Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

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Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

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Transcription:

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army Massimiliano Onorato IMT Lucca Kenneth Scheve Yale University David Stasavage New York University March 2012

Motivation: The Conscription of Wealth What are the economic and political conditions that explain long-run trends in progressive taxation? Onea idea: mass warfare played a bigger role than democracy according to Scheve and Stasavage (2012, APSR) as well as Scheve and Stasavage (2010).

Motivation: The Conscription of Wealth What are the economic and political conditions that explain long-run trends in progressive taxation? Onea idea: mass warfare played a bigger role than democracy according to Scheve and Stasavage (2012, APSR) as well as Scheve and Stasavage (2010).

The Main Question(s) for This Paper What factors have determined the size of armies that great powers have fielded over time? What factors have influenced the fraction of citizens that great powers have mobilized for war?

The Main Question(s) for This Paper What factors have determined the size of armies that great powers have fielded over time? What factors have influenced the fraction of citizens that great powers have mobilized for war?

The Argument Over the long run, changes in technologies for transport and communications have governed the size of armies that it has been feasible and desirable to mobilize. We emphasize two technologies as being particularly important in the history of great power conflicts:

The Argument Over the long run, changes in technologies for transport and communications have governed the size of armies that it has been feasible and desirable to mobilize. We emphasize two technologies as being particularly important in the history of great power conflicts: Transporting Men by Railway

The Argument Over the long run, changes in technologies for transport and communications have governed the size of armies that it has been feasible and desirable to mobilize. We emphasize two technologies as being particularly important in the history of great power conflicts: Transporting Men by Railway Remote Delivery of Explosive Force

The Argument Over the long run, changes in technologies for transport and communications have governed the size of armies that it has been feasible and desirable to mobilize. We emphasize two technologies as being particularly important in the history of great power conflicts: Transporting Men by Railway Remote Delivery of Explosive Force

Other Factors State/Fiscal Capacity - wealth and bureaucracy Political Rights - citizenship rights and extension of the suffrage

Other Factors State/Fiscal Capacity - wealth and bureaucracy Political Rights - citizenship rights and extension of the suffrage Nationalism - invention of idea of "the nation in arms." Political scientists see French Revolution as a turning point.

Other Factors State/Fiscal Capacity - wealth and bureaucracy Political Rights - citizenship rights and extension of the suffrage Nationalism - invention of idea of "the nation in arms." Political scientists see French Revolution as a turning point.

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 We created a data set measuring Military Size and Military Mobilization in great power states from 1600 to 2000. Great power states and years in sample defined by Levy (1983). Includes Austria-Hungary (1600-1918), China (1949-2000), France (1600-2000), Italy (1861-1943), Japan (1905-1945), Netherlands (1609-1713), Ottoman Empire (1600-1699), Prussia/Germany/West Germany (1740-2000), Russia/Soviet Union (1721-2000), Spain (1600-1808), Sweden (1617-1721), United Kingdom (1600-2000), United States (1898-2000).

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 We created a data set measuring Military Size and Military Mobilization in great power states from 1600 to 2000. Great power states and years in sample defined by Levy (1983). Includes Austria-Hungary (1600-1918), China (1949-2000), France (1600-2000), Italy (1861-1943), Japan (1905-1945), Netherlands (1609-1713), Ottoman Empire (1600-1699), Prussia/Germany/West Germany (1740-2000), Russia/Soviet Union (1721-2000), Spain (1600-1808), Sweden (1617-1721), United Kingdom (1600-2000), United States (1898-2000). Sources: 1600-1815 extensive review of historiography for each country along with some primary sources, 1816-2000 primary source is Correlates of War (2010). See appendix for complete description.

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 We created a data set measuring Military Size and Military Mobilization in great power states from 1600 to 2000. Great power states and years in sample defined by Levy (1983). Includes Austria-Hungary (1600-1918), China (1949-2000), France (1600-2000), Italy (1861-1943), Japan (1905-1945), Netherlands (1609-1713), Ottoman Empire (1600-1699), Prussia/Germany/West Germany (1740-2000), Russia/Soviet Union (1721-2000), Spain (1600-1808), Sweden (1617-1721), United Kingdom (1600-2000), United States (1898-2000). Sources: 1600-1815 extensive review of historiography for each country along with some primary sources, 1816-2000 primary source is Correlates of War (2010). See appendix for complete description.

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 and Settings/david.stasavage/Mes documents/dropbox/paris work/mass army/kenslides/ukbasic2.pdf Military Size, Thousands 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 Military Mobilization in United Kingdom 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 Year 0.02.04.06.08.1 Mobilization Military Size Military Mobilization

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 and Settings/david.stasavage/Mes documents/dropbox/paris work/mass army/kenslides/russiasovietunionbasic2.pdf Military Size, Thousands 0 5000 10000 15000 Military Mobilization in Russia/Soviet Union 1700 1800 1900 2000 Year 0.02.04.06.08 Mobilization Military Size Military Mobilization

War Mobilization Data, 1600-2000 Standard Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 17th Century Military Size 69 95.370 62.225 13.000 362.000 Military Mobilization 69 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.190 18th Century Military Size 152 179.559 102.351 12.725 732.474 Military Mobilization 152 0.016 0.011 0.002 0.082 19th Century Military Size 80 481.516 324.011 11.134 2000.000 Military Mobilization 80 0.017 0.009 0.002 0.054 20th Century Military Size 142 2762.583 2546.014 125.923 12500.000 Military Mobilization 142 0.034 0.036 0.002 0.161 Table: Military Size and Mobilization by Century, War Years.

Methods of Recruitment, 1600-2000 Great power? Conscription? Universal? Austria 1600-1918 1771-1918 1868 China 1949-2000 1953-2000 1953 France 1600-2000 1636-2000 1793-94, 1905 Italy 1861-1943 1861-1943 1907 Japan 1905-1945 1905-1945 1873 Netherlands 1609-1713 no never Ottoman Empire 1600-1699 1600-1666 never Prussia 1740-2000 1740-2000 1813 Russia 1721-2000 1721-2000 1874 Spain 1600-1808 1630-1645, 1704-1776 never Sweden 1617-1721 1617-1682 never United Kingdom 1600-2000 1916-1918, 1939-1960 1916 United States 1898-2000 1917-18, 1940-73 1917 Table: Military Recruitment

Pooled Data Break Points Sample. Pooled data includes all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects and break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization with country-clustered standard errors.

Pooled Data Break Points Sample. Pooled data includes all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects and break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. 1859 first year in which railroads used in a significant way in military conflict (Pratt 1915). D1859

Pooled Data Break Points Sample. Pooled data includes all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects and break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. 1859 first year in which railroads used in a significant way in military conflict (Pratt 1915). D1859 Remote delivery. 1970 development of modern cruise missiles (Werrell 1985). D1970

Pooled Data Break Points Sample. Pooled data includes all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects and break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. 1859 first year in which railroads used in a significant way in military conflict (Pratt 1915). D1859 Remote delivery. 1970 development of modern cruise missiles (Werrell 1985). D1970 Nationalism. French Revolution as structural break. D1789

Pooled Data Break Points Sample. Pooled data includes all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects and break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. 1859 first year in which railroads used in a significant way in military conflict (Pratt 1915). D1859 Remote delivery. 1970 development of modern cruise missiles (Werrell 1985). D1970 Nationalism. French Revolution as structural break. D1789

Pooled Data - Break Points - Results Military Size Military Mobilization (1) (2) D1789-23.930 0.003 (138.442) (0.002) 0.866 0.263 D1859 2030.983 0.021 (545.037) (0.004) 0.003 0.000 D1970-1166.186-0.020 (448.374) (0.006) 0.023 0.006 Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Number of Observations 443 443 Table: Military Size and Mobilization in Great Power Wars, 1600-2000.

Pooled Data - No Controls Sample. Pooled data includes 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization; direct measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile development with country-clustered standard errors.

Pooled Data - No Controls Sample. Pooled data includes 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization; direct measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile development with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. Railroad Track is equal to the length of the railroad track available to the public in each country measure in kilometers.

Pooled Data - No Controls Sample. Pooled data includes 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization; direct measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile development with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. Railroad Track is equal to the length of the railroad track available to the public in each country measure in kilometers. Railways. Railroad Track Area is equal to Railroad Track divided by geographic area measured in square kilometers.

Pooled Data - No Controls Sample. Pooled data includes 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization; direct measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile development with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. Railroad Track is equal to the length of the railroad track available to the public in each country measure in kilometers. Railways. Railroad Track Area is equal to Railroad Track divided by geographic area measured in square kilometers. Remote delivery. Cruise Missile is equal to 0 for each year before a country acquires a cruise missile and 1 for each after acquisition.

Pooled Data - No Controls Sample. Pooled data includes 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great power country is at war. Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; break points corresponding to potential factors influencing mobilization; direct measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile development with country-clustered standard errors. Railways. Railroad Track is equal to the length of the railroad track available to the public in each country measure in kilometers. Railways. Railroad Track Area is equal to Railroad Track divided by geographic area measured in square kilometers. Remote delivery. Cruise Missile is equal to 0 for each year before a country acquires a cruise missile and 1 for each after acquisition.

Pooled Data - No Controls - Results Military Size Military Mobilization (1) (2) D1789 96.674 0.003 (83.746) (0.002) 0.271 0.135 D1859 219.159 0.012 (477.470) (0.004) 0.654 0.012 D1970 353.256-0.003 (339.786) (0.004) 0.319 0.546 Railroad Track 43707.090 0.224 (11831.450) (0.106) 0.003 0.056 Cruise Missile -427.278-0.013 (271.825) (0.003) 0.142 0.000 Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Number of Observations 443 443 Table: Military Size and Mobilization in Great Power Wars, 1600-2000.

Pooled Data - With Controls Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile, fiscal capacity, political rights, and country size; and various functions of time with country-clustered standard errors. Fiscal capacity. GDP per capita as proxy. Also used variable coded based on date of first census.

Pooled Data - With Controls Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile, fiscal capacity, political rights, and country size; and various functions of time with country-clustered standard errors. Fiscal capacity. GDP per capita as proxy. Also used variable coded based on date of first census. Political rights. Democracy is equal to one if legislature is elected in free multi-party elections, executive is either directly or indirectly elected, and at least half of adult males have the right to vote.

Pooled Data - With Controls Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile, fiscal capacity, political rights, and country size; and various functions of time with country-clustered standard errors. Fiscal capacity. GDP per capita as proxy. Also used variable coded based on date of first census. Political rights. Democracy is equal to one if legislature is elected in free multi-party elections, executive is either directly or indirectly elected, and at least half of adult males have the right to vote. Country size. Population.

Pooled Data - With Controls Model. OLS regression of Military Size or Military Mobilization on country fixed effects; measures of railroad expansion, cruise missile, fiscal capacity, political rights, and country size; and various functions of time with country-clustered standard errors. Fiscal capacity. GDP per capita as proxy. Also used variable coded based on date of first census. Political rights. Democracy is equal to one if legislature is elected in free multi-party elections, executive is either directly or indirectly elected, and at least half of adult males have the right to vote. Country size. Population.

Pooled Data - With Controls - Results Railroad Track remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Size and Military Mobilization and the substantive magnitude is almost unchanged. Railroad Track Area is positive but not statistically for Military Size but remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Mobilization.

Pooled Data - With Controls - Results Railroad Track remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Size and Military Mobilization and the substantive magnitude is almost unchanged. Railroad Track Area is positive but not statistically for Military Size but remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Mobilization. Cruise Missile estimate is negative and statistically significant with a much larger substantive magnitude.

Pooled Data - With Controls - Results Railroad Track remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Size and Military Mobilization and the substantive magnitude is almost unchanged. Railroad Track Area is positive but not statistically for Military Size but remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Mobilization. Cruise Missile estimate is negative and statistically significant with a much larger substantive magnitude. Fairly robust evidence of significant correlation between GDP per capita and Military Size. No evidence of correlation between Democracy and Military Size.

Pooled Data - With Controls - Results Railroad Track remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Size and Military Mobilization and the substantive magnitude is almost unchanged. Railroad Track Area is positive but not statistically for Military Size but remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Mobilization. Cruise Missile estimate is negative and statistically significant with a much larger substantive magnitude. Fairly robust evidence of significant correlation between GDP per capita and Military Size. No evidence of correlation between Democracy and Military Size. Evidence of significant correlation between Democracy and Military Mobilization. Little evidence of correlation between GDP per capita and Military Mobilization.

Pooled Data - With Controls - Results Railroad Track remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Size and Military Mobilization and the substantive magnitude is almost unchanged. Railroad Track Area is positive but not statistically for Military Size but remains positively and significantly correlated with Military Mobilization. Cruise Missile estimate is negative and statistically significant with a much larger substantive magnitude. Fairly robust evidence of significant correlation between GDP per capita and Military Size. No evidence of correlation between Democracy and Military Size. Evidence of significant correlation between Democracy and Military Mobilization. Little evidence of correlation between GDP per capita and Military Mobilization.

Was it Just the Two World Wars? There could have been many factors common to each or both that might bias the result Remove WWI - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude)

Was it Just the Two World Wars? There could have been many factors common to each or both that might bias the result Remove WWI - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude) Remove WWII - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude)

Was it Just the Two World Wars? There could have been many factors common to each or both that might bias the result Remove WWI - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude) Remove WWII - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude) Remove both - RR coeffi cient still statistically significant, but coeffi cient 60% smaller.

Was it Just the Two World Wars? There could have been many factors common to each or both that might bias the result Remove WWI - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude) Remove WWII - Results stay basically the same (RR coeffi cient 20% lower in magnitude) Remove both - RR coeffi cient still statistically significant, but coeffi cient 60% smaller.

Other Robustness Tests Nuclear weapons Alternative measures of fiscal capacity Census, Taxes, Spending

Other Robustness Tests Nuclear weapons Alternative measures of fiscal capacity Census, Taxes, Spending Country time trends

Other Robustness Tests Nuclear weapons Alternative measures of fiscal capacity Census, Taxes, Spending Country time trends

Interpretation The story we would like to tell is that this correlation reflects causal effect of technological change on military size and mobilization. Maybe...but railroads may have been built to allow for bigger armies and this policy choice may have bave been driven by other unobserved factors besides railroad technology.

Interpretation The story we would like to tell is that this correlation reflects causal effect of technological change on military size and mobilization. Maybe...but railroads may have been built to allow for bigger armies and this policy choice may have bave been driven by other unobserved factors besides railroad technology.

Interpretation Did states build railroads so that they could field larger armies? Generally, not a lot of evidence that this is an important factor in railroad track development.

Interpretation Did states build railroads so that they could field larger armies? Generally, not a lot of evidence that this is an important factor in railroad track development.

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009).

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009). Countries that had substantial nationalizations had less subsequent investment and slower network growth (Bogart, 2009).

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009). Countries that had substantial nationalizations had less subsequent investment and slower network growth (Bogart, 2009). Caveats

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009). Countries that had substantial nationalizations had less subsequent investment and slower network growth (Bogart, 2009). Caveats Privately-owned rails could be for military purposes through network planning/regulation and subsidies.

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009). Countries that had substantial nationalizations had less subsequent investment and slower network growth (Bogart, 2009). Caveats Privately-owned rails could be for military purposes through network planning/regulation and subsidies. For some countries, government ownership was eventually dominant (e.g. Germany) though our results are robust to dropping these cases.

Interpretation RR mostly privately owned (93% in 1860, 82% in 1880, 74% in 1900) When governments had security concerns, they usually nationalized rather than built new track (Bogart, 2009). Countries that had substantial nationalizations had less subsequent investment and slower network growth (Bogart, 2009). Caveats Privately-owned rails could be for military purposes through network planning/regulation and subsidies. For some countries, government ownership was eventually dominant (e.g. Germany) though our results are robust to dropping these cases.

Further Evidence from Conscription Regimes Technology optimal army size method of recruitment OLS estimates generally show positive relationship between railroad measures and Universal Conscription but not non-universal Conscription

Further Evidence from Conscription Regimes Technology optimal army size method of recruitment OLS estimates generally show positive relationship between railroad measures and Universal Conscription but not non-universal Conscription

Military Mobilization in France and Settings/david.stasavage/Mes documents/dropbox/paris work/mass army/kenslides/francebasic4.pdf Military Mobilization in France Military Size, Thousands 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 Nine Years' War War of Austrian Succession WWI Napoleonic Wars WWII Franco-Prussian War Revolutionary Wars 0.05.1.15 Mobilization 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 Year Military Size Military Mobilization

Military Mobilization in France Key Patterns 17th century time of dramatic growth in French army and mobilization 362k men in Nine Years War suggests a roughly 8x increase over the century. Army size and mobilization did increase with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars revolutionary army in 1794 about 732k soldiers consisting of 0.027 of the population.

Military Mobilization in France Key Patterns 17th century time of dramatic growth in French army and mobilization 362k men in Nine Years War suggests a roughly 8x increase over the century. Army size and mobilization did increase with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars revolutionary army in 1794 about 732k soldiers consisting of 0.027 of the population. Striking break is of course mobilization for WWI and WWII 5 million soldiers and over 15 percent of population in 1918

Military Mobilization in France Key Patterns 17th century time of dramatic growth in French army and mobilization 362k men in Nine Years War suggests a roughly 8x increase over the century. Army size and mobilization did increase with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars revolutionary army in 1794 about 732k soldiers consisting of 0.027 of the population. Striking break is of course mobilization for WWI and WWII 5 million soldiers and over 15 percent of population in 1918

Conclusions Political scientists have tended to advance the idea that era of mass mobilization is a consequence of nationalism and the extension of political rights. We argue that states will only raise mass armies if they have the means to transport, supply, and command the armies that they raise and if large armies constitute the most effective means for achieving their security objectives.

Conclusions Political scientists have tended to advance the idea that era of mass mobilization is a consequence of nationalism and the extension of political rights. We argue that states will only raise mass armies if they have the means to transport, supply, and command the armies that they raise and if large armies constitute the most effective means for achieving their security objectives.