Roberto García Moritán

Article 1 Object and Purpose The object of this Treaty is to: Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms; Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion; for the purpose of: Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; Reducing human suffering; Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties. Roberto García Moritán 1. Introduction The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the result of nearly two decades of intense advocacy and diplomacy. 1 It is also a historical novelty in that it is the first international arms control instrument of its kind, and as such represents an important step forward in regulating and restraining the international trade in conventional arms and related items as defined in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Treaty. The ATT, through the creation of international standards to regulate the international conventional arms trade, in part seeks to address one of the structural conditions that lead to and escalate armed violence and conflicts: the supply of arms. As the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General has noted: [T]he importance of addressing root causes has become critical in a world confronted with new and emerging threats [ ] A broader understanding of security has led to the strengthening of the collective commitment of the United Nations to protect civilians and those most vulnerable to violence on the basis of the rule of law (UNGA, 2008, para. 6). In this regard, the ATT represents a change in how the international community defines and addresses common security challenges. In adopting the ATT, States are seeking to improve oversight over international arms transfers by addressing the trade more from the human security perspective, by looking at a range of possible negative impacts from the use of conventional arms and seeking to prevent them. The object and purpose, representative of the essential goals of the ATT, captures this shift. 2. Negotiating History Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that [a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Therefore, the object and purpose of the ATT is fundamental to interpreting and implementing it. Throughout the negotiations, Article 1 went through numerous evolutions. However, the genesis of these evolutions began with the 2006 General Assembly resolution that initiated the ATT process within the United Nations (UN). The preamble of that resolution stated, in part: Recognizing that the absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms is a contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism, thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development. The preamble in a further 2008 General Assembly resolution (63/240) on the ATT stated, in part: Determined to prevent the diversion of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, from the legal to the illicit market. From these initiatory UN resolutions, two related but divergent objectives were present: the need for international standards to regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and the need to prevent the diversion of conventional arms to the illicit market. Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier 23

This dual approach springs from the different conceptions by States of the purpose of the Treaty. For some States the object of the ATT was initially circumscribed to addressing illicit transfers of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons. 2 These States considered that the main purpose of the Treaty should be to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade: a replica largely of the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA) (UNGA, 2001). In this context, they argued that the ATT should not contain restrictions on the legal international trade in conventional arms. Such arguments stemmed in part from fears of a reduced capacity to import conventional arms, which would be dependent on the exporter undertaking an assessment of risks (including risks that the arms would be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law). 3 Russia, seen as an important State in the negotiations given its prominent role in the international arms trade, consistently questioned the usefulness of the future Treaty. It regarded the main purpose of the Treaty as countering arms trafficking and diversion to criminal or terrorist organizations rather than as setting up administrative export procedures. 4 The majority of the UN Member States held more comprehensive views. While recognizing the urgent need and efforts to prevent the illicit trade in and diversion of conventional weapons, many considered that the ATT should be an instrument to regulate the legal trade, starting from the premise that a globalized trade needs global rules and standards. Moreover, it was recognized that most conventional arms in the illicit market initially entered into circulation legally: addressing the illicit market therefore requires greater clarity at the international level on what constitutes the legal trade. 5 Some States, including some major arms exporters, had more economically based reasons for supporting the international norm building, regulatory approach. Some major exporters already are required to follow strict national export controls and comply with existing regional commitments such as the European Union Common Position on Arms Exports (EU, 2008). The normative approach would help to ensure that other major existing or emerging exporters were subject to similar constraints, an argument often stated as levelling the playing field (Garcia, 2014). The final text sensibly recognizes both approaches. Article 1 of the Treaty contains the two distinct yet interconnected objectives: creating international standards for the legal trade, and preventing and eradicating the illicit trade. 3. Analysis of Article 1 The object and purpose of a treaty speaks to a treaty s essential goals and plays an important role in guiding States behaviour. The object and purpose also sets the interpretative framework for the remaining articles of a treaty. 6 The object and purpose guides States behaviour in a number of central ways. For example, a State that has signed or ratified a treaty is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty prior to its entry into force (VCLT, Art. 18). Also, a State may not make a reservation to a treaty that is incompatible with its object and purpose (VCLT, Art. 19(c)). In interpreting its obligations under a treaty, a State is guided by Article 31 of the VCLT requiring that [A] treaty shall be interpreted [...] in light of its object and purpose. While the object and purpose of the ATT will be achieved through the collective implementation of all the obligations in the ATT, certain provisions speak more specifically to obligations States Parties are required to implement in order to achieve the object of the Treaty. For example, Article 5(2) requires States Parties to establish and maintain a national control system, setting the foundation of a regulatory system at the national level. Article 6 (Prohibitions) and Article 7 (Export and Export Assessment) set out the requirements for when a transfer must be prohibited and the risk assessment procedures States Parties must undertake when considering authorization of an export, creating an international baseline of export and transfer controls. The measures States Parties are to take to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion are addressed in different articles throughout the ATT, though most specifically in Article 11 (Diversion). 24 Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier

4. Purposes 4.1 Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability That one of the purposes of the ATT is to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability is not surprising. The ATT was negotiated under the auspices of the UN, one of whose purposes is: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace (UN Charter, Art. 1(1)). Further, under the authority of Article 11 of the UN Charter, UN General Assembly Members may: [c]onsider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments [ ]. Another important Charter element in the maintenance of international peace and security is Article 51, which provides for the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Article 51 is intimately connected to the global arms trade as it is through the transfer, export, import and retaining of conventional arms that States are enabled to lawfully implement this right. 4.2 Reducing human suffering Working towards international peace and security is integrally connected to reducing human suffering. As noted by the UN Secretary-General, achieving security to reduce human suffering must be done on the basis of the rule of law (UNGA, 2008, para.1). The destructive effect of the arms trade on international peace and security is well attested, particularly where such trade is unrestrained, irresponsible or illegal. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has noted: [w]hile the availability of weapons alone is not the cause of violations of humanitarian law or deterioration in the situation of civilians, the experience presented here indicates that the proliferation of arms can be a major factor in facilitating such violations and aggravating the plight of civilians during and after armed conflict (ICRC, 1999). At the same time, the use of conventional arms is also a necessity in providing stability, in particular for legitimate national self-defence, peacekeeping and law-enforcement operations undertaken in accordance with international law. Such use is also an important element in reducing human suffering. The UN Secretary-General has noted: [UN] Member States remain central providers of security; this is their sovereign right and responsibility, to be performed in conformity with the rule of law. To effectively execute these tasks, their armed forces, police and other security forces legitimately employ a range of weaponry [ ] Governments also have a responsibility to ensure public safety and a vested interest in providing human security and development to their citizens (UNSC, 2008a, para. 2). The object and purpose of the ATT employs a tandem approach towards achieving a reduction in human suffering. The ATT recognizes that ensuring rigorous controls on the legal international trade is necessary to protect and safeguard civilians. These controls, consistent with international legal obligations and humanitarian and human rights principles, are stated throughout the ATT (for example, Article 7 of the ATT sets out the regulatory mechanism that places various duties upon States Parties to assess whether their arms exports might be used to carry out international crimes or human rights or humanitarian law violations). The ATT also recognizes that the diversion from the legal trade into the illicit trade must be prevented to reduce its many negative impacts on civilians. In addition to ensuring robust national controls, States Parties must consider risks of diversion of a potential export and take appropriate mitigation measures to address such risks, in addition to a range of information sharing and cooperation measures with other States Parties. Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier 25

4.3 Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties Promoting transparency in the international arms trade has consistently been seen as an important component in achieving international peace and security. The UN General Assembly has repeatedly stated that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States (UNGA, 2013). 7 Transparency is also a key to responsible action by States Parties as greater transparency means greater accountability by States for their activities in the global arms trade. To achieve this purpose States Parties are required to report on measures to implement the Treaty as well as provide annual reports of actual or authorized exports and imports of the conventional arms included within the scope of the Treaty (Article 13). Transparency and responsible action by States will certainly be the foundation that the Conference of States Parties is built upon. Such mechanisms will build confidence in the ATT regime, and enhance trust and mutual cooperation. The need for cooperation amongst States Parties is infused throughout the Treaty text. Often cooperation takes the form of information sharing. For example, States Parties are required to share information on their national control lists (Art. 5(4)), importing States Parties are required to provide appropriate information to an exporting State Party when requested (Art. 8(1)), and importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States are required to exchange information to mitigate the risk of diversion (Art. 11(3)). All States Parties are to take active measures to prevent illicit trafficking. States cannot achieve this without international cooperation. Here, reporting and information sharing will be key: all actors in the global trade need to have as complete information as possible on the activities in the legal trade to be able to identify and analyse diversion routes. Without such cooperation, preventing diversion will be futile. 5. Conclusion The ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014. The success of the Treaty is now dependent on how States comply with their obligations and implement them to ensure their national controls are as robust as possible. Commitment to reporting requirements and active participation in the Conferences of States Parties will also be key to the ATT s success in meeting its object and purpose. The overwhelming support for the adoption of the ATT in the UN General Assembly with 154 States in favour 8 can be seen as reflecting a broader understanding of security and the importance of addressing root causes. The ATT is certainly not a panacea. But by seeking to regulate the global trade in conventional arms through a standard-setting treaty, the ATT is indicative of the increasing recognition by the global community of the need to address structural factors that contribute to human suffering. Endnotes 1 The adoption of the ATT was the culmination of many years of complex negotiations within the United Nations framework, including three sessions of a group of governmental experts, an open-ended working group, four sessions of a preparatory committee, and two diplomatic conferences (UNODA, 2013a, p. 93). 2 India, for example, stated: We believe that the main objective of this instrument should be to prevent the illicit trade in conventional arms including their diversion to illegal and criminal use particularly by terrorists (India, 2012). Russia stated: We consider that the primary goal of a possible document should be countering arms diversion to illicit circulation. Therefore, we see our main goal in preventing the diversion of arms to illegal traffic (Russia, 2010). 3 Pakistan, for example, stated: An arms trade treaty must steer clear of controversial criteria that can be misused by major producer states for political and strategic interests (Pakistan, 2012). Egypt stated: International accountability is the only guarantee against abuse of the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world, in particular when linkages are made between arms transfers and international humanitarian law (Egypt, 2012). 26 Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier

4 Russia, for example, stated: We have been outspoken in favor of consolidating the efforts of the international community aimed at blocking the channels down which arms drain away from legal trade to black markets. We shall not solve all problems, of course, but we shall promptly make access to terrorists and criminals to arms much more difficult thus reducing the number of victims of armed violence (Russia, 2012). 5 Costa Rica stated: Costa Rica will pursue a treaty that establishes universal and legally binding criteria by which States determine the authorization or denial of arms transfers on a case-bycase basis (Costa Rica, 2012). Germany stated: We believe that the trade in conventional arms urgently requires more and appropriate regulation on a global scale (Germany, 2012). South Africa stated: The ATT should be an international instrument that fills a glaring gap that currently exists in the global arms control system (South Africa, 2012). 6 The object and purpose as a fundamental component in a treaty is recognized in the fact that VCLT uses the term object and purpose eight times: Articles 18, 19(c), 20(2), 31, 33, 41, 58(1) and 60. 7 See also, resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992, 48/75 E of 16 December 1993, 49/75 C of 15 December 1994, 50/70 D of 12 December 1995, 51/45 H of 10 December 1996, 52/38 R of 9 December 1997, 53/77 V of 4 December 1998, 54/54 O of 1 December 1999, 55/33 U of 20 November 2000, 56/24 Q of 29 November 2001, 57/75 of 22 November 2002, 58/54 of 8 December 2003, 60/226 of 23 December 2005, 61/77 of 6 December 2006, 63/69 of 2 December 2008, 64/54 of 2 December 2009, and 66/39 of 2 December 2011, entitled Transparency in armaments. 8 An overwhelming majority of 154 countries voted in favour, with 3 against (the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic) and 23 abstaining (UNGA, 2013b). Bibliography Costa Rica. 2012. Statement of Costa Rica at the High-Level Segment: Arms Trade Treaty Diplomatic Conference. 2 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120705/member%20states/ 2012.0705_Costa%20Rica_SE.pdf> Egypt. 2012. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mootaz Ahmadein Khalil, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations in New York before the High-Level Segment of the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. New York. 5 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120705/member%20states/ 20120705_Egypt_E.pdf> EU (European Union). 2008. Council Common Position Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment. 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December. Garcia, Denise. 2014. Disarming the Lords of War: A New International Treaty to Regulate the Arms Trade. Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations. 23 December. Germany. 2012. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Dr. Peter Wittig, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations at the High-Level Segment of the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. 6 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120709/20120706_germany_e.pdf> ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). 1999. Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict: A Study Presented by the ICRC. Geneva: ICRC. Ref. 0734. India. 2012. Statement by Ambassador Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at the Plenary of the Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. 10 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120710/20120710_india_e.pdf> Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier 27

Pakistan. 2012. Statement by Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. 9 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120709/20120709_pakistan_e.pdf> Russia. 2010. Elements to be Discussed in the Context of a Potential ATT. Introductory remarks by the delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2012 UN Conference on the ATT.. 2012. Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). 9 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120709/20120706_russia_e.pdf> South Africa. 2012. Statement by Mr. Johann Kellerman, Director: Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of International Relations and Cooperation. 5 July. <http://www.un.org/disarmament/att/statements/docs/20120706/member%20states/ 20120706_South%20Africa_E.pdf> UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs). 2013. UN Disarmament Yearbook. Volume 38. Part II. UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2006. Resolution 61/89 Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms. Adopted 6 December. A/RES/61/89 of 18 December 2006.. 2008. Report of the Secretary-General: Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform. A/62/659 (and S/2008/39) of 23 January.. 2013a. Transparency in Armaments. A/RES/68/43 of 10 December.. 2013b. General Assembly Meetings Coverage. GA/11354 of 2 April. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2008. Report of the Secretary-General, Small Arms. S/ 2008/258 of 17 April. VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 1969. 1155 UNTS 331. 28 Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories: (a) Battle tanks; (b) Armoured combat vehicles; (c) Large-calibre artillery systems; (d) Combat aircraft; (e) Attack helicopters; (f) Warships; (g) Missiles and missile launchers; and Paul Holtom 1. Introduction Article 2 Scope Arms Trade Treaty (Article 2 ) (h) Small arms and light weapons. 2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as «transfer». 3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that State Party s ownership. Article 2 is a key article of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It outlines the scope of the conventional arms (items) and the activities of the international arms trade to which the ATT applies. Article 2(1) lists the main eight categories of conventional arms covered by the Treaty, but it does not provide definitions for these categories. The categories of conventional arms covered by the ATT are directly relevant to many of the provisions of the Treaty and serve as a point of reference for the scope of the items covered by Articles 3 and 4. Article 3(1) defines the types of ammunition/munitions covered by the Treaty as those that can be fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered by the eight categories listed in Article 2(1). The same approach is taken to determine the parts and components covered by Article 4, which are to be in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered by Article 2(1). Article 2(2) defines a 'transfer' as the activities of the international arms trade that comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, but again Article 2 does not provide definitions for these activities. Provisions of the Treaty relating to these activities are found in Articles 5-10, as well as Articles 11, 12 and 13 on diversion, record keeping and reporting. 2. Negotiating History The scope of the Treaty was one of the critical issues addressed during the ATT negotiations, given the scope's application to all the substantive provisions in the Treaty. Discussions on the scope included both the range of conventional arms and related items and the activities that States would be expected to control as well as those items and activities States would exclude. The negotiations essentially addressed the following questions: What are 'conventional arms' for the purposes of the Treaty? What activities constitute a 'transfer' in the international arms trade for the purposes of the Treaty? As will be shown, the architects of the ATT were only able to provide limited responses to these questions, with the details left for each State Party to elaborate and establish in their own national control systems. 2.1 What are 'conventional arms' for the purposes of the Treaty? One of the most challenging aspects of the preparations for the United Nations (UN) Conferences on the ATT in 2012 and 2013 was the deliberation on the conventional arms to be included within the scope of the ATT. Early in the UN process on the ATT, which began in 2006, approximately a third of the over 100 States that submitted their views on the Treaty to the UN Secretary-General called for the inclusion or adoption of an existing list to be used to define the scope of items to be covered, referring variously to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), the European Union Common Military List and the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (Parker, 2007, pp. 5-6). The Group of Governmental Experts Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier 29

Arms Trade Treaty (Article 2 ) (GGE) established to examine the feasibility, scope and draft parameters of an ATT considered proposals for items to be included in the scope (UNGA, 2008, Part V) as did the subsequent Open-Ended Working Group (UNGA, 2009, Part B). The spectrum of views expressed by States during 2007-2008 on the scope of items to be included in the ATT ranged from those States that wanted to include only the seven categories of arms contained in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register) to those States that wanted to use the 22 categories on the munitions list of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement). States that were supportive of using the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) categories to define the scope wanted the ATT to apply to as comprehensive a list of conventional arms as possible, so drew upon the WA Munitions List to make proposals. This Munitions List is used by the 41 Participating States in the WA as the basis for their national lists of conventional arms and other military equipment subject to export controls. The scope of the WA Munitions List is regularly reviewed and amended by national technical experts from participating States. It currently consists of 22 categories that cover a wide range of weapon systems and military equipment, from small arms to ships, as well as ammunition, information and communication technologies, training equipment, and equipment, parts and components for producing arms. The categories therefore cover not only conventional arms, but also 'related items' and a wide range of military and security force equipment, as well as ammunition, parts and components. Conversely, other States proposed using the much narrower range of seven categories of the UN Register as the main reference point when considering the scope of items to be covered by the ATT. The UN Register was established by the UN General Assembly in 1991 (UNGA, 1991a). Under the Register, States are requested to provide information on the import and export from the preceding calendar year of major conventional weapons designed for offensive military operations within the following seven categories: I. Battle tanks; II. Armoured combat vehicles; III. Large-calibre artillery; IV. Combat aircraft; V. Attack helicopters; VI. Warships; and VII. Missiles and missile launchers (UNGA, 1991). Of those States that used the UN Register as their basis for negotiations on scope, different approaches were taken. A number of States sceptical of the value of the ATT (including China and India) initially advocated that the scope should not go beyond the seven categories of the UN Register. In contrast, other States from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean used the UN Register as a starting point but called for small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition and other military equipment and items to also be included. As a result, during the negotiations the scope of the ATT was discussed as a formula in which other categories could be added to the seven of the UN Register. For example, the so-called '7 + 1 formula' referred to seven categories in the UN Register plus an additional category for SALW (UNGA, 2010). The '7 + 1 + 1 formula' referred to the UN Register as the basis for the scope of the ATT, but called for two additional categories to be added: SALW and ammunition. The UN Register was also used as a basis for States wanting to broaden the items included within its seven categories. During the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in 2010, the facilitator of scope discussions noted that while some States called for a strict application of the seven UN Register categories, other States called for those categories' descriptions to be broadened or replaced with new titles, such as: Tanks Vehicles and armoured vehicles (including reconnaissance/electronic warfare/control of troops/troop transport etc.) 30 Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier

Artillery systems (75mm+) Aircraft fixed wings and variable geometry wings (manned/unmanned including reconnaissance/electronic warfare/refuelling/troop transport) Helicopters rotary wings (manned/unmanned including troop transport) Naval surface vessels and submarines (manned/unmanned) Missiles and Missile Launchers, guided and unguided, including torpedoes. Arms Trade Treaty (Article 2 ) In addition, the facilitator listed another group of 'other' conventional arms beyond the seven categories, which included: Small arms and light weapons Conventional arms and equipment used in law enforcement and internal security operations Combat support equipment, including training equipment, protective personnel equipment, military electronics, fire control/range finder/optical/guidance control equipment. A third category of 'related items' was also listed, which included: Parts and components for covered arms and items Technology to manufacture, modify, repair covered arms and items Ammunition and munitions for included arms and systems Explosives, specifically designed or modified for military purposes and clearly defined Other military systems, specifically designed or modified for military use, including: electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, transportation and training devices Dual-use items (UNGA, 2010). The President's discussion paper prepared for the 3 July 2012 start of the UN Conference on the ATT drew upon this list of items but did not include the distinctions between conventional arms and 'related materials'. 1 The draft text on scope stated: This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms, including, inter alia, those arms and related materiel that falls within the following categories, either unmanned or manned, whether exported in complete, partially assembled or unassembled form. a. Tanks b. Military vehicles c. Artillery systems d. Military Aircraft e. Military Helicopters f. Naval Vessels (surface and submarine vessels) g. Missiles and Missile Launchers (guided and unguided) including launching apparatus h. Small Arms i. Light Weapons j. Ammunition/Military Munitions k. Parts or components specially designed for any of the categories listed in subparagraphs (a)-(i) of this paragraph (UNGA, 2012a, Art. 4.A.1). Weapons and International Law: the Arms Trade Treaty (1 July 2015) Larcier 31