Education Reform in Brazil: an Explanation for the Timing of Improvements

Berbecel 1 Dan Berbecel Government 1291 Prof. Hagopian TF: Brandon Van Dyck November 24, 2010 Education Reform in Brazil: an Explanation for the Timing of Improvements Before the 1990s, social policy in Brazil was extremely poor not only by world standards but also in comparison to other Latin American countries. In particular, the basic education system was an abject failure, and one glaring statistic points out that in 1990 19% of the population above the age of fifteen could not read or write (Country Studies 2010). Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, significant reforms took place, and throughout this paper, I will seek to determine what factors led to the timing of the reforms. By basic education, I mean education at the primary and secondary levels as opposed to the tertiary (university) level, which was arguably world-class. Throughout Part I of this paper, I will begin by describing the problems that existed in the system prior to the Cardoso administration, and then explain the reforms that took place and how they addressed these problems. Afterward, in Part II I will argue that the timing of these reforms was the result of three developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s: 1) A change in the nature of parties, 2) Successful experimentation in the context of the Brazilian federal system, and 3) The increased demand for educated labor. I will also minimize the role of the agency of the Cardoso administration in basic education reforms. Part I: Education before and after reforms The situation of education before the reforms The first major problem in the basic education system was funding, and there were three factors that constrained spending in this area. Firstly, spending on education was constrained by

Berbecel 2 the slow economic growth during this period. Although the 1970s were a period of solid growth for Brazil, many of these economic gains were reversed in the lost decade of the 1980s. Secondly, funding of primary and secondary education was constrained because Brazil increased its already large commitment to tertiary education at the expense of basic education (Birdsall et al 17). Between 1975 and 1989, the percentage of the education budget allocated to tertiary education grew from 18% to 26%. Thirdly, clientelism significantly eroded the funds available, and Birdsall et al claim that unfortunately, appointments in the education system had been treated as political spoils (14). Clientelism led to an overstaffed bureaucracy, not only in terms of teachers (including ghost teachers who according to the article by Plank et al comprised 20% of those receiving teachers salaries in Rio de Janeiro) but also in terms of administrators, maintenance personnel, etc. As a result of the limited funds for basic education, the system did not have adequate resources to handle the increase in eligible students created by the population boom (Brazil had a high fertility rate), and Birdsall et al claim that lacking the resources to meet these costs, the increase in quantity meant an erosion of quality (15). The second major problem in the education system in Brazil relates to the incentives that parents had to send their children to school. Throughout the past decades, Brazil had pursued largely the inward-looking development model of ISI. Unlike countries such as South Korea, Brazil did not focus on manufactured exports (which require an increase in the skill level of workers), thus reducing the demand for educated labor. Additionally, the low quality of education in many public schools served as an additional incentive for parents not to send their children to school, and Birdsall et al describe that: If school quality is low, children learn little and acquire few productive skills, reducing both the likelihood of progressing to the next educational level and the rate of return to schooling when competing in the labor market. Parents are aware that their children are not learning much in school. Once children in low quality schools are old enough to be economically productive, parents no longer have sufficient economic incentive to keep them in school. (24)

Berbecel 3 Lastly, the third major problem in the Brazilian educational system is regional inequalities, and particularly disparities between the regions of the Northeast and those of the South. According to Plank et al the Northeast of Brazil remains poor and continues to lag behind the rest of Brazil in all measures of educational access and attainment (132). Indeed, Luna and Klein write that over half of all illiterates over ten years of age, or some 53 percent, were to be found in the northeast region, even though that region contained only 28 percent of the national population (191). In short, throughout this section I have identified three principal problems in the education system throughout Brazil, namely a lack of funding, a lack of incentives for parents to send their children to school, as well as glaring regional disparities. Throughout the next section, I will describe how reforms addressed these three issues. Educational reforms in Brazil Throughout her paper on educational reform in Brazil, Sônia Draibe writes that the Cardoso government that came to office in 1995 considered education reform one of the major commitments of its political program (389). In this section, two critical initiatives that reformed the basic education system will be examined: the creation of FUNDEF (and later FUNDEB), as well as the Bolsa Escola program. With regards to the three issues in education described earlier, I will show how FUNDEF addressed funding, and how Bolsa Escola addressed incentives. In addition, I will show how both of these initiatives helped to address regional inequalities. Upon taking power, President Cardoso in 1996 secured Constitutional Amendment 14 that initiated the creation of FUNDEF, which according to Draibe sought to change the distribution of educational resources to favor primary education [and] to address regional

Berbecel 4 inequalities (395). FUNDEF built on a provision in the 1988 Constitution which required states and municipalities to spend a minimum of 25% of revenues on education. Firstly, FUNDEF required that of the 25% of revenues that states were required to spend on education, 60% had to be for primary education. In addition, FUNDEF established a minimum amount of spending on a per pupil basis for each state. Because for some states (particularly those in the Northeast) the minimum spending threshold would be over 25% of revenues; FUNDEF created a transfer system whereby the government would make up for the difference. The results of the FUNDEF reform were significant: between 1991 and 2000, the percentage of children of 7-14 years not in school fell from 13% to 3%, and adult illiteracy in this period fell from 21.3 to 13.3 percent. In addition, promotion rates significantly increased from 64.5% in 1996 to 73.6% in 2000, and repetition rates fell by one third from over 30% to only 21.6%. In addition, spending per student increased (by 22.7 percent nationwide), as did teacher qualifications and salaries. (Draibe 2004) Also, these reforms disproportionately benefitted the regions of the Northeast. Eight states in the Northeast were net beneficiaries of FUNDEF funds, and in the Northeast, per pupil spending rose by 100%. In January of 2007, FUNDEF was superseded by FUNDEB, which essentially extended the FUNDEF program to secondary schools. The principle would be the same, whereby the federal government would redistribute resources to the poorest states. (Hagopian October 13) In addition to FUNDEF and FUNDEB, the second major educational reform in Brazil was the Bolsa Escola program created in 2001. Until 2003 when it was superseded by the Bolsa Familia Program, Bolsa Escola provided mothers of children between the ages of 6 and 15 cash transfers conditional on their kids attending school. The payments of Bolsa Escola went disproportionately to the poorer Northeastern regions of Brazil, and in their paper Glewwe et al praise Bolsa Escola by claiming that:

Berbecel 5 The Bolsa program has increased enrollment in Brazil by about 5.5 percent in grades 1-4 and by about 6.5 percent in grades 5-8 The program has lowered dropout rates by about 0.5 percentage points and raised grade promotion rates by about 0.9 percentage points for children in grades 1-4, and has reduced dropout rates by about 0.4 percentage points and increased grade promotion rates by about 0.3 percentage points for children in grades 5-8. (1) The new Bolsa Familia program continues to provide a monthly stipend to mothers who send their children to school. Although payments are very small, only 22 reais per month per child (~$12) up to a maximum of 200 reais, the additional income can make a significant difference for eligible families with incomes below 120 reais. The program also provides a motivation for children to remain in school, since if a student misses over 15% of classes, payment is withheld. (The Economist 2010). In addition, the payments reduce regional disparities, and while 47% of those in the Northeast participate in the program, only 16% of those in the Southeast do so. (Hagopian November 22) In short, these two reforms helped to reshape the education system in Brazil and addressed all three issues that had previously existed. With regard to increasing funding, FUNDEF (now FUNDEB) provided cash transfers, and with regard to incentives, the Bolsa Escola (now Bolsa Familia) Program provided an inducement for parents, particularly mothers, to send their children to school. Finally, both Bolsa Escola and FUNDEF addressed regional disparities, since they disproportionately benefitted the Northeast. While Bolsa Escola and FUNDEF are two of the most sweeping and large-scale initiatives, it is important to mention that they were by no means the only reforms that took place in education. For example, there was also an initiative started in Minas Gerais that later spread to other municipios which attempted to cut the size of educational bureaucracies, and diminish clientelism by instituting examinations for selecting school principles. A School Meals Program (the PNAE) was also created, as well as an initiative which gave parents greater control over school districts (the PMDE) in the hope that this would also reduce patronage and clientelism in the system.

Berbecel 6 Part II: Explaining the timing of these reforms The changing nature of political parties The first major structural change that set the stage for social reforms such as education in Brazil was a change in the nature of Brazilian parties from clientelistic politics to programmatic politics. Before the early 1990s, party labels in Brazil meant very little, and votes were mainly gathered based on short-term benefits that officials gave to their constituents. Kurt Weyland claims that rather than representing collective interests and advancing programs, parties have competed for votes through populist rhetoric and by distributing patronage. Many politicians continue to rely heavily on clientelism (72). Clientelistic parties have two inherent features that inhibit the development of social programs. Firstly, they have extremely limited time horizons and as Wendy Hunter describes, they focus on short-term vote maximization (446). Secondly, they do not seek social programs at the national level that would promote the collective good. Kurt Weyland directly supports this aspect of clientelism, and in a discussion of healthcare he writes: Clientelist politicians also opposed a reorientation from curative to preventative medicine. While medical treatments benefit individuals, many preventive measures, such as assuring a clean water supply, target whole communities. But for patrons, selective incentives are more effective instruments than collective goods. Clients fear of exclusion guarantees their political support for patrons. Thus, the logic of clientelism militated against a progressive reform of Brazil s healthcare system. (166) The same logic applies to education. Clientelistic politicians would never have supported an initiative such as FUNDEF, since improving education would be a collective good, and does not offer as large an electoral advantage to clientelistic politicians as providing benefits to individual constituents. As well, many of the benefits of education are long term (as a more educated population becomes more productive), and thus would never be supported by clientelistic politicians who lack a programmatic strategy. In essence, a vicious circle was created where

Berbecel 7 parties did not adopt social programs that would benefit the poor, thus reinforcing clientelistic practices among the impoverished classes who because of the lack of social services depended upon government officials for jobs, cash handouts, etc. This concept is illustrated below: Figure 1: Pre-1990s vicious circle of party clientelism Resulted in Clientelistic practices among parties A lack of social reforms in areas like education Reinforcing While until the 1990s parties in Brazil followed this clientelistic model, following the logic of Martin Shefter s theory of externally-mobilized parties the growth of the PT caused the others to move toward more programmatic platforms. In his argument, he describes that because new parties often do not have access to the state resources used to distribute patronage, these parties will base their electoral mandate on programmatic appeals. Wendy Hunter concurs and claims that, most often, they orient their energies toward long-term organization building rather than toward short-term vote maximization (446). The PT was certainly an example of a programmatic party, and Weyland writes that as the main exception, the Workers Party has established a new type of party organization in Brazil. It has an unusual level of programmatic commitment (73). As the PT became a potent political force, it forced the other parties to also adopt brands, thus leading to what Hagopian terms, programmatic competition in the legislature. It was this programmatic competition that set the stage for the adoption of reforms such as healthcare, education, poverty reduction, etc. In this virtuous circle, parties would be electorally rewarded for successful social policy initiatives, thus 1) encouraging them to further develop good policies on a programmatic basis and 2) decreasing the effectiveness and demand

Berbecel 8 for clientelistic policies (since programs like Bolsa Escola and education reform obviate the need for citizens to engage in clientelistic practices). This concept is illustrated below: Figure 2: Post-1990s virtuous circle of programmatic competition Resulted in Programmatic competition among parties Social reforms such as education Reinforcing Successful experimentation in the context of Brazilian federalism The second important reason for policy reforms in areas such as education is related to the process of decentralization that sped up as the military rule was ending and democracy was taking root. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: [an] on-going decentralization process started at the end of the 1980s when the country adopted an advanced federalist charter, which was strengthened by an increase in fiscal resources for the states and municipalities, at the expense of direct and indirect taxes formerly collected by the federal government. (Bonnal 2010) Indeed, in the new Constitution of 1988, decentralization was hard-wired and one important advantage of decentralization in social policy and particularly education is the possibility of experimentation and implementation on a larger scale of successful local initiatives. The first example of an effective local initiative that went national is the aforementioned Bolsa Escola program. Initially, Bolsa Escola was a small-scale project started in Brasilia under the governorship of Cristovam Buarque. Although it originally benefitted less than 45,000 children and had a budget of only $24 million, its success eventually provided a blueprint for the government to expand it to over 8 million children in virtually all of the regions

Berbecel 9 across the nation. (Vawda 2001) Another example of how federalism allowed for innovation is the reform project in Minas Gerais, which has become the blueprint for other states (298). Without a federalist system to allow for such experimentation in a smaller scale, it is unlikely that these initiatives would have started at a national level. The importance of federalism and local initiative is neatly summarized by Claudio de Moura Castro when he writes: Changes did not start at the federal government but rather at some forward-looking municipalities, followed by states such as Paraná and Minas Gerais that introduced serious and imaginative reforms. What the Ministry of Education did was to take the best ideas from the states, augment them with other policies, and energize the entire country with them. But this came after significant local changes started taking place. (296) The increased demand for educated labor No explanation for the timing of education reforms would be complete without a discussion of the increasing demand for educated labor in the workforce. I previously identified that one of the problems with the education system in Brazil was that parents lacked incentives to send their children to school. Yet, as Castro describes, between 1995 and 2000 these incentives rose exponentially since labor productivity had risen by 50%, thus making firms abruptly increase the education requirements of those who remain in their labor force (295). Because of the increased complexity of the work environment, it is unlikely that anyone without a minimum of primary education and in many cases high school would be likely to find a reasonably-paying job. One clear example is the Fiat factories, and although in the past they did not require their workers to have a secondary education, they later began to mandate at least a high school degree. Thus, pressured by enterprises that realize they need better educated workers, over two million young Brazilian adults are enrolled in programs leading to diplomas legally equivalent to formal degrees in primary and secondary education (Castro 296).

Berbecel 10 The insignificant role of agency Some critics contend that in order to explain the timing of educational reforms, rather than the structural theories I have described, the catalyst was in fact the agency of the Cardoso administration. They argue that in fact the education system improved because of the Minister of Education, Paulo Renato, as well as the First Lady, Ruth Cardoso. Indeed, as Draibe describes, Renato had formed the historic nucleus (390) of the PSDB, and in addition to being close to the President, he possessed a reputation as a skillful negotiator. Education had also been a significant issue for the President s wife, Ruth Cardoso, who was herself a university professor. Together, these two figures are argued to have served as an effective counterweight to the Finance Minister, Pedro Malan who constantly sought to cut the education budget. Nevertheless, as Castro describes education statistics began to change before the inauguration of the new federal government [of Cardoso] (295). Although scholars such as Draibe rightfully argue that Renato and Ruth Cardoso s ties to the president probably helped to protect certain programs such as the School Meals Program; agency is not, however, satisfactory in accounting for the creation of widespread, sweeping reforms such as FUNDEF which are better explained through the structuralist arguments I have advanced. Conclusion In short, throughout the 1990s education began to significantly improve in Brazil through initiatives such as FUNDEF and Bolsa Escola. Throughout this paper I have argued that the timing of education reforms can be attributed to three structural factors, namely the changing nature of Brazilian parties from clientelistic to programmatic politics, the decentralization process that took place during the late 1980s, as well as the increased demand for educated labor

Berbecel 11 in the workforce. In advancing these structuralist explanations, I have also shown how the timing of widespread reforms was not significantly affected by the agency of the Cardoso administration. An area of further research in the domain of education policy in Brazil would be to address the reasons for the limitations of reforms. While this topic is outside the scope of this paper, I would propose that it was caused by two factors, namely poor historical legacies, as well as development economics which constrained the funding available for social programs. While limitations still remain, Brazil has nevertheless made significant progress in education and in many ways can serve as a model for other developing nations.

Berbecel 12 WORKS CITED Birdsall, Nancy, Barbara Bruns, and Richard H. Sabot. Education in Brazil Playing a Bad Hand Badly, pp. 7-47 and David Plank, José Amaral Sobrinho and Antonio Carlos da Resurreição Xavier, Why Brazil Lags Behind in Educational Development, pp. 117-145 in Nancy Birdsall and Richard H. Sabot, eds., Opportunity Forgone: Education in Brazil (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) Castro, Claudio de Moura, Education: Way Behind but Trying to Catch Up, Daedalus, 129, 2 (2000): 291-314 Country Studies US. Literacy. 2010. November 22, 2010 <http://countrystudies.us/brazil/51.htm> Draibe, Sonia, Federal Leverage in a Decentralized System: Education Reform in Brazil, pp. 374-406 in Robert Kaufman and Joan Nelson, eds, Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives: The Politics of Health and Education Reform in Latin America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Federal Republic of Brazil. 2010. November 20, 2010. <http://www.ciesin.org/decentralization/english/casestudies/brazil.html> Glewwe, Paul. The Impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Enrollment, Drop Out Rates and Grade Promotion in Brazil. August 2010. November 2010. < www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/pglewwe/documents/brbolsa6.pdf> Hagopian, Frances. Lectures: Government 1291. Harvard University. October 22, November 22. Hunter, Wendy, The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers' Party in Brazil, World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2007): pp. 440-475 Luna, Francisco Vidal and Klein, Herbert S., Brazil Since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) The Economist. Brazil s Bolsa Familia. July 29, 2010. November 21, 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/16690887> Vawda (World Bank). BRAZIL: Stipends to Increase School Enrollment and Decrease Child Labor: A Case of Demand-Side Financing. 2001. November 20, 2010 <www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/brazil-bolsa-escola.pdf> Weyland, Kurt, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996