By Renatas Norkus Lithuania s Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally In this essay, I will attempt to raise a few observations that stem from the experiences of a small ally. Indeed, ever since the invitation of 2002 to join NATO, my country has regarded missions abroad as one of the main tasks for the armed forces. It is quite a remarkable departure from the focus on national defence. Such buzzwords as usability, deployment and sustainability have replaced the notions of total defence and territorial forces and now dominate our thinking and guide our military reforms. Why such a shift? The process of our accession to NATO coincided with dramatic changes in the security situation and ensuing global campaign against terrorism. Having invested so heavily in achieving NATO membership, we had no wish to see the Alliance becoming irrelevant in the post-9/11 environment and took the phrase out of area, or out of business with full seriousness. We endorsed NATO s transformation agenda and, yet again, had to reshape our military to fit the notion of NATO going global. The level of our commitment and ambition is well reflected in our decision to lead a PRT in Afghanistan a very demanding, mobilising but also enriching enterprise for our Armed Forces. There is quite a number of lessons learnt stemming from our decade-long participation in international operations. Although the title of this essay alludes to a small state perspective, the same challenges are almost universally applicable to NATO Allies, EU member states and the PfP countries, big or small. Let me make it clear - for me personally, it does not matter, which organization UN, NATO or the EU will put up the flag for any given operation the most important thing is to get the job done. It is not a matter of which flag to use, but a matter of getting the right capabilities to the right place at the right time. All NATO and EU members as well as PfP countries need rapid reaction forces capable of full-spectrum operations, regardless of which organization will take Renatas Norkus is Undersecretary for Defence Policy and International Relations at the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania. This essay is based on a presentation, delivered at the PfP Conference on Defence Policy and Strategy, 3-4 October 2005, Helsinki, Finland. The views expressed in this essay do not necessarily represent the official position of the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania. 167
SMALL ALLIES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATION Volume 8, 2006 action. It is therefore absolutely crucial that UN, NATO, EU and OSCE cooperate and coordinate their military and civil efforts in the ongoing and planned international operations. All these organisations and their members face two types of challenges when conducting international operations: political and military. Starting with political challenges, the first of them is choosing between standing alliances and ad hoc coalitions to pursue national interests. True, Lithuania is involved in NATO-led, EU-led and U.S.-led campaigns. Yet our interest is to ensure that NATO is not reduced to a mere toolbox, a peacetime training and standardisation organisation that never plans and conducts actual operations. Ad hoc coalitions might offer the advantage of greater flexibility for a leading nation, but their stability and longevity often presents a challenge. Each state in a coalition is driven by its own national interests and domestic political dynamics even under most severe of threats. These interests have to be constantly monitored by a lead nation, striving to sustain a coalition. Sometimes such an effort is not rewarded, and some nations inevitably leave coalitions. This can be painful politically and disturbing militarily, as a pullout of even the smallest contribution can upset a well-planned campaign. The lead nation has to plan how to plug the resulting gaps, mostly with its own forces, which prompts to maintain certain reserves and diminishes the advantage of burden-sharing so intrinsic to coalitions. It seems that it would be much more difficult for nations to abruptly leave from UN, NATO or EU-led operation. Maintaining the effectiveness and cohesion of the organisation in charge of the operation is in the best interest of all its members, I wish to believe. Is it not the case that an international organisation be it the UN, NATO or the EU are by default better placed than any ad hoc coalition to create, stimulate and maintain the unity of purpose, which is an essential ingredient of effective multinational operation. In addition, organisation s staff can carry the burden of co-ordinating various national positions of contributing nations a luxury absent in the case of ad hoc coalitions. Another important political consideration is that of generating and sustaining political will of domestic political establishments to commit troops for international operations. Small states rarely have vital national interests at stake in conflicts distant from their territories. On the contrary, there is a common sense public perception that by taking direct part in the fight against terrorism, we expose ourselves more to the threat of international terrorism. Our 168
participation, therefore, is not a function of acute perception of an immediate threat. It is rather an expression of solidarity within the Euro-Atlantic community and defence of common values. Naturally, we hope that if we faced a serious danger ourselves, our allies would respond and come to our assistance, even when their national interests were not directly challenged either. Admittedly, the question of staying power remains. When the survival of a state is not at stake, it takes substantial political will and resolve to sustain commitments in expeditionary campaigns out of solidarity considerations. This points to a broader issue of shaping strategic culture so that international operations are seen as the main mission of the armed forces by increasing number of civilians, while society and decision-makers accept the risks of deploying them to adverse environment that may involve high-intensity combat. Small states also cherish and are very sensitive about their sovereignty. This political sensitivity may infringe upon the possibility to make timely decisions and take timely actions. However, Lithuania s example demonstrates that the issue can be cast aside: our Parliament has pre-authorised deployment of the Lithuanian element of the NATO Response Force, thereby granting full decision authority to the North Atlantic Council. It seems that all NATO and EU countries will have to have similar arrangements, otherwise any deployment of the NRF or the Battle Groups will be anything but rapid. Militarily, a usual complaint is that small states bring too few meaningful capabilities to the table, while the burden of integrating them is substantial. Given various national caveats on the use of those assets and capabilities, planning coalition operations often resembles building the Tower of Babel. Differences in procedures, doctrines, levels of training, standards of equipment, weapons and communication systems further complicate the task. It is quite understandable that some countries would often prefer to do the job by themselves. The counter-argument is that in the times of shrinking defence budgets and overstretched forces even small contributions do matter. Contribution of our special operations unit to the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan is a good example. Large strategic effects of small contributions are also a function of the prevalent type of warfare. They may be of lesser relevance in large-scale manoeuvre warfare. However, what we face in Iraq and, to some degree, Afghanistan are insurgencies that are normally countered by smaller units supported by air power. The times of divisions and corps are in the past. Companies and battalions, operating as semi-autonomous mobile units in a 169
SMALL ALLIES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATION Volume 8, 2006 Collaborative Information Environment are becoming the main combat muscles. In this context, for instance, Lithuania s plans to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion task force for operations abroad would allow for a significant contribution to allied expeditionary operations in counter-insurgencies, stabilisation or peace support operations. In addition, setting up a PRT in the province of Ghowr, which is militarily small, but strategically a significant contribution, is another example of trying to think globally and act locally. Thinking small is natural to us, but, paradoxically, it may be somewhat of a challenge for the countries that are used to planning for major decisive wars. The Chagcharan PRT is an excellent example of a truly multinational project, which unites small countries like Lithuania, Denmark, Iceland and soon Croatia, is supported by the US and the UK, and is a part of the NATO-led ISAF operation, taking place under the UN mandate. Then there is the issue of role specialisation, or so-called niche capabilities. As an Ally, we are looking into some areas where small contribution could bring about significant effects. However, we should avoid the trap of what could be called overspecialisation. Politically, it is not palatable for the small guys to serve water and do laundry while the big guys will do the fighting. For example, Lithuania could develop a Water Purification Brigade to fill in this niche in the Alliance and scrap all its combat units. Although such a move would seem economically sensible, it would be a political suicide for any defence minister of any country. Small states need to share the same risks and challenges with the big countries in order to demonstrate their equal military stature within the Alliance and acquire necessary combat expertise. Multinational projects are a better way to fill various gaps, instead of relegating small nations to the militarily secondary role of service support. Interoperability is certainly one of the crucial factors of success of international operations. Lithuania and other new NATO members made a considerable progress in this area well before the accession to the Alliance. Partnership for Peace was instrumental in this process. The longstanding practice of standardisation within the Alliance is clearly paying off. However, interoperability of armament and equipment is just one side of the coin. Achieving interoperability of minds is a far more difficult goal. Understanding each other on a battlefield comes only through constant and intensive common training and education. Without it, our militaries would be 170
forced to build familiarity with each other s mindset, practices and capabilities during actual operations, which do not help in terms of effectiveness. Certainly, it is not always possible to be equally well familiar with the military of all the Allies and partners. In a way, cultivating closer relation with some of them might be necessary. For example, Lithuania is very keen to deepen the format of Nordic-Baltic Eight for these purposes, building upon our solid record of cooperation. At the end of the day, we should not forget that the vital ingredient of multinational operations is trust. Trust in that the allies will not abandon you. That politicians will seek to maintain unity. That commanders will exercise sound judgement. That units will do their job properly. It takes time, effort and patience to build trust. However, without it, any coalition will be a burden, and the integration of any ally and partner, small or large, will not succeed. Within the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies, we must work on strengthening the bonds of trust, hoping that the Alliance, instead of just enabling coalitions of the willing, will remain THE Coalition. 171