PAD 6109: Institutions and Society Fall 1999 Instructor: Rick Feiock Bellamy 614 (850)644-7615 Office Hour: W 5:00-6:00 and by appointment rfeiock@coss.fsu.edu Class WWW Home Page http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/class/pad6109f99.html Course Description: The purpose of this course is to provide students with a basic understanding of the institutional context of the governance, policy, and management process in the public sector. The course examines the major analytic approaches in institutional analysis and their relevance for understanding public sector issues. Required Texts: Jack Knight Institutions and Social Conflict Cambridge University Press 1992 Robert E. Goodin The Theory of Institutional Design Cambridge University Press 1996 Elinor Ostrom Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Cambridge University Press 1990 James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Cambridge University Press 1990 Edward P. Weber Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation Georgetown University Press 1998 Mark Schneider and Paul Teske with Michael Mintrom Public Entrepreneurs Princeton University Press 1995
Requirements: Students are required to read the assigned materials, participate fully in class, write a research paper, make presentations, and write a final examination. For each class some students will be assigned to make presentations on the assigned readings. The purpose of these presentations is not to summarize the content of the readings. Each presentation will indicate how ideas in that particular reading relate to others in the same week. Presentations will raise critical questions about the readings for class discussion. Presenters who fail to follow these guidelines will be stopped by the instructor. Each presenter will post on the Web Board a review highlighting major arguments of his or her presentation. This must be posted at least 48 hours prior to class. The paper assignment will be in two parts. The first part is a research design/literature review for an analysis in which institutions are the dependent variable. It will be completed and distributed by 10/14. These papers will be presented and discussed in class on 10/21. The research paper will be submitted by 12/2 and presented on 12/9. This paper should build upon the first assignment and be approximately 30 pages in length. Late papers will be accepted with great prejudice. Grading: The grade for the course will be determined as follows: Research Design/Review 10% Final Paper 25% Final Exam 35% Presentations and Participation 30% I will establish a class homepage at: http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/class/pad6109f99.html This page will prove links to all of the supplementary online materials for the class. Please contact the instructor by the end of the first week if you need accommodation for a disability. If a disability is not immediately apparent, verification is required.
Course Outline and Readings I PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE 1. Introduction course overview introduction to Web Board 2. The Study of Institutions Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Ferris, James. M. and Tang, S. Yan. 1993. The New Institutionalism and Public Administration Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3: 4-10. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Editor s Introduction, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Peter Ordershook The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy, in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Ch. 1. Edward P. Weber, Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation, Ch1. Ostrom, Elinor, 1986. An Agenda For the Study of Institutions Public Choice 48: 3-25. Jack Knott and Garry Miller, 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice. ch. 1&2. Lane, Jan Erik. 1995. The New Institutionalism, in Jan-Erik Lane, The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approaches.
3. Economics Approaches to Institutions: Property Rights and Transaction Costs Oliver Williamson, 1988. "The Logic of Economic Organization, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 4: 65-93. Oliver Williamson, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucarcies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 15: 306-347. Geofery Brenan, Selection and The Currency of Reward, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Mancur Olson, Toward a Unified View of Economics and the Other Social Sciences, in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Joseph Stiglitz. 1998. "Private Use of Public Interest: Incentives and Institutions, Economic Perspectives. Journal of Barzel, Yoram. 1982. "Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, April. 4. Organization Theory and Institutions Elias, Khalil, 1995. Organizations vs. Institutions, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151: 445-66. March, James G. And J.P. Olsen. 1984. The New Instutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, American Political Science Review, 78: 734-49. Simon, Herbert. 1995. Organization and Markets Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5: 273-94. James S. Coleman, J. 1991. Constructed Organization: First Principles, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 7 (Special Issue):7-23 Scott, W. Richard. 1994. Institutions and Organizations: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, in W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyers, Institutional Environments and Organizations. Kenneth Arrow. 1991. Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organizations, Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 7: 1-6.
James March, 1997. Administrative Practice, Organization Theory, and Political Philosophy, Barry Bozeman. 1991. All Organizations Are Public: Bridging Public and Private Management. Chs. 1, 6. Jack Knott. 1993. Comparing Public and Private Management: Basic Management Functions and External Constraints, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3: 93-119. 5. Historical Approaches to Institutions Douglas North, Institutions and a Transaction Cost Theory of Exchange, in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Douglas North. Economic Performance Through Time, American Economic Review 84: 359-68. Douglas North and Barry Weingast, 1996, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, in Alston, Eggerston and North. Empirical Studies of Institutional Change. Gary Miller, Confiscation, Credible Commitment, and Progressive Reform in the U.S., Public Choice. Woodlief, Anthony. 1999. The Path Dependent City Urban Affairs Review Robert Bates, Macro Political Economy in the Field of Development, in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. David Soskice, Robert Bates, and David Epstein. 1992. Ambition and Constraint: The Stabilizing Role of Institutions, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 8: 547-559. Margaret Levi, 1996. A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative Historical Analysis, APSA paper. Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 1990. John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott. Bureaucratization Without Centralization: Change in the Organizational System of U.S. Public Education 1940-80, in W. Richard Scott and John W. Mayer, Institutional Environments and Organization. William H. Riker and David L. Weimer. 1995. The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalization and Property Rights in Banks and Hanushek, Modern Political Economy.
6. Political Theory and Institutions Terry Moe. 1991. Politics and the Theory of Organization, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 106-29. Terry Moe. 1990. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-253. Ken Shepsle, Political Deals in Institutional Settings, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design William Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of Special Privilege," in Alt and Shepsle, Positive Political Economy, pp. 195-211 Harold Demsetz, Amenity Potential, Indivisibilities, and Political Competition, in Alt and Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, "Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity," in Alt and Shepsle, Positive Political Economy, pp. 57-89. William Mitchell and Michael Munger. 1991. Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, American Journal of Political Science 35: 512-46. 7. Cooperation and Collective Action Approaches Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom, 1998. A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, American Political Science Review 22: 1-22. Robertson, P.J. and Tang, S. Yan. 1995. The Role of Commitment in Collective Action: Comparing the Organizational Behavior and Rational Choice Perspectives, Public Administration Review 55. William Bloomquist and Edella Schlager. 1999. Watershed Management From the Ground Up, APSA 1999, http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/025/025006schlagered.html David Krebs, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Alt and Shepsle Patrick Dunleavey, Democracy Bureaucracy & Public Choice. Ch. 1-3. II APPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
8. Institutional Design and Its Consequences Philip Petit Institutional Design and Rational Choice, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Bruce Talbot Coram Second Best Theories and Their Implications for Institutional Design, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design John Dryzek, The Informal Logic of Institutional Design, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Richard Feiock and Jaehoon Kim. 1999. "Form of Government, Administrative Organization, and Economic Development Policy Choices," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11, forthcoming http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/rcfpubl.html Russell Hardin, Institutional Morality, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Claus Offe, Designing Institutions in Eastern European Transitions, in Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design 9. Social Capital, Institutions, and Development James S. Coleman The Rational Reconstruction of Society, American Sociological Review 58: 1-15, 1993. John Helliwell and Robert Putnam. 1999. Education and Social Capital, NBER Working Paper W7121, http://www.nberws.nber.org/papers/w7121 Richard Feiock, 1999 Public Investments and State and Local Economic Development: Institutional, Human Capital, and Social Capital Explanations, in progress, http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/archive/ Steven Knack and Philip Keefer, 1997. Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1250-88. Edward Jennings, and Meg Patrick Haist, 1998, The Civic Community, Interest Groups, and Economic Development in the States, APSA paper.
Robert Putnam, 1995, Bowling Alone: America s Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy 6: 65-78. Ruth Storm and Richard Feiock Economic Development Consequences of State Support for Higher Education, 10. Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Management Edward P. Weber, Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation. Sanford Gordon. 1999. Commitment and the Negotiation of Regulatory Settlements, APSA paper, http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/024/024016gordonsanf.html Douglas Heckathorn and Steven Maser. 1987. Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of Government Regulation, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 3: 69-98. Laura Langbein and Cornelius Kerwin, 1999, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, APSA paper http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/050/050001langbeinla.html John T. Scholz. 1991. Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, American Political Science Review. Richard Feiock and Christopher Stream, 1999, Environmental Protection vs. Economic Development: A False Tradeoff?, http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/rcfpubl.html 11. Transaction Costs and Service Delivery Jeffery A. Dubin and Peter Navarro. How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 4: 217-241. R. A. McGuire, R.L. Ohsfeldt, and T. N. vancott. 1987. "The Determination of the Choice Between Public and Private Production of a Publicly Funded Service," Public Choice 54. James Ferris and Elizabeth Grady, 1986. "Contracting Out: For What? With Whom?" Public Administration Review, Stein, Robert. 1993. "Arranging City Services, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3: 66-92.
Richard Feiock, James Clingermayer, and Jered Carr, 1999, Leadership Turnover and Credible Commitment: Implications for Service Contracting, Debt Financing, and Economic Development, APSA paper http://pro.harvard.edu Clingermayer, James and Richard Feiock, 1997. "Political Uncertainty, Transaction Costs, and Municipal Contracting" Public Administration Review. Parks, Roger and Ronald Oakerson. 1989. Metropolitan Organization and Governance," Urban Affairs Quarterly 25. III INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 12. Theories of Institutional Change Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict Lee Alston, Empirical Work in Institutional Economics: An Overview, in Alston, Eggerston, and North, 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Jack Knight, 1998, Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change, in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, Explaining Social Institutions. Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggerston, and Douglas C. North, 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. 13. Entrepreneurs and Institutional Change Pul Teske, Mark Schneider with Michael Mintrom, Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government Richard Feiock and Jered Carr. 1999. "Private Incentives and Academic Entrepreneurs: The Promotion of City/County Consolidation, Public Administration Quarterly forthcoming http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/archive/m18.pdf Linda Johnson and Richard Feiock, 1999, Qualitative Comparative Analysis: An Application to
City/County Consolidation http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/rcfpubl.html Jered Carr and Richard Feiock 1999. An Economic Theory of Local Boundaries and Boundary Change, http://www.fsu.edu/~spap/archive/m27.pdf 14. Change in Government Structure David Knoke, 1982, "The Spread of Municipal Reform," American Journal of Sociology, 87. Protassel, Jeffery. 1988. "Abandonments of the Council Manager Plan: A New Institutional Perspective," Public Administration Review 48. Steven Maser. 1998 Constitutions as Relational Contracts Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8: 527-64. Paul Farnham. "Form of Government and the Median Voter," Social Science Quarterly George Fredrickson. 1994. "The Architecture of Democratic Government: The Type III City," paper presented to North Florida ASPA Maser, Steven. 1985. "Demographic Factors Affecting Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Municipal Charters," Public Choice, 47. Miller, Gary J. 1985, "Progressive Reform as Induced Institutional Preferences," Public Choice 47. Svara, James. 1987. "Mayoral Leadership in City Manager Cities: Preconditions versus Preconceptions," Journal of Politics. Chackarian, Richard. 1996. Reorganization of State Governments, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6: 25-47. Knott, Jack and Garry Miller, 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice. 15. Final Exam