Will the Republicans Retake the House in 2010? A Second Look Over the Horizon. Alfred G. Cuzán. Professor of Political Science

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Will the Republicans Retake the House in 2010? A Second Look Over the Horizon Alfred G. Cuzán Professor of Political Science The University of West Florida Pensacola, FL 32514 acuzan@uwf.edu An earlier, longer version was presented at the 2010 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 4. *Many thanks to J. Scott Armstrong, Randall J. Jones, Jr., Ray Fair, and William B. Tankersley for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Mike Bundrick for his help throughout. Needless to say, I bear sole responsibility for any errors. September 15, 2010

Will the Republicans Retake the House in 2010? A Second Look Over the Horizon Alfred G. Cuzán September 15, 2010 Abstract For the Republicans to regain control of the House of Representatives this year, the Democrats need to suffer a net loss of 40 members, or just under 16% of the 257 seats they took in 2008. With a model similar to one used previously (Cuzán and Bundrick 2006, Cuzán 2010), only estimated with elections since 1870, here I evaluate the likelihood of such an eventuality. Modeling the System For the Republicans to regain control of the House this year, the Democrats need to suffer a net loss of 40 members, or 15.6% of the 257 seats they took in 2008. To evaluate the likelihood of that eventuality, we begin with the wellknown fact that historically the party of the president, the incumbents, almost always incurs a net loss of House seats in midterm elections. As shown in Figure 1, in 14 out of 35 midterm elections held since 1870, or 40 percent of the time, the president s party shrunk by more than 40 members, which is this year s party turnover point. In four exceptional cases (1902, 1934, 1998, and 2002), the incumbents actually gained a small number of seats. The first exception occurred scarcely a year after President McKinley s assassination, when sympathy for the incumbents must have been running high; the second took place in the middle of the anti-republican wave that began in 1930 and peaked in 1936; the third may 1

have reflected a backlash against the impeachment of President Clinton; and the last one can be attributed to the 9/11/2001 rally. Omitting these exceptions, 1 none of which has any similarity to this year s political environment, the odds of the Democrats losses breaching what is this year s party turnover point rise to 14 out of 31 (45 percent). Consider, as well, that the mean incumbent seat loss across all midterm elections is 35 seats (the median loss is 28 seats), although there is considerable variation around that number (s.d.=32). Also, as a proportion of the seats won in the previous election, the average loss is 15% (median=13%; s.d.=15). Thus, a naïve forecast for 2010 would be that the Democrats will lose between 28 and 35 seats, or between 33 and 39 seats. This forecast calls for the Democrats to remain the majority party in the House, with but few seats to spare. <Figure 1 about here> Next, the general model used here for estimating the number of House seats won by the party of the president, the incumbents, is as follows: IncSeats = Α + β 1 (IncSeats t 1 ) + β 2 (PrezElect) + β 3 (Midterm) + β 4 (GROWTH) + β 5 (PRICES) + ε That is, the number of seats going to the incumbents is a function of the number of seats won in the previous election, whether the incumbent party is (or is likely to be) returned to the White House if in a presidential election year (scored 1 if 1 Armstrong and Collopy (1998, 272) suggest that domain knowledge can be used to define the variable of interest, to make revisions in the time series observations, or to adjust for unusual events.... 2

they are reelected, 1 if they are defeated, and 0 if it is a midterm election year), and whether it is a midterm election (1 if it is, 0 if it is not); and, following the referendum tradition pioneered by Kramer (1971) and Tufte (1975), the annual change in real gross domestic product per capita and the yearly absolute change in the consumer price index. 2 Table 1 displays two pairs of estimates of this model. Model 1 is estimated with all 70 elections held since 1870, and Model 3 with the 35 midterm elections only. In Models 2 and 4, several outliers are excluded. As well as the four previously mentioned elections when the incumbent gained seats at midterm (those of 1902, 1934, 1998 and 2002), they include three more midterm elections and four presidential elections. The additional exclusions include the midterm elections of 1872, 1874, 1890 and 1894, and the 1892, 1932 and 1948 presidential elections. In percentage terms, the midterm losses of 1872, 1874, 1890, and 1894 are three times the size of the standard deviation for midterm elections; the 1932 seat loss, as well as the 1892 and 1948 seat gains, are more than two times the size of the standard deviation among presidential elections only. 3 <Table 1 about here> 2 In both his presidential and congressional election models, Fair (2009) uses the absolute value of a measure of price changes. In the APSA conference paper, I did not use the absolute value. 3 The changes are calculated in percent because the size of congress varied until it was settled at 435 for the 1912 election. 3

These additional outliers are associated with specific political processes. The 19 th century outliers were years when the two-party system was reestablishing itself after the interregnum of the Civil War and Reconstruction. The adjustment was not a smooth one, exhibiting large swings, even in successive elections, as in the three that took place between 1890 and 1894. The 1932 presidential election was a disaster for the Republicans, who experienced smaller, yet still significant additional losses in the next two elections during the New Deal party realignment. Finally, the 1948 Democratic gain was only the largest change in seats between the parties associated with changes in party control of the House that took place in the 1946-1954 period, following which the Democrats consolidated what turned out to be a four-decade long period of dominance. Observe in Models 1 and 2 that winning another term in the White House on average yields around 15 to 20 new members from the president s party. (Since the variable ranges from 1 to 1, the coefficient has to be multiplied by two to compute its impact on seats.) This reflects the familiar coattails effect (Jacobson 1987, 150). 4 On the other hand, a midterm election typically costs the incumbents about 30 seats. Note, as well, that across all four models a one percent point change in GROWTH is associated with between one and two additional House seats, while PRICES is associated with a loss of one to two seats. As would be expected, excluding the outliers in Models 2 and 4 improves model fit considerably. 4 By contrast, Fair (2009) found no evidence of any presidential coattail effect (2009: 55). 4

Table 2 displays the performance of Model 2 in one-step-ahead forecasts, starting with the 1986 midterm election. The Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of the forecasts is 12 seats (s.d.=7). The absolute error, on average, amounts to about 6% of the prediction. <Table 2 about here> For the purpose of generating a forecast for 2010 with these models, it is assumed that (1) real per capita GDP grows 2% and (2) PRICES is limited to 1%. I arrived at these assumptions by surveying collections of economic forecasts (see, e.g., Pearson 2010 and Izzo 2010). The bottom row of table 1 displays the number of seats won by the Democrats that is obtained by injecting these economic inputs into all models. The point forecasts range between 221 seats (Model 4) and 226 seats (Model 2), or a loss of between 31 and 36 seats. These are not much different from the naïve forecast with which we began. As shown in the bottom row of Table 1, across all models the probability that the Democrats will emerge in control of the House after the November elections ranges from 0.59 in Model 4 to 0.67 with Model 2. In other words, according to these models, in the race to win a majority of the seats the Democrats have the edge. However, the chances for a Republican victory are by no means trivial between one in three and two in five. Like all forecasts, these are subject to error. If this year s error turns out to be about the same as the average in Table 2, the forecasts could be off by about a dozen seats. Given that, as of mid-september, the generic poll is showing the 5

Republicans with a healthy lead, 5 the error is most likely to be one of overshooting rather than undershooting the actual number of seats the Democrats will end up with on Election Day. Be that as it may, whichever party wins a majority of the seats will likely do so by a narrow margin. A closely-divided chamber, perhaps one of the closest in a century, appears to be in the cards. 5 The Republican advantage is 7.8% at Real Clear Politics and 6.5% at Pollster.com. 6

References Armstrong, J. Scott and Fred Collopy. 1998. Integration of Statistical Methods and Judgment for Time Series Forecasting: Principles from Empirical Resarch. In G. Wright and P. Goodwin (eds.), Forecasting with Judgment, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 269-293. Cuzán, Alfred G. 2010. Will the Republicans Retake the House in 2010? Presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, Washington, D.C., September 4. Cuzán, Alfred G. 2007. The 2006 House Elections: Forecasts and Results. Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association. Extension of Remarks 30:1. Cuzán, Alfred G., and Charles M. Bundrick. 2006. Will the Republicans Retain Control in 2006? Presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, November 11.Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro Polity. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fair, Ray. 2009. Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations, American Journal of Political Science 53: 55-72. Izzo, Phil. 2010. Economists Expect Slow U.S. GROWTH. Wall Street Journal, June 9. Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. The Politics of Congressional Elections. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. Johnston, Louis D., and Samuel H. Williamson. 2008. What Was the U.S. GDP Then? Measuring Worth. http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/. 7

Jones, Randall J., Jr., and Alfred G. Cuzán. 2006. A Retrospective on Forecasting Midterm Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. Foresight. The Journal of Applied Forecasting 5:37 42. http://uwf.edu/govt/documents/fs.issue5.jones.cuzan.pdf. Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896 1964. American Political Science Review 65:131 43. Lawrence, Michael, Paul Goodwin, Marcus O Connor and Dilek Önkal. 2006. Judgmental Forecasting: A Review of Progress Over the Last 25 Years. International Journal of Forecasting 22: 493-518. Pearson, Roy. 2010. A Baker s Dozen Free Sources of Economic Forecasts. Foresight 16:12 15. Tufte, Edward R. 1975. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review 69: 812-826. 8

Table 1. Estimating the Number of House Seats Won by the President s Party, 1914 2008 All Elections Midterm Elections Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 N=70 N=59 N=35 N=28 Constant 44.35 (3.21) 45.62 (4.49) -5.68 (-0.22) 23.03 (1.43) IncSeatst-1 0.82 (11.93) 0.81 (16.47) 0.88 (8.11) 0.77 (11.60) PrezElect 9.95 (1.96) 7.69 (2.16) Midterm -31.65 (-4.47) -27.78 (-5.47) GROWTH (GDP per Capita) 1.74 (2.85) 0.85 (1.88) 1.96 (2.19) 1.24 (2.25) PRICES -2.33-2.48-2.02 (-3.05) -1.25 (-0.88) -0.89 (-1.07) SEE 27.6 18.11 30.50 17.03 Adj. R 2 0.73 0.85 0.67 0.84 Durbin-Watson 2.11 1.91 1.76 2.77 Point forecast for 2010 225 226 223 221 (GROWTH = 2%, CPI = 1%) Net loss of seats -32-31 -34-36 Probability IncSeats>217 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.59 Sources: For seats: Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives; for GDP GROWTH: Johnston and Williamson (2008); for CPI: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 9

Table 2. One-Step-Ahead Forecasts, 1986 2008 (1998 and 2002 outliers omitted se text.) Year Prediction Actual AE AE as % of prediction 1986 162 177 15 9.3% 1988 193 175 18 9.3 1990 149 167 18 12.1 1992 169 176 7 4.1 1994 225 204 21 9.3 1996 216 206 10 4.6 2000 206 212 6 2.9 2004 236 232 4 1.7 2006 201 202 1 0.5 2008 195 178 17 8.7 MEAN 11.7 6.3% SD 6.9 3.9 MEDIAN 12.5 6.7 10

1870 1874 1878 1882 1886 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910 1914 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 20 0-20 -40-60 -80-100 -120-140 Figure 1. Midterm Incumbent Net Seat Loss or Gain 1870-2006 (n=35) Net gain or loss 2010 Turnover point 11