DHP P244: Terrorism & Counterterrorism. Dr. James JF Forest. Exploiting Group Vulnerabilities and Encouraging Terrorist Disengagement

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DHP P244: Terrorism & Counterterrorism Dr. James JF Forest Exploiting Group Vulnerabilities and Encouraging Terrorist Disengagement

Counterterrorism Incapacita0on / Tradi0onal Decapita0on Deterrence Socio-poli0cal Containment Exploi0ng the vulnerabili0es of terrorist groups/networks Promo0ng Disengagement Countering Violent Extremisms (next week) Each of these has poten0al advantages, as well as Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects

Incapacita0on Approach Objec0ve: Kill or capture, removing the capacity of violent actors to make more damage (and decapita0on = focus on elimina0ng group leaders ) Who: Military forces, police, prison services What: (Violent) force, deten0on, drones Advantages: Mostly effec0ve when targe0ng groups with limited membership; Governments usually possess relevant capaci0es Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: May have limited effects in groups with a high recruitment and a strong social basis (resona0ng ideology, enablers) May reinforce recruitment and extremism May undermine human rights and moral legi0macy

Deterrence Approach Objec0ve: Increasing the costs of terrorism by (threat of) punishment / retalia0on to reduce mo0va0on Who: Criminal jus0ce system, military force What: Repression, violent force, punishment, media aven0on, economic and diploma0c sanc0ons Advantages: May be par0cularly effec0ve towards state sponsors of terrorism, or others with territory, assets that can be threatened Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: Limited effects towards highly mo0vated terrorists, in par0cular suicide terrorists Difficult to strike at actors which can not be located May affect innocent third par0es ( collateral damage ), e.g. family members of suicide terrorists May force governments to respond in ways where they weaken and undermine their own legi0macy

Socio-poli0cal Approach Objec0ves: Reduce mo0va0on for terrorism by removing root causes, frustra0ons Who: Governments, NGOs, peace mediators, community leaders What: Conflict resolu0on, poli0cal processes, social development, nondiscrimina0on, rule of law, etc. Advantages: May have posi0ve effects on other social and poli0cal problems Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: There is no single root cause of terrorism; many & complex Root causes are difficult to solve (e.g. protracted conflicts, deeply ingrained social problems, economic dispari0es) Efforts o\en take a long 0me before they make an impact Terrorism is frequently sustained by other reasons than those which gave rise to the terrorist campaign ini0ally

Containment Approach Objec0ve: Long-term war of avri0on; pa0ently wear the terrorist movement down, confident they will eventually fail Who: Poli0cal leaders, criminal jus0ce system, media, society What: Refusal to be terrorized or over-react to terrorist avacks; focus on reducing capabili0es as well as their will to launch avacks Advantages: May be effec0ve long-term; More pragma0cally viable ( defea0ng terrorism raises unreasonable expecta0ons) Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: Requires unusually high level of societal resilience and pa0ence Opposi0on poli0cians can take advantage of perceived so\ness toward terrorism during elec0on periods Does not sa0sfy bloodlust among some members of society vic0mized (directly or otherwise) by terrorist avacks Limited effects towards highly mo0vated terrorists, in par0cular suicide terrorists; Poten0ally costly (financially and human lives)

Exploi0ng Vulnerabili0es Objec0ves: Reduce interpersonal trust and opera0onal effec0veness within terrorist networks; increase doubts about righteousness, success; make individuals want to leave terrorism Who: Government intelligence agencies, informants What: Percep0ons influence; exacerbate disagreements; encourage suspicion, distrust; reduce opera0onal security Advantages: Reduces opera0onal effec0veness; internal squabbling, distrust undermine ability for planning or conduc0ng opera0ons Encourages terrorist network to fall apart from within Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: Requires extensive knowledge on who & what influences behavior Efforts could take a long 0me before they achieve results Does not sa0sfy public desire for revenge following terrorist avacks

Exploi0ng Vulnerabili0es Survival is a central objec0ve of any terrorist network Why do so many terrorist groups fail, and fairly quickly? What separates those that survive from those that fail? Knowledge is a cri0cal asset for any terrorist network Successful terrorist networks are commived to the long-term training and educa0on of its members and supporters Successful terrorist networks study and learn from other terrorist networks What do they need to know and do in order to survive? Financial autonomy, reliability of resources, personnel, etc. Opera0onal capabili0es; mo0va0on; facilita0ng environment Intelligence on CT efforts, peer compe0tors, opportuni0es

Trust is cri0cal To work well, networks require strong shared beliefs, a collective vision, some original basis for trust, and excellent communications - Brian Jenkins, 2006 In human networks, trust is established by various social mechanisms and shared beliefs Anyone can plug into the network if they use the proper protocols (the trusted handshake ), usually enabled by previously established network credentials

Trust is cri0cal Examples of the trusted handshake Shared academic/scientific knowledge base Mutual friends/acquaintances who vouch for you w/their life Family ties, clan, tribe, etc. Religion (doctrinal knowledge, credentials, etc.) Battlefield veteran status (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq) Shared experiences (prison, battlefield, oppression) Some individuals have a very high level of "betweenness centrality" these are critical knowledge brokers connecting different types of members (e.g., veterans & new recruits; scholars & mujahideen) Trusted virtual entrepreneurs connect a wanna-be with others

Exploi0ng Vulnerabili0es Terrorist dependence on knowledge, material resources, competent leadership, etc. can all be poten0al vulnerabili0es Necessity of interpersonal trust (common for all clandes0ne networks) is also a significnt vulnerability

Vulnerabili0es of Clandes0ne Networked Organiza0ons PART ONE: Effec0veness Requirements 1. Opera0onal Security 2. Transac0on Integrity PART TWO: Preference Divergence 1. Tac0cal Control 2. Strategic Authority

1. Opera0onal Security Any organiza0on involved in clandes0ne ac0vi0es faces similar challenges in terms of opera&onal security Includes ferre0ng out spies within the organiza0on Must maintain a level of security that facilitates conduc0ng meaningful transac0ons of informa0on and finance Secure long-distance communica0on can be 0me consuming and expensive Constant fear of (and hiding from) intelligence agencies, law enforcement

Idea: Promote the perception that we have the capability to intercept any and all kinds of technology-based communications Technology and OPSEC Technology enables organizations to become more networked Technological Capacity Constraining their technological capacity (through technology-based intelligence gathering) forces more face-to-face interaction More frequent face-to-face interaction can increase a clandestine network s vulnerabilities - technology, eavesdropping - human intelligence, spies Operational Security

2. Transac0on Integrity Without money, terrorists can do nothing The ways in which terrorists obtain and use money can also be a vulnerability if deemed repulsive by poten0al supporters Problem: Limited or no accountability regarding financial transac0ons, movement of assets, weapons, people Because of opera0onal security needs, a clandes0ne organiza0on cannot offer much transparency regarding its finances This allows considerable la0tude for abuse, corrup&on

Transac0on Integrity Strength of any network is based on the level of its integrity for conduc0ng transac0ons (communica0on, financial, etc.); reliability and trust of a network are cri&cal Transaction Integrity Expecta&ons of money to support opera0ons will be made available in a 0mely fashion Expecta&ons that individual recipients will do the correct things with those funds Group Effectiveness Transac&on integrity necessary to maintain opera&onal effec&veness

Exacerba0ng Transac0on Integrity Challenges Slow the transfer of funds, assets from one node to another; cause unexplained transac0on delays Encourage internal loo&ng (or percep0on of loo0ng) Get money to disappear with no reason Have conspicuous consump&on items (big screen TV) appear in place of the missing money Encourage acrimonious debates over preferen&al treatment, special benefits given to certain members of the network unfairly Publicize examples of lavish lifestyles of AQ leaders focusing on KSM and his playboy an0cs; al Fadl stealing money in Kenya; the Montreal cell and its money mismanagement, etc. Paint a portrait of these guys as anything but humble, pious, devout Muslims or competent financial decision makers. Overall objective is making a network s members want to leave, disengage

Exacerba0ng Transac0on Integrity Challenges Promote suspicion, rumors, mistrust Publicize accounts of financial mismanagement, corrup&on, misappropria0on, fund diversion Encourage suspicion that dona0ons, funds will not necessarily be used as donor intended (e.g., to pay drug couriers, pros0tutes, murderers of schoolchildren, etc.) Force leaders to consider puni0ve ac0ons against agents/opera0ves Degrade the integrity within financial networks; make asset management more difficult Overall objective is making a network s members want to leave, disengage

Agency Theory A network s members have different preferences, based on personal experiences, percep0ons, etc. Preference divergence impacts the level of trust/ expecta0ons of shared effort toward common goal Preference divergence can make it harder for a network s principals to maintain: 1. Tac0cal control 2. Strategic authority These create vulnerabili7es within terrorist networks that can be exploited

Tac0cal Control Cellular structures complicate C2 Poli0cal and ideological leaders the principals must delegate certain du&es to middlemen or low-level opera0ves, their agents. But because of the need to maintain opera0onal secrecy, terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly monitor what their agents are doing. Tactical Control Operational Security Thus, preference divergence creates opera0onal challenges which can be exploited to degrade a terrorist group s capabili0es.

Tac0cal Control Preference divergence over controlled use of violence Terrorists cannot afford too alienate the center of gravity, or risk losing support Must reign in overzealous members, prevent lowranking members from ini0a0ng their own avacks against strategically high-value targets Difficul0es in resolving chains of command Preference divergence over who needs what kinds of situa&onal awareness Tactical Control Operational Security Preference divergence over what should be done to maintain security Increased potential for fratricide ( own goals )

Exacerba0ng Tac0cal Control Challenges Exacerbate Tactical Control challenges - Force leaders to consider punitive actions against agents/operatives Make information management more difficult; degrade the C2 network channels with noise, static Flood the network nodes with requests for info/requests for clarification of intent, strategy, etc. Goal: overwhelm the decision-makers from within Encourage perceptions of counterproductive plans or actions among low-level operatives; raise concerns among political ideological leaders about their lack of tactical control Overall objective is making a network s members want to leave, disengage

Strategic Authority Within all networks, there are forces which influence how the nodes operate. if Mafia, certain family leaders/patrons... if Jihadis, certain influential scholars... Strategic Dissension Preference divergence over who s in charge Internal dissension among the network s leadership is a challenge Group Effectiveness Strategic disagreements within network lead some members to subvert the authority of senior commanders Principals must combat perceptions of strategic drift, disconnections between rhetoric and actions

Exacerba0ng Strategic Authority Challenges Identify the most influential members within each network; who is trusted most? Whose word carries most weight, and why? Identify and exploit rivalries within each network and between networks - Disagreements already exist in these networks - How to exacerbate them, make them more acrimonious? - Encourage debate; force them to defend their ideas Highlight personal agendas of those who are in charge Discussion forums and social media provide insights about internal debates rooted in religious doctrine and pragmatic necessity; Influence and promote debates about strategic coherence, leadership competency, direction Overall objective is making a network s members want to leave, disengage

Break

Disengagement Strategy Objec0ve: Make ac0ve terrorists quit, individually or collec0vely Who: Governments, criminal jus0ce system, NGOs, family members, community & religious leaders, et al. What: Amnesty, witness (protec0on) programmes, nego0a0ons, poli0cal processes, alterna0ves to violence Advantages: Reduce the size of terrorist groups and prevent recruitment May cause internal splits and weaken the terrorist group Could provide vital intelligence and witnesses in court cases Limita0ons and nega0ve side effects: Probably has major impact only on declining terrorist groups Amnesty programmes may easily be abused; risk of recidivism Amnesty may be difficult to accept by the vic0ms of terrorism

Disengagement Strategy The choices a person makes... 1. Before terrorism 2. During terrorism 3. A\er terrorism

1. Before terrorism What have we learned about the mul0ple pathways through which people become engaged in terrorist ac0vity? Radicalized? Recruited? Were they forced into it? Is there something unique or different about these individuals? Psychological? Family background? Poor? Religious? What paverns can we iden0fy, if any?

2. During Terrorism What have we learned about the various kinds of roles an individual can play within a terrorist network? Passive Support Community Activists Finance Technical Indirect Aid and Abet Violent Actor Hidden support PR Leaders/ policy logistics Direct Aid & Abet LEGAL ILLEGAL

2. During Terrorism What can governments do to encourage individuals to voluntarily leave a terrorist network? Does a person s role within a terrorist network impact the ways in which we might be able to encourage or incen0vize them to voluntary disengage?

Exploi0ng Vulnerabili0es Opera0onal secrecy Strategic direc0on and authority Morale among members Ideological coherence and resonance Financial dimensions Perceived credibility Tac0cal control

3. Leaving Terrorism What have we learned about the many ways in which individuals leave a terrorist network? Disengagement The behavioral act of stopping one s engagement in terrorist behavior De-radicaliza0on The cogni0ve change that is some0mes associated with disengagement Also a term used to describe programs that seek to rehabilitate former terrorists Can this be measured or assessed effec0vely?

Disillusionment with Push Factors Overall strategy or specific ac0ons Leadership Other members Day to day tasks/rou0ne Loss of faith in ideology Burnout Fear of being caught/vic0mized Clandes0ne lifestyle Having to cope with avacks

Pull Factors Competing loyalties Longing for a conventional life Employment/educational opportunities Desire to marry and establish a family or the demands of having a family Promise of amnesty

Poten0al Benefits Investment in disengagement programs could: Provide exit pathways from terrorism Help reduce # of ac0ve terrorists Re-socialize ex-members Build civil society cooperation, resilience Sow dissent and doubt within terrorist networks Acquire intelligence, evidence Reduce dependency on repressive counterterrorism Increase the legitimacy of the state Reduce economic & social costs of imprisonment Foster ex-terrorists as potential influencers

Poten0al Benefits For the terrorist, disengagement effort could offer them: Full amnesty for crimes committed Reduced sentencing Improved conditions in prison Serving in prison with other ex-members Ideological dialogue/training/indoctrination Job training and education Economic subsidies to participant and/or family Assistance to get married New social networks New job New identity

Poten0al Benefits In return, terrorists would likely need to agree to: Stay away from terrorist or other violent activities Stay away from radical organisations and politics Accept to serve (reduced) sentences for committed crimes Provide intelligence and/or witness in court Meet victims, confess and ask for forgiveness Distance themselves (publicly) from terrorism (and extremism) Take part in activities to reduce recruitment to extremist groups (including CVE next week s lesson)

Summary Disengagement is a complex, dynamic process Multiple factors Major reason for leaving: disillusionment from disparity between fantasy vs. reality Can be sudden, but it is usually gradual Disillusionment can happen at any 0me (early or late) Some who disengage do not de-radicalize, and some who de-radicalize cannot easily disengage Many terrorists become disillusioned early but cannot express it In fact many compensate for it by becoming more extreme

Research Ques0ons How does [ terrorist group x ] deal with the organiza0onal tradeoffs between security and efficacy? How does a person s pathway into the terrorist network influence their reasons or opportuni0es for leaving? How does a person s role within the terrorist network influence their reasons or opportuni0es for leaving? Who within this specific context is best suited to influence an individual s mo0va0ons for leaving terrorism?

Final Exam Ideas What are some cri0cal challenges faced by all contemporary terrorist groups? How can a government best leverage its strengths and exploit the weaknesses of a terrorist network like al-qaeda or the Islamic State?

Wrap-up Ques0ons? Reminder: CT Briefing papers due at start of final class session next Monday, May 1 st