Key Words: UNCLOS, AIIB, setting of disputes.

UNCLOS and the Future of Maritime Disputes in South China Sea Abstract M I Sharif United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into effect in 994. All nations in the South China Sea except Chinese Taipei complied with the convention. Philippines, Vietnam, China, Brunei and Malaysia are the nations which ratified the convention consecutively. Chinese Taipei in 998 adopted a series of domestic laws that conformed to the provisions of UNCLOS. Although some overlapping claims are noticeable, peaceful resolutions are possible according to the part XV of the convention. The peaceful way of settling the disputes is gainful for China because these can lead to good partnerships. Chinese ambitions may sound counterproductive but the soft approach will help China maintain a sphere of influence and support for its rise. The formation of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is an indication of influential superpower position of China through which she wants to contest USA. In fact, China is ready to make concessions peacefully with her neighbouring countries in order to remove the feeling of need for USA. Key Words: UNCLOS, AIIB, setting of disputes. Introduction United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded in 982 and entered in effect in 994 after 6 nations had ratified. All nations in the South China Sea (except Chinese Taipei) are party to the convention which regularize rights and responsibilities of coastal states in different areas of the sea. Philippines were the first nation in the South China Sea area to ratify it in 984 followed by Vietnam in 994 and China, Brunei and Malaysia in 996. Though Chinese Taipei is not a signatory due to its inability to become a member of the United Nations, in 998 it adopted a series of domestic laws (Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental) that generally conform to the provisions of UNCLOS. As a result, all nations in the theatre are in obligation to comply with UNCLOS 982. This interesting fact put forwards a scope for all existing maritime disputes in South China Sea (SCS) to be settled through provisions of UNCLOS. Despite this common understanding, due to the grey areas of interpretation of UNCLOS provisions; several overlapping claims are visible. Part XV of the convention provides for peaceful resolutions for such disputes which are achievable and can Lieutenant Commander, Bangladesh Navy 35

bring peace and stability in the area. As a result, actually it is possible to bring forth a peaceful solution of the conflicting claims in near future. General Orientation South China Sea has an area of,4, sq miles and is one of the large water bodies in the world. In China it is called South Sea while some of the neighbouring nations have recently started calling it in different names like West Philippine Sea (by Philippines) or East Sea (by Vietnam). While the demarcation of plain sea area can be determined in a suitable method, the sovereignty of islands is heavily contested. Interestingly, UNCLOS delimits maritime zones departing from land territories with an existing sovereignty. As a result, the contesting parties in South China Sea strike at the very base of this concept by proposing the idea of sovereignty of the islands or land features. Out of all these land features, none had any indigenous human settlement originally. These islands and features are divided in mainly three types: a. Fully submerged: Macclesfield Bank (disputed among China, Chinese Taipei, the Philippines and Vietnam). b. Submerged during high water: Scarborough Shoal with only rocks above water (disputed among China, Chinese Taipei and the Philippines). c. Permanently above water: three island groups:- () Pratas Islands (atoll of three islands): under full control of Chinese Taipei. Claimed by China. (2) Paracel Islands (archipelago of about 3 islands and reefs): under full control of China. Claimed by Chinese Taipei and Vietnam. (3) Spartly Islands (archipelago with numerous tiny islands and reefs): Occupied by China, Chinese Taipei, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. In addition, Brunei has a claim over part of the archipelago. The concept of EEZ or rights over sea area far away from the coast is a recent phenomenon comparing with claims over land territories or islands. As a result, most of the current maritime delimitation disputes derive from their claimed or historic rights over coast or islands. Therefore, sea area claims are to be examined based on land/island claims from the past because possession of land will generate possession of seas, and not the other way. 36

Relevant UNCLOS Provisions There are a number of Articles of UNCLOS that are relevant concerning South China Sea dispute. Article 2 explains the Regime of Islands and puts three conditions to qualify as full status island: a. Must be naturally formed; thus excludes artificial islands built by some of the contesting parties. b. Must be above water at high tide; thus excludes low tide elevations of Scarborough Shoal and other reefs. c. Must be able to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own; to generate exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. As a result, rocks or islets that are natural and remain above water at all times, may only have territorial sea. Though naturally thinking, none of the islands were originally able to sustain economic life of their own, present development works have changed the situation in some. Article 74 covers delimitation of EEZ for countries with opposing/overlapping coasts. It makes a point for achieving equitable solution and in case of any disagreement; it refers to Part XV of UNCLOS on dispute resolution. Article 3 discusses the low tide elevations which submerge during high water. They can be considered as points for baseline to draw territorial sea only if they lie within 2 NM of mainland or an actual island. As most of the disputed features in South China Sea are far away from the mainland, these low tide elevations can only be significant if they lie within 2 nm of any of the real islands. This complex nature of low tide elevations have been a matter of controversy even in the pre-unclos era. Article 6 talks about artificial islands which can be constructed by the coastal nation. However, they have no impact on territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf. At best, the coastal nation can declare 5 meter safety zone around them if that does not hamper freedom of navigation of other nations. Eventually, if a low tide elevation is made a land feature that remains above water permanently (through land filling, etc); it will be considered an artificial island with no significant enhancement of rights over maritime zones. Article mentions about historic bay. Though Art 298 mentions about exceptions for historic bays or titles, the definitions are ambiguous. Certainly, 37

South China Sea is not a bay. However, the issue of historic title or rights is one of the burning issues for which UNCLOS does not have elaborations. Dispute Resolution Options UNCLOS advocates for peaceful resolution of all disputes in the spirit of the UN charter. UNCLOS puts that as an obligation to member states in Article 279 of the convention. In fact, the whole part XV of the convention (Article 279-299) deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Apart from formal proceedings, Article 28 keeps open the option of dispute resolution at any time through an agreement within themselves. This is an important issue since the coastal nations can actually sit for a negotiated settlement on maritime boundary or use of resources even if the sovereignty of the islands have not been definitely decided. A fine example is the Gulf of Thailand where joint development areas between Cambodia-Vietnam, Vietnam-Malaysia, Malaysia-Thailand exist. This solution is seen somehow as a provisional (yet long-lasting) solution without compromising individual claims or political image. Often, the sitting government is not willing to permanently sacrifice national or historic claims, therefore; they tend to enter into provisional agreements instead of permanent treaties or recognitions. When any such agreements are not achievable, UNCLOS lists a number or options to make headway. According to Article 287 of the convention, following courts or tribunals have jurisdiction to settle such disputes: a. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This Hamburg-based tribunal can be approached by state parties or non-state parties (e.g. international organizations; in specific cases only) for settlement. However, both parties must agree to bring the case in front of the tribunal. If only one wishes to bring the case to the tribunal, it will not work. However, once the parties agree to start the proceeding, there is no coming back. The verdict is binding and there is no scope for appeal. b. The International Court of Justice (ICJ). This court is the prime judicial court of the United Nations and has a wide variety of jurisdictions apart from maritime disputes. It can overlook certain limitations of other maritime courts as it can rule over land territories, too. In the contentious cases, only states can be parties. All UN members are by default members of ICJ and have an obligation to comply. Action can be taken by the UN Security Council for cases of non-compliance. However, this presents a limitation against any permanent member of the Security Council; who can practically prevent any resolution being passed by applying Veto. A 38

known case of Veto power exercise against an ICJ ruling was in 986 ICJ Case between USA and Nicaragua. c. Arbitral Tribunal. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is the appointed arbitral tribunal as per Annex VII of UNCLOS. Even if one party doesn t agree, the other party in a maritime dispute can still initiate such arbitration. Bangladesh also received a verdict from PCA in her case against India, when the later was not willing to settle the matter through ITLOS. Another famous case under this court is the recently concluded Philippines vs. China case on South China. Interestingly, China refrained from taking part in the arbitration process by declaring that the court lacked jurisdiction. However, the proceedings continued and the verdict came as a landmark decision mostly in favour of the Philippines. Though PCA does not have an immediate instrument to enforce the outcome, China s refusal may have a damaging effect on its reputation. This important case is likely to ignite further cases and arbitrations concerning other nations in the area. In fact, most SCS littoral nations sent their representatives during the case. d. Special Arbitral Tribunal. composed of experts on specific fields as per Annex VIII of UNCLOS and nominated by parties in dispute on specific cases concerning fishery, environment, scientific research, pollution, etc. While Article 296 of the Convention describes the finality and binding force of such decisions taken by above courts and tribunals as final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute (Para of Art 296), there is a full section on limitations and exceptions to applicability (Art 297-299) which apparently keeps different way-outs for a contracting party to claim for exception. Art 298 gives the option for claiming exceptions for some categories of disputes (including historic bays and titles). For example, China had previously declared on 25 August 26 their intention of availing such exceptions. In fact, after the case in PCA had been submitted by Philippines, China rejected the jurisdiction of the Court through a position paper published by her Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there is another important article of UNCLOS which makes the job easier for a court or tribunal. Paragraph 4 of Article 288 clearly states that In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal. Accordingly, in the aforementioned Philippines vs. China case, the Court examined Chinese position and concluded that exceptions were not applicable under Article 298()(a)(i) since the South China Sea was neither a historic bay nor China had been consistent 39

with her claims of historic title (though the Court could identify China claiming historic rights short of title at some point, but not historic titles ). Present Disputed Claims: Vietnam Vietnam as independent political entity came into being with the recognition of independence from France. However, in 954, it was still divided in two. As North Vietnam was being aided by communist China in its struggle for dominance, in 956 it accepted Chinese claim over Paracels and Spartlys islands in an apparent gesture of giving up under Chinese pressure. However, South Vietnam had a different opinion and continued claiming over both Paracels and Spartlys. The South tried reopening an abandoned French camp in Shanhu Island. In 974, the southern government started to exercise its claims actively. They tried to put Vietnamese settlers in the Spartlys and even drove out Chinese fishermen from the Paracels resulting in a skirmish leading to their defeat at the hand of the Chinese forces. After the unification of Vietnam, the north-led government repudiated its earlier position of 956 and upheld the southern claim by declaring its right over both Paracels and Spartlys. Eventually neighbours China, Malaysia, Chinese Taipei and Philippines protested. However, Vietnam continued its attempt of garrisoning in the islands. As of today, it has control over 2 island/land features which is the largest in number among all other claimants. Vietnam s claim base on their historic linkage while denying Chinese historical claims. While a large part of these islands lie within 2 nm from Vietnam, Vietnam looks forward to extend the EEZ through attributing full status to the outlying islands. Though Vietnam s actual historic possession of those islands will be difficult to prove in a court of law, when confronting Chinese claim; they may get an advantage using the legacy of French colonial occupation of the archipelago. As a result, they may be interested to go to an international court against China to prove their case. Given the declared rejection of China from dispute resolution methods of UNCLOS, Vietnam may still resort to ICJ as a non-unclos resolution option. However, there is a chance that other nations (e.g. Philippines, Malaysia, etc) may intervene in any such case and claim their respective parts. Therefore, it is more convenient for Vietnam to settle matters in a bilateral agreement instead of going to the court. Present Disputed Claims: Philippines There is no record of Philippines s claims over these islands during Spanish or American periods. In 956 a Filipino businessman unilaterally claimed the Spartlys as a new territory. In 974, Philippines apparently purchased from that businessman these islands for just one peso. Subsequently, the government 4

occupied five small islands and planned to occupy more. However, neighbouring nations disregarded this purchase affair as a farce and protested Philippines claim and occupation of those islands. Philippines argue that many of these islands lie within 2nm from its coast. In fact it had unilaterally claimed a 2- nm EEZ in 978 in anticipation of UNCLOS 982. Philippines today have control over 9 of the islands/rocks. Present Disputed Claims: Malaysia Malaysia declared its EEZ in 979 (before UNCLOS) and retains its claims over southern part of the Spartlys. In 983, it occupied Pulau Layang-Layang (Swallow Reef) and put its troops there. Malaysia also built up airstrip and currently has physical control over 5 land features in the Spartlys. Present Disputed Claims: Brunei Brunei does not have physical control over any of the islands/features in dispute. However, her declared 2 nautical mile EEZ includes part of the southern Spartlys known as the Louisa Reef. At present there is no physical occupation of that reef by any nation, however both China and Malaysia have claims over it. Present Disputed Claims: China and Chinese Taipei Despite de facto difference in identity, Chinese Taipei and China today present similar claims over South China Sea islands. First recorded exercise of Chinese claim in the South China Sea dates back to 884-885 when France tried to annex those islands within French Indochina. Though France garrisoned some troops, they allowed Chinese fishermen to continue fishing. In 938 Japan took over SCS islands from France and put them within administrative structure of the province of Taiwan which was then under Japanese control. After the World War II, the islands were claimed by the Kuomintang government. In 946, despite French protests; they built encampments in two of the largest islands (only these two were considered to be habitable); Taiping in Spartlys and Yongxing in Paracels. After the shift of power in China, as Kuomintang administration left the mainland, it withdrew both of its camps. In 956, China (PRC) set up a camp in Yongxing and Chinese Taipei set up one in Taiping. These camps remain today and are strengthened by other facilities. In 988, China seized few more islets after their scuffle with Vietnamese forces. Apart from these, Chinese Taipei has always been holding the Pratas Island (largest of the SCS islands) with contesting claims from China. Chinese generalized claims over the SCS referred to one of their old drawings that showed dashed lines delimiting Chinese claimed sea area. Later, two dashes from the Gulf of Tonkin were removed keeping the famous "nine-dash line". 4

Future Outlook - China and the Rest While it is difficult to predict future, it is evident that nations act in line with their own interests. The future of South China Sea is therefore likely to be settled not merely on ego and pure pride, rather from rational calculations. The nations in discussion are too connected in terms of economic and political ties that any hotheaded decision will bring no fruit. However, if we think of all possible outcomes, the combinations can be made into five separate end-states. Giving an indicative value to the entire spectrum of end-states with regards to benefit, loss and cost; a net gain can be roughly calculated. Since, China stands out in terms of economy and military from all other nations, she needs to be considered separately. Interests of rest of the countries can be considered in one identical score base. Table summarizes possible future scenarios with weight-based score assignments. The values attributed are indicative only and taken on rough assumptions where anything positive or beneficial has been given + score and negative/costly situations have been given - score. Only in some cases, +2 or -2 have been given, where the benefit or cost is evidently higher. The NET GAIN column is likely to give a picture of the outcomes for China or the rest; thus being base for a rational thinking. Though it is not possible to add apples with oranges, the calculations have been more in qualitative side than being a quantitative one. Here, it will be difficult to ascertain whether +2 is really double the benefit of +, but certainly +2 or + will be a rational and preferable choice in comparison with -. Explanation of each scenario is discussed in the next paragraph. Table : Net Gain/Loss for China and the Rest in Different Scenarios Scenario Fate of Islands / feature s Present status quo of island control maintai ned Status Gain (positive/negative) Loss/ Net Gain Status of Exploitatio Other Military maritime n of benefits cost zones resources Infrastru cture/ deploym ent in islands Countrie s continue to invest resource s and efforts to strength en island infrastru cture without any economi c gain Disputed Politic al situati on (a) Mistru st and quarrel contin ues Others : Image / national ego (b) No change (c) None of the nation is able to explore/ develop marine and seabed resources peacefully. Nil (d) Financi al/ resourc e investm ent (e) (f) (Benefit ) =(a+b +c+d)- (e+f) -2-2 42

Scenario Fate of Islands / feature s Infrastru cture/ deploym ent in islands Status of maritime zones 2 Countries agree on referring to a court/arbitration and eventual verdict on island sovereignty and maritime boundary. Politic al situati on (a) Peacef ul accept ance of verdict Others : Image / national ego (b) Reductio n of initial claim - 2 - Exploitatio n of resources (c) Peaceful use of resources by all the parties Other benefits (d) Global and regional positive image 2 Financi al/ resourc e investm ent (e) Military cost (f) (Benefit ) =(a+b +c+d)- (e+f) 2 2 3 Strongest economy of the area (China) achieves an advantageous control of islands/maritime zone through providing economic concessions to all parties. In other words, China buys prestige by paying cash and kind. Peacef ul Others : Positive image for China. Exclusive to China Financial gain to other states 2 4 Strongest military in the area (China) evicts others by force, however extraction of seabed resources remain marginally profitable because of impossibility to bring gas/oil to nearby coastal area. 5 Status quo of island control maintai ned Status Gain (positive/negative) Loss/ Net Gain Hostile enviro nment all countries disengage from active garrisonin g or deploying governme nt assets through mutual understan ding Joint or demarcated resource developme nt agreement achieved - Others : - Peacef ul Others : Domesti c Popular image for China, negative domestic image for others - Positive image for all parties Hostile environme nt prohibits safe and costeffective exploitatio n of resources Conducive environme nt for exploitatio n of resources Negative global and regional image for China - Positive global and regional image for China in particular 2 2-4 -5 4 3 43

The different scenarios are as follows: a. Scenario. While present status quo may be continued for some time, each year all the parties are losing in terms of efforts and resources. Thus -2 for not only China but also for everybody else in the region. Because, there is no significant gain for anyone, but cost in terms of infrastructure or military deployment keep on racking. b. Scenario 2. A peaceful ice-breaking could be scenario 2 where, by agreement of all parties; the dispute is referred to a tribunal/arbitration panel. However, while such process can be lengthy, each nation risks losing permanently some or all of their claimed possessions and this could be domestically detrimental for the image of the running government. In fact, no other nation from the SCS littoral (except China) has yet put a declaration regarding optional exception from binding obligations under such courts. On the other hand, China is always suspicious of such international bodies as we saw previously. However, if the nations in South China Sea can ever agree unanimously for such a legal procedure, their net gain is the second best of all future scenarios. In light of historic uninhabited status of the disputed islands, full island status of most of these land features is very much unlikely. This will facilitate drawing 2nm or equidistant (in case of bordering nations) EEZ boundaries. c. Scenario 3. In the third scenario, China buys the South China Sea by giving cash or kind concessions to other claimants. One such recent example is the Egyptian case of handing over two Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia in gratitude for a package deal worth $22 billion. While Chinese growing economy may allow such a peaceful option, some of the neighbouring countries with strong nationalistic ego might not be such willing. In fact, the net gains for both sides are not very promising when quantified in values. However, apart from cash, other benefits in terms of political support for a particular government/leadership or development partnerships look promising. Take the case of recently elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. During his visit to China soon after being elected, he announced to resolve the South China Sea dispute through discussions rather than referring to courts or tribunals; despite having won PCA arbitration just few months before. No wonder, just a change of leadership brought $3.5 billion deal for Philippines. d. Scenario 4. The fourth scenario is the worst case scenario and the only scenario with violence. All the parties are extremely loser in such a case with high loss of lives or assets. While any ultra-nationalist in 44

China may be willing to show the world Chinese military capability, China runs a risk of serious embarrassment if success is not fully achieved. As China has not fought and won any modern war in recent history, policymakers in China might not risk the credibility they achieved in Asia. Moreover, the United States will always remain a factor for China to be considered when military means are used. This scenario is also the most dangerous for other nations in the region. e. Scenario 5. The fifth scenario is the one that gives best combination of scores to all the sides. Both China and the rest are able to develop the resources without any apparent compromise of their national image. China will be benefitted most as only it has sufficient capability to develop deep sea resources. Eventually Chinese companies have the greatest chance to be successful in the bidding process offered by other nations. Most of the hydrocarbon deals show that, the bidding winner gets a good share of the profit. If China could come in a shared development of the resources in the area, Chinese companies are most likely to be awarded. Due to geographical distances, China can make significant profit from hydrocarbon extracted from SCS if they can sell it in the littorals through pipelines instead of transporting long distances. Therefore, only a happy neighbour can maximize Chinese gains. In fact, this is the best solution for all the parties involved. As the claims in the South China Sea mostly evolve around the claimed sea area generated by the disputed islands; China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam are working on establishing their rights on the claimed islands. Once sovereign rights are established, maritime zones can be taken into consideration. Without recognition of the claims over these islands, the sea area will not be awarded because of the long distance from the mainland of each country. However, presently the nations are strengthening their positions in the islands only, and are not engaged in forcible eviction of other nations, although there are incidents of harassing fishermen or survey vessels. As the scenario 5 shows, the idea of sovereignty or national ego can be bypassed through cooperative sharing or development of maritime zones while maintaining status quo of the islands and rocks. The example of Malaysia, Thailand or Brunei could be seen as a positive approach for achieving similar agreements in the South China Sea. As the occupation or islands or land features are almost complete, control of maritime zones seem to be in a stalemate. As a result, no nation is able to effectively exploit resources peacefully. 45

For each country in dispute, there are two factors to be considered to arrive in an acceptable solution: national prestige and potential material gains from respective claim. However, when national prestige of two or more parties is involved, it is obvious that one or more parties in discussion will see attenuation in the perceived idea of self-prestige when a definitive delimitation of maritime borders is drawn. This brings us to a situation where all the sides may agree in a situation of joint ownership of the area in discussion. Governments and political parties in each state are more likely to agree in a situation where a definite ownership is not declared. With the risks to high and benefits so meagre, the ruling governments are unlikely to lose a face in front of their citizens. While verdicts from ITLOS, PCA or ICJ are likely to determine a definite border, countries anxious to prevent any perceived defeat will rather agree on a compromised sharing instead of losing it all. Conclusion As there are both peaceful and violent ways of terminating a dispute exist, the case of SCS clearly shows that multiple options for peaceful solution under the light of UNCLOS exist and offer better gains for all the parties. While the stronger nation (both Militarily and economically); in this case China, may show some muscle flexing to intimidate other contesters, a cost-benefit analysis show that it is more gainful for China to settle them peacefully. In addition to being the least expensive option, the peaceful settlement through cooperative engagement will actually be beneficial for Chinese companies in the long run. In fact, in 24, a Chinese conglomerate purchased Australian company Roc Oil which had won a Malaysian awarded gas field that falls within Chinese claimed nine-dash line. Though, the exploration deal later fell apart, this is one small step towards that big leap for partnerships. Looking at present day Chinese ambitions and urge for super power role, one may argue that it will be counterproductive for China to make enemy out of all SCS nations for little or no gain at all. On the other hand, some concessions and soft approach may not only benefit everyone but also help China maintain a sphere of influence and support for its rise. Chinese action in forming the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) clearly indicates that China is aiming for its long sought responsible and influential superpower position contesting USA and is ready to make concessions to other small nations in order to garner positive reception. China knows that the only way to keep USA out of SCS is to make her small neighbours comfortable and not allow them feeling the need for US presence. If China settles its disputes with the SCS states, next step for her would 46

be to mediate between other states and use her own influence in settling such disputes peacefully; a position China has always been ambitious of. References International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 969 (between Gemany-Denmark and Germany-Netherlands). Available at: http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/52/933.pdf UNCLOS available at: http:// www.un.org/ depts/los/convention_agreements /texts/unclos/part8.htm Symmons, Clive. When is an Island Not an Island in International Law? The Riddle of Dinkum Sands in the Case of US. v. Alaska. International Boundaries Research Unit (UK, 999) Thao, Nguyen Hong. Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Autumn 999), Durham University, UK. ITLOS Case No 6. Available at: https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-6/ ICJ case 7 http://www.icj cij.org/docket/?sum=367&p=3&p2=3&case=7&p3=5 Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines dated 24/2/7. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_ 66285/ t2747.shtml The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 2 July 26 (Paragraph 229). Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/75/26/7/ph-cn-2672-award.pdf Roach, Captain J Ashley (ret). Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea. Center for Naval Analyses (August 24), Department of the Navy, USA. Johnson South Reef (Spartly Islands) naval battle of 4 March 988. S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman (ed). The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea. 47

Walsh, Declan. Egypt Gives Saudi Arabia 2 Islands in a Show of Gratitude, The New York Times, April 26. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com Blanchard, Ben. Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost, The Reuters, 2 Oct 26. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippinesiduskcn2kas The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People s Republic of China. Set Aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development, 7 November 2. Available at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/362/364/t823.htm Paul, Sonali. China's Fosun agrees $44 million takeover of Australia's Roc Oil, The Reuters, 4 Aug 24. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/24/8/4/us-roc-oilcompany-fosun-intl-offer-idukkbng3ug2484 48