The Role of Human Capital: Immigrant Earnings

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Transcription:

The Role of Human Capital: Immigrant Earnings Econ821 Prof. Lutz Hendricks March 10, 2016 1 / 32

The Idea How could one measure human capital without knowing the production function? The problem: we only observe wages wage = [skill price] * [human capital] skill prices (unobserved) differ across countries A simple idea: observe workers from different countries in the same labor market with the same skill prices Hendricks (2002) 2 / 32

Immigrant Earnings in the U.S. The motivating fact: immigrant earnings do not vary much across rich / poor source countries. Mean residual log wage 0.4 0.2 0-0.2-0.4 β = 0.09 [s.e. 0.01] R 2 = 0.35 N = 118 IRL DNK AUS BMU CAN GBR ZAF NZL SWE NLD NOR FIN IND SYR PRTESP CHE FRA BEL LCA HKG BRB ZWE LBNSAU CZE HRV GRC DEU AUT ITA JPN TZA LAO MYS SGP GUYJAM FJI HUN TUR SVK ROM ARG KEN MKD LVA IRN RUS TTO BIH ISR POLTWN GHA CPV SLE PHL BLZ PAN BLR PRI HTI KHMNGA BHS LBR ETH SLV NIC BRA VEN CHL HND IDN PRYCHN VNM LKA UKR KWT CRI ESTISL GIN BOL CMR GTM URY MEX SDN COLKAZ PAK ERI AFG EGY THA ECU JOR BGR ALB NPL MAR UZB DZA IRQ AZE DOM PER LTU UGA SEN MDAGEO ARM YEM BGD -0.6-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 Relative source country GDP Source: 2010 U.S. Census 3 / 32

Approach 1. run a descriptive wage regression 1.1 LHS: log hourly wage 1.2 RHS: schooling, experience, sex, marital status,... 2. for each person, compute residual log wage 3. sort workers by country of birth 4. for each country of birth: compute mean residual log wage 5. plot it against relative gdp per worker (PPP, PWT) Main result: A 1 log point increase in gdp is associated with a 0.09 log point increase in wages (given characteristics). 4 / 32

Migrant Selection If migrants are similar to the average worker at home: the graph measures source country human capital relative to the U.S. Main concern: Immigrants from low income countries are more positively selected than immigrants from rich countries. 5 / 32

Indirect evidence on selection 1. Studies that follow migrants across borders show little selection 1.1 but mostly Latin American countries 2. Return migrants earn roughly the same as never-migrants 3. Refugees earn roughly the same as other migrants 4. For some countries (SLV, JAM), a large fraction of workers migrates to the U.S. at some point 4.1 lots of back and forth migration Not everyone is convinced... 6 / 32

Schoellman (2012)

Schoellman (2012) An extension of the immigrant earnings approach by Schoellman (2012) The idea: use returns to schooling in the U.S. to measure school quality. Implementation Run a simple wage regression where coefficient on schooling varies by source country. Result: school coefficient varies from 0 (ALB, TON) to 12% (CHE, JPN) 8 / 32

Richer countries have higher returns 9 / 32

Countries with higher test scores have higher returns 10 / 32

What about selection? Selection could be a problem if immigrants with low schooling are more positively selected than those with high schooling Then returns to schooling among immigrants could be lower than among non-migrants perhaps a priori not too plausible Restrict sample to countries with high fraction of refugees (50%+) 11 / 32

Transferability There really isn t good evidence to rule out that the human capital acquired in low income countries is a poor match for rich country labor markets. But we are living in a model with only 1 type of human capital. 12 / 32

Accounting Model Next task: translate school quality differences into output differences. Aggregate production function: Y j = A j K α j [h(s j,q j )L j ] 1 α (1) Observed: Y j,k j : PWT S j : Barro and Lee (2013) 13 / 32

Human capital production function h(s j,q j ) = exp [ (S j Q j ) η /η ] (2) This is an invention, due to Bils and Klenow (2000). We need to estimate Q j and η. Then we can construct h for each j and perform levels accounting. 14 / 32

Estimating Q j The idea: immigrant returns to schooling reveal Q j We want to estimate Q j by running the regression ( ) lnw S j Q j US = c + M US S j US (3) Q US In words: Run a Mincer regression with country specific returns to schooling Then j s Mincer coefficient is proportional to its Q j This is really based on intuition, not a model. 15 / 32

Motivating Model for the Wage Regression To motivate this regression, we develop a simple model. Workers maximize lifetime earnings: where max pvearn scost (4) S τ+t pvearn = h(s,q j ) e rjt w j (0)e gjt dt (5) τ+s They take Q j as given. τ+s scost = e rjt λ j w j (0)e gjt h(t τ,q j )dt (6) τ The cost of schooling is proportional to foregone earnings. 16 / 32

Optimal Schooling Optimal schooling satisfies where M j = S j = [ Q η j /M j] 1/(1 η) (7) (r j g j )(1 + λ j ) 1 exp[ (r j g j )(T S j )] (r j g j )(1 + λ j ) Claim: M j is the Mincer return in country j. This is a bit fishy b/c in the model everyone is the same (no variation in S). Not clear what is supposed to change to induce changing S (likely Q) within a country Some poorly explained messing around with the equilibrium wage in the US then yields the desired regression equation. Now we have Q j as a function of M j (roughly the same everywhere) and S j. 17 / 32

Estimating η The idea: Use the equilibrium schooling equation lns j = η 1 η lnq j + 1 1 η lnm j (8) Set M j = M based on estimated Mincer regressions. Instrument Q j with test scores. 18 / 32

my results would be somewhere between 72% and 138% higher than those that ar the literature. Table 2 gives these results in more detail. I construct human capital stocks using I compare the size of cross-country human capital differences in this paper with t papers in the literature (Hall and Jones, 1999; Hendricks, 2002). The results in the l vary somewhat due to the many details in sample selection, choice of the Minceria 19 / 32 Development Accounting 404 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Main result: Quality differences are as important as school quantity TABLE 2 differences. Baseline accounting results and comparison to literature This paper Literature η = 0 42 η = 0 5 η = 0 58 Hall and Jones (1999) Hen h 90 /h 10 6 3 4 7 3 8 2 0 h 90 /h 10 y 90 /y 10 0 28 0 21 0 17 0 09 var[log(h)] var[log(y)] 0 36 0 26 0 19 0 06

Comments The empirical idea is quite nice: use immigrant returns to schooling as a proxy for source country school quality Quantitatively, it s a bit hard to make this work We run again into the two issues that plague the entire literature: 1. What is the production function for h? 2. How do deal with migrant selection? The only clear way out (I think): direct measures of migrant selection 20 / 32

NIS Data

NIS data This is based on Hendricks and Schoellman (2016). The idea: a direct measure of the importance of things other than human capital: the wage gain experienced by migrants migrants take their h with them, but leave capital and tfp behind. This deals with selection: we observe the same worker in 2 labor markets. 22 / 32

Accounting Model Aggregate production function: Y c = Kc α [A c H c ] 1 α y c = Y c /L c = (K c /Y c ) α/(1 α) A c h c = z c h c Contribution of h to output gaps: h c /h c. Share of output gap due to h: share h = ln(h c /h c) ln(y c /y c ) (9) 23 / 32

Migrant wage gains Observed wage: w c = (1 α)z c h c Wage gain: z US /z c directly measures the contribution of h to output gaps 24 / 32

NIS data New Immigrant Survey 12,000 new permanent residents in 2003 About half are new arrivals The others are adjustments of status Data on: jobs and wages pre and post migration demographics: age, sex, schooling visa status 25 / 32

Results: Pre- and post migration wages Figure 1: Wages, Wage Gains, and GDP per worker (a) Pre- and Post-Migration Wages (b) Wage Gains at Migration Hourly Wage, 2003 US Dollars 20 15 10 5 0 2003 Mean U.S. Wage <1/16 1/16 1/8 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/2 >1/2 PPP GDP per worker relative to U.S., 2005 Pre-Migration Wage Post-Migration Wage Ratio of Post to Pre Migration Wage 4 3 2 1 0 <1/16 1/16 1/8 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/2 >1/2 PPP GDP per worker relative to U.S., 2005 Key: wage gains are small relative to output gaps. Example: quite small relative to the gap in GDP per worker, suggesting that country plays a small role in development accounting. We formalize this idea in the next subsection. Output gap 21 4.1 Accounting Wage gain 3Implications Contribution of h: ln(7)/ln(21) = 0.64 Recall from equation (4) thatourmeasureoftheimportanceofcountryisthelog-wage change at migration relative to the log-gdp per worker gap, with the importance of human 26 / 32

Main Result Table 2: Implied Human Capital Share in Development Accounting GDP p.w. Category Human Capital Share 95% Confidence Interval N < 1/16 0.71 (0.64, 0.78) 178 1/16 1/8 0.61 (0.57, 0.66) 415 1/8 1/4 0.58 (0.48, 0,67) 295 1/4 1/2 0.52 (0.34, 0.70) 168 > 1/2 0.83 (-0.11, 1.76) 299 Table note: Each column shows the implied human capital share in development accounting (one minus the wage gain at migration relative to the GDP per worker gap); the 95 percent confidence interval for that statistic; and the number of immigrants in the corresponding sample. Each row gives the result from constructing these statistics for a di erent sample or using di erent measures of pre-migration wages, post-migration wages, or the GDP per worker gap. Main result: h accounts for 2/3 of output gaps! for di erent subgroups and consider its robustness. 27 / 32

Robustness Contribution of h is similar for: different visa categories (H1B, family visas,...) different school levels recent / non-recent arrivals 28 / 32

Why so different from previous research? Migrant selection is massive average years of schooling: > 13 (even for poor countries) typical pre-migration occupations: white collar no migrants that previously worked in ag Pre-migration wages are much higher than average source country wages. 29 / 32

poorest countries are selected by more nearly a factor of six, whereas immigrants fr Migrant selection richest countries are hardly selected at all by this measure. Figure 4: Selection of Immigrants by GDP per worker 6 5 Selection 4 3 2 1 0 <1/16 1/16 1/8 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/2 >1/2 PPP GDP per worker relative to U.S., 2005 Total Selection Selection on Observables 30 / 32

Interpretations Migrants are very different from the typical worker. If wage gains are similar for people with low schooling / self-employed / people in ag: then wage gains are small relative to gdp gaps h accounts for more than half of output gaps Key question: Do wage gaps between the kinds of people we see in NIS and typical workers reflect human capital or barriers? 31 / 32

References I Barro, R. J. and J. W. Lee (2013): A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950 2010, Journal of Development Economics, 104, 184 198. Bils, M. and P. J. Klenow (2000): Does Schooling Cause Growth? The American Economic Review, 90, 1160 1183. Hendricks, L. (2002): How Important Is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from Immigrant Earnings, The American Economic Review, 92, 198 219. Hendricks, L. and T. Schoellman (2016): Human Capital and Development Accounting: New Evidence From Immigrant Earnings, Mimeo. University of North Carolina. Schoellman, T. (2012): Education quality and development accounting, The Review of Economic Studies, 79, 388 417. 32 / 32