The 2015-16 Third Circuit Update & A Primer on Johnson and its Aftermath with Ron, Tammy & Fritz
Where Have All The Oral Arguments and Opinions Gone?
Guess which circuit holds the fewest oral arguments? (Hint: it s the same one that issues the fewest published opinions.)
The percentage of the Court s cases in which it heard argument over the same period:
Search and Seizure
United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2015) Facts: Philadelphia Police receive an anonymous tip of a black male wearing a grey hoodie with a gun in his waistband talking to a female at 914 N. Markoe St. Issue: When was Mr. Lowe seized for purposes of the reasonable suspicion necessary under Terry v. Ohio. Holding: Mr. Lowe was seized when the he froze in response to the police show of authority, and the police did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop and frisk.
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2015) Facts: Messers. Nagle and Fink were co-owners and, respectively, the President/CEO and Chief Operating Officer and Board Chairman of a concrete manufacturing and construction corporations that defrauded the Government. The FBI executed two search warrants at the corporations offices, seizing and imaging the computers and the file server. Issue: Did the owners of these closely held corporations have the necessary legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge the search? Holding: No, while the corporate entities could make a challenge, Nagle and Fink would have to show a personal connection to the places searched or the materials seized.
Trial Issues United States v. Kolodesh, 787 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2015) No issue of prosecutorial misconduct in the Government s use of translation of Russian recordings, which involved vulgar language, because the defendant had previously stipulated to the truth and accuracy of the recordings and the statements were relevant to the conspiracy. United States v. Edwards, 792 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2015) Government comments during closing argument on a defendant s right to remain silent were not harmless. The Third Circuit found that the remarks violated the prohibition in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2015) In an extortion under color of right prosecution based upon fraudulent IRS refunds, the fact that the defendant could not have actually influenced the IRS is not determinative. Rather, the focus is on the victim s state of mind and what she believed. United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378 (3d Cir. 2015) Where the Government argues in closing based upon a theory not charged in the indictment, in this case, accessory after the fact, it amounts to a constructive amendment of the indictment and violates the Fifth Amendment. Washington v. Sec y Dep t of Corr., 801 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2015) Co-defendant s statement was insufficiently redacted under Bruton and its progeny that it was transparent to the jurors that it referred to the defendant.
United States v. Steiner, No.14-4628, 2016 WL 827989 (3d Cir. March 3, 2016) Although the Court was deeply troubled by the Government s admission of evidence respecting an unrelated arrest of the defendant, the error was harmless. The discussion on the admissibility of evidence to complete the story under Rule 404(b) is informative and the Court points out the limited circumstances where such evidence may be admissible. The District Court, in a possession of ammunition charge under Section 922(g), was not required to instruct the jurors that they had to be unanimous as to each type of ammunition. The defense maintained that such an instruction was necessary because the indictment was duplicitous in charging, in one count, the possession of different types of ammunition.
United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2015) District Court lacks jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release unless a summons or an arrest warrant are issued before the term expires. The jurisdictional deadline is not subject to equitable tolling and an order by the court directing the issuance of a summons is insufficient.
Sentencing Issues United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2015) Applying a Government Benefit calculation for loss and subtracting from the loss figure the value of the performance of the contracts United States v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc) Finding a constitutional sentencing error where the defendant was subject to mandatory seven-year sentence for brandishing a firearm, when such fact had not been found by a jury as required by Alleyne v. United States, U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Although the defendant received an 84-month sentence, the Court declines to find the error harmless even though the same sentence would have been imposed under the Guidelines.
United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2016) Cross-examination of defendant as to factual issues of guilt or innocence during allocution when he had not contested such issues constituted plain error and required re-sentencing. United States v. Lopez-Esmurria, No. 14-4166, 2015 WL 6468060 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2015) The Court declined to find an Apprendi or Alleyene error in connection with drug quantity findings at sentencing when the jury specifically found otherwise for purposes of the mandatory minimums. However, the Court remanded for a re-sentencing because the District Court s findings were based upon those in the presentence report and Probation s findings were premised upon unstated assumptions of drug quantities that no witness testified to.
JOHNSON What s the big deal?
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) Residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges and produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates. Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague because it ties the assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ordinary case of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements and leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony. Increasing a defendant s sentence under the residual clause denies due process of law. Overruled James and Sykes.
Justice Antonin Scalia 1936-2016 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) force clause Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) residual clause
Armed Career Criminal Act 18 U.S.C. 924(e) 15-year mandatory minimum term for felon-in-possession if defendant has 3 prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense violent felony means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year: Force Clause: offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another Enumerated Offenses: burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives Residual Clause: offense that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
Pre-Johnson World Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): Adopts formal categorical approach ( generic burglary) Shepard, 544 U.S. 13 (2005): documents for modified categorical approach James, 550 U.S. 192 (2007): examine language of a statute & application of state courts (FL attempted burglary of a dwelling) Begay, 553 U.S. 137 (2008): predicate offenses must be similar in kind to enumerated offenses purposeful, violent, aggressive (DUI) Chambers, 555 U.S. 122 (2009): predicate offenses must be similar in kind and degree of risk to enumerated offenses (escape failure to report)
Pre-Johnson World Johnson, 559 U.S. 133 (2010): violent physical force required under force clause (FL battery by touching) Sykes, 564 U.S. 1 (2011): similar in risk to closest analog among the enumerated offenses (Indiana flight from law enforcement by vehicle) Descamps, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013): modified categorical approach applies only if statute is divisible; does not apply if statute is overbroad and has single, indivisible set of elements (CA burglary)
Overbroad, Indivisible... with liberty and justice for all!
Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) Divisible Statute: one or more elements in the alternative Prosecutor must select element and jury must be unanimous e.g., burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile one crime corresponds to generic crime and other does not court may look to additional documents (Shepard) to determine which offense (generic or non-generic) formed the basis of the defendant s conviction
Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) Indivisible Statute: overbroad, sweeps more broadly than generic offense e.g., an entry as opposed to an unlawful entry conviction under the statute is never a conviction of a generic offense not alternative elements but alternative means or methods US v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014)(Pa terroristic threats overbroad) US v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485(4 th Cir. 2015)(sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion indivisible and not COV) factfinder is not unanimous on the means or methods
Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) Modified Categorical Approach applies to divisible statutes only if at least one but not all divisible sections matches the generic version, courts may used approved documents to determine which section applied if the elements do not match the generic version, the inquiry is over
Mathis v. United States, No. 15-6092 (cert. granted Jan. 19, 2016; argument set for April 26, 2016) Issue: whether the modified categorical approach may be used whenever there is an or between methods of committing the offense or may be used only when those methods are actually elements, i.e., the factfinder must find one or the other to convict * See footnote 2 in Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2285
Other Implications of Johnson Guideline Definition of Crime of Violence U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) Firearm Used, Carried or Possessed in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence 18 U.S.C. 924(c) Other firearms offenses 924(a)(6)(B), 929(a)(1) Statutory Definition of Crime of Violence 18 U.S.C. 16 Illegal Reentry 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) Three Strikes 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) Restitution 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i) Release and detention 18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4)
U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) The term crime of violence means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
COMMENTARY Application Note 1 Crime of Violence includes: the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such acts. Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a) (e.g., a sawed-off shotgun, sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb or machine gun)
COMMENTARY AFTER JOHNSON If the Commentary and the Guideline it interprets are inconsistent, the Guideline controls. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). The Commentary has no freestanding definitional power. US v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 340-41 (4 th Cir. 2015)( the government skips past the text of 4B1.2 to focus on its commentary, but it is the text, of course, that takes precedence. ) US v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53 (1 st Cir. 2016)( hopeless to rely on Application Note)
References to Crime of Violence Definition in 4B1.2 Career Offender U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)(2) Firearms Offenses U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 Supervised Release Violations U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(1)
CAREER OFFENDER U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 Enhancement (assigns different Offense Level and Criminal History Category VI) applies if: (1) the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least 2 prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. * Johnson challenge to instant offense and predicate offenses
PROPOSED AMENDMENT Effective August 1, 2016: deletes residual clause revises enumerated offenses murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or use or possession of firearm in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a) or explosive material defined in 18 U.S.C. 841(c) adds definitions in Commentary for forcible sex offense and extortion keeps language in Commentary about conspiracy and attempts
RETROACTIVITY FPD handling motions to correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 Welch v. United States, No. 15-6418 (cert. granted Jan. 8, 2016; argument set for March 30, 2016) DOJ Position: Johnson is retroactive for all ACCA cases (direct review and collateral review). Johnson applies to pipeline Guideline cases but not on collateral review. US v. Gumfory, 4:14-CR-0228 (Doc. 35 Govt Brf).
FIREARMS 924(c) Firearm Used, Carried or Possessed in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence For purposes of this subsection, the term crime of violence means an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Note: No enumerated offenses & force is against person or property
Johnson Applied to 924(c) US v. Bell, 2016 WL 344749 (N.D. Cal.) US v. Edmundson, 2015 WL 9582763 (D. Md.) US v. Lattanaphom, 2016 WL 393545 (E.D. Cal.)
Be Aware Of Other Firearms Offenses References to 924(c): 924(g) interstate acquires, transfers, or attempts to... a firearm 924(h) knowingly transfers a firearm 924(j) causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm 924(o) conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(6)(B): 922(x) transferring a gun or ammunition to a juvenile 18 U.S.C. 929(a)(1) armor piercing ammunition
18 U.S.C. 16 The term crime of violence means (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Note: no enumerated offenses & force is against person or property
Illegal Reentry 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) Increased statutory maximum for an alien who enters the United States after a previous removal which was subsequent to the commission of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) Subsection (F) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16 for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year See also U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) 8 level increase to offense level if defendant was convicted of an aggravated felony * Commentary of 2L1.2 has own definition of crime of violence without residual clause
Johnson Applied to 16 Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9 th Cir. 2015) US v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7 th Cir. 2015) US v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 2016 WL 537612 (5 th Cir.), reh g en banc granted, 2016 WL 766980 (5 th Cir. 2016)
WHAT S LEFT? Enumerated Offenses ACCA: burglary, arson, extortion, involves explosives Career Offender: murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, sawed off shotgun or involves explosives (pending amendment) (None in 924(c) or 16) Force Clause has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person (ACCA & Career Offender: not property)
Fighting the Enumerated Offenses Focus is on Elements of the Generic Crime e.g., Generic Burglary (1) unlawful or unprivileged entry into or remaining in (2) a building or structure (3) with intent to commit a crime (Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599)
Fighting the Enumerated Offense Step 1: Find Generic Offense Step 2: Compare the Elements Step 3: Is Statute Indivisible or Divisible? If statute is overbroad or indivisible, inquiry stops. If statute is divisible, make sure one of the alternative elements meets the generic offense. Then look to Shepard documents to determine if that particular offense was the basis for the conviction. (Descamps)
Burglary Wins US v. Evans, 2015 WL 9480007 (W.D. Pa.)(1992 PA burglary not COV following Descamps) US v. Bayya, 2015 WL 8751795 (D. Oregon)(first degree burglary in Oregon not ACCA predicate) US v. Cornejo-Lopez, 2015 WL 7274060 (D. Neb.)(attempted burglary in Nebraska not ACCA predicate) US v. Welch, 2016 WL 536656 (2d Cir. 2016)(NY attempted burglary in second degree not COV) US v. Maldonado, 2016 WL 229833 (2d Cir. 2016)(NY attempted burglary third degree not COV)
Fighting the Force Clause Johnson v. United States, 599 U.S. 133 (2010) physical force not defined so give it ordinary meaning violent force that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person connotes a substantial degree of force when the adjective violent is attached to the noun felony, its connotation of strong physical force is even clearer force strong enough to constitute power
Fighting the Force Clause Step 1: Does the Statute have as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force? Step 2: Is Statute Indivisible or Divisible? If statute is overbroad or indivisible, inquiry stops. If statute is divisible, make sure one of the alternative elements meets the generic offense. Then look to Shepard documents to determine if that particular offense was the basis for the conviction
Key Issues to Remember Requires violent force not unwanted touching Force must be directed against a person, not property (ACCA & CO) Requires the use of force, not merely the causation of physical injury Force must be used intentionally, not recklessly or negligently Just because the word force is in the statute may not be violent physical restraint may not be enough offenses based on absence of legally valid consent don t qualify
CHALLENGE AND PRESERVE!! The Third Circuit gets it wrong and they admit it. US v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 2014)( While it may be tempting to examine the conduct underlying a given conviction, as the District Court did, the Supreme Court now says we cannot. )
PA Statutes Resisting Arrest US v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460 (3d Cir. 2010)(COV under residual) Fleeing or Attempting to Elude US v. Townsend, 2015 WL 9311394 (3d Cir. 2015)(not COV following Johnson) US v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2014)(no element under force clause and not enumerated, COV under residual)
PA Statutes Aggravated Assault Commonwealth v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. 2005)( evidence of the use of force or the threat of force is not an element of the crime of aggravated assault. ) US v. Knight, 2016 WL 223701 (D.N.J. 2016)(NJ statute not COV)
PA Statutes Simple Assault US v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 1999)(COV under residual) US v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009)(intentional or knowing violation of (a)(1) is COV under residual) US v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2014)(finds (a)(1) divisible) But see Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2006)( physical menace in subsection (a)(3) COV under force clause of 16)
PA Statutes Robbery US v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2013)(divisible after Descamps) US v. Hollins, 514 Fed. Appx. 264 (3d Cir. 2013)(robbery by force however slight not force clause but COV under residual) US v. Dobbin, 2015 WL 7873596 (3d Cir. 2015)(threat immediate serious bodily injury satisfies force clause) US v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9 th Cir. 2015)(CA robbery not ACCA violent felony)
PA Statutes Recklessly Endangering US v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010)(after Begay mere recklessness cannot constitute COV) Terroristic Threats US v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014)(after Descamps not COV)
Federal Offenses Commonly Paired With 924(c) Hobbs Act Robbery 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) US v. Standberry, 2015 WL 5920008 (E.D. Va.)(is COV) Carjacking 18 U.S.C. 2119 US v. Sandoval, 2016 WL 632212 (D. Nev.)(is COV) US v. Tsarnaev, 2016 WL 184389 (D. Mass.)(is COV) Bank Robbery 18 U.S.C. 2113 US v. Green, 2016 WL 277982 (D. Md.)(is COV)
Some Success US v. Edmundson, 2015 WL 9311983 (D. Md.)(conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery not COV) US v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4 th Cir. 2015)(sex trafficking by fraud, force or coercion not COV) US v. Litzy, 2015 WL 5895199 (S.D.W. Va. 2015)(OH robbery third degree not COV) US v. Jordan, 2016 WL 556729 (8 th Cir. 2016)(Arkansas aggravated assault not ACCA predicate)
More Success US v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204 (10 th Cir. 2015)(TX aggravated sexual assault not COV) US v. Maldonado, 2016 WL 229833 (2d Cir. 2016)(NY attempted burglary third degree not COV; also federal phone count no longer qualifies) US v. Bell, 2016 WL 344749 (N.D. Ca. 2016)(robbery of govt property not COV but assault of federal officer is COV)