Exercise Public Choice Chair of Economic Policy Winter Term 2016/17
Instructions Participation and examination in the exercise to upgrade the course from 3 to 6 credits Examination workload: 4 pages Essay 10 minutes presentation 5 minutes discussion of another Essay 1 out of three exercise session as examination session ( see next slide) Deadline for the submission of allessay: 5.12.2016
Please assign a 1 for your highest preference and a 2 for your second preference. Leave the third box empty. Lf.-Nu Name 14.12.2016 Political Competition 04.01.2017 The political economy of trade policy and free trade agreements 18.01.2017 The Origins of the State: Social Contract and Redistribution 1 Name Student 1 2 Name Student 2
Topic Assignment after you have filled in your preferences in the sheet we will assign the specific topics until 4.11.; 12:00 you will have your presentation and your discussion in the same session you should attend the other 2 sessions as audience if you are going to miss one of these two session please drop a note to Mr. Spiegel (sebastian.spiegel@uni-jena.de)
Specific tasks I Essay: summarize a given paper on 4 pages figure out the core messages show the important results and findings explain the method take a critical stand to the paper
Presentation: 10 minutes talk Specific tasks II give main findings from your Essay provide some debatable statements Discussion of another Essay we will inform you after the assignment whom you have to discuss 5 minutes talk give your view to the paper and essay provide alternatives or extensions
The sessions Session 1: Political Competition Date: 14.12.2016 Host: Prof. Dr. Andreas Freytag Session 2: The political economy of trade policy and free trade agreements Date: 04.01.2017 Host: Dipl.-Vw. Susanne Fricke Session 3: The Origins of the State: Social Contract and Redistribution Date: 18.01.2017 Host: Sebastian Spiegel, M.Sc.
a) The Median-Voter Readings Session 1 Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider (1978): A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom, The Economic Journal, Vol.88, No. 350, pp.243-253. Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Jeffrey B. Lewis (2004): Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.112, No. 6, pp.1364-1383. Schofield, Norman (2007): The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.74, No. 3, pp.965-980. b) Multiparty Politics Haan, Jakob de and Jan-Egbert Sturm (1997): Political and economic determinants of OECD budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.13, pp.739 750. Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle(1990): Coalitions and Cabinet Government, The American Political Science Review, Vol.84, No. 3, pp.873-890. Riker, William H. (1982): The Two-Party System and Duverger'sLaw: An Essay on the History of Political Science, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp.753-766. c) Rent-seeking Bhagwati, JagdishN. (1982): Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.90, No. 5, pp.988-1002. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2002): Corruption and rent-seeking, Public Choice, Vol.113, pp.97 125. Baland, Jean-Marie and Patrick Francois (2000): Rent-seeking and resource booms, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.61, pp.527 542.
Readings Session 2 a) Multilateral trade liberalization and free trade agreements Albertin, Giorgia(2008), Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice, IMF Working Paper, WP/08/65. Levy, Philip I. (1997): A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements, The American Economic Review, Vol.87, Issue 4, pp.506-519. Stoyanov, Andrey and HalisMurat Yildiz(2015): Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy, European Economic Review, Vol.80, pp.140-164. b) Free trade agreements, interest groups and domestic politics Liu, Xuepengand Emanuel Ornelas (2013), Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy, in: CEP Discussion Paper No 1184, January 2013. Naoi, Megumi and ShujiroUrata (2013); Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, in: Asian Economic Policy Review, 8, pp. 326-349. Ornelas, Emanuel (2005), Rent destruction and the political viability of free trade agreements, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (4), pp. 1475-1506. c) Interest groups and rules of origin and standards Chase, Kerry A. (2008), Protecting Free Trade: The Political Economy of Rules of Origin, in: International Organization, 62, pp. 507-530. Sturm, Daniel M. (2006), Product Standards, Trade Disputes and Protectionism, in: The Canadian Journal of Economics, 39 (2), pp. 564-581. Swinnen, Johan and Thijs Vandemoortele(2012), Trade and the political economy of standards, in: World Trade Review, 11 (3), pp. 390-400.
Readings Session 3 a) Applications of the Social Contract Theorem in modern economic literature Bodea, Cristina andadrienne LeBas(2013): The Origins ofsocialcontracts: AttitudestowardTaxation in Urban Nigeria, CSAE Working Paper, WPS/2013-02. Kyriazis, Nicholas and Emmanouil M. L. Economou(2013): Social Contract, public choice and fiscal repercussionsin AthenianDemocracy, TheoreticalandPracticalResearch in EconomicFields, Vol.4, Issue 1, pp.61-76. Zhang, Boyu, Cong Li, Hannelore De Silva, Peter Bednarik and Karl Sigmund (2014): The evolution of sanctioninginstitutions: an experimental approachtothesocialcontract, Experimental Economics, Vol.17, Issue 2, pp285 303. b) Influential factors for the preference for redistribution Alesina, Alberto, Guido Cozzi and Noemi Mantovan(2012): The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution, The Economic Journal, Vol.122, Issue 565, pp.1244 1261. Haußen, Tina (2014): Is there a Gender Gap in Preferences for Public Spending? Evidence from Germany, Conference Paper, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik. Kaplow, Louis andsteven Shavell(2003): Fairness versus welfare: noteson thepareto principle, preferences, and distributive justice, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9622. c) The role of redistribution in society and social contracts Alesina, Alberto andgeorge-marios Angeletos(2002): Fairness andredistribution: US versus Europe, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University. Levy-Garboua, Louis (1991): General interest and redistribution with self-interested voters: Social contract revisited, Public Choice, Vol.69, pp.175-196. Ythier, Jean Mercier (2011): Optimal redistributionin thedistributive liberal socialcontract, in Fleurbaey, Marc, Maurice SallesandJohn A. Weymark(Ed.): SocialEthicsandNormative Economics, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pp303-325.