Notes on Policy Repercussions of The New Economics of the Brain Drain

Similar documents
The Client s System in the Czech Labour Market: Brokers, Immigrants and Employers

The new economics of the brain drain

Integration Challenges the German Experience

WORLD ECONOMICS. The New Economics of the Brain Drain. Volume 6 Number 2 April - June By ODED STARK. Reprinted from

Toil and Tolerance: A Tale of Illegal Migration

CEDI. Working Paper No CEDI DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Revised May 2007

CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE EASTERN POLICY OF THE EU

Highly skilled migration from Poland and other CEE countries myths and reality

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate

DEMOCRACY PARTNERSHIP ENLARGEMENT

Unemployment and the Immigration Surplus

V. MIGRATION V.1. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

Europe, North Africa, Middle East: Diverging Trends, Overlapping Interests and Possible Arbitrage through Migration

Chapter Ten Growth, Immigration, and Multinationals

HISTORICAL REGIONS DIVIDED BY THE BORDERS

Newsletter III. 1. Received grant announcement. 1. Received grant announcement General Assembly meeting in Warsaw December

Political Integration of Immigrants: Insights from Comparing to Stayers, Not Only to Natives. David Bartram

Between brain drain and brain gain post-2004 Polish migration experience

Riccardo Faini (Università di Roma Tor Vergata, IZA and CEPR)

Options for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in 2014

Remittances and the Macroeconomic Impact of the Global Economic Crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan

Commentary on Session IV

MIGRATION IN TURKEY CONFERENCE Transformation of Opportunity and Risks in the Country from Emigrant to Immigrant

Questionable Achievement: EC-Ukraine Visa Facilitation Agreement

Discussion Paper. The Slovak Republic on its Way into the European Union. Eduard Kukan

8th German-Nordic Baltic Forum

MC/INF/267. Original: English 6 November 2003 EIGHTY-SIXTH SESSION WORKSHOPS FOR POLICY MAKERS: BACKGROUND DOCUMENT LABOUR MIGRATION

POVERTY, TRADE AND HEALTH: AN EMERGING HEALTH DEVELOPMENT ISSUE. Report of the Regional Director EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part I Immigration Theory and Evidence

Review of implementation of OSCE commitments in the EED focusing on Integration, Trade and Transport

Problems and Challenges of Migrants in the EU and Strategies to Improve Their Economic Opportunities

Part I Immigration Theory and Evidence

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 21 May /08 ADD 1 ASIM 39 COAFR 150 COEST 101

Public Oversight System in Poland

EXAMINATION 3 VERSION B "Wage Structure, Mobility, and Discrimination" April 19, 2018

Internationalism in Higher Education: A Review

Emigrants (EU15) 11,370 2,492 8,988 22,850

KEY MIGRATION DATA This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this UZBEKISTAN

Labour migration after EU enlargement ESTONIA. Siiri Otsmann Labour Policy Information and Analysis Department Ministry of Social Affairs

Chapter 9. Labour Mobility. Introduction

NAZI VICTIMS NOW RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION SURVEY A UNITED JEWISH COMMUNITIES REPORT

Study. Importance of the German Economy for Europe. A vbw study, prepared by Prognos AG Last update: February 2018

Czech Republic in the Unsecure World: What Does the Foreign Policy Community Think?

Memorandum to the UK Presidency. Putting refugee protection at the heart of the Hague Programme

THE HOMELAND UNION-LITHUANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS DECLARATION WE BELIEVE IN EUROPE. 12 May 2018 Vilnius

Transnational Migration: New Challenges for Nation States and New Opportunities for Regional and Global Development

Skilled Worker Migration and Trade: Inequality and Welfare

From the President. By July Your Excellency,

The Pull Factors of Female Immigration

THE CZECH EXPERIENCE

Profile of Migration and Remittances: Estonia

Economic aspects of Croatian emigration

NEW MONITORING REPORT

2011 HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON YOUTH General Assembly United Nations New York July 2011

Migrant Acceptance Index: Do Migrants Have Better Lives in Countries That Accept Them?

PRACTICAL MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN POLAND TO REDUCE ILLEGAL MIGRATION

14.54 International Trade Lecture 23: Factor Mobility (I) Labor Migration

EU15 5,424 2,322 3,706 11,452

Executive Summary. International mobility of human resources in science and technology is of growing importance

Bilateral Migration Model and Data Base. Terrie L. Walmsley

Brain drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries. Are there Really Winners?

EU15 53,908 24,699 31, ,544

immigration: how advanced is the debate?

5. Trends in Ukrainian Migration and Shortterm

Labour Migration in Lithuania

Migration and Development

Migration and Education Decisions in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Framework

International Business Economics

Seminar on Gender-Sensitive Labour Migration Policies. Logistical Modalities

Migration, Intermediate Inputs and Real Wages

The Legal Framework for Circular Migration in Belarus

Does government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test

Remittances, Migration and Inclusive Growth: The Case of Nepal

Labour migration and the systems of social protection

Tilburg University. Can a brain drain be good for growth? Mountford, A.W. Publication date: Link to publication

SOUTH AFRICA KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

CARIM-East Methodological Workshop II. Warsaw, 28 October 2011

DIASPORA POLICY IN LITHUANIA: BUILDING BRIDGES AND NEW CONNECTIONS

Brain Drain and Emigration: How Do They Affect Source Countries?

EF.FR/4/05 26 May 2005

Migration and Remittances 1

EEF.DEL/3/09 19 January 2009

Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Countries: Country Study on Germany

Armenia, Migration & the Sustainable Development Goals

BELARUS. INTERNATIONAL RATINGS

Attracting skilled international migrants to China A review and comparison of policies and practices

The Outlook for EU Migration

Remittances by Country and by Type of Worker -

Losses and gains to developing countries from the migration of educated workers : an overview of recent research, and new reflections

Emigration and source countries; Brain drain and brain gain; Remittances.

Quantitative Analysis of Migration and Development in South Asia

Konrad Raiser Berlin, February 2011

An overview of the migration policies and trends - Poland

Cross-Border Mobility in the OSCE Region ( )

Illegal Migration and Policy Enforcement

THE EFFECTS OF LABOUR FORCE MIGRATION IN ROMANIA TO THE COMUNITY COUNTRIES-REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES-

ideaforum The Polish Law on the Supreme Court in light of rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union

List of Projects. Peter Havlik

WE PROMOTE FREEDOM, TRUTH AND COMMON SENSE IN PUBLIC DEBATE

Transcription:

Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Center for International Relations Reports&Analyses 16/06 Oded Stark Notes on Policy Repercussions of The New Economics of the Brain Drain The Report has been published in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States within the project 'Transatlantic Security Challenges and Dilemmas for the European Migration Policy'. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ul. Emilii Plater 5, 00-688 Warszawa TEL.: () 646 5 67, FAX: () 646 5 58 www.csm.org.pl, info@csm.org.pl

Notes on Policy Repercussions of The New Economics of the Brain Drain by Oded Stark Universities of Bonn, Klagenfurt, and Vienna; Warsaw University; ESCE Economic and Social Research Center, Cologne and Eisenstadt Mailing Address: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse, D-511 Bonn, Germany; E-Mail Address: ostark@uni-bonn.de - 1 -

1. Whom to admit when the concern of the receiving country is the wellbeing of those who stay behind in the sending country 1.1 Let labor be the only production input in the home country H. Let the output, hence the gross earnings, of any worker in H be an increasing function both of the worker s own skill level and of the economy-wide average skill level. Let there be two types of worker - low ability, unskilled workers, and high ability, skilled workers. Let the fractions of the two types be 1 each. Let the level of skill of the unskilled be θ, and let the level of skill of the skilled be θ, where θ > θ. The low ability workers cannot acquire a skill level that is higher than θ. The high ability workers can optimally choose how much human capital to acquire. Let θ be normalized at zero. Then, to begin with, the average skill level in H is 10 + 1 θ θ = (1) Let the earnings of a worker whose skill level is θ 0 be higher in the developed country of destination, D, than in H. Let θ neither depreciate nor appreciate upon migration, and let the employers in D discern θ accurately and instantly upon a migrant s arrival. Hence, any H country worker will be better off if he migrates to D. 1. If a fraction of the unskilled leave, what will the effect be on those who stay behind? Suppose that 1 4 of the unskilled leave. Then, the new average skill level at H will be 0+ 1 θ 4 4 7 7 θ 4 = () Since θ > θ, all those who stay behind gain by virtue of the new average skill level at H 4 1 7 being higher. - -

1. Suppose, alternatively, that 1 4 of the skilled workers leave. Clearly, the consequent average skill level at H will be 10 + θ 4 7 7 θ 4 = () Since θ < θ (recalling (1)), the new average skill level is lower and hence, every H 1 7 country worker who stays behind will therefore be worse off. In a static framework, a D country that is concerned about the wellbeing of those who stay behind at H, if faced with a choice of either admitting unskilled workers from H or skilled workers from H, will thus want to admit unskilled workers from H. 1.4 But suppose that, in line with the New Economics of the Brain Drain (Stark, 005), we have a dynamic setting: the prospect of migrating to D induces the skilled (high ability) workers to acquire more human capital, θ, such that θ = 4 θ + ε, where ε is any positive number, however small. Then, not only will the unskilled who stay behind gain from the migration of the skilled, they will gain more than they would have gained if 1 4 migrated. If θ = 4 θ + ε, then the new average level of human capital at H will be ( ) 01 + θ + ε 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 4 of the unskilled = θ + ε > θ (4) 4 Hence, if θ > θ, the unskilled who stay behind will indeed gain more. 1.5 The lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the migration policy of a benevolent D cannot be oblivious to the responses to the policy, to the incentives that the policy triggers, and to the impact of those responses on the wellbeing of those who stand to be affected by the policies indirectly. - -

. How and why the migration policy of the receiving country will be paradoxically shaped when there are incentives to form human capital.1 Let there be n workers in H: n low ability workers with skill level θ =, and n high ability workers with skill level θ = 6, such that skill level θ was formed when the probability of migration to D was 1 4. The skill level θ was formed independently of the probability of migration and cannot be affected by (changes in) that probability. The D country is not able to decipher the skill levels of individual migrant workers; it can only decide on the numbers that it admits. At the outset, the average skill level at H, θ, is 4, as is the average skill level of the migrant workers, assuming that the shares of the workers of the two skill types in a migration flow are the same as their shares in the population of H.. Let D seek to have the average skill level of the migrants at a level higher than 4, indeed, higher than 5 which is the current average level of human capital at D. If D could select, it would admit only those whose skill level is 6, thereby achieving its objective. But it cannot. So let us consider the repercussions of D increasing the probability of migration from 1 4 to, say, 1 such that, as a consequence, while those whose skill level is θ do not acquire any additional human capital, the high ability workers now acquire 6+ + ε units of human capital. The new average level of human capital of the migrants (like that of those who stay behind at H), will be + (6+ + ε ) = 5+ ε > 5 (5) Thus, D benefits, the unskilled who stay behind benefit (since 5+ ε > 4), and the migrating skilled benefit (assuming that they expose their 6+ + ε units of human capital to a superior rewarding production environment at D). If the skilled who stay behind are also better off, then everyone is better off. - 4 -

Note that raising the probability of migration from 1 4 to 1 entails a doubling of the numbers of both the skilled migrants and of the unskilled migrants.. A lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the dynamic consequences of a migration policy could invite a policy that appears somewhat paradoxical: to overcome the adverse repercussions of the presence of unskilled workers in the incoming migration flow, more unskilled workers are admitted. September 006 Reference Stark, Oded. 005. The New Economics of the Brain Drain, World Economics 6, pp. 17-140. - 5 -

Center for International Relations WHO WE ARE? The Center for International Relations (CIR) is an independent, non-governmental think-tank. The Center s primary objective is to monitor the current international situation, giving special attention to Poland s foreign policy and to countries of strategic importance to its execution. CIR is especially focused on issues dealing with European integration, transatlantic relations and the relations with our neighbors, notably Germany, Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus. CIR s activity is of an analytic and educational nature. Over the last decade we have managed to build up a forum which has allowed for serious debate concerning foreign policy. In this way we propagate in Poland a modern view of international relations. Towards this end CIR prepares reports and analyses, holds conferences and seminars, publishes books and articles, carries out research projects and organizes public debate. The Center cooperates with many leading research institutions dealing in foreign affairs, worldwide. The President of the CIR is Mr. Eugeniusz Smolar. OUR ADDRESS: ul. Emilii Plater 5, 00-688 WARSZAWA tel. (0048-) 646 5 67, 646 5 68, 69 8 98 fax (0048-) 646 5 58 e-mail: info@csm.org.pl You are welcome to visit our website: www.csm.org.pl OUR SPONSORS: The Ford Foundation The Stefan Batory Foundation The Konrad Adenauer Foundation Robert Bosch Foundation German Marshall Fund of the United States The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation Office of the Committee for European Integration European Commission Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland Ministry of Defense of Poland WestLB Poland S.A. The Reports and Analyses of the Center for International Relations are available online at the CIR website: www.csm.org.pl 6