This paper was presented in International Energy and Security Congress that took place at Kocaeli University, Turkey on September 23 24, 2014.

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Bu metin 23 24 Eylül 2014 tarihlerinde Kocaeli Üniversitesinde düzenlenen Uluslararası Enerji ve Güvenlik Kongresi başlıklı konferansta sunulan tebliğdir. This paper was presented in International Energy and Security Congress that took place at Kocaeli University, Turkey on September 23 24, 2014.

THE EFFECT OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS ON GLOBAL SECURITY Sertif DEMIR Abstract The Ukrainian Crisis has been the main contention issue between West and Russia since the collapse of the USSR and the end of Cold War. This crisis has indicated that geopolitics becomes major concern in politic rivalry among big powers. Resurgent Russia s reaction to the ousting President Yanukovich from power was much unpredicted. Russia threatened territorial integrity of Ukraine by annexing Crimea and supporting Russian origins in East and South of Ukraine for armed struggle toward separation. Those policies of Moscow has showed that she is no longer tolerable to any color revolution occurring around its neighbors. Asserted Russia tries to change the power balance shaped post-cold War. The Western world has not welcomed Russian asserted policies in Ukraine and started to impose selected economic and financial sanctions on Russia in order to prevent Russia to take further action in Ukraine. Russia responded with some sanctions too. So, the World has experienced a new political confrontation between West and Russia. This confrontation has some negative implication on global security such as energy, nuclear arm reduction talks, regional conflicts, armaments, economic shrinkage etc. The fear of new cold war has spread all over the world. However, although Ukraine crisis is an indication of new geopolitics struggle between West and Russia it is too early to decide that this will provoke for starting new cold war. So, this paper will analyze the Ukrainian Crisis and its effect on global security. Key Words: Ukrainian crisis, global security, Russia, West, energy security, Turkey. Introduction The Ukrainian Crisis has been the main disagreement issue between West and Russia since the collapse of USSR and the end of Cold War. This crisis has become the strategic breaking point at the relations in the eyes of West, as asserted Russia ties to reshape the politic and military architecture designed by the West. The events started as result of internal political struggle, but has gained international dimension with intervention of big players. Major factors affecting the changing dimension can be expressed by the geopolitics concern, energy security, Russian minorities in Ukraine, Doç. Dr., sertifdemir@gmail.com 505

the free movement of Russian Black Sea fleet, the enlargement of NATO toward eastward and Russian s perception of Ukraine as their partner in their future initiatives. Resurgent Russia has reacted very barely against the ousting of President Yanukovich from power by uprising of opponents in Ukraine started in November 2013. Russia has threatened territorial integrity of Ukraine by annexing Crimea and supporting Russian origins in East and South of Ukraine for armed struggle toward separation. Those policies of Moscow has showed that she is less tolerable to any more color revolutions occurring around its neighbors, comparing to past. Asserted Russia tries to change power balance shaped post- Cold War. The World has experienced a new political confrontation between West and Russia. This confrontation has some negative implication on global security such as energy, nuclear arm reduction talks, regional conflicts, armaments, economic recession etc. The fear of new cold war has spread all over the world. So, this paper aims at analyzing the effect of Ukrainian crisis on global security. Analyze of Ukrainian Crisis Ukraine still faces major problems remained from Cold War era. Ukraine particularly, has failed to resolve its internal divisions and build strong political institutions, hampering its ability to implement economic reforms 1. As economy has not been recovered from stateowned structure, instead successive presidents allowed oligarchs to gain increasing control over the economy. 2 Corruption has been widespread as Ukraine's fifty richest people controlled nearly half of the country's gross domestic product, 3 On the other hand the last President has also been subject of corruption. According some sources Yanukovich s family may have embezzled as much as $8 billion to $10 billion a year over three years. 4 On the other hand, Ukraine is one of three Slavic countries (RF, Belorussia and Ukraine) gained independence after the dissolution of USSR. New Russian elites consider three countries can come together for new Slavic Empire. Although Belorussia mostly favors to be part of this Slavic empire, but Ukraine was divided, half favors this `dreaming empire, half of Ukraine was against it. Besides, the last popular uprising in 2013-2014 has demonstrated that Ukraine would hardly be part of foreseen Great Empire. Therefore, a 1 Robert McMahon, Ukraine in Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540\, Accessed 28 Aug 14. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 506

policy summarized as divide, conquer and rule has been implemented in Ukraine by Russia. This has been best expressed by Helena Yakovlev-Golan as: 5 The Orange Revolution and Ukraine s resistance to Russia s aspirations to create an informal empire made the Russian political elite believe that Ukraine, as a lost soul, should be coerced to love and saved from its Orange nationalists. These beliefs and the Russian desire to keep Ukraine within Russia s sphere of influence encouraged the Kremlin to create an internal turmoil within Ukraine in the hope of replacing the pro-western Ukrainian elite The resolve of Ukraine s civil society to resist most Russian-led integrative initiatives and the strong pro-european moods within Ukraine made Moscow realize that its aspiration to control all of Ukraine was unattainable. The Kremlin gave up its continuous attempts to convince Ukraine to join its informal empire and instead crossed the Rubicon by occupying and consequently annexing Crimea. Russian policymakers had decided to split Ukraine into smaller pieces just to devour some of them, thereby compensating themselves for the loss of Ukraine. Ukraine crisis has started with peaceful demonstration, on 21 November 2013 against decision of President Yanukovich to suspend preparations for the signature of the EU- Ukraine Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. 67. The demonstration has resembled the events occurred in 2004 Ukraine which resulted in the ousting of government and was called colored (Orange) revolution by Western media. However, the colored revolution occurred at countries has adversely impacted on Russian presence and dominance. So, Russia, in order to prevent any uprising similar to previous one, alarmingly involved Ukraine s internal issue. Main involvement was to provide enormous support to President Yanukovich with gas price reduction and later it turned to15 billion aid package. However, with aid of Western institutions and states, demonstrators did not stop their protest and peaceful demonstration turned to bloody uprising with death 100 people in middle of February 2014. This led to more involvement of EU and other major EU countries to end 5 Helena Yakovlev-Golan, Siblings Affairs: Russia s Foreign Policy toward Belarus and Ukraine, http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/siblings-affairs-russias-foreign-policy-toward-belarus-andukraine/, Accessed 17 Aug 14. 6 EU Fact Sheet, 12 June 2014, www.eeas.europa.eu/.../140612_01_en.pd, p. 1, Accessed 17 Aug 2014. 7 The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is an initiative of the European Union governing its relationship with the post- Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, intended to provide a venue for discussions of trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other issues between the EU and its eastern neighbors. The project was initiated by Poland and a subsequent proposal was prepared in co-operation with Sweden. It was presented by the foreign minister of Poland and Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated by the European Union in Prague on 7 May 2009 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/eastern_partnership, Accessed 17 Aug 14)/ 507

the conflict. Negotiations mediated by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the EU foreign affairs high representative led to an agreement signed by opposition leaders and President Yanukovych on 21 February. 8 However, this agreement was not accepted by demonstrators and president fled the capitol. As president Yanukovich fled capitol Ukrainian Parliament put 2004 Constitution again into effect which envisages parliamentarian system. Later new government was established. There were several turning points in the evolution of the protests. One was on 30 November, when riot police dispersed the crowd with extreme violence. Intimidation failed; the numbers escalated, along with their demands. 9 The other one was the intervention of rightest group which was depicted by Russian official propaganda as proof of the ultraradical, Nazi nature of the demonstrations. 10 Both situations can be important phase of uprising which heavily implicated it. The demonstrators have attained their political aim with the fleeing of President Yanukovich. However, this can be named as Prius victory, as the Ukraine lost its sovereignty over Crimea and is about to lost sovereignty at Eastern Ukraine as a result of uprising. Russia annexed Crimea and tempted Russian origin in Eastern Ukraine for separation. RF has responded the ousting of Yanukovich from power with heavy blow. After Petro Poroshenko became new president after election conducted on 25 th May 2014. He tried to increase central government control over restive eastern cities. Although Ukraine has gained some advantages over separatist groups fierce fights between two sides does not seem to end in very short time. Main reason can be Russian s support to separatist. Therefore, Ukraine, the US and NATO accused Russia for arming the separatists. 11 As seen from Russian courses of action, she well prepared for Ukrainian Crisis and determined what to do in advance. Russia has attached great importance to Ukraine, because Russia has strong fraternal ties with Ukraine dating back to the ninth century and the founding of Kievan Rus, the first eastern Slavic state, whose capital was Kiev. Ukraine is also a major economic partner that Russia would like to incorporate into its proposed Eurasian Union, a customs bloc due to be formed in January 2015 whose likely members include Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. 12 Additionally, Ukraine is also hub of transportation 8 International Crisis Group Report, Ukraine: Running out of Time, Europe Report, No.231, 14 May 2014, p. 1. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 McMahon, op. cit. 12 Ibid. 508

portal of Russian energy to Europe. Considering all those points, Ukraine is considered an indispensable country for Russia. Unlike Russia, The West was caught unprepared and determined its courses of action depending on progress of events. The West has started to impose some filtrated economic sanctions on Russia s individuals, some sectors and companies. In the beginning those sanctions have seemed less efficient; nonetheless, by imposing more strict measures on Russian s energy and armament sectors in mid July 2014, Russia has reacted by imposing sanction on selected agricultural productions of Western states. That means Western sanctions have started to bother Russian economy. On the other hand, Russian annexation of Crimean peninsula and arming separatist group in Eastern Ukraine has been considered breaking international laws. Russian acts are against the provisions in the UN Charter; the 1997 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, which requires Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity; and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by the U.S., UK, and Russia, that document provided security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. 13 Concluding, resurgent Russia has reacted unpredictably against the ousting of President Yanukovich from power. Russia has threatened sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by annexing Crimea and supporting Russian separatist. The Western has not welcomed Russian asserted policies in Ukraine and started to impose selected economic and financial sanctions on Russia in order to prevent Russia to take further action in Ukraine. Russia has responded with some sanctions too. The World has experienced a new political and economic confrontation between West and Russia. This confrontation has some negative implication on global security fields such as energy, nuclear arm reduction talks, regional conflicts, armaments, economic recession etc. The following explanation will emphasize those security concerns. The Effect of Ukrainian Crisis on Global Security As stated earlier, Ukrainian crisis has become turning points in relation between Russia and Western since 1990s. The world might experience a new cold war that has adverse implication on global security issues. Russia is no longer considered a reliable state by Western as she jeopardized sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by using force through breaking UN Charts. Furthermore, Russia s occupation and annexation of the 13 Ibid. 509

Crimean Peninsula have plunged Europe into one of its gravest crises since the end of the Cold War. 14 This serious development would affect the global politics and military situation adversely. The Fear of Spreading the New Wave of Cold War The fırst effect can be the spread of new wave of cold war that can surpass all mild relations prevailed almost more than 20 years among RF and Western Bloc. While the ended Cold War was conducted in scope of Morgenthau s classic realist theory the new cold war might be conducted in scope of Mearsheimer s neorealist offensive theory which describes that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security because the anarchic makeup of the international system... 15 So, Russia has not been pleased with the current amount of power to deter and balance NATO and America. In order to consolidate her security and she tries to establish economic and political unions among old Soviet Republics including Ukraine. However, as the Yanukovic were ousted from power through street demonstrations and Russia has lost its leverage for her security scheme. Thus, she has south other solutions such as annexing Crimea and separating Eastern Ukraine. In return of Russian s action the Western has imposed some calculated sanction on Russia to deter and punish it. However, reciprocal sanction might trigger new cold war wave which threatens global security. The Spread of Geopolitics Concern Among Nations Since RF has recovered herself from post-cold War turmoil, she has applied geopolitics approach in old Soviet land. Russia has employed a combination of several means to sustain its hegemony at old Soviet Republics. So those means have covered energy, economic, crisis, internal ethnic clashes and intimidation. 16 Although Moscow has a variety of tools it can use to exert regional influence -- bribes, energy exports, trade ties -- supporting separatist movements remains its strongest. 17 Separatism in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has played a key role in maintaining Russian influence over the region. So, 14 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia's Latest Land Grab How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab, Accessed 09 May 2014. 15 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 16 Lada L. Roslycky, Russia s Smart Power in Crimea: Sowing the Seeds of Trust,,Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Aquatic Insects Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011, 299 316, p. 299. 17 Mankoff, op. Cit. 510

Russia is using smart power, a combination of hard military power and soft power operations to use separatism as a geopolitical tool. 18 Among RF leaders, Putin has sought to maximize Russia s economic, energy, and geopolitical leverage in Russia s neighboring countries. Raising energy prices or completely cutting off energy supplies to serve as effective tool for Russia. Fragile countries in region also suffer from territorial integrity issues, and the presence of Russian armed forces in their breakaway regions continues to be a major problem. 19 Russia was against some old Soviet Republics Western tendencies and reluctantly accepted NATO and the EU membership of some, such as Baltic States. The RF perceived this shift toward the West as a threat to its geopolitical power Geopolitics consideration can be depicted as Russian s aspiration to gain past prestigious status by forming a strong union of nucleus from the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In order to counteract the EU s eastward expansion efforts, Putin created the project called Eurasian Union that is to be officially formed in 2015. Led by Russia, this initiative s economic precursor the Eurasian Customs Union already counts Belarus and Kazakhstan as members. 20 Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have been considered key figures at those points. Those countries were deemed to secure Russia s geopolitical and economic well-being. 21 On the other hand, the Russian elite perceived Ukraine and Belarus as fraternal countries with which the Russian people had unique historical and linguistic ties 22. However, Ukraine has been dropped off from that project as new administration is pro-western. So, Putin has been trying to divide and conquer Ukraine. As for Ukraine, She plays an important role in Russia's energy trade; its pipelines provide transit to 80 percent of the natural gas Russia sends to European markets, and Ukraine itself is a major market for Russian gas. Militarily, Ukraine is also important to Russia as a buffer state, and was home to Russia's Black Sea fleet, based in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol under a bilateral agreement between the two states. 23 18 J.S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public, 2008 quoted by Lada L. Roslycky, Russia s Smart Power in Crimea: Sowing the Seeds of Trust, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011, p. 299. 19 Richard Kraemer and Maia Otarashvili, Geopolitical Implications of the Ukraine Crisis, May 2014, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/04/geopolitical-implications-ukraine-crisis, Accessed 27 Aug 14 20 Ibid. 21 http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/siblings-affairs-russias-foreign-policy-toward-belarus-andukraine/, Accessed 17 Aug 14 22 Helena Yakovlev-Golan, Siblings Affairs: Russia s Foreign Policy toward Belarus and Ukraine, http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/siblings-affairs-russias-foreign-policy-toward-belarus-and-ukraine/, accessed 17 Aug 14. 23 McMahon, op. cit. 511

As a result Russian s attitudes of using geopolitics in international relations can trigger the other regional and global players to pursue the similar way to any problems, conflicts, or crisis. Every nation starts to consider protecting its national benefits, targets through geopolitics approach. On the other hand, Russian involvements in old Soviet republics issues have adverse implication for its future benefits. Russia s coercive diplomacy and support of separatist movements actually diminish its influence. 24 Because, all involved countries have become distant from Russia and got closer to Western. On the other hand, by splitting apart internationally recognized states and deploying its military to disputed territories. 25 The End of NATO Enlargement toward East Russia s reaction to Ukraine crisis in reference to later occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as well as encouraging and supporting Russian origin in Ukraine for separation is likely to conclude the enlargement of NATO toward old Soviets land. First of all, NATO hardly accepts a country in a civil war. Most NATO countries have less tendency to provide Ukraine with full membership considering current chaotic situations. Russia is likely to attain her aims by geopolitics approach. Along with those results, the possibility of granting Georgia and Azerbaijan with full membership has faded as well. However, NATO will satisfy Ukraine for its ambitious of being in Western organizations. Some encouraging words were expressed for her NATO membership in latest NATO Summit held at Wales on 4 to 5 September 2014. On the other hand, most American realist theorist or doctrinaire started to justify or legitimize Russian acts toward Ukraine and claimed NATO s eastward enlargement was a wrong decision which provoked Russia to follow offensive course. 26 They struggle to appease the US s public opinion as the American government has not achieved to return Russia from its decision related to Crimean peninsula. Considering all those, Ukraine s NATO membership is likely not to take place in near future. Disarmaments and Nuclear Arms Talks The prolonged dispute between West and RF might negatively affect disarmament and nuclear arms talks. As known, The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was suspended by Putin 2007 and still both sides have not reached an agreement to solve Russian 24 Ibid 25 Ibid. 26 John J. Mearsheimer Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West s Fault The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014. 512

concerns. The Ukrainian crisis will negatively affect the treaty negotiations. Without resolving Ukrainian crisis no one expects a solution to the Russian CFE suspension. On the other hand, The US and RF have been negotiating nuclear arms talks at certain period of time. The Ukrainian crisis will adversely implicate on the nuclear arms talks. On the other hand new Russian missile new Russian missile (the R-500, a cruise missile using the 9K720 Iskander launcher, and a short ranged ICBM). was deemed by the US as a breach of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in 1987. A negotiation period might starts between two countries, it hardly possible to expect a solution to disagreements if current Ukrainian crisis prevails. The Deterioration of Economic Crisis Due to Ukrainian crisis, the US and EU has started impose some economic sanction on the RF and RF has reciprocated with some sanctions also. This mutual sanction will definitely reduce economic cooperation and foreign trade between both sides. Having considering global economic crisis, reciprocal economic sanctions will further deteriorate the economic situation especially in Europe and Russia. So recovering from the recession in Europe will take longer than expected due to the mutual economic sanctions. The Increase of Russian Impact at Black Sea With the annexation Crimean peninsula Russia has consolidated its stronghold at Black Sea as its fleet will utilize Sevastopol harbor without any restriction. RF had to take permission from Ukraine for using this harbor previously, Russia has taken full control of Kerch strait that is needed for the exit from Sea of Azov. So, while Russia has ended all problems in regard to Black Sea fleet, she has created conditions for its power-building at Black Sea. During 2000s, Turkey and Russia collaborated on the maintaining of Montreux Status dated 1936. Americans were too upset about the Turkey for this collaboration. However, Turkey adamantly stood against all the US pressure and did not allow Black Sea to be a venue for big powers rivalry arena. Especially, Turkey met a lot of pressure from the US to free use of Turkish Straits during Russia-Georgia War in August 2008. New situation in Black Sea definitely provides Russia with more powerful stance comparing to past. Russia currently acts wisely by not scarring the other littoral states. However, nobody knows what Russia will do in future. She may make its fleet larger in future, which will be assessed as threat by littoral states. That might lead the US and NATO to involve in Black Sea issue for their security necessity. So, Turkey will again face with big 513

powers demand. Montreux Treaty, which is core treaty in Turkish security architecture, can also be part of bargaining which definitely bothers Turkey. Impact on EU s Energy Security Energy, already an important security concern, will continue to shape future military and political relations 27. Keith Smith 28 analyses energy relations in terms of national security risks. He considers 29 European dependency on Russian energy not only a threat to the sovereignty of the EU s new member states, but also holds it directly responsible for the corrosive effect on transatlantic relations. As expressed earlier, RF has been using `energy` as her leverage to make benefits happen. Russia cut gas supply off to Ukraine and Europe during 2006 and 2009 winters. Everybody expects similar action from Russian in 2015 winters. EU s energy dependence on Russia makes EU vulnerable to Moscow decisions, acts or attitudes. According to Energy Security Strategies 30 The EU imports 53 % of the energy it consumes. Coming to each energy source, the EU imports 42 % of solid fuel, 66 % of gas, 88 % of oil it consumes. The EU imports from Russia 39 % of imported gas and 33 % of total imported oil. Additionally Russia shares the largest portion in foreign trades of the EU. Therefore, EU has hesitated to take more strict measure against Russia while she has violated international law by annexation Crimean peninsula. The US and other major European countries have been upset about Russian policies; however they are ın position to impose more strict measures because of dilemma they have faced. However, EU has considered diminishing its energy dependence to Russia and has searched other options including alternative energy resources, alternative regions and inventions of new technologies. For this aim it is asserted that The basic assumption is that abundant U.S. shale gas can be exported to Europe and function as a realistic alternative in case of gas supply disruptions following decisions in the Kremlin. 31 Additionally, establishing a common European gas purchasing vehicle in order to bargain with Russia 32 is 27, Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Russia and Europe s Mutual Energy Dependence, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2010, p. 65, quoted by Tom Casier, Russia s Energy Leverage over the EU: Myth or Reality?, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4, 493 508, December 2011, p. 495. 28 Smith K., Russia-Europe Energy Relations: Implications for US Policy, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2010, p. 1 quoted by Casier, op. Cit., p. 495. 29 Ibid 30 The EU Energy Security Strategy, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/images/20140528_energy_security_infograph1.jpg, accessed 28 Aug 14. 31 Andreas Goldthaua, Tim Boersmab, The 2014 Ukraine-Russia crisis: Implications for energy markets and scholarship, Energy Research & Social Science, No. 3, 2014, p. 113-115. 32 Ibid, p. 113-115. 514

also considered. Sanctions targeting Russia s oil sector has been also deemed another way and finally new avenues for energy research is offered. 33 The EU Energy Security Strategy 34 published on 24 th May 2014 has expressed the measures regarding possible adverse of Ukrainian Crisis over energy security. According to this strategy the EU works on possible measures regarding to disruption in the gas supply for the coming winter; increasing energy efficiency; diversifying supplier countries and routes; and establishing one voice in external energy policy; The future of European gas markets is dependent on three gas pipeline projects: two supported by Russia (Nord Stream and South Stream) and one by Europe and Turkey (Nabucco), whose aims are to bring Caucasian gas to Europe. 35 In order to free the EU from energy the dependency on Russia, the EU definitely needs a strong determination and willingness for alternative energy sources to diminish its energy dependence on Russia. Implication on Turkey s Relations with Turkic Republics Russian new asserted strategy is likely to adversely affect Turkey foreign policies regarding Turkic Republics. Asserted Russia would like to increase her effect over other old Soviet republics. It should not be forgotten that Russia has also intimidated other countries by policies implemented at Ukrainian crisis. Russian Federation tries to spread her influence throughout old Soviet lands for new Russian Empire. Turkey is likely to meet some Russian hindrances while pursuing to sustain close relation with Turkic Republics. This might affect Turkish energy cooperation with Turkish Republics. The Turkish republics might refrain from enhancing current or further projects or initiatives. Asserted Russia might jeopardize those Republics through internal issues such Nagorno-Karabakh. Implication at other Regional Crisis Moscow can adversely affect the other regional crisis in order to settle the Ukrainian in her perspective and use as leverage to affect Western countries decision. For example, Russia can press Iran not to compromise very easily with West at the uranium enrichment policy. Russia might use Syrian crisis as a tool to influence the West. Finally, Moscow, with the aid other BRIC countries and/or the members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization can try or challenge Western Interests as were case in establishing BRIC Treasury Bank. The 33 Ibid, p. 113-115. 34 The EU Energy Security Strategy, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/security_of_supply_en.htm, Accessed 28 Aug 14. 35 Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Russia And Europe's Mutual Energy Dependence, Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2010, p. 65 515

Ukrainian crisis has proved that Russia are against any view which sees Russia as a weak factor at international arena. Conclusion Ukrainian crisis has indicated that Moscow is less tolerable to any color revolution occurring around its neighbors, comparing to past. Asserted Russia tries to change power balance shaped post-cold War. Later or sooner, the world will inevitably have witnessed these developments because no political order will last forever. Russia tries to alter that political order when the US fed up with intervention in foreign issues and too reluctant to send troops abroad. Furthermore, Russia has deemed itself obviously strong enough to challenge Western s policies outlined at 1990s. The mutual steps taken and sanctions imposed for the Ukrainian Crisis would definitely adverse impact on global security. New security and politics architecture will be established as result of bargaining and powerfulness of both sides REFERENCES Casier, Tom, Russia s Energy Leverage over the EU: Myth or Reality?, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4, 493 508, December 2011. Goldthaua, Andreas, Tim Boersmab, The 2014 Ukraine-Russia Crisis: Implications for Energy Markets and Scholarship, Energy Research & Social Science, No. 3, 2014, 13 15. http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/siblings-affairs-russias-foreign-policytoward-belarus-and-ukraine/, Accessed 17 Aug 14 International Crisis Group Report, Ukraine: Running out of Time, Europe Report N 231, Accessed 14 May 2014. Kraemer, Richard and Maia Otarashvili, Geopolitical Implications of the Ukraine Crisis, May 2014, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/04/geopolitical-implications-ukrainecrisis, Accessed 27 Aug 14 Mankoff, Jeffrey, Russia's Latest Land Grab How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab, Accessed 09 May 2014. 516

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