Modern Air & Space Power and Political Goals at War

Modern Air & Space Power and Political Goals at War Lt.Col. Güngör ÖZER * ABSTRACT Modern Air&Space Power is increasingly becoming a political tool. In this article, Air&Space Power as a political tool will be discussed. The primary purpose of this article is to search how Air&Space Power can provide contributions to security and also to determine if it may reach the political goals on its own at war by SWOT Analysis Method and analysing the role of Air&Space Power in Operation Unified Protector (Libya) as a case study. In conclusion, Air&Space Power may not be sufficient to win the political goals on its own. However it may reach the political aims partially against the adversary on its own depending upon the situations. Moreover it can alone persuade the adversary to alter its behavior(s) in war. Keywords: Air&Space Power, Politics, War, Political Goals, Strategic Air Attack, Military Coercion. 1. INTRODUCTION Modern Air&Space Power is increasingly becoming a political tool. In this article, Air&Space Power as a political tool will be discussed. This article aims to discuss and search how Air&Space Power can provide contributions to security and to determine whether or not it may reach the political goals at war on its own. The nature of politics and war, the relationship between political goals and military objectives in war, SWOT Analysis of Air&Space Power and the case study for the role of Air&Space Power in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) are going to be utilized in order to reach a result. Strategic air attacks, Air&Space Power in terms of military coercion, comparison of the military objectives with the political goals will be some of the points to be discussed in this article. 2. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND WAR First of all, the fundamental character of politics and the violent expression of politics called as war should be explained well. As Clausewitz states, It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. 1 War is viewed as an extension of national policy; however, not as a specifically separate activity as defined by armed conflict. It is of the utmost importance that modern policy guide modern warfare carefully and skilfully. Based upon Clausewitz s statement, it can be said that all types of wars can be considered as the acts of policy. Hence the military cannot operate independently of the political goals. The proper relationship of war and politics is that war must always be subordinate to policy and serve as a means to reach a political end. Warfare must not exist in the absence of policy nor without a political purpose guiding it. As policy and war are strongly related with each other before the war, they both must be interconnected even after the war starts as well. Therefore, policy should always be considered as the driving factor behind the war. As a course of action, the policy must be designated first and then a military plan must be prepared if required. But this relationship between policy and military plans should be flexible since political goals may change even during the war phase. For this reason, commanders should always have back-up military plans. It is certain that wars are made to achieve the political objective(s). So either politicians or commanders should take the followings into consideration. * gokalpbahar@hotmail.com phone: +90 507 747 48 41-1-

- Politicians should be very well aware of their own military capabilities. They must know what the military force can achieve and cannot. Moreover, the politicians should understand how to use the military to achieve the political goal(s). This is important for the politicians to give clear, decisive and attainable directives. - Policy is the driving force for war and military strategy is planned depending on policy. But policy makers must know that the political goals must be altered in case the military plan fails. - The commanders should well understand and be able to analyse the political goal(s) so that a right military strategy with the effective military plan and courses of action could be prepared. The two different terms used, policy and politics, both concern power. While every specific war has its unique causes, war as a phenomenon is fundamentally concerned with the distribution and redistribution of power. 2 Politics is the process by which power is distributed and cannot be characterized as a rational process. Policy, on the other hand, can be characterized as a rational process. Policy is a rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned purposes and actions of individuals in the political struggle. Hence, to describe war as an instrument of policy is entirely correct. It is an act of force to compel our opponent to do our will. Policy, while it is different from politics, is produced by means of a political process. 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL GOALS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN WAR It is important to understand the links among national strategy, military strategy, and other supporting strategies during a conflict. Without understanding of this fundamentally, it will be difficult to establish the appropriate relationship between policy and the military action intended to carry out the policy. In war, the national strategy focuses the instruments of national power on achieving its political ends or objectives as articulated by the political leadership. Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to attaining the objective of national strategy. 3 Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of national power towards the accomplishment of the political objectives of the overall national strategy. The departure point for military strategy, therefore, is the objectives of the national strategy. From this point, military strategy must identify a military goal or objective that will lead to accomplishment of the political objective. The military objective then provides the basis for the identification of specific ways to accomplish that objective. The selection of one of these courses of action and its further development results in a strategic concept that embodies the key components of the chosen military strategy. The military strategy is not developed in isolation from the other instruments of national power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives and strategies. Now it is time to analyse political goals in theory. Assessing war from many perspectives, there may be two basic political goals in war which are survival and triumph. Survival is overcoming the dangers and risks that originate from the enemy and it is assessed as the minimum requirement and goal in war. Survival is necessary for the presence of the population in that state. It is a prerequisite and a must for triumph and the continued existence of the political entity that is at war as well. On the other hand, triumph is a kind of result for the political aims of the war, an achievement of the political aims. Actually in either case, both sides lose the war, neither part wins the war and achieves the victory. What is necessary for the victory is the reestablishment of peace after victory. States go to war for several reasons. Those reasons may be such as protecting the country or seizing a valuable piece of territory, protecting people against an approaching potential threat or maintaining the balance of power in the region. No matter how they may vary, political objectives in war can be categorized as limited and unlimited. The difference between limited and unlimited political objectives are very fundamental. That is to say, a limited political objective is related to survival and remaining in power. But an unlimited political objective targets the elimination of the adversary. -2-

According to Clausewitz, there is a correct proportion between political and military objectives. Starting from this point, figure-1 indicates the proportional relationship between political and military objectives and also explains how political objectives guide the military ones. Figure-1. Limited and unlimited political objectives. 4 Figure-2 below shows the relationship between political and military objectives in terms of limited and unlimited (highend) ones. Political Objective Limited Political Objective Unlimited Military Objective Limited Military Strategy: Erosion Military Objective Unlimited Military Strategy: Annihilation Figure-2. Relationship between political and military objectives. Political and economical tools on international platform are used to make the enemy accept the political objectives of the state before the war starts. If those precautions do not work then it may be time to start using military power, So it can easily be said that war is the latest solution to the international crises and problems and the military strategy is used in order to make a contribution to reaching those political goals of that state. The reasonable and achievable political goals guide towards right military objectives. The wars whose objectives are not clearly articulated, and engagement that fails to show progress will eventually lose public support. A political strategy tightly coupled with achievable military objectives is the only way for the public to be able to judge progress. In today s modern World, people want to know when/how the war will be over. If we have a look at the subject in terms of public support, the American public is wondering why they are still in Afghanistan and Iraq since the political objectives for entering the wars in there were never clear from the beginning. Maybe the U.S. should make a broader assessment and re-create political goals and then revise the military plans again. It should be kept in mind that poorly stated political objectives will result in a military strategy that is vague and perhaps even unattainable. Removing the Iraqi Army from Kuwait was the political goal of the first Gulf War. And naturally the supporting military objective was in parallel with its political goal. It was easy to tell the American public what they were there for and when -3-

it was over since the goals were clear, attainable and decisive. The U.S. needs that level of clarity for the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq now. In Afghanistan, political goals might be listed as follows: 5 - The destruction of Al Qaeda s ability to conduct global terrorism, which included denying Al Qaeda sanctuaries for launching attacks, - Exacting retribution for the 11 September attacks, - Preventing the expansion/future development of global terrorism, - Getting maximum support for American actions from the rest of the World, especially from the Islamic World. In Iraq, distinct political goals guided the initial phase of America s war there 6 : - The removal of Saddam Hussein from power to eliminate his perceived capability to engage in terrorist activities on a global scale, particularly with weapons of mass destruction, After removing Saddam Hussein from power, the U.S. has pursued two key goals in Iraq: First, developing the necessary conditions to foster a democratic government; second, getting maximum support for American actions from the rest of the World, especially from the Islamic World. 4. AIR & SPACE POWER Air&Space Power can be defined as the ability to project power from the Air&Space Power to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events. 7 Around 30% of the World is land and 70% is water, but the air covers both land and sea. So the air power is absolutely essential in enabling all campaigns to be conducted successfully. This advantage of air power is spectacularly superior to army and navy. From this point of view, Air&Space Power is definitely going to be required in every phase of war such as peace time, crisis, operation, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace establishment, humanitarian assistance etc. Technology in aviation has made a great advance since the first air vehicle was invented in 1903. This advance has become both in civil aviation and in air operations. Throughout the history of air warfare, many war strategists and commanders said words of praise about air power. Among them, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery states; If we lose the war in the air we lose the whole war and lose it quickly. 8 Winston Churchill says the same in parallel to what Montgomery does, Air power may either end war or end civilization. 9 And what General Arnold says is not different from Churchill s and Montgomery s, A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security. 10 The purpose of this article hereby is to discuss the role of Air & Space Power in wars and to reach a conclusion whether it can accomplish political goals in war on its own. To start with, the best way to analyse Air & Space Power may be by SWOT method. SWOT ANALYSIS OF AIR & SPACE POWER Strengths of Air & Space Power Speed/Range / Height / Ubiquity / Flexibility Concentration / Precision / Lethality / Agility Opportunities Strategic Air Attack / Surprise Attack / Military Coercion / Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Weaknesses Brevity of Presence (Impermanence) / Limited Payload / Weather / Cost / Basing / Fragility Threats Lacks Persistence / Logistics Table-1. Analysis of Air & Space Power by SWOT Method. a. Strategic Air Attack: Strategic air attack is A military action carried out against an enemy s center(s) of gravity or other vital target sets, including command elements, war-production assets, and key supporting infrastructure in order to effect a level of destruction and disintegration of the enemy s military capability to the point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity 11. Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986, -4-

Israeli attack on Osirak Reactor in 1981, Israeli attack in Bekaa Valley in 1982 are a few examples for strategic air attacks. b. Surprise Attack: Elements of surprise attack are time, place, employment of new tactics, weapon systems, and equipment, speed of maneuver, deception and secrecy. Air & Space Power has the capabilities to fulfil these elements of surprise attack. In order to achieve a successful surprise, the attacker should use at least one of these elements. The more elements are used together in a good harmony the more successful the surprise attack is. In today s wars, air power with its strengths is very effective in accomplishing surprise attack. Six-Day War in 1967, Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 are a few examples for surprise attack. c. Military Coercion: Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave more differently than it otherwise would. 12 Based upon this definition, we can say that coercion has two meanings: compellence and deterrence. Deterrence is stopping an adversary from implementing an undesired action. Deterrence is a strategy intended to discourage an adversary from undertaking an action not yet started, or to prevent enemy from doing something that the other side does not desire. Deterrence dissuades through fear of punishment. Compellence is reversing an undesired action. Air coercion can be defined as the use of air power to pressure an opponent to behave in a different manner from usual, in the presence of air attacks. Air power is the most important instrument of modern military coercion 13 and identifies four coercive air strategies: punishment, risk, denial and decapitation. In today s wars, strategic air attacks with its strengths such as speed, range, flexibility etc can play a crucial role in coercing an enemy into adopting a desired course of action. Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is an example for military coercion. 5. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF AIR & SPACE POWER IN OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR-OUP 2011 (CASE STUDY) This case study intends to demonstrate that airpower was the main military capability used in the stabilization process and is the key for contemporary peace operations in the 2011 Libyan air campaign which is called as Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Given that the airpower represented the means for accomplishing the political purpose of protecting civilians in Libya, this case study will focus on the role played by the joint allied air forces during OUP. Another point is that airpower is an effective coercion instrument that can deliver results in a quick and precise manner with few casualties and collateral damage, capable of compelling any enemy to concede. According to NATO, OUP is considered as a peace support operation with a strong component of peace enforcement, given the fact that such mission includes an operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially. 14 The 2011 Libyan air campaign lasted seven and a half months, from the first launch of weapons on 19 March to 31 October 2011. Overall, 18 nations provided air or maritime assets and 34 nations provided other forms of support. 15 Over 260 aircrafts of the coalition force in OUP were used. With regards to Libya, one finds basically three categories of NATO countries: those that conduct offensive air operations; those that relegate their actions to air policing, effectively a non-combat role; and those which fail to appear at all. 16 From the beginning of the NATO operation till the end, a total of 26,323 sorties, including 9,658 strike sorties, were conducted. 17 However, it has to be kept in mind that the success in Libyan campaign was assured not only by the airpower, but by the naval one as well. But the role of naval power played in Libyan campaign will not be mentioned here since the focal point of this study is the role of air power. But this is not to say that the success of intervention fully belongs to the air forces; moreover other capabilities played a vital role in insuring the achievement of the mission s goal in Libya. -5-

The political goals of OUP both for NATO and for European Union (EU) were the removal of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the collapse of his regime and protecting civilians from the attacks of Gaddafi s regime. Depending on the subject goals, the military strategy for OUP was designated: A UN-mandated arms embargo, a no-fly-zone over Libyan territory, actions to protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack by military forces from the Qaddafi regime. And then courses of action for the military plan started to be carried out. As of March 8, 2011 NATO conducted 24-hour air surveillance of Libyan territory by the AWACS aircraft deployed for NATO s Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. Starting from March 23, 2011 NATO launched a maritime operation in order to enforce the arms embargo against the Libyan regime; during this operation, the participating vessels and aircraft monitored the Central Mediterranean off the Libyan coast and interdicted any vessels suspected of violating the arms embargo by carrying illegal arms or mercenaries. On March 27, the no-fly zone enforcement started under NATO`s command. On the same day, the expansion of the mission`s scope by NATO was announced in order to protect civilians and civilian areas through air strikes on Qaddafi s ground forces. The coalition air forces physically destroyed concrete measures of Gaddafi s armed forces and stopped the government from having control over its population. Air superiority, essential for these strategies was achieved rather swiftly by imposing the no-fly zone. Airpower was used in the peace enforcement operation in Libya also by identifying units of troops loyal to the regime from the army and not mere conscripts, by identifying governmental command and control nodes and attacking them by reducing civilian casualties so as to gain trust of the population, by reducing the regime s capability of attacking civilians. Thus, the Libyan intervention included counter-air operations, interdiction (by the installment of the no-fly zone), but also surveillance and reconnaissance. It can be affirmed that airpower in Libyan operation accomplished all roles attributed classically to air forces: aerospace control, force application (through strategic attacks and interdiction), force enhancement (through special operations, electronic combat and intelligence operations). In Libya, air operations ranged from defensive counter air to offensive counter air missions. Over 260 air assets ranging from fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuelers, AWACS, unmanned aerial vehicles and attack helicopters and also aircraft carriers were employed. During the air mission, over 26,500 sorties destroyed more than 5,900 military targets including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600 tanks or armoured vehicles. Airpower was thus used for operations aimed at destroying lines and nodes of communications, the enemy s military assets, but also for boosting the population s morale: because it did not have troops on ground, it was hard for the coalition to give an impulse to the population to fight against the regime; however, NATO attacked locations symbolic for the regime s power (for example, the state security headquarters in Tripoli) or dropped leaflets. Air interdiction was a great success during the Libyan campaign due to the achievement of air superiority. In operations in Libya, the traditional warfare shifted to asymmetric warfare. In this situation, air powers flexibility proved an extremely valuable asset for the Allies. An essential role in obtaining success was undoubtedly the ability to rapidly target and re-target, which became even more important after the shift from regular to irregular warfare. As a result, the 72-hours targeting cycle was shortened and the targeting planning cycle was drawn closer to execution in order that the Prioritized Target List would keep up with the swift developments on the battlefield. As there were no boots on the ground (at least directly), highly advanced Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets proved crucial, especially in the case of urban area targets. And when it comes to ground air strikes, it is important to mention that this air campaign was based on the principle of achieving maximum effect with minimum force, meaning that the use of precision-guided munitions used against targets in populated areas enabled the Allies to achieve their targets while reducing any civilian casualties to a minimum. A Human Rights Watch report indicated that NATO has failed to acknowledge 72 civilian deaths (including 20 women and 24 children) resulting from eight NATO air strikes and has not investigated potentially unlawful attacks. 18-6-

6. CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT War is a political instrument and a continuation of political activity by other means. War is viewed as an extension of national policy; however, not as a specifically separate activity as defined by armed conflict. It can be said that all types of wars can be considered as the acts of policy. Hence the military cannot operate independently of the political goals. The proper relationship of war and politics is that war must always be subordinate to policy and serve as a means to reach a political end. As policy and war are strongly related with each other before the war, they both must be interconnected even after the war starts as well. Therefore, policy should always be considered as the driving factor behind the war. So politicians should be very well aware of their own military capabilities. They must know what the military force can achieve and cannot. This is important for politicians to give clear, decisive and attainable directives. On the other hand, commanders should well understand and be able to analyse the political goal(s) for creating a right military strategy. There are two basic political goals in war which are survival and triumph. Survival is a prerequisite and a must for triumph and the continued existence of the political entity that is at war as well. Triumph is a kind of result for the political aims of the war, an achievement of the political aims. The politicians must designate reasonable and achievable political goals for the commanders right military objectives. The wars without clearly articulated objectives will eventually lose public support. It should be kept in mind that poorly stated political objectives will result in a military strategy that is vague and perhaps even unattainable. Air & Space Power with its capabilities such as speed, range, flexibility, concentrations and with its opportunities, is definitely going to be required in every phase of war such as peace time, crisis, operation, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace establishment, humanitarian assistance etc. in modern warfare. Airpower is inherently a strategic force rather than a tactical one. And it is increasingly becoming a political instrument in the last century as it was employed in several operations such as Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli attack on Osirak Reactor in 1981, Israeli attack in Bekaa Valley in 1982, Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986, Kosova and Bosnia Operations, Iraq Operation and lastly Libyan campaign. Airpower has been most effective when employed to fulfill limited objectives. In Libyan campaign, airpower demonstrated that it was the main military capability used in the stabilization process. Another point is that airpower is an effective coercion instrument that can deliver results in a quick and precise manner with few casualties and collateral damage, capable of compelling any enemy to concede. The missions implemented successfully by coalition airpower in Libyan campaign were establishing air superiority, 24-hour air surveillance by AWACS, counter-air operations, interdiction, reconnaissance, aerospace control, force application through strategic attacks, air-to-air refueling, dropping leaflets in terms of psychological operations. The OUP showed that the strategy of boots off the ground has many advantages when it can be employed. It results in comparatively low casualty rates and low costs when especially precision guided munition were employed. The NATO-led air operations had certainly a paramount role within all parts of the OUP; this mission proved that air assets form a critical component of modern military operations which can significantly contribute to its success. Nevertheless, the role of sea power and also, to a certain extent and more indirectly, of land power to the mission should not be overlooked in a temptation to overestimate air power qualities while ignoring its obvious limitations. To conclude, air power is indeed effective but it delivers its best results while being integrated with land and sea forces. Therefore, each service should develop with the other two members of the team in cooperation, not in competition, as all military assets or components should rather be joint. -7-

REFERENCES [1] Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, The American Bombing of North Vietnam, 1989, p.1. [2] Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, The Free Press, New York, 1973, p.114. [3] Strategy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1, U.S. Marine Corps, 12 November 1997, p.40. [4] Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English, The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945, Oxford University Press, New York& Oxford, 1994. http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/bassford/cie/toc.htm [5] Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, The American Bombing of North Vietnam, 1989, p.221. [6] Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, The American Bombing of North Vietnam, 1989, p.222. [7] Air Staff Ministry of Defence, British Air&Space Power Doctrine, AP 3000, Fourth Edition, p.7. [8] Robert F. Grattan, The Origins of Air War, The Development of Military Air Strategy in World War I, Oxford Publishing Services, 2009, p.174. [9] Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 14 March 1933. [10] Herman S. Wolk, Fulcrum of Power, Essays on the United States Air Force and National Security, Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003, p.96. [11] Air Force Basic Doctrine, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1997, p.51. [12] Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Confronting Iraq U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War, RAND Cooperation, 2000, p.6. [13] Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell University Press, 1996, p.55. [14] NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Edition 2012, Version 2, p.2. [15] Lessons Offered from The Libya Air Campaign, Royal Aeronautical Society, p.3. http://aerosociety.com/assets/docs/publications/specialistpapers/libyaspecialistpaperfinal.pdf [16] Dr.Christian F. Anrig, Allied Air Power over Libya, Air & Space Power Journal, Winter 2011, p.92. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2011/2011-4/2011_4_09_anrig.pdf [17] NATO and Libya, Operational Media Update, 23 October 2011. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111024_111024-oup-update.pdf [18] Ruxandra BOSILCA, Airpower in contemporary interventions: stabilization, coercion, peace enforcement and peacemaking. Case: Operation Unified Protector, Libya 2011, INCAS Bulletin, Volume 5, Issue 2, Bucharest- Romania, April-June 2013, p.84. -8-