FHSMUN 34 SECURITY COUNCIL THE SITUATION IN COLOMBIA Author: Brian D. Sutliff No one can feel as the owner of the country and no one can feel excluded from the right of property. We must all suffer Colombia. - former President Alvaro Uribe Velez Introduction The prevalence and constancy of armed violence in Colombia is its undeniable contemporary tragedy. Torn apart by the ravages of nearly sixty-five years of civil war and internal conflicts, Colombia s tragedy has become a critical security issue for the entire Western Hemisphere. As the various actors in this seemingly interminable series of conflicts interact and revise their strategies, they impose considerable burdens on Colombia s neighbors, but most especially on the civilians caught in the middle. The international community, including the UN System, needs to consider the ending of violence and the implementation of comprehensive disarmament and development strategies in Colombia among its immediate and long-term security priorities. Former President Alvaro Uribe articulated that he believed that the end of armed conflict in Colombia may be in sight because of his government s aggressive counterinsurgency policies against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); his successor, Juan Manuel Santos, served as Minister of National Defense from 2006-09 and has mostly maintained the more assertive, or confrontational, policies of the Uribe government. Recent evidence points to a weakening of the FARC s operational capacities but it is still too early for the Colombian government to proclaim victory. Previous governments have sought to claim victory over the FARC and other guerrilla groups in Colombia only to see the guerrillas stage audacious actions and raids. Furthermore, President Santos and the Colombian military need to repair their relationships with Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela as well as quite possibly account for possible war crimes, including in the July 2, 2008 hostage rescue where at least one Colombian soldier illegally used the insignia of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on his uniform.
La Violencia Colombia s centrality in the Western Hemisphere has been a constant over the past 200 years. Colombia occupies a critical geographic location, situated at the northern tip of South America, directly linking the continents of North and South America together while also touching both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Colombia s importance for the Western Hemisphere was also solidified through Simon Bolivar s original Gran Colombia, a larger country that once also contained modern Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. Ecuador and Venezuela would break away from Colombia in the nineteenth century and the United States would assist Panama in gaining its independence from Colombia in 1903 by positioning American warships off Colombia s coast while Panamanian rebels staged a brief uprising. Throughout the first 150 years of Colombia s existence as an independent country, the dominant Conservative and Liberal parties contested elections, argued, and engaged in armed conflict against each other. In 1948, after the murder of the leading Liberal candidate for president, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala (hereafter referred to as Gaitán), Colombia was torn apart by horrific violence as Colombia would bear witness to its own version of Cold War antagonisms between the Conservatives, many of whom sought to emulate Francisco Franco, the Fascist leader of Spain, the Liberals, and the small Communist party. The Conservatives, as the dominant political party after the Liberals boycotted the 1950 presidential elections in protest against the concerted wave of violence unleashed in the wake of Gaitán s death, used the security forces to create cadres of assassins known as pájaros [birds in Spanish] who intimidated and eliminated political opposition in many areas. The Liberals began to retaliate in kind and by the early 1950s, La Violencia was in full swing. Journalist and human rights monitor Robin Kirk writes that the struggle that rapidly consumed Colombia, was personal. Grand political fortunes were at stake, but so too were simmering land disputes, municipal rivalries, indiscretions, ambitions and affairs of the heart 1 As La Violencia engulfed more Colombian communities, it exacerbated the persistent social and economic inequality that has always plagued Colombia. When poor peasants were forced off their lands, wealthy landowners and their political allies used their, often forced, exodus to expand their own landholdings. The deepening of these social and economic inequalities only seemed to be reinforced by the violence perpetrated by the official security forces as well as their unofficial allies. The peasants and other internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were forcibly relocated or fled in advance of the encroaching violence eventually created communities from which sprang the most organized and fiercest resistance to La Violencia. Enter Las Guerrillas By 1960, the effects of La Violencia were felt throughout Colombia, particularly in the rural areas. The Liberal party fractured further, with some of the most marginalized members, such as Pedro Marín, later to be known as Manuel Marulanda Velez or Tirofijo 1 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America s War in Colombia PublicAffairs New York 2004 p. 25.
[Sureshot], joining forces with the Communists. By the mid-1960s, Colombia s landscape was being radically reshaped by the conflicts between the security forces and a rapidly expanding cadre of guerrilla groups including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Popular Liberation Army (ELP), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the April 19 Movement (M-19). As these rebel groups survived large-scale government military operations, they also began to pose a serious challenge to the Colombian government. By the early 1960s, the FARC and other rebel groups had carved out several independent republics in the poor rural southern provinces of Colombia and they began to exercise sovereignty in these zones. The government s alliance with the United States only served to alarm many of these groups further at the height of the international Cold War rivalry. The government would gradually adapt its strategy to include relief aid and medical services, modeled along the lines of President Kennedy s Alliance for Progress. Called Plan Lazo, this combination of relief aid and military force was aimed at eliminating the autonomous status of the independent republics. Plan Lazo failed to eliminate the independent republics completely. Marín, or Tirofijo, would later argue that if the government had spent even a fraction of the money it used equipping soldiers to help needy farmers and build roads and schools, it might well have avoided decades of trouble with the FARC. 2 Later Colombian governments, including the successive governments of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), effectively ceded control of large areas of southern Colombia to the FARC in attempts to reduce violence and also induce the guerrillas to negotiate. As these attempts at negotiation failed to produce positive results, the violence between the government and the guerrillas would be augmented by the government s creation of and alliances with new paramilitary organizations, or self-defense groups. Self-Defense Groups That Go On the Offense The extremely close relationships between the Colombian military and the paramilitary organizations, or self-defense groups, have been critical linkages for the economic, military and political elites in Colombia for many years. The infamous pájaros of La Violencia would in time be superseded by the more well-organized and largely selffinanced self-defense groups of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the United Self- Defense Forces (AUC). The influential paramilitary leader, Carlos Castaño, of the AUC presented his armed forces, eventually totaling 32,000, as developing organically in response to the violent excesses and Marxist ideology of the guerrillas. In reality, though, the paramilitaries were never a homogenous organization but rather a marriage of interests between powerful local warlords, drug barons, organized crime, members of local political and economic elites and counter-insurgent groups. 3 The rhetoric of the self-defense groups also consistently conflicted with their own actions in the rural areas of Colombia. The paramilitaries have frequently used drug cultivation and trafficking, 2 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death 2004 p. 53. 3 International Crisis Group (ICG), Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 3.
donations from wealthy landowners, extortion, smuggling, and other organized criminal activities to finance their growth and activities. 4 The paramilitary groups in Colombia constituted the infamous Sixth Division of the Colombian armed forces because of their extremely close partnerships and working relationships. The Colombian military routinely shared intelligence feeds and information with the paramilitaries, particularly given that many paramilitary commanders and fighters had previously been active members of the Colombian security forces. In a chilling echo of the atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan, investigators and journalists have documented attacks where the Colombian military began actions and then left the area to allow the paramilitaries to work without any official oversight or obstruction. 5 As the chilling realities of the paramilitaries actions, as well as their continued close relationships with the government and security forces, became common knowledge, especially outside Colombia, the Colombian government began to take steps to curb the worst violence of the paramilitaries. In 2006, the AUC announced that it was voluntarily demobilizing and disarming in return for amnesty from crimes committed over the previous decade. Beyond improving the international image of Colombia s government, certainly in the opinion of its most important security patron, the United States, the Colombian government removed an embarrassing challenge to its own authority. The International Crisis Group (ICG) recently noted that the military power exercised added to the instability of the state to deliver public services in rural areas and allowed the paramilitaries to take de facto control of even legal local economies. 6 While the demilitarization and the demobilization of the AUC is a welcome step towards securing a lasting and just peace in Colombia, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and key civil society representatives, have identified a third generation of paramilitaries, including the New Generation Organization (ONG) in Nariño and the Black Eagles in Norte de Santander. 7 In December 2011, the Colombian government celebrated the surrender of the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC), particularly as it was the first time that the Colombian security forces had accepted the surrender of the leadership and significant fraction of the membership of one of the New Illegal Armed Groups (NIAG) that had emerged from the recently demobilized paramilitary groups. Unfortunately, the attorney general s office had little choice but to free most of the fighters almost immediately, as only nineteen leaders were originally subjects of an arrest warrant. 8 Demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating (DDR), where possible, the members of these NIAGs is absolutely essential to achieving sustainable peace in Colombia and it may have broader implications for the entire region. Uribe consistently 4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia s demobilization of paramilitary groups August 2005 Vol. 17, No. 3 (B). The entire report can be accessed at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf 5 Bill Weinberg, Colombia s Heart of Darkness in NYC and DC The Nation July 29, 2008. 6 ICG, Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 4. 7 ICG, Colombia s New Armed Groups May 10, 2007 p. 2. 8 ICG, Dismantling Colombia s New Illegal Armed Groups June 8, 2012 p. i.
downplayed the significance of the NIAGs but as president Santos has designated the NIAGs the greatest threat to the security of Colombia s citizens. Colombia and Terrorism Western media accounts of terrorism overwhelmingly focus on the Middle East and the Muslim World but Colombia has been cited as an important front for terrorism by the United States and other governments. The FARC and the AUC have both been labeled as terrorist organizations by the US State Department and the tactics used by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and Colombian security forces have frequently targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure, including power stations and oil pipelines. The FARC maintained important links to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) throughout the 1990s and the Basque nationalist group Euzkadi ta Aksaluna (ETA), considered a terrorist group by Spain, and was rumored to have trained in Colombia in FARCcontrolled areas. 9 Throughout the 1990s, massacres and reprisal massacres targeted peasants and anyone suspected of having collaborated with the enemy. While the overall level of violence in Colombia is significantly below the levels of the previous 15 years, attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure continue, including the recent FARC assassination of 3 teachers they suspected of being military informants. 10 The Reach of Drug Money The unfortunate portrait of Colombia is nearly always one focused on the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs, especially cocaine. There is no denying that Colombia is clearly the world s largest producer of cocaine as well as an important producer of heroine and marijuana nor that the sale of illegal drugs brings in tens of billions of dollars annually. Drug money is now so deeply embedded in Colombian society that it is nearly impossible for national politicians to declare that their campaigns have not been financed, at least in part, by drug sales. The guerrillas and the paramilitaries are also so heavily invested in the drug trade that some of the worst atrocities committed by each side have been perpetrated primarily to capture better cocagrowing land. As always, those caught in the middle are the Colombian civilians. Combating the cultivation, production and trafficking of Colombian cocaine has been a priority for successive Colombian and American governments, regardless of political party, but the overall success of the so-called war on drugs has been rather limited. The attempted eradication of coca plants over the past few years has reduced the total amount of coca grown in Colombia but has also damaged food crops and produced serious environmental consequences. 11 Furthermore, any attempt to stamp out coca production in Colombia will likely lead to increased production in Bolivia and Peru, just as efforts to wipe out Bolivian and Peruvian coca production in the 1980s only spurred Colombia to massively increase its own production; coca production in Peru has increased in recent years and has not been subjected to the extensive fumigation that has 9 BBC News, Colombia used for terrorist training April 24, 2002. 10 Simon Romero, Cocaine Sustains War in Rural Colombia New York Times July 27, 2008. 11 The Economist, The unstoppable crop June 19, 2008.
occurred in Colombia. In early 2012, the governments of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru began discussions about a unified system to measure coca production in their respective countries and throughout the region, ostensibly with an eye to reducing and eventually eliminating the production of cocaine. 12 The drug problem and the myriad overlapping and often interrelated security issues in Colombia cannot be addressed by any one country; rather, these problems require comprehensive multilateral and multistakeholder solutions involving many agencies of the UN System, the OAS, national governments, NGOs, and interested civil society representatives. With the massive expansion of the drug industry came the development of narco violence. The billions of dollars that flowed into Colombia provided the weaponry that dominated the extremely violent rivalry between the Cali and Medellín drug cartels throughout the 1980s. When the US government, under President Ronald Reagan, initiated its War on Drugs, the effects were quickly felt in South America. The US then worked with governments, including Colombia s, to arrange for the arrest and extradition of drug traffickers such as the notorious Pablo Escobar. As the Colombian government sought to extradite more traffickers, Escobar, who was elected to the Colombian Congress as a deputy representative in 1982, and other narcotraffickers had judges and police officers assassinated and Colombia s cities were rocked by deadly bombings. Escobar s control of the Medellín cartel made him one of the richest men in the world by the end of the 1980s, but he was also undoubtedly one of the most violent. According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), he bombed a passenger plane, as well as Colombia's federal police headquarters, and paid bounties for the murders of policemen and members of rival drug cartels. Estimates are difficult, but it is thought he was responsible for more than 4,000 deaths. 13 Escobar would eventually bargain with the Colombian government to put himself under house arrest, meaning that he would confine himself to his multimillion dollar home and continue to direct the activities of the Medellín cartel until his death in 1993. The Colombian government would eventually stop extraditing drug traffickers to the US and the campaign of assassinations and bombings ceased. These events are of critical importance for Colombia and the US as the current Colombian government is seeking to expand current extradition efforts. At the beginning of August 2008, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe requested that the US lengthen the minimum prison sentences for convicted extradited drug traffickers. 14 Colombia: World Kidnapping Capital As the various conflicts in Colombia escalated, the guerrillas began exploring other options for financing their operations, including war taxes levied on the economic activities occurring within the independent republics, including narcotics cultivation, production, and trafficking, and kidnapping wealthy people, their children, and foreigners for ransom. The M-19 guerrillas first proved that ransoming wealthy hostages could be a 12 Hannah Stone, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia Plan Unified System to Measure Coca Crops Insightcrime.org March 23, 2012. Found at: http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2392- colombia-peru-bolivia-plan-unified-system-to-measure-coca-crops 13 Mike Ceasar, At home on Pablo Escobar s ranch BBC News June 2, 2008. 14 The Washington Post, Uribe to ask US for longer trafficking sentences August 1, 2008.
lucrative source of income for the guerrillas in the mid-1970s; by the 1980s, the FARC and ELN would be involved as well and Colombia would in time claim the dubious honor of leading the world in annual kidnappings. These kidnappings would raise the cost of doing business in Colombia for foreign corporations, such as Occidental Petroleum, and would bring in millions of dollars to the guerrillas. These tactics would alienate large swaths of Colombian society against the guerrillas as well as bring them into direct confrontations at times with wealthy and well-armed drug traffickers who bought up huge amounts of land in areas that had traditionally been the domain of the guerrillas. Robin Kirk notes that trouble between the traffickers and the FARC was inevitable. At its core, the FARC remained a movement of peasants and ideological purists who hated everything the traffickers represented but coveted the power of their money. For their part, the traffickers cared nothing about the FARC s decades-old claims against Colombia s elites 15 Kidnapping would also incur the wrath of corporations who would then funnel contributions and even weapons to the paramilitaries fighting the guerrillas; the banana-exporting Chiquita would eventually confess to paying nearly $1.75 million USD to the AUC to protect its workers as well as to channeling large numbers of weapons to the AUC. Chiquita would eventually pay a $25 million USD to the US Justice Department and would sell off its Colombian branch to avoid further penalties. In 2011, nearly 300 kidnappings were registered by the Colombian authorities, including over 20 Canadian oil workers who were rescued by the Colombian military the day after their reported abductions by the FARC. 16 Regional Concerns Colombia s security problems are not strictly internal and therefore they require feasible and sustainable international solutions. Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela are the countries most immediately affected by violence and instability in Colombia but the effects can be felt in the United States and Europe as well. Several of the guerrilla groups have used sanctuaries in Ecuador and President Hugo Chavez has in the past been an important sponsor of the FARC. After a FARC laptop was recovered early in 2008 detailing links between Chavez and the FARC, Chavez began to distance himself from the FARC. 17 The Colombian government infuriated Ecuador in March 2008 by initiating hostilities against guerrillas on Ecuadorean soil; the OAS ruled that the attack was a violation of Ecuadoran sovereignty. In the aftermath of the attack, Ecuador severed diplomatic ties with Colombia; at the beginning of June 2008, Ecuador and Colombia restored low-level diplomatic ties but relations between the two countries remain strained. 18 Ecuador and Colombia continue to assert that the other country does not meet its obligations to patrol their 360+ mile common border. In a recent article in The Washington Post, the Ecuadoran Special Forces patrolling the border region distilled the composition of many of the people living in the jungles along the border. Of the few people who live here, many are Colombian settlers, some of them refugees fleeing the 15 Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death p. 109. 16 Rory Carroll, Colombian troops rescue 22 kidnapped oil workers The Guardian March 8, 2011. 17 Juan Forero, Chavez, Seeking Colombia Role, Distances Himself from Rebels The Washington Post July 8, 2008. 18 BBC News, Colombia and Ecuador restore ties June 6, 2008.
guerrilla war or toxic fumigants sprayed over the coca fields of southern Colombia, some of them farmers conspiring with the guerrillas. Some are guerrillas themselves. The soldiers can rarely tell who is who. 19 The implicit support for the guerrillas by many people along the border is essential for the FARC s resilience. Several million Colombians have also fled the fighting in their country and immigrated to various Latin American countries, the US, Canada, and Europe, creating important Colombian communities in many international cities. Creating a stable and secure Colombia will allow many of these emigrants, a considerable number of whom are refugees, to return to Colombia and will also allow Colombia and its neighbors critical opportunities to improve their political relationships and cultural and economic ties. The Colombian government s self-congratulatory rhetoric about the imminent demise of the FARC and other guerrillas continues to be tested by the inabilities, or possibly unwillingness, of the respective governments to effectively police their borders. On May 21, 2012, FARC guerrillas ambushed and killed 12 Colombian soldiers on patrol in the north of the country, close to the Venezuelan border. 20 This ambush in the north of the country followed an earlier FARC ambush in March 2012 that killed 11 Colombian army soldiers further south near the Venezuelan border. 21 These attacks were preceded by a smaller attack on a Colombian military base in Putumayo, near the border with Ecuador, in March 2011. 22 Colombian-Ecuadoran relations have improved in recent months as the two countries have restored full diplomatic relations and strengthened economic ties 23 ; these developments reflect a significant shift from the more confrontational diplomacy during the Uribe presidency as well as from Ecuador s issuance of an arrest warrant for then Defense Minister Santos in 2008. 24 Improvements in relations between Colombia and Venezuela have also been welcome, and unexpected, developments in the region. 25 The UN System and the OAS in Colombia As the depth of the violence in Colombia continues to disrupt domestic and regional development and security initiatives, the Organization of American States (OAS) has increased its direct involvement to assist in mediating a solution to the violence and insecurity. In February 2004, the OAS established the OAS Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) with a mandate to verify initiatives to bring about a ceasefire and end of hostilities, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration into 19 Joshua Partlow, In a Conflict that Crosses Borders, Ecuadorans Track an Elusive Foe The Washington Post August 8, 2008. 20 BBC News, FARC rebels kill 12 Colombian soldiers in border ambush May 21, 2012. 21 BBC News, Colombian soldiers killed in FARC ambush March 17, 2012. 22 Fox News Latino, Guerrillas attack military base on Colombia-Ecuador border March 14, 2011. 23 Colombia Reports, Colombia, Ecuador relations improve, bilateral trade restored December 20, 2011. 24 Delegates should note that the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, has been in office since January 15, 2007. 25 Mariano Castillo, How deep are relations between Colombia and Venezuela? CNN December 3, 2011.
society of the illegal armed groups that operate in Colombia. 26 The effectiveness of the OAS Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OAE) remains widely disputed. The United States government, President Santos closest ally, has praised the OAS s performance 27 in this regard where human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), have criticized the OAS Mission. 28 The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) continues to call upon the Colombian government as well as the guerrillas and the paramilitaries to protect the lives of human rights investigators as well as trade unionists, both of whom are still frequent targets of violence and assassination attempts. 29 The UN s human rights presence in Colombia stretches back to 1996 when the Office in Colombia of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) began its mission to monitor the human rights situation in Colombia and to work with the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement the recommendations of the Office s annual reports. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also works extensively in Colombia and throughout the region to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador. The UNHCR also launched a new internet campaign, in conjunction with 10 partner organizations, called Corre por la vida, Running for life, to provide greater assistance and relief to Colombian internally displaced persons (IDPs). 30 Land mines An unfortunate shared characteristic of many developing world conflicts is the widespread use of land mines and Colombia is no exception. In a country that averages 3 injuries and/or deaths daily due to land mines, the highest rate in the world 31, it is disturbing that so few of the armed groups admit to using land mines. 32 The Colombian government is a party to the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of land mines and must officially refrain from using land mines but the military s close connection to right-wing paramilitaries that refuse to disclose whether or not they use land mines impedes the government s efforts to completely disassociate itself from land mines. The FARC admit 26 Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the OAS for Monitoring of the Peace Process in Colombia, signed January 23, 2004, by the Secretary General of the OAS, César Gaviria, and President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 27 Eric Green, US Department of State, Report Reviews US-Backed Peace Mission in Colombia: US official says peace process in Colombia making progress September 8, 2006. Found at: http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2006/september/200609081217011xeneerg0.7633478.html 28 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Colombia: Sweden and Netherlands Should Withdraw Support for OAS Mission June 23, 2005. Found at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/23/colomb11214.htm 29 UN News Centre, Colombia: UN experts call for ending violence against human rights defenders April 30, 2008. Found at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=26515&cr=colombia&cr1= 30 UN News Centre, New UN Running for Life campaign spotlights plight of Colombia s displaced July 25, 2008. Found at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=27487&cr=columbia&cr1= 31 United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF), Deadly landmines threaten the lives and well-being of rural children in rural Colombia April 4, 2007. Found at: http://www.unicef.org/protection/colombia_39301.html 32 Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá, In Colombia, Land Mines Claim Three Victims a Day Folha de Sao Paulo February 22, 2006.
to laying land mines in Colombia but none of the other guerrilla groups claim to use these weapons. Colombia has the third greatest number of land mines deployed of any country in the world, behind only Cambodia and Afghanistan, and yet most of the likely parties to use them deny any purchases or deployment of these munitions. The United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF) has implemented classes to teach rural children about the dangers posed by land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) but the government, armed groups, international community, NGOs, and related civil society representatives need to increase their efforts to remove land mines throughout Colombia. The OAS program for Comprehensive Action against Anti-Personnel Mines (AICMA) initiated demining assistance in Colombia in 2005 and maintains a regional coordinator s office in Bogota. 33 Child Soldiers in Colombia The various disturbing components of the Colombian conflict are like the layers of an onion; as another layer is peeled away, another deeper, and likely related, problem is exposed. While the pernicious and debilitating impacts of child soldiers are most frequently associated with conflicts in sub-saharan Africa, they surface with disturbing regularity in Colombia, too. UNICEF estimates that are at least 6,000-7,000 child soldiers in Colombia, working with urban-based militias, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries. 34 These estimates may in fact be rather conservative; other estimates place the number of child soldiers in Colombia between 15,000-20,000. While obtaining reliable statistics on the total number of child soldiers is difficult under the best of circumstances, the global economic slowdown and/or crisis could easily add more impoverished children to the ranks of all sides in the Colombian conflict. 35 These children typically come from poor, marginalized communities. Some are abducted and forcibly recruited while others join the militias, guerrillas, and paramilitaries because of recruitment bonuses and access to economic opportunities and resources that would frequently be unavailable to them otherwise. A critical element of children ripe for recruitment include the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) under the age of 18. Cornell University researchers Charles Geisler and Niousha Roshani note that Whether during war or peace, there actually appears to be a strong relationship between the risk of recruitment during displacement and the risk of displacement as an outcome of recruitment. 36 UNICEF and many local and international NGOs are striving to provide vulnerable children and IDPs with needed supplies and services but all of the armed parties, including the Colombian government, must immediately stop recruiting child soldiers, demobilize current child soldiers, and cooperate with these organizations to end this shameful and utterly destructive practice. While the UN Office of the Special 33 Organization of American States (OAS), Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines January 15, 2010. Found at: http://www.oas.org/dsp/english/cpo_desminado.asp 34 UNICEF, Colombia: Background. Found at: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/colombia_2660.html 35 Reuters, Crisis means more child soldiers in Colombia-UN February 11, 2009. 36 Charles Geisler and Niousha Roshani, The Role of Young IDP s as Soldiers Colombia Journal June 17, 2006. Found at: http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia240.htm
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict has concluded that the Colombian government has made important progress in prohibiting the use of child soldiers in intelligence operations, the Secretary-General s Special Representative (SRSG) has expressed serious concerns that the Colombian government and the other parties involved have not adequately addressed the needs of both active and demobilized child soldiers. Referring to 63 child soldiers recently demobilized from the AUC, the SRSG noted that These children, however, were not formally handed over as per the requirements of the collective demobilization process, and there are concerns that a number of children have been missed-out in this process. 37 Plan Colombia During the 1990s, the US government began devoting greater attention to the violence in Colombia, linking this violence to the US-led war on drugs. In 2000, the Clinton Administration and the US Congress approved a 3-year $1.3 billion USD aid package through which the US would begin assisting Colombia militarily. Plan Colombia, as the aid package came to be known, was reauthorized and expanded by President Bush in 2003. While President Obama has reduced the Plan Colombia requests in his budget proposals to Congress, the total amount of Plan Colombia aid since 2000 has passed some $8 billion USD. 38 Plan Colombia has also included extensive fumigation efforts aimed at eradicating coca cultivation but these efforts have also destroyed traditional agricultural production in certain areas of Colombia. 39 While then Presidents Bush and Uribe cited Plan Colombia aid as highly effective and influential in improving the security situation in Colombia, extrajudicial killings by the official Colombian security forces rose in 2007, according to Amnesty International s latest report. 40 After the Ecuadoran government declined to renew the lease for the US naval base at Manta in 2009, naval personnel and assets were promptly moved to Colombia as a result of the October 2009 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Colombia and the US. 41 These proposals to expand the total number of US military facilities or bases in Colombia to a total of 7 were later ruled unconstitutional by the Colombian Supreme Court, meaning US forces would only be permitted at bases that existed before the signing of the 2009 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). 42 Recent Developments The Colombian government senses that the FARC is more vulnerable than it has been in years for several reasons. With the recent deaths of leaders such as Raul Reyes and Marín, the FARC has lost some of its most experienced commanders. Furthermore, 37 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Developments in Colombia. Found at: http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/colombia.html 38 Colombia Reports, US plans 15% cut to Plan Colombia February 14, 2011. 39 BBC News, Colombian governors decry coca fumigation efforts March 13, 2001. 40 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the World s Human Rights Found at: http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/americas/colombia 41 Globalsecurity.org, Plan Colombia National Consolidation May 7, 2011. Found at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/colombia.htm 42 The Guardian, Colombian agreement over US military bases unconstitutional August 18, 2010.
the Colombian military s recent successes have not only harassed the guerrillas but they have also disrupted the ability of the FARC to communicate and coordinate activities. Millions of Colombians have marched in demonstrations and protests in recent years, calling for an end to kidnapping and violence, with the most visible expressions of anger being directed towards the guerrillas. Since popular support is critical to the success of any guerrilla movement, the FARC must be concerned by the widespread condemnation of their tactics by many segments of the Colombian population. Bogota s confidence may be tempered, however, by recent developments. At the beginning of July 2008, Colombian soldiers rescued 15 hostages, including 2002 presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 3 US Department of Defense contractors. While the initial media reports were predictably glowing with praise for the Colombian government and military, the government later admitted that one of its soldiers wore the insignia of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on his uniform; according to many international legal jurists and scholars, this may well constitute a war crime. 43 The Colombian government claimed that this was an unauthorized gesture made by a nervous soldier; then President Uribe issued a formal apology to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) two weeks after the incident. Combating the culture of impunity for Colombian military and political leaders and inculcating a profound sense of respect for human rights must be a cornerstone of any sustainable peace plan for Colombia and the region. While President Uribe enjoyed high levels of popularity in Colombia, over 60 of his political allies in the Colombian Congress, including his cousin Mario Uribe, have been arrested and/or imprisoned due to their close connections to the paramilitaries. 44 Then Defense Minister Santos then removed 27 military officers, including 3 generals and 11 colonels, for ordering extrajudicial executions, including of civilians, and intentionally reporting civilian deaths as killed rebels. Within the next few years, hundreds of Colombian soldiers were arrested and put on trial for human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and intentional killing of civilians. 45 Peace in Colombia: An Achievable Goal Achieving peace in Colombia will not be easy; 60 years of war have left deep and lasting animosities and grievances throughout Colombia. While these tensions are palpable, it is also clear that the overwhelming majority of Colombians wish to end these fratricidal conflicts and focus on economic and human development initiatives. President Santos appears more willing to negotiate with the FARC leadership than Uribe but given the resilience of the guerrillas and many of the legitimate grievances that have caused so much violence and pain in Colombia that must still be addressed, it is likely that any negotiated settlement to the Colombian conflict may take years to design and implement. The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that military gains can pay off only if 43 The New York Times, Colombian Soldier Wore Red Cross Logo in Hostage Rescue July 17, 2008. 44 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia confronts its bloody past BBC News August 2, 2008. 45 Chris Kaul, In Colombia, 6 sentenced in false positives death scheme Los Angeles Times June 14, 2012.
combined with a political strategy that consistently pursues a swap of imprisoned insurgents for hostages in FARC captivity, reestablishes much needed working relationships with neighbors along borders and strongly advances integrated rural development to consolidate security and broaden Colombia s international support. 46 While these tactics may be promoted by outsiders, prisoner exchanges and negotiations were never the preferred strategies of the Uribe government, it still remains to be seen how the Santos government will react. In early April 2012, the FARC released its last 10 military and police hostages, although they are still holding an undetermined number of civilian hostages. 47 President Santos welcomed this prisoner release but declared that the FARC would need to release all prisoners before negotiations could resume. Regardless of whether the government and the guerrillas engage in future prisoner exchanges, it is essential that all armed groups commit themselves to sustained peace negotiations designed to bring about a comprehensive solution. The FARC has consistently called for demilitarization of Florida and Pradera municipalities in Valle del Cauca department but the Uribe government is steadfast in its refusal to create a demilitarized zone (DMZ). Colombia and the international community may also wish to examine the peace and reconciliation commissions that countries such as Chile, Guatemala and South Africa have instituted to investigate the human rights situation. Furthermore, the Colombian government, in concert with the international community, needs to inculcate a profound respect for human rights throughout its security forces and system of justice in order to regain the trust of millions of Colombian citizens. Clearing Colombia of land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) is a critical step in creating a stable environment for economic, human, and social development and the UN System and the international community need to assist Colombia in mine clearance. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and child soldiers must be included in any comprehensive settlement to the violence plaguing Colombia. Assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to return to their communities and to implement sustainable economic, human, and political development initiatives is another related element to any long-term comprehensive solution. Guiding Questions How can the UN System, the OAS, and neighboring countries assist Colombia in resolving the violent conflicts currently occurring? How might the international community bolster already existing initiatives aimed at providing assistance and relief of Colombian IDPs and refugees? How might the government of Colombia improve its relations with neighboring countries such as Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela? What new steps need to be taken to induce the FARC and other guerrillas to negotiate with the Colombian government? How might efforts to demobilize and disarm former AUC and other paramilitary fighters be strengthened and accelerated? How should 46 ICG, Colombia: Making Military Progress Pay Off April 29, 2008 p. 1. 47 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia s FARC releases hostages BBC News April 3, 2012.
Colombia most effectively accelerate the process of demobilizing, disarming, and potentially prosecuting and/or reintegrating commanders and fighters of the New Illegal Armed Groups (NIAG)? How can the UN System assist the Colombian government in more effectively integrating fundamental respect for human rights into the security forces and the system of justice? How can Colombia and the UN System ensure protection for civilians, particularly vulnerable and frequently targeted groups such as women, journalists, and labor activists? What actions, initiatives, or programs can the UN System and the OAS implement to accelerate the demining process in Colombia?