://cens.ceu.edu/contact-us The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the (CENS). Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES and the (CENS). 4