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Get out a NEW sheet of Notebook Paper for the warm-up. Title it Unit 6 Warm-Ups N put your name on it! Set up your warm-up paper like the orrections format # Problem Work nswer 1 2 Warm Up ay 2 Go to this link to vote for Soft rinks: https://goo.gl/forms/pv7jcd6seuvfxws1 lso, write your answers on your paper.

Warm Up ay 2 etermine the winners by each method 1. Plurality 2. Majority 3. orda 4. Runoff 5. Sequential Runoff 10 4 Go to this link to vote for Soft rinks: https://goo.gl/forms/pv7jcd6seuvfxws1 7 8 lso, write your answers on your paper.

Warm Up ay 2 NSWERS etermine the Plurality, Majority, orda, Runoff, and Sequential Runoff winners. 10 4 Plurality: Majority: None orda: Runoff: Seq. Runoff: 7 8

HW Questions?

Homework ay 2 Packet p. 4-5 Front Side of Worksheet ( Worksheet p21-24 )

Pairwise Voting Once all of the ballots are submitted, we consider all of the different pairings of two candidates against one another If there are three candidates, there are three pairings: vs., vs., and vs. If there are four candidates, there are six pairings: &, &, &, &, &, &

8 5 ondorcet The Marquis de ondorcet was a friend of Jean-harles de orda. He believed that a choice that could obtain a head-to-head majority over every other choice should win (using pairwise voting) 6 ompare each choice with every other choice. Record the wins and losses in a table. 7 *Make an educated guess for the winner and compare with other candidates. vs ( wins) vs ( wins) vs ( wins) Since wins head-to-head over every other choice, it is the ondorcet winner.

The ondorcet method has a flaw. onsider this set of preference schedules. 20 20 20 ondorcet sometimes fails to produce a winner. This is known as a Paradox. Example Head-to-head: vs ( wins) vs ( wins) vs ( wins) nother Example head-to-head: vs (tie) vs (tie) vs (tie) Group ranking methods may violate the Transitive Property.

You Try! Find the winner using ondorcet, majority, plurality, runoff, sequential runoff and orda: 30 22 27 21

Find the winner using ondorcet, majority, plurality, runoff, sequential runoff and orda: 30 22 27 21 ondorcet: Majority: Runoff: Sequential runoff: orda: Plurality:

rrow s 5 onditions Necessary for a Fair Group Ranking Method Kenneth rrow is an merican economist and mathematician. He gained worldwide recognition for his mathematical applications to election theory. The many paradoxes in election methods led Mr. rrow to formulate a list of conditions he thought were necessary for a group ranking to be fair.

Take a few minutes to read this article. https://tinyurl.com/hex8ven

Ten representatives of the language clubs at entral High School are meeting to select a location for the clubs annual joint dinner. They must choose between a hinese, French, Italian, or Mexican restaurant.

Racquel suggests that because the last 2 dinners have been held at Mexican and hinese restaurants, this year s dinner should be at either an Italian or French restaurant. They vote 7 to 3 in favor of the Italian restaurant. Martin doesn t like Italian food and says that the new Mexican restaurant is really good. He proposes that the group choose between Italian and Mexican. They voted 7 to 3 to hold the dinner at the Mexican restaurant. Sarah s parents own a hinese restaurant and say that she can get a group discount. The group votes between the Mexican and hinese restaurant and selects the hinese restaurant by a 6 to 4 margin. This is an example of Pairwise Voting and Mr. rrow considers this group ranking method to be flawed. * If we look back at their original preferences, we see that French food was preferred to hinese food in every case, yet they voted for hinese food.

rrow s 5 onditions Necessary for a Fair Group Ranking Method

1. Non-ictatorship The preference of a single individual should not become the group ranking without considering the preferences of others.

2. Individual Sovereignty Each individual should be allowed to order the choices in any way and to indicate ties.

3. Unanimity If everyone prefers one choice over another, then the group ranking should do the same. Example: If every voter ranks candidate higher than candidate, then the final ranking should place candidate higher than candidate.

4. Freedom from Irrelevant lternatives The winning choice should still win if one of the other choices is removed. The choice that is removed is known as an irrelevant alternative.

5. Uniqueness of the Group Ranking The method of producing the group ranking should give the same result whenever it is applied to a given set of preferences.

Exercise 1 Your teacher decides to order drinks for the class based on the vote just conducted. In doing so, she selects Hannah s preference schedule because she likes the drinks she chose. Which of rrow s conditions are violated by this method of determining a group ranking? Non-ictatorship

Exercise 2 Instead of selecting the preference schedule of a single student, your teacher places all of the individual preferences in a hat and draws one. If this method were repeated, would the same group ranking result? Which of rrow s conditions does this violate? Uniqueness of the Group Ranking

Exercise 3 o any of rrow s condition s require that the voting mechanism include a secret ballot? Is a secret ballot desirable in all group ranking situations? Explain why or why not.

pproval Voting: Kenneth rrow proved that no method, known or unknown, could always obey all 5 conditions. (ny group-ranking method will violate at least one of rrow s conditions in certain situations) lthough a perfect group ranking will never be found, current methods can still be improved. new system is called pproval Voting:

Soft rink allots o the soft drinks vote again, but this time use pproval Voting. Your ballot still has these soft drinks listed. oke, iet r. Pepper, Sprite, Pepsi, Water Place an X beside each of the soft drinks you find acceptable. Tally the drinks you approve on the board. etermine the group ranking. Was the winner the same as with any of the other group ranking methods from before?

pproval Voting In pproval Voting, you may vote for as many choices as you like, but you do not rank them. You mark all those of which you approve. For example, if there are five choices, you may vote for as few as none or as many as five.

dvantages of pproval Voting? It gives voters more flexible options It reduces negative campaigning It increases voter turnout It give minority candidates their proper due What are some disadvantages? pproval voting forces voters to cast equally weighted votes for candidates they approve of. Voting for your second choice candidate can in some cases lead to the defeat of your favorite candidate.

pproval Voting Practice The participants in a summer school recreation program decided to vote on which activity they preferred, Running Track, Softball, adminton, or Swimming. The winning activity was determined by pproval Voting. The following summarizes the responses of the participants: 12 participants voted for Swimming and adminton. 5 participants voted for adminton, Running Track, and Softball. 10 participants voted for Running Track and adminton. 13 participants voted for Softball and adminton. 1. How many total votes did Swimming receive? 2. How many total votes did adminton receive? 40 3. How many total votes did Running Track receive? 15 4. How many total votes did Softball receive? 18 5. Which activity is selected by the summer school participants using pproval Voting? adminton 12

You Try! Frisbee lub members decided to let the participants vote on the color of the T-shirt, using pproval Voting. The possible colors are Steel Gray, Robin s Egg lue, Eggshell, andy pple Red, and Sunflower Yellow. Here is a summary of the results: 12 participants voted for Steel Gray. 7 participants voted for Steel Gray and Sunflower Yellow. 20 participants voted for Eggshell and andy pple Red. pproval Voting Practice 18 participants voted for Robin s Egg lue, Eggshell, and andy pple Red 23 participants voted for Sunflower Yellow and Robin s Egg lue. 25 participants voted for andy pple Red. Use pproval Voting to determine the color of the t- shirt. andy pple Red wins with 63 votes

Example: etermine the winner by the ondorcet Method Twanda

Homework ay 2 Packet p. 4-5 Front Side of Worksheet ( Worksheet p21-24 )

lasswork: PS Mathline ctivity 3: Pairwise omparisons ( That s another term for the ondorcet Method )

lasswork: PS Mathline ctivity 4: pproval Voting