PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL SEEKING PEACE IN COLOMBIA TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL SEEKING PEACE IN COLOMBIA TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction 3 Background 3 Itinerary of the Mission 4 Methodology of the Report 4 PART ONE: MIRAR THE REALITY 6 Chapter Two: Armed Actors in the National Context 6 The Guerrilla Movement: The FARC and the ELN 9 The Paramilitaries: Autodefensas de Colombia (AUC) 10 Colombia s Armed Forces 12 Chapter Three: Colombia and the International Community 14 Colombia and the United States 16 Colombia and the European Union 17 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 21 Chapter Four: Regionalisation of the Conflict 24 Border with Ecuador 24 Border with Venezuela 25 Border with Panama 26 Border with Peru 26 Border with Brazil 27 Chapter Five: Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and the 28 International Criminal Court Human Rights 28 International Humanitarian Law 34 International Criminal Court 40 Gender-Based Violence in the Conflict 40 Drug Trafficking and the Conflict 41 Chapter Six: The Conflict as Experienced in the Regions 44 Cucutá The Venezuelan Border region 44 Cordoba Montería 46 Santander Barrancabermeja The Petroleum Region 47 Chocó Quibdó 51 Cauca Popayán 53 Cauca Tolima Antioquia 55 Antioquia - Medellín 57 Caquetá Florencia 59 1

Chapter Seven: Peace Efforts in Colombia 63 Peace Efforts of the Catholic Church 63 Peace Negotiations and the Catholic Church 67 The Experience of the Peace Communities of Urabá 68 Redepaz and Civil Society 69 UNHCR in Colombia 71 PART TWO: JUZGAR TO JUDGE 72 Chapter Eight: A Religious and Ethical Reading of the Colombian Conflict 72 Theological Foundations of a Role for the Catholic Church in Colombia 72 Pax Christi s Tradition 73 PART THREE: ACTUAR TO ACT 75 Chapter Nine: Reflections, Recommendations and Commitment 77 Reflections 75 Recommendations 77 Commitment of Pax Christi International and its Member Organisations 80 Annex: Members of Delegations 82 2

Pax Christi International Seeking Peace in Colombia 1 Chapter One : Introduction Background Seeking to deepen its commitment to peace and human rights in Colombia, Pax Christi International sent five delegations to Colombia between September 2002 and July 2005. 2 This report combines the findings of all five visits with extensive research. Pax Christi International does not wish to duplicate other efforts, including those by Pax Christi national sections. Rather, the delegation visits and this subsequent report aim to achieve five objectives: 1. Review key aspects of the present reality in Colombia with emphasis on the continuous conflict and its effects on the victims of the violence and those who work with these victims; 2. Support the efforts of the Catholic Church in Colombia to end the conflict through non-violent means and promote peace and justice. Pax Christi undertakes this effort particularly in partnership with Colombian national and regional offices of Pastoral Social (SNPS) 3 ; 3. Develop contacts with Colombian and international NGOs actively working for peace and justice in Colombia, including CRS Colombia, and explore possibilities for further collaboration with CIDSE, Caritas Internationalis and other; Support peace-building initiatives in Colombia including those of Redepaz 4 ; Coordinate the activities, especially advocacy work, of Pax Christi member organisations with governments and intergovernmental organisations. 4. As a Catholic peace movement Pax Christi International is rooted in the Gospel of Jesus Christ and Catholic social teaching. The visits and this report give special status and emphasis to the perspectives and experiences of those who suffer most as the direct result of a prolonged period of conflict. This report also gives attention, though not exclusively, to the contributions of the Catholic Church and its efforts towards achieving peace. These efforts will be put in the context of Catholic social teaching to highlight the Church s unique contributions to the peace effort. The report concludes with recommendations for further efforts to promote peace. Invited by the Presidency and the Secretariat of Pastoral Social of the Catholic Church in Colombia and supported by the then President of the Bishops Conference, Cardinal Pedro 1 Working Paper of Pax Christi International on Colombia. Original English. Ref.: AM.02.E.06. 2 Two preliminary visits took place in September 2002 and April 2004. The main fact finding visit was scheduled July 2004. Two follow-up visits by the coordinator of the International Secretariat took place in May and July 2005. 3 SNPS: Secretariado Nacional Pastoral Social (Caritas Colombia). 4 Redepaz is the National Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War in Colombia and is since 1 November 2005 a member organisation with Pax Christi International. 3

Rubiano 5, Pax Christi International visited Colombia to express its solidarity with the people of Colombia in their hopes and desires as well as in their suffering caused by extreme violence and poverty. Pax Christi International strongly supports the commitment of the Catholic Church for peace and reconciliation. The main delegation to Colombia consisted of participants from Latin America, Europe and the United States. 6 In addition to the delegates, other members and friends of Pax Christi contributed to the research in preparing this report. Itinerary of the Mission In its visits to Colombia, the Pax Christi International delegation worked with Pastoral Social in Bogotá to develop itineraries which facilitated meetings with many groups at various locations, including outside of Bogotá. In 2002, a small delegation made a preparatory visit to Bogotá and to Montería in the Province of Córdoba, to Quibdó in the Province of Chocó, and to Barrancabermeja in the Province of Santander where Pax Christi Germany is active. In April 2004, a second preparatory visit was made to finalize decisions regarding the organisation of the broader international fact-finding delegation planned for July. In July 2004, the entire Pax Christi International delegation again visited Bogotá. Several from the delegation visited Quibdó and Barrancabermeja. Others visited Cucutá in the Province of Norte de Santander, Florencia in the province of Caquetá, Popayán in the Province of Cauca, and Medellín in the Province of Antioquia. The special characteristics of each region are discussed in the appropriate section of the report. In May 2005, a follow-up visit was made to Colombia to attend the National Congress for Peace and Reconciliation of Pastoral Social and to consolidate contacts made on earlier visits as well as to identify Colombian organisations which were interested in forming long-term partnerships with Pax Christi in the work for peace and non-violence. In July 2005, another follow-up visit took place. The coordinator of the International Secretariat participated in the sixth national constituency meeting of Redepaz held in Tarqui in the province of Huila. Additional visits were made to the province of Cauca and to Bogotá to learn more about the ongoing projects of Pax Christi Netherlands. Finally, Pax Christi International expresses its gratitude to Cardinal Rubiano, Monsignor Hector Fabio Henao, and the dedicated women and men of Pastoral Social who generously assisted the delegation at every step of the journey. While we acknowledge that this report would not have been possible without their assistance, Pax Christi International takes full responsibility for the opinions and conclusions expressed in this document. 5 In July 2005 Archbishop Luis Castro of Tunja succeeded Cardinal Rubiano as President of the Colombian Bishops Conference. 6 See Annex for the names and affiliations of members of the delegation. 4

Methodology of the Report Three dimensions define the methodology for this report. Its overall organisation uses the format of Mirar-Juzgar-Actuar (See-Judge-Act). Rooted in Catholic tradition, this approach begins with a look at the reality. Thus, the first section of this report examines the situation in Colombia through a critical study of documents prepared by other organisations and complemented by the observations of delegates during the different visits of Pax Christi International. The intent was to update, verify and supplement the information from these resource documents. In the second section, Juzgar, the report analyses the situation in the light of the values of faith as found in scriptures, Catholic tradition and the social teachings of the Catholic Church. Finally, in the third section Actuar, Pax Christi members bring the insights of the first two sections together in recommendations for action. 5

PART ONE: MIRAR - THE REALITY Chapter Two: The Armed Actors in the National Context Pax Christi International views Colombia s long-lasting internal conflict as one of the most tragic humanitarian crises in the world. Some call it the third worst conflict on the globe at the present time falling behind the crisis in Sudan and that in Iraq. The conflict has endured for at least forty years with a consequent pattern of endemic violence in society. The murder rate is 77.5 deaths per 100,000. Estimates indicate there are more than 3 million illegal and 1 million legal arms present in the country, with an active illegal arms trade bringing in more weapons every day. 85 percent of all murders are committed with small arms - only 20 percent of these are due to the armed conflict itself. Armed actors include at least 26,000 insurgents from several different guerrilla groups; a slightly smaller number of paramilitaries; and official armed forces numbering approximately 350,000, all of whom are involved in the conflict along with, according to official numbers, 800 US troops (double the number previously allowed by the United States Senate) and 600 civilian contractors (also a 50 percent increase of the previous allotment). 7 No armed group has come close to winning the war. Instead, the war has expanded in terms of areas of violence and numbers of victims. The presence of drug trafficking provides a substantial part of the financial base 8 for the operations of all illegal armed groups and, as the delegation was told many times, has corrupted relationships within Colombia and between Colombia and other actors. The crisis can be viewed in many ways: a humanitarian crisis, an environmental crisis, a crisis in international relations, an economic crisis and a crisis of the political system. 9 Because of this great complexity, Pax Christi International believes that no single strategy will be sufficient to bring a resolution to the conflict. At the same time, Pax Christi International also remains strongly committed to non-violent strategies to eventually bring about a secure and just peace, since the experience of the peace movement confirms that violence only begets more violence. The present conflict cannot be understood outside its historical context. Beginning in 1948, a series of violent conflicts between the Liberals and Conservatives erupted into a ten-year period of civil war (1948-1958) called La Violencia. During this ten-year period, bands of Liberal and Conservative armies along with guerrillas fought with each other in the countryside. More than 200,000 people were killed. In 1958, this violence ended with the formation of a power-sharing Frente Nacional (National Front), in which the Liberals and Conservatives shared power but excluded all other parties. This arrangement was maintained until 1974 by limiting democratic liberties and formally 7 Colombia: Internal Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding: Challenges and Realities, power point presentation prepared by Catholic Relief Services in collaboration with Pastoral Social, July 2004. ; Closing the Seams : U.S. Security Policy in the Americas, Adam Isaacson, NACLA: Report on the Americas, Vol 38, No 6, May/June 2005, p. 14. 8 Other sources of financing are kidnapping, extortion and dealing in contraband. 9 Callejon con salida, UN Human Development Report for Colombia 2003. Summary, pp. 3-4. 6

declaring a permanent state of siege. It brought about the increasing militarization of society to control opposition movements. 10 During the period from 1960-1974, those groups excluded from power formed several revolutionary groups: Frente Unido por el Pueblo (People s United Front) (founded in 1960 in connection with the revolutionary Catholic priest Camilo Torres), three of the major guerrilla forces currently acting in Colombia - the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) (1964); the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (the National Liberation Army ELN) (1965); in 1966-1967, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (the Popular Liberation Army- EPL). During the 1970s a second generation of revolutionaries emerged the April 19 Movement (M-19); the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), which, although not a guerrilla movement, had broad support among the urban poor; and an indigenous guerrilla force named after the Indian prophet Manuel Quintin Lame, the Worker s Self- Defence (ADO) and the Worker s Revolutionary Party (PRT). All these became targets of repression. A combination of this growing opposition movement of those excluded from power, the repression of these groups and an economic downturn led to a national strike in 1977. At the same time there appeared more blatant corruption in the political manoeuvring of the national government. In 1977, President Julio César Turbay Ayala issued an anti-terrorist National Public Safety Statute which unleashed generalized repression marked by disappearances, torture, and political assassination. In the decade of the 1980s, the various guerrilla groups gained enough strength to be able to negotiate ceasefires with the government of Conservative Belisario Betancur. At this time, although the main body of the FARC did not renounce armed struggle, it formed a political arm - the Patriotic Union (UP). Also during this same period, the paramilitary movement began to form as a reaction to the activities of the guerrilla and Betancur also began to take action against drug traffickers. From that period until the present more than 20 years the people of Colombia have suffered from the armed conflicts among various guerrilla groups, the paramilitaries often in league with the state s public forces, and the violence of drug traffickers and common criminals with no political or ideological position but simply taking advantage of the conflict for their own gain. During the 1980s until the present time, there were repeated attempts by various administrations to bring an end to the conflict but all of them failed. In August 2002, President Álvaro Uribe took office as the democratically elected president of Colombia. His government s agenda had three pillars: 1) Improve security across the country by stepping up pressure on the irregular armed groups while devising ways to encourage them to lay down their arms and demobilise; 2) Modernise the state apparatus and battle corruption; and 3) Balance the budget while reviving economic growth and reducing unemployment. 11 10 Summary of history taken from the website of the Colombian Human Rights Network on 21 July 2003. http://colhrnet.icg.org/timeline.htm 11 See President Álvaro Uribe s inaugural address, Retomemos el lazo unificador de la ley, la autoridad democrática, la libertad y la justicia social (Bogotá, 7 August 2002) as cited in Colombia: Will Uribe s 7

Since his inauguration President Uribe has chosen to concentrate his efforts on security by increasing the Public Forces the military and the police and by creating a network of collaborators and informers. He has also promoted constitutional and statutory reforms criticised for mixing civil and military judicial powers, increasing impunity for illegal armed groups and taking away Colombian citizens legal right of appeal for violation of human rights, 12 and increasing military expenditures at the expense of social investment. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, in the first year of President Uribe s administration the number of people killed outside of combat for socio-political reasons was 3,956, approximately the same number as in the final year of the previous administration. The number of people killed in combat (state agents, paramilitaries, guerrillas, civilians killed in cross fire) also remained consistent for both periods (3,022 and 3,000) approximately twice the figure of 1999. 13 Since then, because of President Uribe s policies there has been an increased state military and police presence and security improved for all Colombians but most markedly for those in the urban areas. Between 2002 and 2003, kidnappings, homicides and massacres decreased significantly. 14 Assessments by government officials and affirmed by human rights groups show a quantitative drop in the number of killings and kidnappings by 2003. However, the magnitude of the human rights crisis remained huge: o The daily average of persons killed or disappeared as of September 2003 was still approximately 20; o On average there is one victim of torture every day; o In 2003, 2,140 persons were victims of arbitrary detentions, with 6 persons kidnapped daily; o And in the first nine months of the year, 175,270 persons were forcibly displaced from their places of residence. 15 According to information collected by CODHES, a Colombia-based human rights organisation, violence has not subsided and remains constant throughout the country, as measured by an increase in the number of internally displaced persons. Further, data for the first part of 2005 show no alleviation in the situation for displaced persons: o SISDHES (Information System for Forced Displacement and Human Rights) estimates a displaced population 6,996 persons, 10 percent more than in the first trimester of the past year (56,672). Honeymoon Last?, Latin America Briefing, International Crisis Group, Bogotá/Brussels, 19 December 2002, p.1. 12 Some Points to Present to the Human Rights Commission, Carlos Rodriguez Mejia, Deputy Director, Colombian Commission of Jurists. New York, 15 March 2004, p. 5. 13 ABColombia Submission to UK and Irish Governments in advance of the 60 th United Nations Commission on Human Rights by Christian Aid, Cafod, Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, SCIAF, Trocaire. February 2004, p.7. 14 Colombia: President Uribe s Democratic Security Policy, 13 November 2003, Latin America Report N 6, International Crisis Group, Bogotá/Brussels. 15 Some Points to Present to the Human Rights Commission, Carlos Rodriguez Mejia, Deputy Director, Colombian Commission of Jurists. New York, 15 March 2004, p. 3. 8

o At least 363 municipalities of the 32 departments of the country received displaced persons during this period 16 Arguing that his policies have been successful, and knowing that especially Colombians living in the city claim they feel more secure, President Uribe has stated recently that there needs to be consistency in national policy in order to achieve long-lasting success. Thus, in December 2004, Congress passed a law amending the 1991 Constitution to allow the possibility of electing a sitting president to a second term. 17 In October 2006, Colombia s highest court, the Constitutional Court, ruled that this new law is constitutional, making it legally possible for Uribe to be re-elected. 18 The policies of President Uribe have not eliminated the human rights crisis that has been the reality in Colombia for years. In fact, the Colombian Commission of Jurists notes that not all aspects of the human rights crisis can be measured, citing as an example the effects on the civilian population of the government s refusal to accept the principle of international humanitarian law respecting the distinction between military and civilians as an example. This section would not be complete without noting that, in addition to the political and social crises spawned by the conflict, the people are experiencing an economic crisis similar to that being experienced by other Latin American countries. Despite the International Monetary Fund report of April 2004 which stated the [Colombian] economy has become much less vulnerable compared with a year ago with lowered public debt and real economic growth doubled to 3,7 percent and a decline in inflation, 19 unemployment is still widespread, especially in the smaller villages and rural areas. The delegation often heard how difficult it was for displaced persons to earn a living because of this high rate of unemployment and the saturation of the informal sector. 20 The Guerrilla Movement: The FARC and the ELN The two major guerrilla groups at the present time are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In March 2003, it was reported that approximately 20,000 combatants made up the left-wing guerrilla groups that wage war against the Colombian state. 21 Of these, the largest is the FARC which began in the 1960s when Liberal Party self-defence groups united with the Communist party. At the beginning, the FARC was based in the rural areas of southern Colombia. It continues to exist under the leadership of a secretariat with its original leader Manuel 16 CODHES, http://www.codhes.org.co/dmensual.php?informe=55&report=57&phpsessid= de96e184012febb8cf0eeffaf494292c, p. 2. 17 International Crisis Group, Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects, Latin America Report No 14, 16 June 2005, p 2. 18 Murillo, Mario. Presidential Re-Election in Colombia Good News for Paramilitaries. Colombia Journal, 24 October, 2005, www.colombiajournal.org/colombia220.htm 19 Press Release No. 04/81, 23 April 2004. 20 STAT-USA Market Research Reports http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimrri.nsf/en/gr119803e.html, 7 June 2004. 21 Fact sheet from the US Office on Colombia, March 2003, Understanding Colombia Series: The Illegal Armed Groups 9

Tirofijo Marulanda and six others, maintaining both its communist ideological base and its rural roots. Now, however, it is also active in urban areas. It has well-documented ties to narco-trafficking activities and receives much of its financing from sources related to the cultivation, distribution and taxation of illegal crops. A second source of financing comes from money received through kidnapping and extortion. The FARC has been negotiating on and off with the government since the 1980s when it agreed to a ceasefire and formed the Patriotic Union (UP) a legal political party. Subsequently, members of the UP were systematically assassinated by the paramilitaries and their military allies while FARC militants remained armed in the countryside. In part because of this, the FARC has great scepticism about the potential for negotiations with what they view as an illegitimate Colombian government. It did engage in negotiations with the Pastrana administration between 1999 and 2002 and succeeded in obtaining a large demilitarised zone in southern Colombia. These negotiations ultimately failed. However, in August of 2005, after discussions with church officials, President Uribe gave the go-ahead for Bishop Luis Augusto Castro to attempt to organise preliminary talks with the FARC concerning a suspension of hostilities which could then be followed by a cease-fire and a peace process. 22 All illegal armed groups regularly violate international humanitarian law. In early 2005, the FARC was reported to be holding about 80 high profile people including Ingrid Betancourt, an independent presidential candidate kidnapped in February 2002 and three US Pentagon contractors taken hostage a year later. Some believe they hope to exchange these prisoners for some 500 captured guerrillas. The ELN, a numerically smaller (3,000 to 5,000 armed combatants) Marxist guerrilla group, sometimes acts in coordination with the FARC and sometimes in opposition to it. Its strongest base of operations is in the rural and mountainous areas of the north, northeast, and southwest Colombia and in the border region with Venezuela. Peace talks between Bogotá and the militarily weaker ELN, started in 1999, and continued sporadically until the end of 2003. The Paramilitaries: Autodefensas de Colombia (AUC) Colombia s paramilitary groups are illegal right-wing groups with the stated purpose of confronting the left-wing guerrillas and providing for the defence of landowners and business people (in some cases they were the land owners themselves hence their name as a self-defence group) against the leftist guerrillas. Although there is some armed combat between the various paramilitary groups, the paramilitaries most often attack civilians, including labour leaders, leftist politicians, journalists, human rights defenders and peace advocates, relatives of guerrillas and anyone who has contact with guerrillas or 22 A more detailed description of the FARC s activities and goals under Plan Patriota and the policies of Uribe can be found in the International Crisis Group report Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects, June 2005. 10

guerrilla sympathizers. Many of the sources used for this report consider the paramilitaries as the worst of the human rights violators in Colombia. According to the US Office on Colombia, From July 2001 to June 2002, the paramilitaries committed 71 percent of the violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Colombia. 23 Human rights organisations and others describe the AUC as having close links with the Colombian military. For this reason, some say that they face little opposition from the Colombian military and are able to carry out many atrocities with impunity. Until his disappearance in August 2004 and subsequent murder, Carlos Castaño was the leader of several paramilitary groups known under the name of AUC. The leadership of the AUC was then taken over by the, if anything, more aggressive Salvatore Mancuso, an Italian immigrant, from the northwestern region of Colombia. Montería and the province of Córdoba are seen as the seat of the AUC. Currently, the AUC has a network with mercenaries all over the country and many civilian victims have been caught in the violent war between the AUC and the guerrilla. Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and US President George W. Bush s declared war on terrorism, the AUC describe their actions as carrying out Colombia s war on terrorism. An effort by the administration of President Uribe is currently under way to negotiate the demobilisation of at least some of the paramilitary groups and their reintegration into civil society. On July 15, 2003, Colombia's largest paramilitary group, the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), agreed to demobilize a reported 13,000 paramilitary fighters and their leaders by December 31, 2005. Known by the location where talks were held, the Santa Fe de Ralito agreement was signed by nine paramilitary leaders, six government representatives, and three representatives of the Colombian Catholic church. 24 According to Francisco Santos, Vice President of Colombia, in a visit by the Pax Christi delegation in July 2004, this process has been moving ahead and is seen as demonstrating possibilities of reconciliation with other groups. The goal for the current negotiations is to dismantle and demobilize the self-defence groups by the end of the year 2006. 25 Others describe the process as seriously flawed and perpetuating impunity. For the government however, this is a very difficult process. The groups have regional alliances and fight for territory within their regions. Although there has been a supposed cease-fire since December 2002, it has never been fully implemented. While the paramilitaries have accepted international supervision of their demobilisation, the international community is reluctant to take on this role. While the Organisation of American States (OAS) has expressed its willingness to become involved, that willingness has been met with significant criticism, with some calling for a legal 23 Ibid. 24 Colombia's Checkbook Impunity - a Briefing Paper, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, September 22, 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/checkbook-impunity.htm 25 Dialogue with Colombia, p. 10. 11

framework to be in place prior to the demobilisation to avoid some of the problems experienced with an earlier demobilisation process in Medellín as described below. Colombia eventually hopes to also get help from the UN, from the US, from the European Union and different European countries claiming that the successful demobilisation of 20,000-armed persons is difficult, especially in the context of ongoing conflict. 26 Colombia s Armed Forces In Colombia, the civilian-led Ministry of Defence is composed of an army, navy - including marines and coast guard, a national police and an air force. The military is charged with both internal and external security. It is estimated that there are approximately 250.000 members of the security forces: 145,000 military and 105,000 police. 27 Armed state law enforcement personnel and investigative authorities, such as the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and the Attorney General's Technical Corps of Investigators, are also included in the public security forces. The DAS reports directly to the president and has authority in the investigative, law enforcement, and intelligence gathering arenas. The National Police are charged with counter-narcotics operations. In well-documented cases, the members of Colombia s armed forces have been accused of human rights violations. In a June 2004 memorandum to the US Congress regarding human rights certification for Colombia, the Washington Office on Latin America makes the following points regarding current state responsibility for human rights abuses: 1. In cities in conflict zones, such as Barrancabermeja, Barranquilla, Cucutá and Medellín, levels of violence were the same as or higher than in 2003 (as documented by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), in spite of a heavy presence of security forces. Increases were recorded in certain grave human rights violations, including forced disappearances and torture committed by state security forces. 2. There are new cases of state responsibility for executions, both directly and by omission, including the murders of Kankuamo indigenous leaders. 28 According to Vice President Francisco Santos, in the last year President Uribe has implemented his Democratic Security Policy, aimed at greatly reducing guerrilla strength by increasingly the number of troops and police units in the countryside and by increasing the coca eradication effort. According to Vice President Santos, the military now understands that to have displacement, murder, threats against labour leaders or human rights defenders and kidnappings in the territory for which they are responsible is a failure. As indicators of the policy s success, he compared the incidence of murders, displacement and kidnappings: murders were down 22 percent in 2003 even though 26 Read more in section 2.3.3. Demobilisation, demilitarisation and re-integration. 27 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/colombia/players_ca.html, March 2002. 28 Foreign policy memorandum concerning Human Rights in Colombia, WOLA, http://www.wola.org/colombia/colombia.htm; June 23, 2004 12

around 20,000 Colombians were killed; in the first half of 2003 displacement was down to some 95,000 Colombians as compared with the first semester of 2002 when there were 205,000 Colombians displaced; 800 fewer Colombians were kidnapped this year than last year. 29 He further stated that people felt safer on the roads now and that in 2003 only five towns were destroyed in comparison to 37 in 2002 or 31 in 2001. Finally, he indicated that acts of terrorism were down 46 percent over the previous year. 30 In reviewing these figures, Pax Christi concurs with human rights groups who note that these claims fail to take into account the stable or increasing levels of violence in conflict zones or the degree to which the improvements are a function of changes in tactics by the illegal armed actors. 31 29 In its May-June issue, NACLA Report on the Americas links the success of the offensive with significant logistical support by the United States military and private contractors in support of both Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota. Closing the Seams : US Security Policy in the Americas. NACLA Report on the Americas, May-June 2005, pp. 14. 30 Francisco Santos, Vice-President of the Republic of Colombia, cited from Proceedings of A Dialogue with Colombia on Reconciliation and Democracy. Brussels, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 28 November 2003, p. 9. 31 Foreign policy memorandum, WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America), 2004. 13

Chapter Three: Colombia and the International Community The long-lasting conflict in Colombia has been strongly influenced by forces outside of Colombia. On the one hand, illicit trafficking in drugs has provided much of the financing for the irregular forces on all sides of the conflict. Without drug consumption in the North, the purchasing of arms and financing of troops would not be possible. In addition, Colombia has received official support from the United States and the European Union in support of policies of particular interest to the donor. Colombia and the United States The United States has been involved with Colombia economically, politically and diplomatically since the nineteenth century. Political tensions have arisen between the two countries from time to time, but economic ties have remained strong, with coffee traditionally the main legal export from Colombia to the US and many US business interests, including oil, present in Colombia. Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, Colombia received the largest amount of US foreign aid of any country in Latin America. This aid was earmarked for the alleviation of Colombia s external debt and for domestic development projects. At times, the US also sent military aid to strengthen Colombia s counterinsurgency efforts. But in 1975 President Alfonso López-Michelsen blamed his country s unhealthy economic dependency on foreign aid, stopped all aid from the US and developed a closer relationship with Cuba. In the 1980s, Colombian Presidents Julio César Turbay and Belisario Betancur shifted back and forth between friendship with Cuba and friendship with the US, depending on Colombia s needs. With the increase in drug trafficking between Colombia and the US, tensions increased as well. In 1986, the US Congress established a certification process as part of the war on drugs that pegged all US foreign assistance to a country s level of cooperation with US counter-narcotics efforts. Nonetheless, despite decertification for failure to adequately support US counter-drug efforts in the mid-1990s, and despite US State Department human rights reports implicating Colombian police and military forces in serious human rights violations, Colombia has continued to be one of the highest recipients of US military aid in the hemisphere. Presently this aid is offered in support of Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota. The US contribution to Plan Colombia peaked during the first year of the programme at US $977.3 million of total inter-agency aid in 2000. This dropped to $230.3 million in 2001, but was projected at $751 million for 2006, with 82 percent military and police assistance and 18 percent economic and social assistance. 32 The implementation of Plan Colombia has not achieved its goals with regard to drug trafficking. Despite aid of over $3 billion since 2000, there has been no change in the 32 The Center for International Policy s Colombia Program, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm, 27 September 2004. 14

availability of drugs in the United States and the generalized violence in Colombia s society continues, including in Putumayo and Arauca, the areas of greatest US and Colombian security focus. 33 All groups with whom the delegation met acknowledged that the continuation of violence throughout Colombia is a major concern. Prior to 11 September 2001, US aid to Colombia was channelled for use only in the counter-narcotics campaign. After 9/11 the Bush administration changed its position toward aid to Colombia, permitting it to be used for counter-terrorist efforts and to protect US investments in Colombia. Both major Colombian guerrilla groups and the paramilitary group (AUC) have been labelled terrorist organisations by the US government. The US presence in Colombia has been legally limited since 2000, when Congress approved "Plan Colombia. The presence of more than 400 active military personnel and 400 private US citizen contractors in Colombia at any given time was prohibited. However, in early 2004, after several years of quietly expanding that role, US administration officials asked the US Congress to raise the cap" on US personnel in the country. The request was made based on the US participation in Plan Patriota, a huge Colombian military offensive in the country's guerrilla-dominated south. At first the cap on private contractors was raised, while the troop cap was maintained. This led some to believe that US military objectives will increasingly be carried out by private contractors. Subsequently, however, both the numbers of troops and the number of contractors permitted by the US government in Colombia have been increased significantly. 34 Even before this increase in support for Plan Patriota, many religious and secular groups in the US were critical of the impact of US aid on the level of violence. On the one hand a US State Department report to Congress in February 2003 affirmed the effectiveness of US policy in curbing human rights abuses while a human rights report written by the US State Department at almost the same time criticised the poor record of the Colombian government on human rights. 35 This latter report underlined that Impunity remained at the core of the country's human rights problems. The civilian judiciary was inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case backlog, and undermined by corruption and intimidation. Ironically, in an implicit recognition by the members of the US Congress that Colombia was, in fact, not meeting the human rights conditions that it had established, the 2003 appropriations removed these conditions from 75 percent of military aid to Colombia, sending the disturbing message that human rights conditions had diminished in importance for the US government had diminished in importance for the US government. 33 In its January 2005 report the International Crisis Group supports this contention: the paramilitary drug networks appear to remain in place, with the bulk of their illegal assets, particularly in rural Colombia, unaffected. The government has failed to establish promising peace talks with the ELN, the insurgent group with the most tenuous drug links. Nor has it significantly weakened the FARC -- whose ties to drugs are deep -- despite much intensified security efforts and a major military offensive (Plan Patriota) begun in 2003. The FARC retains a strong presence in most coca and poppy growing regions and participates actively, along with the AUC and the new generation of "baby drug cartels", in the narcotics business., Executive Summary. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3238&l=1 34 Closing the Seams, NACLA Reports, p 14. 35 US State Department report to Congress in February 2003; US State Department Human Rights Report for 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18325.htm). 15

All of this notwithstanding, the Bush administration continues to affirm the effectiveness of its policy programme in Colombia. A seventh year of renewed aid to Colombia was requested by the Bush administration and approved by Congress, with no significant changes in the package. 36 There is every indication that significant US involvement in Colombia will continue for the foreseeable future. In addition to the resources given Colombia in support of Plan Colombia, the United States has provided training for Colombian military in the United States. Ten thousand troops have studied at the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, more than from any other Latin American country. SOA graduates have been linked to some of Colombia s most heinous human rights violations. The 1993 human rights report, State Terrorism in Colombia, cites 247 Colombian officers for human rights violations. Fully one half of those cited were SOA graduates. The problem has been persistent. Presently, General Mario Montoya Uribe, an SOA graduate, commands the Joint Task Force South, which includes the 24 th Brigade. The 24 th brigade is ineligible for US military aid due to its complicity in paramilitary violence. 37 US policy objectives in Colombia relate overtly to drug trafficking and the control of terrorism. However, the US has a number of significant economic interests in Colombia not the least is oil. US military aid has benefited such companies as Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum and Canada s Petrobank by providing protection of major pipelines. 38 This same aid benefits companies entering Colombia to exploit its oil reserves including Harken Energy a Texas-based energy company with links to President Bush. According to a November 2004 press release, a Harken subsidiary will own 100 percent of its contract subject only to an initial 8 percent royalty payable to the Colombian Ministry of Energy. 39 Both Colombia and the US consider trade to be extremely important. Colombia views the US as its major trading partner; 40 the US sees Colombia s second largest population in South America as a prime potential market. The Uribe government strongly supports trade liberalization throughout the hemisphere, both through bilateral agreements and creation of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. 41,42 36 The Colombia Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses, A regional conference report of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Kimberly Stanton, August 2005, p 1. 37 http://www.soaw.org/new/docs/colombia10,000grads.pdf School of the Americas Watch article by Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group and Heather Dean of SOA Watch. (probable date 1999) 38 Plan Colombia Benefits US Oil Companies, Gary Leech, http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia198.htm, November 2004, and affirmed in the delegation interview with Vice President Francisco Santos in July 2004. 39 Ibid. 40 Delegation interview with Vice President Francisco Santos, July 2004. 41 http://www.coltrade.org/about/bilat_index.asp, 20 November 2004. 42 The US Andean 'Free Trade' Agreement Chokes Along, by Todd Tucker and Daniel McCarthy November, 2004, http://www.progress.org/2004/fpif56.htm 16

Colombia and the European Union Since the 18 th century, Colombia, like other Latin American countries, has been tightly linked to the European continent by historic, cultural, and ethnic bonds. 43 These ties are the foundation for European Union (EU) policy in Latin America, but the actual relationship of Colombia with the European continent is very complex, involving the EU in its capacity as a supranational institution, as well as several individual European states and governments, each of which maintains their own relationships with Colombia. In 1987, a ministerial dialogue was institutionalised between the European Union and the Rio Group, a group which was originally comprised of 13 Latin American countries, including Colombia. These ministerial dialogues aimed to conduct consultations over the important political, economic and social issues within Latin America. Links are also maintained within the framework of a 1993 agreement of cooperation between the EU and the Andean Community which pertain primarily to the conditions for cooperation and trade. By the end of 2003, its members were working to broaden the regional agenda to social and security issues, particularly drugs and terrorism. 44 The EU also works with Colombia in the areas of economic cooperation and development. Over the years, it has given humanitarian aid in the face of natural disasters and established a special office in Colombia in order to support the internally displaced population (IDPs) who are victims of the internal armed conflict. Many of the individual nations of the EU such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, have their own long-standing relations with Colombia, particularly in the economic sphere. These help shape national responses to the sponsorship of special projects, the provision of funding for Plan Colombia, and the policies of the Colombian government to deal with illicit drugs and generalized violence. In the last ten years, the chief areas of concern for the European Union relative to Colombia have been developing a peace process to end the armed conflict, human rights violations, the economy and drug trafficking. 45 Restoring peace has been identified as the most significant development priority for Colombia. Pastrana s efforts to launch a peace process involved requesting funding from the EU for Plan Colombia. 46 In response, Pastrana was told by the European Com: does not intend to take part in any initiative with a military dimension. 47 Subsequently, the European 43 http://www.decol.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_colombia/political_relations.htm (7 October 2004) 44 http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/news.asp?snavlocator=66&version=printerfriendly&list_id=902. (18 October 2004). 45 These points are made on the web page for External Relations of the EU. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_01_192.htm 46 Europe was calculated to contribute 63-65 percent to all aid and investment in Latin America. The contributions are recorded in detail in the annexes to the Colombia Country Strategy Paper, which the European Commission published in 2001 and further elaborated upon in 2002. 47 Proceedings of the Debate on Plan Colombia at the European Parliament, 30/1/2001. 17

Parliament supported a resolution calling for support of a peace plan for Colombia but rejected Plan Colombia perceived by some as a war plan. 48,49 The EU also rejected the fact that US aid was made contingent on an anti-narcotics strategy that provided for the aerial fumigation of illicit crops by chemical and even biological agents. 50 European and certain Colombian experts believed such an eradication strategy to be counterproductive. Farmers lured away from coca cultivation could be expected to move on and replant even larger plots of illicit crops elsewhere to compensate for their losses, causing ever-greater damage to delicate rainforest ecosystems. Furthermore, chemical and biological eradication agents were viewed as endangering Colombia s biodiversity an issue that was high on Western and Nordic Europeans list of concerns. Near the end of Pastrana s term, peace negotiations with the FARC collapsed, making it even more difficult to get financial support from Europe for Plan Colombia. With the election of President Uribe, a conference was set up in London in 2003, which concluded with a major policy statement from the EU regarding its relations with Colombia. In the statement, the government representatives from Europe reaffirmed their strong political support for the Colombian government in its efforts to address threats to democracy, terrorism, illegal drugs, human rights and international humanitarian law violations and the serious humanitarian crisis. 51 They encouraged Uribe s commitment to seek a negotiated solution to the internal conflict through direct engagement with the illegal armed groups and expressed their willingness to provide practical help to the Colombian government and the UN in peace efforts. They encouraged early implementation of the recommendations by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia and protection of human rights NGOs, social leaders and trade unionists. They also agreed to refocus their cooperation programmes with a view to the strengthening of state institutions, the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis, the protection of human rights, environmental activities and the development of alternatives to drug production. 52 Since the 2003 Conference, the European Union has expressed concerns regarding President Uribe s Democratic Security Policy and his negotiations with the paramilitary groups. In addition, the European Council of Foreign Ministers has cited the necessity of ending impunity, of ending collusion between the security forces and the paramilitaries, and of ensuring that any process of demobilisation of illegal armed groups guarantees the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation. The Council has also been concerned about the policy of granting judicial police powers to the security forces and promoting a 48 The quote was ascribed to the Portuguese delegate Joaquim de Miranda, member of the European Parliament United Left fraction (GUE/NGL) and President of that Parliament s Development Commission. 49 The actual European Parliament Resolution, 01/02/2001, is available at http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/doc/.ep01_02_01.htm 50 The European NGO Council on Drugs (www.encod.org); the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute, Vicious Circle and Fumigaciones y conflicto en Colombia - al calor del debate ; Drogas y conflicto Documentos de debate n 2, Amsterdam: TNI Briefing Series, 2001. 51 London Meeting on International Support for Colombia ( London Declaration ), 10/7/2003. 52 Ibid. 18

network of civilian spies, blurring the distinction between civilian non-combatants and combatants. Such blurring often results in the labelling of non-combatants as guerrilla sympathizers or terrorists and to arbitrary arrests of labour leaders and human rights activists. 53 Further it makes the application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law more difficult. Another concerted European aid programme included support for so-called peace laboratories. In its first phase, such support was concentrated in the Magdalena Medio region. Then, in January 2004, 33 million was given for another project in 62 municipalities in the provinces of Antioquia and Norte de Santander and the Macizo region. A second phase of a similar project was then initiated in the municipality of Patía in the Province of Cauca in March 2004. 54 Initially these projects, budgeted for up to 43 million of Commission funding, were announced to start in 2002 to support the implementation of peace agreements by fostering local institutions, civil actors promoting peace, economic and social development. In addition to peace laboratories, the concerted European aid packet also provided for resources to combat violence and human rights violations, and to relieve the social impact of conflict on displaced people 55 and children involved in conflict and to support alternative development in areas where manual eradication of drug crops has taken place. This part of the packet was funded largely by individual European Union member states and disbursed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, to Colombian public institutions, to civil society organisations active in the defence of human rights and international humanitarian law, and to academic institutions. The EU has considered the paramilitaries to be terrorists since the inception of its list of terrorist organisations in 2001. 56 However, it was not until after the May 2002 massacre of civilians in Bojayá that the EU added the FARC guerrilla to its list of terrorist organisations and it was not until April 2004 when dialogue between the ELN and the government failed, that this guerrilla group was added as well to the EU list of terrorist organisations. Some European countries had by then become facilitators of the presidential talks with the armed groups. Those who acted in this fashion in the dialogue with the FARC were Spain, France, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, as well as Canada, Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela. Those listed as friends" in the dialogue with the ELN were Spain, 53 Isaacson, NACLA Reports, pp 14-15. 54 Discussion of some of the questions related to the peace laboratories is presented in a paper entitled La estrategia de cooperación de la UE en Colombia con énfasis en los laboratorios de paz: objetivos, resultados, viabilidad y perspectivas by Bettina Reis a German sociologist in a conference entitled Balance and Perspectives on Political Relationships and Cooperation Between the EU and Colombia, 14-16 July 2004, Lleida, Cataluña in Spain. 55 This type of support was not new to the European aid arsenal. The Commission had been granting an annual EUR 24 million in non-programmable aid to displaced persons in Colombia since 1997. 56 The list was introduced in December 2001 in the aftermath of the 11/9/2001 events, and included AUC from the onset. Spain and Belgium are reported to have pushed the idea to include FARC, in Cumbre de Madrid condenará terorismo. In: El Tiempo, 16/5/2002. 19