The division of Europe 1945-9 was unprecedented and neither planned nor desired by the Allies. Why did it happen? The story of the division of Europe in the aftermath of World War II is a complex one. It is a story which is shaped not only by the entirely disparate mindsets of two superpowers, but also by the haunting spectre of Germany and its past. While it was certainly unplanned and undesirable for the Allies at the outset, it would eventually become convenient to divide up Germany and, essentially by proxy, Europe as a whole. Underpinning the entire period was the fact that the US and the USSR simply saw things, to put it simply, in two completely different ways. Soviet views of what caused the war, what would prevent another one and their basic ideology of how the world should be run was so completely opposed to the way the US saw things that conflict was, if not inevitable, then very likely. Europe would be the battleground for this war of ideas and its division would run along these lines. As early as 1941 (Pressnell & Hopkins, 1988, 223-224) meetings had begun taking place - firstly with just Roosevelt and Churchill, but quickly with Stalin as well with at least part of the discussions focusing on the question of what to do with Europe after the war had ended. Even at these early stages, however, it was not hard to see that conflict was almost inevitable. Then-Czech President-inexile Edvard Benes, for example, quite accurately contended (1942, 228-231) that areas of strife would include the makeup of post war Germany (both economically and in terms of its boundaries), much of Eastern Europe and the involvement of the Soviet Union in proceedings. The first of these factors would prove to dictate events almost entirely, while the latter two would merely be strong contributing factors. Judt (2005, 102-103) notes that Roosevelt was happy to put off discussions of the future of Germany at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 precisely because he believed it was going to be such a contentious issue. This, however, would have consequences because much of the territorial division would eventually be decided by where the various invading armies stood when the Germans
surrendered. Much of western Germany was controlled by American and British forces, while the Russians had come in from the east and had that side of the country, as well as much of Eastern Europe. The two key cities in Hitler s former territory, Berlin and Austria, would become sub-divided in themselves along similar lines. The lay of the land in occupied-germany as well as the similar division of Berlin itself in 1945 (mapsof.net) In understanding the outcome of the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 and, indeed, the events which set in motion the division of Europe as a whole we must understand the mindsets of both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time. The formerly great European powers were now simply a nonentity. Britain was spent (and ruined economically), France humiliated and Germany forced into complete submission. The shape of Europe was to be decided exclusively by Harry S Truman and Josef Stalin. Schlesinger (1985, 938-939) observes that Truman was under significant pressure to bring the boys home and wash his hands of the entire European situation. Stalin, meanwhile, wanted to preserve the territory he had gained during the war, gain a foothold for Communism in Europe and ensure that the Soviet Union would be the dominant force in the area. Critically, however, Stalin misread the situation and American intentions spectacularly. Ironically, this would draw a previously reluctant United States back into the struggle and set the stage for a Cold War which would last for nearly half a century. (Schlesinger, 1985, 939-940) In the meantime the Soviet Union made tremendous,
controversial gains in the Potsdam Treaty itself. The German border would be shifted to below prewar levels in Soviet favour; Poland was opened up to communist influence as well as its borders moved; Germans living in areas that had now been rezoned were to be expelled and the Russians were granted significant reparations from their zone of occupation. (Potsdam, 1945) Germany would remain the key element of things moving forward. The Russians wanted to continue to utilise the remnants of the country to fuel its own recovery. Similarly, they saw this as a way of ensuring Germany s deindustrialisation, which in turn would guarantee that they would never be a threat again. The western allies, meanwhile, saw the resource-rich country as a key element in the economic recovery of Europe and its continuing growth as paramount. At the Moscow conference of March-April 1947, the western allies continued to push a plan for the rebuilding economically of their West German section, with a view to eventually allowing it to be self-reliant. The Soviets, meanwhile, were pushing for a unification of Germany with a view to reparations being then drawn from the more prosperous western region of the country. Fearing that this would lead to Germany essentially becoming entirely under Soviet influence, this was refused. (Judt, 2005, 124) As a result, negotiations essentially came to a halt. Germany seemed doomed to become partitioned and this, though not what they had initially intended, became convenient for the west in particular. The section of Germany which they occupied was, as mentioned, the most valuable to them economically and without it the reconstruction of Europe would prove extremely difficult. Unable to risk this region coming under the Soviet sphere of control, partition seemed like the easiest, if not the best option. (Judt, 125-128, 155) The next key element in the evolution of the division of Europe was the Marshall Plan. The purpose of the plan was to inject significant amounts of money into Europe in order to rehabilitate her financially. It was offered to all European countries, including the Soviet Union itself as well as its neighbours in Eastern Europe. Maier (2005, 168-170) argues that Marshall Aid essentially ensured division as it openly threatened to involve America in Soviet spheres of influence. Prior to this a situation in which the Soviet Union may have been contented with having communist influence politically in certain Western Europe countries such as France while the US happy enough to see democracy and open-trade get a fair shot in Eastern Europe was still something of a possibility. The
Marshall Plan, however, ensured a worst case scenario and spurred the Soviet formation of Cominform in response. Described as a co-ordination of communist interests in the area, it was actually a ploy by Stalin to ensure Soviet domination of the area. (Judt, 2005, 143) Many of the Eastern European states had to be coerced to fall in line with the Russians, Judt contends (2005, 132-137), and Stalin looked to move quickly in order to ensure that they did not accept Marshall Aid. Maier (2005, 172) points out the political brilliance of offering Marshall Aid to the Soviets and the countries within their sphere of influence. By doing so they placed the decision of dividing Europe firmly into the hands of Stalin and company. Acceptance of the plan would further American influence and ideals into Eastern Europe while rejection would isolate communist parties in Western Europe. In effect, it would also force Stalin to draw the battle lines upon which the yet un-named Cold War would be fought. In the same breath Maier also questions the morality of such a power play by the United States as while Marshall Aid provided prosperity for millions of Western Europeans, forcing Stalin s hand in such a manner also doomed many people in the East to poverty and starvation. In the aftermath of all this, George F Kennan s seminal X document (also known as The Long Telegram ) resulted in containment became the name of the game for the United States. The lines had been basically down the middle of Europe through Germany and preserving democracy and economic growth in Western Europe while pushing back communist/soviet advances was deemed to be most important. Tensions would be further heightened in the aftermath of the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the final chapter of the division of Europe during this period would be written with the unprecedented formation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1949. (Judt, 2005, 148-149) NATO members (which included all of the major players such as the US, UK, France as well as other key states such as Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Spain amongst others) pledged to come to each other s defence in case of attack, presumably from the Soviet Union itself. (Judt, 2005, 148) What followed was a focused period of rearmament and a huge statement of intent on behalf of the Western world
against the Soviet Union. Similar to the formation of Cominform in the aftermath of Marshall Aid, the formation of NATO would eventually result in the Soviets drawing up the Warsaw Pact in 1955 which included all of the major nations of the Eastern European Soviet bloc. The division of Europe was now complete, with both sides now formally bound together economically, politically and militarily. (Judt, 2005, 149-151) The main victims of this final division would be the countries in Eastern Europe which, unfortunately, fell under Stalin s sphere of influence. Both Judt (2005, 135-140, 426-428) and Maier (2005, 173) note the horrific effects that many of the people of these areas felt in the aftermath of the fall of the iron curtain. It is interesting to note that while the nature of the conflict was almost certainly worsened by Soviet paranoia over American intentions, as can be viewed in Novikov s famous long telegram of his own in September 1947, the opposite is also true. Paterson (1986, 7) recounts a quote from Kennan himself in which he states that the image of Stalinist Russia poised and yearning to attack the West, and deterred only by our possession of nuclear weapons, was largely a creation of the Western imagination. In light of this, it can certainly be argued that the formation of NATO was at the very least reactionary (in light of the Czech coup) and at the worst, completely unnecessary and inflammatory. Similarly the political brilliance of backing the Soviets into a corner of sorts via the Marshall Plan could also be argued as being divisive in a manner that was not entirely warranted at the time. The division of Europe in the four years following the end of the second World War was principally caused by the desires of the two new world superpowers the United States and the USSR to assert their ideologies upon what was essentially a conquered continent. Both aspirations were the result of their different reasons for the initial cause of the war. The US, believing that the social and economic difficulties imposed by the First World War were the root of the unrest, saw instilling democracy as a way to promote growth which would result in prosperity and, as a result of this, stability. The USSR, meanwhile, saw fascism as essentially capitalism run amok. It was their belief that the only way to build a cohesive Europe was to snuff it out in order to ensure that we did not see another Hitler. Similarly, they saw the subjugation of Germany as being a key part of this process, while the western
allies understand that its rejuvenation was needed in order to rebuild Europe. In the end, it was something that was certainly avoidable in a number of ways. The key differences in terms of Soviet and American mindsets and their mutual suspicion of each other would result in lines being drawn that were simply not required. At its root (and all of the key developments can be linked back to this) the division of Europe was caused by the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to put their differences aside and work together. Bibliography Benes, E. (1942). The Organization of Postwar Europe. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, 226-242. Crook, C. (2007). Europe. Foreign Policy, No. 161, 22-24, 26-27. Fuchs, R., & Demkbo, G. (1978). The Postwar Mobility Transition in Eastern Europe. Geographical Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 171-182. Judt, T. (2005). Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. London: Vintage. Maier, C. (2005). The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe. Journal of Cold War Studies, 168-174. mapsof.net. (2011, March 20). Occupied Germany and Berlin. Retrieved March 20, 2011, from Mapsof: http://mapsof.net/germany/static-maps/png/occupied-germany-and-berlin Mazower. (2000). Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West. International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 58, Wartime Economies and the Mobilization of Labor, 275-282. Paterson, T. (1986). The Origins of the Cold War. OAH Magazine of History, 5-9, 18. Pressnell, L., & Hopkins, S. (1988). A canard out of time? Churchill, the War Cabinet and The Atlantic Charter, August 1941. Review of International Studies, 223-235. Schlesinger, J. (1985). The Eagle and the Bear: Ruminations on Forty Years of Superpower Relations. Foreign Affairs, vol 63, no 5, 937-961. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945. (n.d.).