Institutional Resilience of the Semi-Presidentialism of Taiwan: Integration of the President and the Prime Minister under the Party Politics

Institutional Resilience of the Semi-Presidentialism of Taiwan: Integration of the President and the Prime Minister under the Party Politics Yu-chung Shen yuchung@thu.edu.tw The semi-presidential system has been adopted in most new democracies in the past three decades; it is also the constitutional order of most democracies, which are clustered into three groups: established, post-leninist, and postcolonial democracies (Wu, 2011: 22). Because the number of countries with a semi-presidential constitution is increasing, it is increasingly crucial to discuss semi-presidentialism. According to Maurice Duverger, semi-presidentialism is a regime with three elements. First, the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage. Second, the president possesses considerable powers. Third, in addition to the president, the prime minister and ministers possess executive and government powers and can stay in office only if the parliament does not oppose them (Duverger, 1980: 166). Therefore, semi-presidentialism could be defined as a political system with dual executive branches. Moreover, because of the dual executive branches, the constitutional operation of semi-presidentialism might be similar to the presidential system if the president is de facto the head of government. It might also be similar to the parliamentary system if the prime minister is de facto the head of government with the support of the parliamentary majority. Duverger contended that the logic inherent in a semi-presidential government, especially in the French case, dictates not a half-presidential and half-parliamentary form but alternating presidential and parliamentary phases: presidentialism when the presidency and parliamentary majority belong to the same party or a coalition, and parliamentarism when they belong to opposing parties or coalitions (1980: 185 186). On the basis of this characteristic, Shugart and Carey (1992) classified semi-presidentialism into two subtypes: president parliamentary and premier presidential. Under the president parliamentary system, the cabinet is dually accountable to both the president and the parliament. Under the premier presidential system, the cabinet is only accountable to the parliament. Numerous studies have attempted to reveal the factors that influence the practice of semi-presidentialism. The main findings from the literature are institutional design and party politics, especially the president s institutional and noninstitutional power. As Metcalf mentioned, one of the reasons for the disagreement on the number of semi-presidential regimes is specifically related to the issue of presidential power (Metcalf, 2000: 661). Sartori also considered the president s power when addressing the concept of semi-presidentialism. As Elgie commented on Sartori, the powers of the president are integral to the understanding of the term. Moreover, Sartori mentioned that it is not the powers that presidents have on paper that is crucial, but the powers they possess in practice (Elgie, 2007: 4). In general, if the president is empowered with strong constitutional power and is also the head of the ruling party, the constitutional operation would be similar to the presidential system. Such constitutional powers are especially if the president has the right to dismiss the premier or to dissolve the parliament. By 1

contrast, the constitutional operation would be similar to the parliamentary system if the president is weak in the constitution and is also not the head of the ruling party. In addition, on the basis of the dual executive system of semi-presidentialism, intra-executive conflict might emerge between the president and the prime minister over the control of the executive branch of the government (Protsyk, 2006: 219). Because semi-presidentialism is changeable, theoretical claims about the advantages or disadvantages of semi-presidentialism are highly divergent (Moestrup, 2007: 30). The central finding from the literature on postcommunist semi-presidentialism is the negative effect on democratic performance when choosing a semi-presidential system with a constitutionally powerful president (Protsyk, 2011: 100). This paper first discusses the institutional resilience of semi-presidentialism and then describes the constitutional operation in Taiwan, showing that the vague constitutional design and the party politics are two critical variables for a powerful president but not responsibilities in the constitutional architecture. Characteristics of Semi-Presidentialism and Institutional Resilience Institutional resilience is a concept often analyzed in economic and environmental studies. Discussions on resilience under the socio-ecological system have a dual dimension: nature and social. This means that resilience could be socially constructed (Aligica, 2014: 107). Institutional resilience is measured using the effective law-making (capacity) and institutional stability (recovery). It is explained by the actions of the coalitions in power. Resilience refers to the capacity of a system to maintain its operation and functions under disturbance. A resilient constitution can adapt without losing its normativity and allows democracy and the rule of law to also demonstrate resilience when facing a crisis. Resilience is also defined as the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a potentially hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions (Contiades and Fotiadou, 2015: 3 4). From these standpoints, resilience is defined in terms of (1) the magnitude of the shock that the system can absorb and endure in a given state, (2) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization, and (3) the degree to which the system can build capacity for learning and adoption (Aligica, 2014: 110). On the basis of this definition, discussions on the resilience of different constitutions consider the legislative effectiveness and stability of the system when facing difficulties. The critical index measures the government stability and capacity to solve problems under pressure. If we take care on the relationship between executive and legislative branches, semi-presidentialism could be considered a more resilient constitutional order than either the presidential or parliamentary system. Semi-presidentialism is changeable and diversity in practice and theory. Under semi-presidentialism, the president and the prime minister might both be the head of executive. The triangular relationship among the president, prime minister, and parliament depends on numerous factors such as the institutional design, party cohesion, and electoral system. Supporters and critics of semi-presidentialism tend to posit opposite effects of semi-presidentialism. Supporters 2

argue that it is a flexible regime with an inbuilt premium for cooperation and coalition building, whereas critics emphasize the risks of rigidity, conflict, and instability associated with it (Moestrup, 2007: 31). Such flexibility increases the resilience of the system. Regarding the constitutional operation of the presidential system, a unified or divided government is a condition dependent on the president s partisan strength in the parliament. Regarding the parliamentary system, a majority or minority government is a condition dependent on whether the cabinet has the support of the parliamentary majority. However, the conditions of semi-presidentialism are substantially more complex and flexible because of the dual executive system. First, the dual executive system increases diverse possibilities between the executive and the legislative. Second, under a unified government, the president and the cabinet may be substantially more capable of cooperating with the parliament. As Lijphart (1992) discussed, semi-presidentialism entails an alternation of parliamentary and presidential phases depending on whether the president s party has a majority in the legislature. Thus, a divided government means gridlock between the president and the parliament. However, cohabitation under semi-presidentialism might work and relieve the risk of gridlock. A minority government means reduced legitimacy of the executive under the parliamentary system. However, the government can maintain its legitimacy from the president under semi-presidentialism. Vague Constitutional Design in Taiwan Taiwan, Mongolia, and East Timor are the three youngest semi-presidential systems in East Asia. Taiwan is also one of East Asia s renowned tiger economies and the world s only Sinitic democracy, but it faces an ongoing crisis of nationhood (Reilly, 2011: 117). The constitution of Taiwan was adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of China in December 1946. The original constitutional draft was the revised parliamentary system. After an amendment in 1997, Taiwan became a semi-presidential system with a strong president. According to the amendments to the constitution, the prime minister shall be appointed by the president without the approval of the parliamentary majority (Additional Art. 3). However, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-confidence vote against the prime minister. Nevertheless, the president may, within ten days following the passage of a no-confidence vote by the Legislative Yuan against the prime minister, declare the dissolution of the Legislative Yuan after consulting with its president (Additional Art. 2). In the triangular relationship among the president, parliament, and government, the president can decide on government formation and cabinet reshuffle at their own will. Moreover, because issuing a vote of no-confidence involves the risk of being dissolved, the parliament regards the vote of no-confidence as a last resort. Thus, the constitutional design in Taiwan enables the Executive Yuan to have a closer relationship with the president than with the legislature. Accordingly, the Executive Yuan must be responsible to the Legislative Yuan and the president. A president parliamentary system with dual accountability was established. The new constitutional order after the constitutional amendment is vague. On the basis of the discussion by Shugart and Carey, presidential power could be classified into 3

legislative and nonlegislative powers. 1 According to the provisions of the constitution, Taiwan s president is formally weak in terms of the president s legislative power. Because the president has no authority to propose legislative bills, the most effective way for them to express personal opinions on policy decisions is by participating in cabinet meetings. In Taiwan, Article 58 of the Constitution states, The Executive Yuan shall have an Executive Yuan Council with its President as Chairman and that the President cannot participate in the Council. Nevertheless, the constitution empowers the president to establish the National Security Council. According to Additional Article 2, To determine major policies for national security, the President may establish a National Security Council and a subsidiary national security bureau. The constitution enables the president to propose legislative bills for the sake of national security and other related issues. Moreover, the constitution does not specifically stipulate the circumstances under which the president can establish the National Security Council. Thus, the National Security Council is a means for the president to influence the cabinet in determining policies (Shen, 2015: 204). In addition, the president s nonlegislative power is strong. The prime minister is the head of government but only on paper. The prime minister is appointed and removed by the president without the approval of the parliament. The prime minister is therefore the agent of the president and carries out the president s will. The president s authority does not reside in their own powers but rather in their ability to appoint and dismiss the prime minister at will (Wu, 2007: 207). The institutional resilience is therefore structured. According to the amended constitution, the president is de facto the leader of the government but is not responsible to the legislature. The prime minister presides over cabinet meetings that decide on policies and prepares bills and budgets. The prime minister and their cabinet are responsible to both the president and the parliament. The cabinet is not formed based on the confidence of the parliament but on that of the president. Lijphart called this the presidential cabinet. The president has full capacity to govern the state by controlling the cabinet. If the political environment is not stable or is in trouble, the president can replace the prime minister anytime to reverse the plight. In fact, the cabinet has been reformed 12 times during 2000 2016. There was a divided government six times during President Chen Shui-bian, and a unified government six times during President Ma Ying-jeou. The cabinet reshuffle since 2000 was not caused by the relationship between the president and the parliament but by the president s will. Table 1 lists the prime ministers since 2000. Comparing the life of these cabinets, the longest serving cabinet was Yu Shyi-kun; he was also the prime minister under a divided government. 1 Presidential legislative powers include package or partial veto power, decree power, the exclusive introduction of legislation, budgetary powers, and the proposal of referenda. Presidential nonlegislative powers include cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, censure, and the dissolution of assembly. Please see Shugart and Carey, 1992: 150. 4

Table 1. Prime ministers of Taiwan since 2000 President and type of government Chen Shui-bian Divided Government Ma Ying-jeou Unified government Prime Minister Term of office Days Reason of reshuffle Tang Fei 20/05/00-06/10/00 139 Politics Chang Chun-hsiung 06/10/00-01/02/02 483 Election Yu Shyi-kun 01/02/02-01/02/05 1096 Election Hsieh Chang-ting 01/02/05-25/01/06 358 Politics Su Tseng-chang 25/01/06-21/05/07 481 Politics Chang Chun-hsiung 12/05/07-20/05/08 365 Election Liu Chao-shiuan 20/05/08-10/09/09 478 Politics Wu Den-yih 10/09/09-06/02/12 879 Election Chen Chun 06/02/12-18/02/13 373 Politics Jiang Yi-huah 18/02/13-08/12/14 658 Politics Mao Chi-kuo 08/12/14-01/02/16 420 Election Chang San-cheng 01/02/16-20/05/16 109 Election Presidentialized Party of Taiwan The second reason for the institutional resilience in Taiwan is party politics. After directly electing the president since 1996, the president has always played a critical role between the ruling party and the government. The presidentialized party is also the trend of main parties such as the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. 2 In general, checks and balances might hold across branches, but they do not hold within parties. Therefore, there is strong toughness and resilience when the president is both the head of the government and the chairman of the ruling party. In the term of office, the president is also de facto the real leader of their party most of the time. According to the party constitution of KMT and DPP, the president is also the party chairman. It is a critical point to make party presidentialization. After directly electing the president since 1996, all presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen have been the chairman of their parties most of the time (Table 2). In addition, the party system of Taiwan is moving toward a two-party system with stronger party discipline after reforming to the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system from a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) since 2008. After the electoral system reform, party discipline has been stronger and can easily ensure a clear majority on the basis of the two-party system. This has improved the president s political influence. 2 Samuels and Shugart (2010) argued that to the extent that the capture of a separately elected presidency is crucial for control over the distribution of the spoils of office and/or the policy process, party behavior and organization will tend to mimic the constitutional structure, giving rise to a presidentialized party. Party presidentialization is likely under both presidential and semi-presidential systems. 5

Table 2. Presidents of Taiwan as party chairmen since 1996 3 Time President As party chairman Not as party chairman 1996/05/20-2000/05/20 Lee Teng-hui (KMT) 1996/05/20-2000/03/24 Days: 1404 2000/03/24-2000/05/20 Days: 57 2000/05/20-2008/05/20 Chen Shui-bian (DPP) 2002/07/21-2004/12/11 2007/10/15-2008/05/20 2000/05/20-2002/07/21 2004/12/11-2007/10/14 2008/05/20-2016/05/20 Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) 2016/05/20- Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) Days:1092 2009/10/17-2014/12/03 Days:1872 2016/05/20- non Days:1828 2008/05/20-2009/10/17 2014/12/03-2016/05/20 Days:1048 Two major changes after the electoral system reform are party discipline and the effective number of political parties. First, party discipline is becoming stronger under MMM. In Taiwan, 73 of all 113 legislators are elected by plurality in single-member districts, and 34 legislators are elected by party list PR. Only six others are still elected by SNTV. According to the influence of electoral systems, party discipline would be stronger than SNTV regardless of plurality in single-member districts or party list PR. SNTV provides those elected an incentive to cultivate patron client networks. It also produces factionalism and divisions within a party (Lin, 2006: 197). However, party discipline would be stronger under the majoritarian electoral system. The candidates must be dependent on their party to win the election. In addition, the president is stronger in their party because of the coattail effect in the concurrent election. 4 Generally, the timing of these elections directly affects the legislative partisan composition primarily through the presence or absence of presidential coattails bringing into office a legislature whose members (when the elections are concurrent) are more likely to be of the president s party than is the case when the legislative elections are held separately from the executive contest (Jones, 1995: 103). Wang and Cheng also mentioned that coattail and presidential popularity play a role in Taiwanese citizens electoral calculus (Wang and Cheng, 2016). Second, the effective number of political parties is also reduced with MMM. Although there are still 34 legislators elected by party list PR, there are 73 more than double the seats that are elected by plurality in single-member districts. Duverger's law proposes that the simple majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system on the basis of psychological and mechanical effect. The two-party system was established in Taiwan after the electoral reform. 3 In the beginning of the term of office, President Chen Shui-bian and President Ma Ying-jeou were not chairmen. However, they won the presidential election and were the real leaders of their parties. Thus, President Chen Shui-bian was in fact the party leader for 1884 days and was not the leader for 1036 days. President Ma Ying-jeou was in facto the party leader for 2387 days and was not the leader for 534 days. 4 Taiwan s 2016 elections were the second time that the presidential race was held concurrently with the election of its parliament. The first time was in 2012. 6

Table 3. Effective number of political parties of Taiwan Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012 2016 ENPP 2.28 2.54 2.48 3.47 3.26 1.75 2.23 2.16 Electoral System SNTV MMM A two-party system with strong party discipline makes a powerful parliament. However, the president is in fact also the real leader of the ruling party. This increases the stability of party presidentialization. The presidentialized party is the party that is led by the president. A unified government with a concurrent election strengthens the president in their party and increases the influence on the parliament. For KMT and DPP, the president is also the party chief most of the time. Both KMT and DPP have held other party primaries to select the candidate for the presidential elections. This has occasionally caused personnel inconsistency between the chief executive and the top leader of the incumbent party. After the presidential election, the party therefore becomes a platform for the communication of the president s executive policies. Regarding the institutional resilience of Taiwan, a critical and crucial factor is that the president is de facto the head of the ruling party. The party is considered an instrument of the president to influence the parliament. However, political parties are not to be standardized and regulated by the constitution. The president has major influence on policy-making because he or she is also the chief of the ruling party but not the role of president. If the government is facing difficulties or losing the elections, the president can resign as the chairman of the party but maintain the legitimacy and authority of the president. It is similar to how lizards drop their tails to survival when they are threatened by a predator. President is the Decision Maker but is not Responsible to the Parliament According to the provisions of the constitution and the party politics, the resilience of Taiwan s semi-presidentialism stands out through the constitutional role of the president. There is a major gap between the constitutional order on paper and in practice. In the practice of Taiwan s semi-presidentialism, the president can appoint and replace the prime minister; therefore, the president is in fact the real leader of the government. Moreover, the president is also the chief of the ruling party. However, the president is not empowered with excessive legislative power on the provisions of the constitution. This means that the president has the power to make decisions with their leadership of the cabinet or ruling party. However, the president would never be responsible to the parliament for policy. The only pressures for the president are from reelection and their party. However, these are all informal and blurred. Semi-presidentialism is complex with three institutional actors, namely the president, prime minister, and parliament. The essence of semi-presidentialism is that the government might be led by the president, whose legitimacy is from direct election, or the prime minister, whose legitimacy is from the support of the parliament. From the perspective of the political agent, the prime minister is the hub of competition between the president and the parliament. Shugart and Carey categorized semi-presidentialism into two subtypes: the president parliamentary system and the premier presidential 7

system (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Under the president parliamentary system such as Taiwan, the president can appoint and dismiss the prime minister by their will. In this case, the president is both the dominant executive official as well as the dominant actor in the entire system, and the prime minister is the president s agent. If the government is in trouble because of the failure of policies, the president could replace the prime minister or even resign as the chairman of the ruling party. Some examples prove the institutional resilience of Taiwan as discussed. On March 29, 2000, President Chen Shui-bian announced that Tang Fei was chosen as the first premier to head the new cabinet after DPP s victory in the 2000 presidential election. However, on October 3, Tang Fei resigned from his post amid a nuclear power row over Taiwan's energy policy. The first cabinet endured only 139 days. President Chen established energy policy by replacing the premier. This is a typical example of the resilience of the constitutional operation of Taiwan. Another example under a divided government is Frank Hsieh Chang-ting. On January 25, 2006, Premier Frank Hsieh resigned from office after DPP lost key mid-term elections on December 3, 2005. In addition, the parliament overruled the budget proposed by Hsieh's government. Hsieh did not obtain the approval of President Chen to request the parliament to reconsider the budget. These examples show that changing the government depends on the president s will rather than on gridlock between the cabinet and the parliament. The situation is similar even under a unified government. On August 6, 2009, typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan and took hundreds of lives. President Ma replaced the prime minister and the general secretary to quell the pressure of public opinion. Another example is the Sunflower Movement on March 19, 2014. Students protested against the ratification of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, a trade liberalization pact between China and Taiwan, and occupied the Legislative Yuan for 24 days. After the Sunflower Movement, KMT suffered a historic defeat by the opposition DPP. Premier Jiang Yi-huah led his cabinet to resign en masse following the defeat, and President Ma was also expected to quit his post as the chairman of KMT. Even the policy was stopped at that time; the constitutional order which government is led by the president did not change. On the basis of this discussion and the aforementioned examples, the president plays a critical role in the institutional resilience of Taiwan s semi-presidentialism. Whether it is a unified government or a divided government, the semi-presidential system could be operated and led by the president. Although the government has changed frequently, the structure of the government is still led by the president. In addition, the president is the decision maker or the veto player at least. Conclusion Semi-presidentialism is a dual executive system with a directly elected president and a cabinet that remains in office if the parliament does not oppose it. The constitutional order is flexible and resilient in essence and in practice. A divided government causes the presidential system to be in trouble. A minority government causes the cabinet instability under the parliamentary system. However, under semi-presidentialism, cohabitation can unite the cabinet and the parliament and is workable under a divided government. The 8

cabinet can also survive and stay in office with legitimacy from the president even without the support of the parliamentary majority. The semi-presidential system was adopted in Taiwan in 1997. The constitutional powers of the president are more limited. The president does not participate in cabinet meetings; the president does not dissolve the parliament according to their will. However, the dual executive system is always unified regardless of whether it is supported by the parliamentary majority. This is because the president can appoint the premier without the approval of the parliamentary majority. As a result, the cabinet is terminated only when the president considers it politically necessary to appoint a new premier. The resilience is reflected in the vague constitution. Otherwise, the ruling party stands with the president because the president is also the real leader most of the time. After the electoral system reform, the parliamentary majority with strong party discipline has strengthened the president and increased flexibility when making crucial policy. The institutional resilience of Taiwan is built on the president, who is empowered to form the government and leads a presidentialized party that has the majority in the parliament. 9

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