GENERAL PHARMACEUTICAL COUNCIL FITNESS TO PRACTISE COMMITTEE PRINCIPAL HEARING 25 Canada Square, London E14 5LQ Friday 2 March 2018 Chairman: Committee Members: Committee Secretary: Mr Michael Caplan QC Ms Yemisi Gibbons Ms Claire Bonnet Mr Mark Mallinson CASE OF: GHUMRA, Zameer Abdul Majid (Registration Number 2057494) ------------------------------------- MR ALEXANDER WALKER, Counsel, appeared on behalf of the General Pharmaceutical Council Mr Ghumra was neither present nor represented ------------------------------------- Transcript from the Shorthand Notes of T A Reed (Wiltshire) Ltd Tel No: 01793 764614 -------------------------------------
I N D E X Page Decision Proceeding in Absence 1 Determination - Facts 3 Determination Misconduct and Impairment 10 Determination Sanction 17 Determination Interim Measures 23 PLEASE NOTE: Copies printed from email may differ in formatting and/or page numbering from hard copies
DECISION Proceeding in absence THE CHAIRMAN: An application has been made by the Council to proceed in the absence of the registrant. Mr Ghumra does not attend today and we have indicated previously that we are satisfied that he has properly been served with the notice in accordance with rule 3 of the Fitness to Practise Rules 2010. The application by Mr Walker on behalf of the Council is made under rule 25. We have been referred to two legal authorities. One is Jones and Hayward, in which the judge set out a number of matters that a court, or in this case a panel considering whether to proceed in the absence of a registrant should have in mind. The other case is Adeogba, which is a regulatory case. The brief factual background here is that the registrant in this case indicated in November 2017 a change to his registered address, to a prison address. He had been convicted of a criminal offence. The Council has been in communication with him. They have sent him letters with the papers in this case. They have also indicated to him, bearing in mind that he is in prison, that he could if he wished to make representation in writing, and also that arrangements could be made for him to join in the proceedings by way of telephone. Nothing has been heard from the registrant. We have been told there has been no response from the registrant other than the fact of the form in November 2017 changing his registered address to that of the prison where he is currently serving his sentence of imprisonment. We are aware that any panel considering whether to proceed in the absence of the registrant must proceed with the utmost care and caution. The panel has to balance a number of factors. The panel has to consider the conduct of the registrant so far as this matter is concerned and whether he has voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings. 1
The panel also has to consider the public interest in the hearing proceeding expeditiously, whether there has been prejudice to the registrant and fairness both to the registrant and to the Council. The panel has to consider fairness to all parties in proceedings here. We have been told there has been nothing heard from the registrant. He has been served with a notice of hearing. He has also been served separately with the skeleton argument and the documents upon which the Council relies. He could of course have applied for an adjournment; he has not done so. He could of course have applied to join in these proceedings by telephone; he has not done so. In fact there has been no communication from him. We are driven to the conclusion that he has therefore voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings. We are aware of the authorities, as I have mentioned, and also, again as I have mentioned, of the public interest in these hearings proceeding most expeditiously and the fairness to both parties. In our view, it would be appropriate in this case to proceed in the absence of the registrant, bearing in mind what I have said, that he has not communicated with the Council asking for an adjournment or taken up the opportunity that has been placed before him to join in these proceedings by telephone. We take the view that he has voluntarily absented himself and that the proceedings here should continue in his absence. Having said that, we are mindful that in so doing we should proceed with the utmost care and caution. If there are any points which can be made for his benefit or taken into account for his benefit, then we will most certainly do so. Therefore, we agree to the application made by the Council this morning to proceed in the absence of the registrant. -------- 2
DETERMINATION Facts THE CHAIRMAN: This is the Principal Hearing relating to Mr Zameer Abdul Majid Ghumra, the registrant, a pharmacist first registered on 23 October 2013 under registration number 2057494. Mr Alexander Walker appears on behalf of the General Pharmaceutical Council. The registrant does not attend. We have said that we are satisfied that he has been properly served with the notice of hearing under rule 3 of the General Pharmaceutical Council (Fitness to Practise and Disqualification Rules etc.) Order of Council 2010. An application has been made by the Council to proceed in his absence under rule 25. We have ruled that we consider it appropriate in this case to proceed in the absence of the registrant. The particulars of allegation against the registrant are that: You were first registered as a pharmacist on 20 October 2003: 1. On 5 October 2017, you were convicted at Nottingham Crown Court of dissemination of a terrorist publication contrary to section 2(1) and 2(20(d) of the Terrorism Act 2006. By reason of the matters set out above your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your conviction. Under rule 42, where facts at a Principal Hearing are in dispute the burden of proving the facts rests on the Council. The Committee must consider whether they have been established in accordance with the civil standard of proof; that is, more likely than not that the facts occurred in the manner alleged by the Council. 3
The registrant is not present. He has not admitted the facts set out in the particulars of allegation and we must therefore proceed on the basis that the Council has to satisfy us that the facts are proved to the appropriate standard. The allegation here is that the registrant was convicted of a criminal offence. Rule 24(4) says that: Where a person concerned has been convicted of a criminal offence in the British Islands a copy of the certificate of conviction certified by a competent officer of the court is admissible as conclusive proof of that conviction and the findings of fact on which it was based. We have been provided with a document, which is at page 94 of our bundle, which is headed The Crown Court at NOTTINGHAM with a Case Number and a Court Location Code. It says: HM Courts & Tribunals Service. It says: Certificate of Conviction concerning Zameer Abdul Majid GHUMRA, his surname, who on 05 OCT 2017 in this Crown Court was tried and convicted on indictment of dissemination of a terrorist publication contrary to section 2(1) and 2(2)(d) of the Terrorism Act 2006. The said Zameer Abdul Majid GHUMRA was on 06 OCT 2017 sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. Subject to notification provisions under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 for a period of 15 years. To pay a Victim Surcharge of 120.00. It also carries a further certification: I certify that the details in this Certificate are a true and complete extract from the court record to the best of my knowledge and belief and it is signed by an Officer of the Court and dated 14 November 2017. 4
We are satisfied that that is a certificate certified by a competent officer of the court and that it is admissible as conclusive proof of that conviction and the finding of fact on which it was based. The background to the case comes from the sentencing remarks of the judge, which have been provided to us. On 6 October 2017, HHJ Dickinson at Nottingham Crown Court said this: On 5 October 2017, Zameer Ghumra was convicted by the jury of the offence of dissemination of a terrorist publication, contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The offence was committed in the summer of 2014. The defendant showed to a child, [ ], aged 8, ISIS propaganda videos of beheadings. This was a terrible thing to do. What makes this case particularly serious is the reason why the defendant showed the child those dreadful scenes. It was part of a determined effort to indoctrinate and to radicalise the child, and to turn this small boy, [ ], into a terrorist. It is important to have regard to the terms of the offence of which the defendant has been convicted. Freedom of opinion and expression, tolerance of a wide range of views is at the foundation both of our society and of the justice system. This offence restricts that fundamental right. However this is not an arbitrary curtailment of freedom of speech. Dissemination of terrorist material is an offence under this section only if the defendant intends his conduct to encourage acts of terrorism or he is reckless to that effect. In this case, the jury was sure that Zameer Ghumra showed to the child a recording of an Islamic State beheading and that it was his intention to encourage the child to commit an act of terrorism within the foreseeable future, once he was old enough to do so. That is the way in which the case was left to the jury in the route to verdict. Question 3 was: 5
Are we sure that when Zameer Ghumra showed the beheading video to [the child], it was his intention to encourage [the child] to commit a terrorist act within the foreseeable future once [the child] was old enough to do so? The maximum sentence for this offence is seven years' imprisonment. The offence covers a wide range of conduct including, for example, large scale distribution of material in printed or digital form, which may read by many or by no-one. The material may relate to acts of terrorism generally or to some specific theatre of conflict. The culprit may intend to encourage specific acts of terrorism or be reckless as to the effect. In this case, the target audience was one person, not larger numbers. But that person was a young child, [ ]. It was his intention to turn the child into a young terrorist. The evidence before the jury was that the boy asked the defendant, How do they behead people, because it makes you feel so disgusting? to which the defendant [ ] replied, If you truly love Allah then you will do it. There is no evidence that the younger brother, aged 7, saw the ISIS beheading images. However, both boys were shown violent movies, mainstream films but inappropriate for the boys, and done for a purpose, Sweeney Todd, for example. The defendant created Twitter accounts for both boys. They were set up to follow hate preachers such as Abu Baraa and Anjem Choudrey. The profile page for the older boy was the Islamic State flag. He produced business cards for the younger boy, the 7 year old, on which this young child was described as a Palestine army general and it showed an image of an assault rifle. The defendant spoke of taking the boys to Syria. There was a tweet, dated 28 August 2014, which begins, Hypothetical situation. Two children under 10, 7 and 9 with [man] who wants to migrate. Mum is murtard [meaning born Muslim but rejected her faith]. 6
Better to stay put until children older? Or better to migrate with children? But then how would he take care of them and work / fight? The evidence of the older boy is that the defendant [ ] said to him, Why don t you come and join us in ISIS? Do you want to stay here and make other people believe in ISIS, or do you want to come with me? What a thing to ask an eight year old child. The evidence is that the defendant taught the boys how to punch and kick, and to throw a knife. Got stuff ready for us, stuff that you need to climb mountains was how the older boy put it. As the younger boy, aged 7, told the police, He told me so much stuff that it made me want to do it. How, why could that happen? [The child] said this in his recorded interview, [ ]: He believes a very very very extreme Islam. He basically believe that ISIS. He believe that if anyone's non-muslim and they say something bad about Islam, you just kill them. He said, If it's in school, don't kill them, just beat them up. He said, If it's outside, if it's somewhere else, I have to just kill them and you can't make friends with any non-muslim. The jury were taken through the defendant's Twitter account which both followed and was followed by a number of hate preachers and Islamic State Twitter accounts. But included this, a tweet from 21 August 2014, Don't ask me about the #beheading, there are more important things for me to talk about, like Muslims getting killed by the kuffars [unbelievers or disbelievers]. In similar vein, on 5 September a tweet, Who cares if a kafir got beheaded? I've got better things to worry about, like Muslims. Mr Ghumra, I have heard something of the effect of your behaviour on the children. [The] older [boy] suffering a nightmare, in fear that he might be 7
shot by a sniper. The longer term effect is that the boys no longer have contact with [you]. I hope it is right that the boys did, at one time, idolise you, as you said in your evidence; but you abused that trust and that privilege in the most extreme way imaginable. Suddenly those boys were torn from you, [ ]. They turned from admiring you to hating you and that was bound to have a damaging effect on the children. As they get older, because even now they are only 11 and 10, as they get older and become adults, they will face that dreadful situation of deciding whether or not they will choose to resume contact with [you].. As I made clear in the course of the submissions from counsel, it is not necessary for me to decide whether or not [the child] suffered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This is not a case for putting a label on the effect on the child. Mr Ghumra is aged 38, he has no previous convictions. He qualified as a pharmacist and worked in that occupation for at least 11 years. I have read a number of references from family, friends, work associates which speak highly of him, and, in a sense, this defendant's descent from a decent, hard-working [ ] man, to the conduct that the jury have heard about in this trial, may be yet another pernicious effect of extremism. Sadly, it is clear to me from the defendant's evidence that, although he protests that he now sees Islamic State as wicked and ISIS fighters as terrorists, he still clings on to some of his extreme views. Zameer Ghumra was convicted following a trial. I do not penalise him for that, he is entitled to have his trial. But it means that there is a complete absence of any indication of remorse. Indeed the defence at trial was that these boys had been brainwashed by their mother and [another] in order to make a false complaint. This is a most shocking crime, it is extremely serious and has damaged the children. I venture to think it has also caused offence to the vast 8
majority of decent, law abiding followers of the Islamic faith. In my judgment, this calls for a sentence near to the maximum permitted. Mr Ghumra, for this offence you are sentenced to prison for a term of six years. Parliament has provided that you will serve one half of that sentence and you will then be released on licence. The notification provisions under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 apply automatically. The victim surcharge provision applies and the order will be drawn up accordingly. We find the facts set out in the particulars of allegation proved. ----------- 9
DETERMINATION Impairment THE CHAIRMAN: The next stage is for us to decide if the registrant s fitness to practise is currently impaired. We have found that we are satisfied that the registrant was convicted at Nottingham Crown Court on 5 October 2017 of the offence of the dissemination of a terrorist publication contrary to Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. He was sentenced on 6 October 2017 to six years imprisonment, made subject to notification provisions under the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 for a period of 15 years and ordered to pay a victim surcharge of 120. The Pharmacy Order 2010 contains no definition of what is meant by impaired fitness to practise. Article 51(1) of the Order provides that: A person s fitness to practise is to be regarded as impaired for the purposes of this Order by reason of (c) a conviction in the British Islands for a criminal offence The issue is whether the registrant s conviction leads to the conclusion that the registrant s fitness to practise is currently impaired. Guidance on fitness to practise is provided in rule 5(1) of the General Pharmaceutical Council (Fitness to Practise Rules) Order of Council 2010. This provides that: The Committee must have regard to the criteria specified in paragraph (2) or, where appropriate, (3), or, where appropriate, paragraphs (2) and (3), when deciding, in the case of any registrant, whether or not the 10
requirements as to fitness to practise are met in relation to that registrant. Rule 5(2) provides fitness to practise criteria: In relation to evidence about the conduct or behaviour of the registrant which might cast doubt on whether the requirements as to fitness to practise are met in relation to the registrant, the Committee must have regard to whether or not that conduct or behaviour (a) presents an actual or potential risk to patients or to the public; (b) has brought, or might bring, the profession of pharmacy into disrepute; (c) has breached one of the fundamental principles of the profession of pharmacy; or (d) shows that the integrity of the registrant can no longer be relied upon. Further, under rule 24(11) of the rules: Where the Committee finds that a registrant concerned has failed to comply with the standards, that failure (a) may be taken into account by the Committee in determining whether or not the registrant condemned s fitness to practise is impaired; and (b) is not, of itself, to be taken to establish that the registrant s fitness to practise is impaired. The current standards are the ones that were published in May 2017. Standard 6 is headed Pharmacy professionals must behave in a professional manner. It says in Applying the standard : 11
People expect pharmacy professionals to behave professionally. This is essential to maintaining trust and confidence in pharmacy. Behaving professionally is not limited to the working day, or face-to-face interactions. The privilege of being a pharmacist or pharmacy technician, and the importance of maintaining confidence in the professions, call for appropriate behaviour at all times. The guidance says that there are a number of ways to meet this standard and gives some examples of the attitudes and behaviours expected. These include that pharmacy professionals should be trustworthy and act with honesty and integrity, treat people with respect and safeguard the dignity and maintain appropriate personal and professional boundaries with the people they provide care to and with others. We have been assisted by consideration of the authorities. The meaning of fitness to practise was explored in Sigmund v General Medical Council [2008] ETHIC 581 (Admin). There, Matting J adopted the summary of potential causes of impairment offered by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Shipman Inquiry report. Dame Janet Smith considered that impairment would arise where a doctor and the same would be relevant for a pharmacist: (a) presents a risk to patients; (b) has brought the profession into disrepute; (c) has breached one of the fundamental tenets of the profession; (d) has acted in such a way that his integrity can no longer be relied upon. Those are of course the same categories referred to in rule 5(2), which we have mentioned. 12
The authorities tell us that the context of a practitioner s behaviour must be examined, as was set out in the case of Cheated v General Medical Council [2009] ETHIC 645 (Admin), In circumstances where there is misconduct at a particular time, the issue becomes whether that misconduct, in the context of the [practitioner] s behaviour both before the misconduct and to the present time, is such as to mean that his or her fitness to practise is impaired. The [practitioner] s misconduct at a particular time may be so egregious that, looking forward, a panel is persuaded that the doctor is simply not fit to practise medicine without restrictions, or maybe at all. On the other hand, the doctor s misconduct may be such that, seen within the context of an otherwise unblemished record, a Fitness to Practise Panel could conclude that, looking forward, his or her fitness to practise is not impaired, despite the misconduct. A corollary of the test to be applied comes in the case of Young v General Medical Council [2009] ETHIC 1923 (Admin) where it was said that: a FTPP is required to look forward rather than backward that a finding of misconduct in the past does not necessarily mean that there is impairment of fitness to practise a point emphasised in Cohen v General Medical Council and Zygmunt... In looking forward, the FTPP is required to take account of such matters as the insight of the practitioner into the source of his misconduct, any remedial steps which have been taken and the risk of recurrence of such misconduct. It is required to have regard to evidence about these matters which has arisen since the alleged misconduct occurred Any approach to the issue of whether a practitioner s fitness to practise should be regarded as impaired must also take account of the collective need to maintain 13
confidence in the professional as well as declaring and upholding proper standards of conduct or behaviour, in particular see the case of Zygmunt. It was further said that: In the ordinary case such as this, the attitude of the practitioner to the events which give rise to the specific allegations against him is, in principle, something which can be taken into account either in his favour or against him by the panel, both at the stage when it considers whether his fitness to practise is impaired, and at the stage of determining what sanction should be imposed upon him. That was in Nicholas-Pillai v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 1048. Insight, in the sense of determining whether the practitioner appreciates the gravity of what happened, is a significant consideration in assessing fitness to practise. This can mean that the question of remediality and risk of repetition are of secondary importance. (See PSA v NMC and Wilson [2015] EWHC 1887 (Admin).) On sentencing the registrant, the learned judge said that the registrant: showed to a child, [ ], aged 8, ISIS propaganda videos of beheadings. This was a terrible thing to do. What makes this case particularly serious is the reason why the defendant showed the child those dreadful scenes. It was part of a determined effort to indoctrinate and to radicalise the child, and to turn this small boy, [ ], into a terrorist. The learned judge went on: This is a most shocking crime, it is extremely serious and has damaged the children. I venture to think it has also caused offence to the vast 14
majority of decent, law abiding followers of the Islamic faith. In my judgment, this calls for a sentence near to the maximum permitted. The maximum sentence for this offence was seven years: the registrant was sentenced to six years. He has always denied the offence. He has not engaged in this process in any way. He has shown no remorse or insight whatsoever. The registrant was convicted of a most serious offence. He was prepared to encourage a person to take up arms as a terrorist. If he was successful, undoubtedly this could lead to members of the public being injured. The conduct for which the registrant has been convicted represents a most serious offence which presents a risk of actual harm to members of the public. Furthermore, there was a clear risk of psychological harm to anyone shown such a video, more so because in this instance the person shown the video was so young. Indeed, one of the children shown the video did, according to the judge, suffer psychological harm. A pharmacist convicted of this offence is capable of bringing the profession into disrepute by undermining public confidence in pharmacy professionals, who are expected to demonstrate the appropriate personal and professional conduct. The ideology of ISIS is one which is incompatible with the fundamental principles of the pharmacy profession, which requires one to treat people of all faiths and lifestyles with respect. The registrant has by his actions breached one of the fundamental tenets of the profession. We consider that the registrant presents a risk by his actions to members of the public and particularly those he might treat if he were allowed to practise, namely patients. So far as upholding professional standards and public confidence are concerned, to use the words of Cox J in CHRE v NMC and Grant, 15
the need to uphold proper professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment of fitness to practise were not made in the circumstances of this case. Particularly given the nature of the conviction in this case, we consider that limbs (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 5(2) are certainly engaged in this case. We are satisfied that for these reasons, by virtue of the registrant s conviction, his fitness to practise is currently impaired. ----------- 16
DETERMINATION Sanction THE CHAIRMAN: This is our determination on sanction. We have found that we are satisfied that the registrant was convicted at Nottingham Crown Court on 5 October 2017 of the offence of dissemination of a terrorist publication contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2016. He was sentenced on 6 October 2017 to six years imprisonment, made subject to notification provisions under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 for a period of 15 years and ordered to pay a victim surcharge of 120. We determined that by virtue of that conviction the registrant s fitness to practise is currently impaired. The Committee now has to decide what if any sanction should be imposed in this case. We have taken account of the submissions of Mr Walker, on behalf of the Council that the only appropriate sanction here is to remove the name of the registrant from the register. The Committee s powers upon a finding of impairment of fitness to practise are set out in Article 54(2) of the Pharmacy Order. They are a warning, the registrant s removal from the register, a direction for suspension for a period not exceeding 12 months, or a direction for conditions to be imposed upon the registrant s registration for a period not exceeding three years. The Committee is aware that the purpose of any sanction is not to punish, although any sanction may be punitive in its effect. Any sanction must be just, proportionate and appropriate. The Sanctions Guidance states that the purpose of sanctions is threefold, namely protection of the public, the maintenance of public confidence in the profession and the maintenance of proper standards. The Sanctions Guidance sets out as the key factors to consider in deciding the most appropriate sanctions to impose: the extent to which the registrant has breached the standards of conduct, ethics and performance published by the 17
Council (the relevant standard in this case being standard 6 in the 2017 standards, which we referred to at the impairment stage); the interests of the registrant weighed against the public interest; the personal circumstances of the registrant and any mitigation they have offered; any testimonial or character references given in support of the registrant; any relevant factors that may aggravate the registrant s conduct in the case; any submissions made to the Committee by the Council s representative and the registrant; and of course the contents of the guidance. To make sure that the sanction is proportionate, the Committee should consider each available sanction, starting with the lowest and deciding if it is appropriate to the case. If it is not, the Committee should consider the next sanction until it decides whether a particular sanction is appropriate. The Committee should also consider the sanction immediately above and say why it has decided a more serious sanction is not appropriate and proportionate. We have to give weight to the public interest and the need for public interest in the profession and the maintenance of proper standards, as well as consider the position of the registrant. We are aware of the case of Law Society v Brendan John Salisbury, where it was held that the statement of principle relating to sanction for professional misconduct set out in Bolton v Law Society remains good law, subject only to the qualification of the European Convention on Human Rights Articles 6 and 8, which need to be taken into consideration when applying Bolton. The judgment in Salisbury refers to Bolton in which it was held that: The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price. 18
In Marinovich v GMC [2002] UKPC 36 the Privy Council said that the Professional Conduct Committee: was entitled to give greater weight to the public interest and to the need to maintain public confidence in the profession and the consequence to the appellant in this case the registrant of the imposition of the penalty. The case of Crabbie v General Medical Council [2002] 1 WLR 3104 is also brought to the attention of the Committee by the Council. In Crabbie, the appellant, a practising doctor, was involved in a road traffic accident in which all parties received injury and one individual died. The registrant was subsequently convicted of death by dangerous driving with excess alcohol, the sentence imposed by the criminal courts being one of five years imprisonment, and the PCC of the General Medical Council directing that the appellant be erased from the register. The appellant appealed to the Privy Council, where Lord Scott of Foscote in giving the judgment of the board stated: Accordingly it is proper, in their Lordships opinion, for the PCC, when deciding in a conviction case on the appropriate direction to give, to have regard to the nature and gravity of the criminal offence in question. The extent to which the fact that the offence has been committed by a practising doctor is likely to bring the profession into disrepute or to undermine public confidence in the profession is a proper matter for the PCC to take into account. It is a matter the weight of which it is primarily for them to judge (see Dad v General Dental Council [2000] 1 WLR 1538 per Lord Hope of Craighead at p 1542). 19
The Council submits that in the registrant s case the conviction for a terrorism related offence is so serious as to raise serious issues with the registrant s fitness to practise. It is submitted that it poses a risk to patients both indirectly, by the registrant seeking to persuade others to potentially carry out acts of terrorism, and directly, by a combination of the views held by the registrant and the possibility that the registrant may show material to someone and it cause them harm. It is further submitted that the ideology of ISIS is such that one who shares that ideology and has sought to promote it, holds beliefs which are fundamentally incompatible with being a registered professional. Finally, it is submitted that serious damage has been done to the reputation of pharmacy professionals and the public s faith in them by the conduct of the registrant. We have considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. The registrant has been convicted of a most serious offence, although not directly concerned with his profession as a pharmacist. It was, as the judge remarked, a most shocking crime, extremely serious and has damaged children. What makes this case particularly serious, as the judge said, is the reason why the defendant showed the child those dreadful scenes of an ISIS propaganda video of beheadings. It was part of a determined effort to indoctrinate and radicalise the child and to turn a small boy into a terrorist. It was, as the judge said, a terrible thing to do. Such was the serious nature of the offence, that the registrant received close to the maximum sentence possible in law. We agree with the submissions made to us by the Council that what the registrant did poses a risk to patients as well as the wider public. 20
We agree that the ideology of ISIS is such that a person who shares that ideology and particularly has sought to promote it, holds beliefs which are fundamentally incompatible with being a registered professional. By his conduct the registrant has damaged the reputation of pharmacy professionals and the public s faith in them. The registrant has not engaged in these proceedings at all. There has not been placed before us any testimonies or character reference. He has shown no remorse or insight. The only point that we can see can be said on his behalf is that, since he was first registered in October 2003, there is no suggestion that there have been any other disciplinary matters brought against him. The Committee has considered the appropriate sanction in this case. We consider that a warning would not be appropriate. The matter is far too serious for a warning. The Committee considered carefully whether there were any conditions that we could properly impose in this case which would address the public interest. Having done so, we do not consider that there are any such conditions in this case. The Committee has to consider whether a period of suspension would be fair, proportionate and appropriate, balancing the public interest, the public confidence in the profession and the right of the registrant to practise his profession. Even if we consider that suspension would be appropriate, it would not be open to us in this case. For the sake of completeness we should explain the reasons why that is the position. The registrant was sentenced to six years imprisonment on 6 October 2017. He will serve half of that sentence and then be released on licence. It is necessary to review the authorities of CHRP v GDC and Fleishmann [2005] EWCA 87 and 21
Khan v General Pharmaceutical Council [2016]UKSA 64 to consider if suspension is available as a sanction today. Following the Supreme Court decision in Khan, we would have to be able to say that if suspension was open to us as a sanction, a 12-month suspension would be adequate and sufficient. We could not say or indicate that it should be for a longer period; that would be a matter for the review committee. The sentence of imprisonment imposed on this registrant would clearly continue beyond the next 12 months. In Fleischmann the judge said that, as a general principle, where a practitioner has been convicted of a serious criminal offence he should not be permitted to resume his practice until he has satisfactorily completed his sentence. Twelve months suspension would not be adequate if we were able to consider suspension, as the sentence of imprisonment would continue for a period of longer than 12 months. In those circumstances suspension would not be open to us as a sanction. We would wish to make it clear, however, that even if we could consider suspension, we would not consider that an appropriate sanction in this case. In view of the nature and gravity of the conviction and all the surrounding circumstances, we consider the registrant s conduct to be fundamentally incompatible with continued registration as a pharmacist and that public confidence in the profession demands no lesser sanction than removal from the register. Therefore, our decision today, after careful consideration, is to direct the registrant s removal from the register. ----------- 22
DETERMINATION Interim measures THE CHAIRMAN: An application has been made by the Council under Article 60 for interim measures in this case. We have indicated that our decision today is to direct the registrant s removal from the register. The application for interim measures is made because the decision today will not take effect for the period in which a registrant can appeal, namely 28 days. If he does appeal, it will not take effect until the outcome of that appeal. Mr Walker on behalf of the Council makes the application on the basis that it is otherwise in the public interest in the light of our findings today and our decision to impose a sanction of removal. Our finding is on the basis that the registrant s conduct is fundamentally incompatible with continuing registration as a pharmacist, and the public would be shocked to learn that he was permitted continue practising subject to the appeal period. Of course we are aware that if he did appeal then removal would not take effect until after the outcome of that appeal. We have considered the matter carefully. We are aware that interim measures can only be put in place if we are satisfied that they are necessary for the protection of the public or otherwise in the public interest. We did make it clear that we consider the registrant s conduct to be fundamentally incompatible with continued registration as a pharmacist. Public confidence in the profession demands no lesser sanction than removal from the register in this case. We do consider that if members of the public were asked about this matter, as far as we can say they would be shocked if the registrant were allowed and permitted to continue to practise pending the outcome of the appeal. In all the circumstances of this case we do think that this is a case where it is appropriate and necessary to impose interim measures on the grounds that it is 23
necessary for the protection of members of the public and is otherwise in the public interest. We do so order. MR WALKER: Sir, there is an interim order still in place. I understand that it is due to expire in the coming weeks. I can confirm the date but I ask that that is removed, given the direction for interim measures. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. It is appropriate to remove the interim order given where we are on the imposition of interim measures. That concludes the hearing. Thank you very much. ----------- 24