From consensus on neutrality to a divided opinion on NATO

From consensus on neutrality to a divided opinion on NATO A study of the Swedish foreign- and security policy debate: 1989-2018 Olof Mathiesen UPPSALA UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT MASTER S THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE AUTHOR: OLOF MATHIESEN SUPERVISOR: SVERKER GUSTAVSSON THESIS DEFENCE: SPRING 2018 CREDITS: 30 CREDITS

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden s security strategy has undergone radical changes. Due to recent years deteriorated security situation in Europe, the debate on Swedish NATO-membership has become more prominent. Previous research has mostly focused on the practical/military implications of the choice of security strategy whereas the knowledge about the political ideas and goals that are behind the choice of security strategy is largely unknow. Based on a qualitative approach, this thesis has studied how the Swedish foreign and security policy debate has changed between 1989 2018. Targeting the Social Democratic party, the Moderate Party, the Centre party and the Liberals, this thesis has described and analyzed these parties fundamental goals/values and world views from the perspectives of realism and liberalism. This study finds that there has been several changes both in world views and fundamental goals/values, where the earlier period in this study was more influenced by realism, to where liberalism started to become more prominent in the debate from the late 1990s until 2018, although realism has in some degree come back during recent years. Key words: foreign and security policy, neutrality, military non-aligned, security strategy, NATO, realism, liberalism, international relations, world view, fundamental goals/values. 1

Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 3 1.1 Research question & Purpose...6 1.2 Disposition of the thesis...6 2. Theory & Previous Research... 7 2.1 Historical background & Previous Research...7 2.2 Realism... 10 2.3 Liberalism... 14 3. Research Methodology... 18 3.1 Design & Case Selection... 18 3.2 Qualitative content analysis & descriptive idea analysis... 19 3.3 Operationalization & Definitions.21 3.4 Analytical Framework.24 3.5 Material.26 4. Results... 27 4.1 The Social Democratic Party... 27 4.2 The Moderate Party... 32 4.3 The Centre Party... 37 4.4 The Liberals..42 5. Discussion... 47 5.1 Future studies 49 6. Conclusion... 50 7. References... 51 2

1. Introduction In recent years, the security situation in Europe has deteriorated, mainly due to Russia s attempts to change the borders of Georgia and Ukraine by military force. An outcome of this deteriorated security situation is that the debate on Swedish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become more prominent, where many people view the question of NATO as a topic for the Swedish general election in September 2018. In January 2018, at Folk och Försvars yearly security conference in Sälen, the leader of the Moderate party (M) and thus a prime minister candidate in the Swedish election, Ulf Kristersson, stated in his speech that An Alliance-government under my leadership will methodically continue Sweden's approximation to NATO, with full membership as a stated goal. Kristersson continued with stating that A decision on membership in NATO can neither be nor should be taken with a weak majority. But as little as a small majority can bring Sweden into NATO, as little can a big minority be given permanent right to keep Sweden outside." 1 By Kristersson s reference to a big minority, Kristersson was referring to the Social Democratic party (S) and their current and historical opposition of joining NATO. The previous M leader and prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, who was in favour of joining NATO, chose not to pursue a Swedish NATO-membership due to the lack of will from S, as well due to a lack of unity between the centreright parties on NATO-membership. Fredrik Reinfeldt motivated this by the fact that it was useless to pursue a Swedish NATO-membership unless S changed their opinion and that it was important to have a broad consensus regarding Sweden s security policy. 2 By Kristersson s speech, M and the Alliance 3 demonstrated that the unchallenged period of S- ownership in the NATO-question is over and that the Alliance will not accept a deadlock by S forever. 4 The Social Democratic party has historically owned and controlled the question of NATOmembership, and S has never really been challenged before on this question. According to the researcher Nils Andrén, S has since the 1950s prevailed and dominated in the Swedish foreign and security policy debate. Although, there has overall been a historic consensus between S and the centre-right parties for a long time on what Sweden s security doctrine should be, namely the policy of neutrality including military non-alignment. 5 1 Tal av Ulf Kristersson vid Folk och Försvars rikskonferens den 14 januari 2018. P 9. 2 Svenska Dagbladet. 2013.05.16. & SVT Nyheter. Love Beneigh. 2014. 01.12. 3 The Alliance is a centre-right political alliance in Sweden. The Alliance consists of the four centre-right parties in the Riksdag: M, C,L & KD. 4 Svenska Dagbladet. 2018.01.13. 5 Andrén. 2002. P 98 100 & Möller. 2004. P 169 170. 3

In the fall of 2015 both the Centre party (C) 6 and the Christian Democrats (KD) 7 changed their positions on NATO and argued in favour of a NATO-membership. After KD and C changed their opinions on NATO, they joined M and the Liberals (L) in their positive view of NATO. Thus, all the Alliance-parties now wants to join NATO while S say no to NATO and argues that the military nonalignment still serves Sweden well. Previous research regarding Swedish security policy has mainly focused on the voters preference on NATO 8 and on the historical aspects of Sweden s neutrality doctrine. Nils Andrén, has concluded that the Swedish security policy has had major paradigm shifts both in content and design, where the Swedish security policy has become heavily characterized by a strong process of internationalization. This process of internationalization of the security policy is due to Sweden s increasing integration with international organisations such as the EU and NATO. 9 Recent research has concluded that the Swedish security strategy has radically changed since the end of the Cold War, with the death of the neutrality strategy towards a strategy based on international solidarity and cooperation. 10 Security research argues that when a state have to choose a security strategy the basic question that the country should ask is: shall the state try to secure its security by mainly its own independent resources or if the state should try to establish security by cooperation with other states in alliances or through international security cooperation. Before choosing security strategy, the state should also ask itself whether it should try to secure its national security by mainly passive politics aiming to keep the country outside of conflicts, or if the state should prioritize options to actively affect the security policy environment in a way that reduces the risk for conflicts. 11 Regarding the choice of the future Swedish security strategy, the political parties have tried to investigate what choice to make in the form of a public report on all the Swedish defence cooperation. Ambassador Krister Bringéus, who wrote the report, concluded that it was obvious that the policies that Sweden applies today, including our EU-membership and close cooperation with NATO, is fundamentally different from the policies that were applied during the Cold War. 12 Ambassador Bringéus stated that the question of joining NATO is in its nature a political question 6 Svenska Dagbladet. 2015.08.31. 7 Svenska Dagbladet. 2015.10.09. 8 Oscarsson & Bergström. 2017. P 68. 9 Andrén. 2002. P 196 198. 10 Westberg. 2015. P 200 201. 11 Westberg. 2015. P 13. 12 Bringéus. 2016. P 161. 4

that cannot be answered or solved by a report. 13 Hence, it is a matter of political will and ideas that will solve the NATO-question and in general dictate the Swedish foreign and security policy. Sweden has not been in war for over 200 years, which makes Sweden a unique case in Europe. Many people have argued that the main reason for Sweden s long period of peace was the neutrality doctrine. Ulf Bjereld argues that in many circumstances Sweden avoided wars due to other things, such as power political circumstances and the direction of international politics at various times. 14 Sweden serves as an interesting and unique case, a country that has undergone a big change of its security strategy by abolishing its neutrality doctrine and at the same time Sweden is one of few countries that are neither neutral nor belongs to a military alliance in Europe. Previous research shows that in Sweden the foreign and security policy rarely change when Sweden has a change of government due to the high degree of consensus between the political parties. 15 However, with the move by the Alliance to declare a push for NATO-membership if they win the election in 2018, this previous fact will change. According to the researcher Katarina Brodin, studies of foreign and security policy often focuses on the official decision-makers, their goals, values and their world views. Hence, when studying official decision-makers, in terms of individual politicians, political parties or representatives of states, fundamental goals/values and world views cannot be ignored if one wants to understand, explain, describe or anticipate foreign and security policy. Thus, the world views and fundamental goals/values are regarded as important ideas that will affect the official decision-makers decisions. 16 Two of the most dominant international relations theories regarding foreign and security policy have historically been liberalism and realism. These theories have been regarded to be highly influential for decision-makers actions both during the Cold War and after. 17 To summarize, what we know is that the Swedish security strategy has changed over time as well as that the political parties have changed opinions on what the preferable security strategy should be. Hence, previous research has mostly focused on security strategies and their practical implications. What has not been fully studied are the political arguments and ideas that are behind these strategy changes over time. Hence, what have not been fully studied are how the political parties world views, goals and values, regarding changes of Swedish security strategies, have changed over time. 13 Bringéus. 2016. P 125. 14 Brommesson & Ekengren, et al. 2017. P 33. 15 Brommesson & Ekengren, et al. 2017. P 25. 16 Brodin. 1977. P 11 12. 17 Edström. 2016. P 529 530. 5

1.1 Research question & Purpose The above introduction thus leads to the overall research question for this thesis: How has the Swedish foreign and security policy debate changed over time by the political parties between 1989 2018? Accordingly, this leads to the overall purpose for this paper: To describe and analyze the political parties world views and fundamental goals/values in the annual foreign and security policy debate between 1989-2018, based on the theories of liberalism and realism. To answer the research question and to implement the purpose, this study will conduct a descriptive qualitative content analysis in combination with a descriptive idea analysis of the political parties world views and fundamental goals/values. The political parties that will be included in this study are; the Social Democratic party, the Moderate party, the Centre party & the Liberals. 1.2 Disposition of the thesis The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters and a conclusion in the end. Theory and previous research will be presented in the following chapter, focusing on the theoretical framework of realism and liberalism and historical background with previous research. In the third chapter, a methodological discussion will be given where the choice of methods is described and where the material and the used operationalizations will also be described. The result of this study will be presented in the fourth chapter. A discussion and a reflection on the main findings in this study will be given in the fifth chapter. In the end of this essay a conclusion of this essay s main findings will be given. 6

2. Theory and Previous Research 2.1. Historical background & Previous Research Sweden has not been at war for over 200 years, which makes Sweden a unique case in Europe. Many people have argued that the main reason for Sweden s long period of peace was the neutrality doctrine. Ulf Bjereld argues that in many circumstances Sweden avoided war due to other things, such as power political circumstances and the happenings and direction of the international politics at different times. 18 There have been times during these more than 200 years of peace, when Sweden came close to war and where Sweden made alliances to be prepared for the event of war. For example, during the Crimean War (1853-1856), Sweden signed a treaty with Great Britain and France stating that Sweden would not concede any territory to Russia if Russia made any claims on Swedish territory, while Great Britain and France promised to come to Sweden s aid if Russia would use military force against Sweden. During both World War I & World War II, Sweden declared itself neutral with the wish of remaining outside these wars. The Swedish neutrality during both of the world wars had exceptions, or some would say strategical adjustments to the declared policy of neutrality. For example, when Sweden allowed German troops during WWII to cross Sweden on their way to Finland, something that was not in accordance with being neutral. Sweden s actions during WWII have later been debated, whether it was the right thing to do, to make exceptions to the neutrality but keeping Sweden outside the war. 19 The modern neutrality doctrine, from after the end of WWII, was in many aspects a chosen alienation from joining any side during the Cold War, which contributed to Sweden s relatively unique position in the world and the idea of Sweden as a country that undertook a middle way. 20 The policy of military non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in war, was the guiding formulation of Swedish foreign- and security policy during the Cold War. This formulation was by most people recognized as the crucial element of the Swedish neutrality doctrine. One of the most important elements of the neutrality doctrine, in peacetime, was to create credibility in the world for Sweden s desire to remain neutral in the event of a conflict. To achieve this credibility a strict line of abstinence from all forms of military cooperation with NATO or any individual NATO-country were required. 21 Overall there was a political consensus regarding this doctrine and its purpose among 18 Brommesson & Ekengren, et al. 2017. P 33. 19 Brommesson & Ekengren, et al. 2017. P 34 35. 20 Westberg. 2003. P 9. 21 Möller. 2004. P 171 173. 7

most of the political parties in Sweden. 22 Tommy Möller, argues that the main difference between S and the centre-right parties view and understanding of the neutrality doctrine were their difference on regarding the doctrine designed and based upon principles versus being of a more pragmatically character. The Social Democratic party was of the understanding that the neutrality doctrine was based upon the principle of neutrality, that being neutral and being a third option between the West and East was of value. Especially M and L viewed the neutrality doctrine as something that served Sweden well for the time being, depending on the circumstances. The conflict regarding the neutrality was also about the room to maneuver in the foreign policy. S argued that Sweden should apply a strict and ideological neutrality in the conflict between East and West during the Cold War, while the centre-right parties argued that the credibility of Sweden s neutrality doctrine was primarily dependent on a strong military defence, not being ideological neutral. Hence, these parties would have wanted Sweden to take a clearer ideological stand in favor of the West and capitalism. 23 We know today that Sweden, both under S-governments and centre-right governments did make exceptions to their own acclaimed polices, where preparations and contacts were made with NATO and western countries to be prepared for the event of war. Hence, there have sometimes been a difference between the rhetoric and the actions made by Swedish politicians during the Cold War. 24 Regarding the strategical choices for small states, Eric Labs has presented six feasible choices for security strategy that a small and relatively weak state could undertake. The following six alternatives: 1. A policy that would support the non-military alignment. 2. A policy of bandwagoning, meaning that a small and weak state would seek cooperation with the primary threat against the own state and thus making this threat friendlier and to gain other advantages. 3. To have an alliance with a great power that offers protection against the state or states that are the primary threat against the own security. 4. To have an alliance with a great power to actively combat a common enemy. 5. Establishing a small state alliance. 6. To wage war on your own. 22 Möller. 2004. P 169. 23 Möller. 2004. P 170 173. 24 Holmström. 2015. P 623 625. 8

Sweden has according to Jacob Westberg used and applied all these six options during the period from 1812 until 2014. 25 Previous research on small states actions regarding security policy concludes the following: 1. Small states are very sensitive towards the surrounding external environment, such as the level of tensions between the great powers and the presence or absence of a balance of power between them. 2. In the choice for small states between being a member of an alliance or being non-aligned, their understanding of their own means and capabilities to wage their own policy reflects the choices small states make. 3. Small states are quick to adjust their policy after changed power conditions/changes in the balance of power or from pressure from great powers. Previous research tells us that the consequences of a security strategy have an impact on the likelihood of that policy s survival or not, meaning how successful or unsuccessful an adaptation to the great powers has been. For example, after Sweden s loss of Finland in 1809, against the war with Russia, Sweden made a radical change of its security strategy. Due to the absence of failure (no war and no defeat), since Sweden adopted its neutrality policy including military non-alignment, after 1814, is an important factor for why this policy is still relevant and hard to reconsider. Another example, Norway and Denmark were before and in the beginning of WW II countries with a policy of non-alignment. Their experiences of being invaded and occupied thus undermined their faith in the policy of non-alignment and therefore choose to join NATO. 26 25 Westberg. 2015. P 28 29. 26 Westberg. 2015. P 49 51. 9

2.2. Realism 2.2.1 Realism- World View The realist view is by history convinced that the international system is based on conflict and cooperation where the best one can hope for is balance between conflict and cooperation. It will however from time to time be impossible to achieve such a balance. Realism in international affairs centers around the struggle for power among self-interested states where the prospects for eliminating conflict and war are generally not that good. The central aspects of realism centers around the thought of the international system where states are the central actors in international politics rather than individuals or international organizations. The international system is characterized by many unchangeable and permanent powers. From the realist perspective, states often have goals that never changes, where conflicting goals sometimes leads to war. Realism has a pessimistic view of the international system which is filled by evil people that seeks power. Therefore, states security is based on power, where power keep humans and states desire for violence in order. For this reason, realist rejects the idea that moral principles should guide the foreign and security policy. The overall goal for any of the state s actions is to serve the national interest (raison d état) whether economic, military, or culturally. Hence, all morally questionable actions made to serve the national interest are legitimate. 27 The classical view of realism is considered to be based on the ideas of Hans Morgenthau. For Morgenthau, the concept and idea of power has been central for realism thinking. Morgenthau believed that a multipolar balance of power rather than a bipolar balance of power was to be preferred. Kenneth Waltz, with his neorealism thinking, argued that a bipolar balance of power was more stable and predictable. The international system should be understood from its hierarchy and the desire for achieving balance of power. The structure of power in the international system can either be centralized or decentralized, where Waltz argued that states are in a decentralized anarchic system, without superiority or supranational rules. From this perspective, all states are equal and strive for status quo to ensure their survival. The power-sharing in the international system is dependent on the balance of power and structure of the international system which is dependent on the number of dominating states; uni-, bi-, or multipolar power order. 28 27 Andrén. 2002. P 59 60. 28 Gyllensporre. 2016. P 477 478. 10

In opposition to Waltz s status quo, John Mearsheimer introduced the offensive neorealism that claims that states will try to maximize their influence and power in the world. Mearsheimer, argued in 1990 that the collapse of the Soviet Union would take the world back to the future - to a world of power politics in Europe based on the idea that the end of the Cold War order was likely to increase the risks that crisis and war would occur in Europe. What observers suggested in the end of the Cold War, that a new age of peace was dawning, was not true according to Mearsheimer. 29 Hence, Mearsheimer argued that the liberal prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe was flawed and would not work in the long run. 30 The concept of balance of power can be understood as that there is equilibrium in terms of access to power resources between states in the international system. This equilibrium is believed to reduce the risk for conflicts since expansive states must count on the possibility of other great powers may support weaker states if attacked. Thus, if there is a balance between the great powers, the outcome of such a potential conflict would be uncertain, therefore the assumption is that the balance of power protects the independence of states. Historically, great powers have, in order to avoid war between themselves, been prepared to sacrifice smaller states territory. Therefore, the level of consensus between allied great powers and small states on their goal of cooperation in an alliance will be of extra importance to the smaller states. Regardless of the power distribution in the international system one can expect states to protect their independence by trying to create counterweights to emerging powers by supporting weaker states threatened by stronger expansive states. Another option for states is to unite with the stronger expanding states, a so-called bandwagoning strategy. The states that choose bandwagoning also risk becoming dependent on the good will of the great power that they unite with and where they also must adapt to the great power. Stephen Walt has defined bandwagoning as a strategy where a state allies with stronger states that also constitute the main threat against the own state. Walt thus modified the previous balance of power theory by emphasizing that states in the choice between creating counter powers, thus balancing emerging and threatening states, or to unite with them do not focus on the question about which of the sides of a conflict is strongest. The decisive factor for states choices is the question of what state constitute the main threat to the own state. Hence, states can conduct balancing by aligning with the stronger side if the weaker side is perceived as more threatening. This modification of the balance of power theory led Walt to the conclusion that the vast majority of states that have been exposed to external threats have chosen balancing 29 Mearsheimer. 1990. P 52. 30 Mearsheimer. 1990. P 8. 11

against those states rather than to unite with them (bandwagoning). The exception to this has been when military weak states choose to unite with a threatening superpower because effective assistance from outside was not possible. 31 There are different approaches a state can take regarding balancing, which is at the core of the idea of balance of power. The overall idea of balancing refers to the idea that a group of states or individual states take actions aiming towards equalizing the odds against more powerful states in order to avoid being dominated. Hence, to make it harder and less possible for powerful states to exert their superior military power over weaker states. Therefore, states can choose between the alternatives to improve their own capabilities (internal balancing) or join alliances with other states (external balancing). A clear reason for why the majority of states chooses balancing instead of bandwagoning is because by joining a balancing alliance allows these states to have more influence and thus the opportunity to play an important role in that alliance. Balancing can be based on hard balancing (similar as hard power) or soft balancing (similar to soft power), or both at the same time for various interest a state may have. Hard balancing refers primarily to military means and capabilities and some economic means to balance a threat. Soft balancing refers to the usage of diplomatic and economic measures to balance a threat instead of military measures. 32 In line with the different strands of realism the overall idea of realism is that smaller states face a choice between balancing (maintain/create a balance against what the state perceives as threat) or bandwagoning. Overall, the different strands of realism all argue that the state is the main player in the international system and that system is characterized of anarchy and therefore survival and security are the prime drivers for states actions where the balance of power is central to achieve this. 31 Westberg. 2016. P 417 419. 32 Edström. 2016. P 533 534. 12

2.2.2 Realism- Fundamental goals/values Among the most important goals for states is to protect and secure their freedom of action and independence. 33 For realism, national interests are goals and values where the overall national interest has traditionally been defined in terms of power where the main driving force is to maximize profits and to reduce risks for the state. A state s national interests are dependent on what context the state is in, for example regional and geographical contexts as well as size and resources available. The politics behind trying to achieve these goals is centered around a power struggle, where the will to achieve these goals are forming a power struggle between different conflicting wills. Power is defined as one actor s control over another actor s thoughts and actions. Thus, national interests should be defined accordingly in the term of power maximization. Power application to controlling the thought of others or the capability/power to affect other states and actors thoughts is an important element of power. Thus, when decision-makers are faced with having to make decisions, they will choose actions that are rational, meaning that decision-makers will choose the action that will minimize the risks and increases the maximization of power, whether it be financially, military, politically etc. Besides the aspects of power, realism argues that states basic need of securing their survival needs to be prioritized above any other objective such as moral values. 34 33 Westberg. 2015. P 47. 34 Westberg. 2015. P 34 37. 13

2.3. Liberalism 2.3.1. Liberalism World View One of the founders of neoliberalism Joseph Nye, has argued against realism thinking, especially in the post-cold War world, stating that states are no longer the only important players in the international system where security is just one of many great goals a state may have where brute force may not be the best way to achieve these goals. For neoliberalism the usage of preference formation and agenda framing as means of shaping the international system before the usages of military force serves as instrument for decision-makers to use. Nye points out that this is more applicable between interdependent and democratic countries. 35 Andrew Moravcsik has argued that the context states are in has a great impact for how states act in world politics. From a liberal perspective, shaping states preferences is more important in international politics than as the realist would argue, the configuration of capabilities. 36 State preferences is referring to a set of fundamental interests among states in the international system. In the liberal view, preferences are independent from other states strategies and thus preferences come before other states political actions or analysis of external treats. Hence, liberalism s view is that states actions in terms of changes of fundamental preferences are more important than changes of the strategic circumstances of how states decide to strive for their preferences. Accordingly, states do not naturally try to maximize a set of fixed understandings of wealth, security or sovereignty, as the realist perspective would claim. For liberals, states strive for certain combinations and interpretations of wealth, security and sovereignty that are often best promoted and represented by international institutions and norms. In the liberal view states apply trade-offs with other states to pursue their goals and interests. Thus, it is normal for states to give up some of their sovereignty to benefit in other areas. Liberals view trade-offs as inevitable and a consequence of the international system. 37 Liberals stress the importance of interdependence in the international system where the level of interdependent preferences between states dictates how states will act. In the liberal view, the reason for why states act differently, through for example cooperation or conflict, is due to their preferences. However, this does not mean that states just push for their favorite policy with 35 Nye. 2011. P 17 18. 36 Moravcsik. 1997. P 513 514. 37 Moravcsik. 1997. P 519 520. 14

disregards to other states. In fact, what liberalism is saying is that states try to achieve their own preferences while being under constraints of other states preferences. More specifically, in the liberal view of interdependence there is an idea of a set of benefits and costs established when states aim to achieve their preferences. Therefore, preferences dictate the possibilities for conflict or cooperation. Where preferences are harmonious or compatible there are more options for cooperation and less risk for conflict. When states strive for the domination of other states to achieve their preference, meaning that they will impose costs with no or little mutual benefit, there is a higher risk for conflict and tensions. The main reason for conflict in the liberal view is because states that are aggressive or revisionist holds preferences that are unacceptable to other states and where the aggressive state is willing to accept high costs. Thus, liberals argue that power and arms buildup is not per se what should worry states but rather the revisionist state s preferences. 38 Liberals world view on peace and conflict focuses on their understanding of the importance of democracy. Aggressive or revisionist states that are willing to undertake risky and/or costly policies are more likely to be undemocratic. The liberal democratic peace idea argues that democracies do not in general wage war and especially not against other democracies since individuals in a democratic state will not vote for the costs of war that will ultimately have a negative impact on themselves. Therefore, democratic institutions and states do not promote war in general since they often share the same preferences or find ways of peaceful cooperation. Liberals argue that history is full of examples where undemocratic leaders have started war against much more powerful opponents, such as Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Hence, pure power does not always prevent conflict as realism would argue, but changed preferences are more likely to prevent conflicts. However, liberals do acknowledge that democracies can act aggressive in cases for preventive wars that responds to threats against weak states. It is also possible that democracies can wage war in peripheral parts of the world that lacks the political or legal preconditions for any form of relationship based on cooperation. The difference between when democracies and when undemocratic states wage war is that the undemocratic state do not respect international law or any international institutions and thus their actions are more arbitrary. 39 The liberal world view is characterized by the will for establishing a system that can control the anarchy in the international system. Hence, an international system based upon international law and international organization. The belief is that norms should form states polices where the same 38 Moravcsik. 1997. P 520 521. 39 Moravcsik. 1997. P 531 532. 15

moral principles that applies between humans should apply between states. For Liberalism, the global world order is based on democracy and universal values where states cooperate. 40 A central factor in international relations for liberalism is that the interest of the individual and the state can best be maximized through cooperation and within international organisations. Thus, international organizations should work for improving welfare, liberty and security, in order to establish a more peaceful and secure world. The idea is that international institutions facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation in several areas, including security. For Liberals, power should only be used to serve liberal values. 41 Liberalism sees that hierarchy exist in the international system and that states have different capabilities, including military strength. Since liberalism strives towards protecting the individual freedom for the individual and for states, international order is needed. International order requires that states do not become dominated by other states and thus states forms alliances to protect themselves and to protect important liberal values. 42 The liberal idea of the world order is based on the belief that the perspective provided by realism-an international order based on conflict and anarchy where the powerful sets the rule and the powerful state(s) decides, can in fact be reformed and regulated by more international cooperation. Liberals will achieve this primarily through international law, the establishment of international organisations and areas of cooperation that creates interdependence between states. Another important aspect of liberalism in international relations is the role of international institutions. International institutions offer according to Keohane, a platform from where states mutual interest of maintaining the cooperation on these shared interests drive and develops states cooperation. In these institutions, smaller and less powerful states can also have an influence and promote their interests. International organisations acts thus as rules of the game where the international organisations creates expectations on its members that they will fulfill their obligations. By providing a set of institutionalized forms for negotiation and information sharing, states options are thus in an extent limited due to the expectations that states will honor their agreements and fulfill their obligations. 43 For liberals, states cooperate on security when they have common interests. Among the benefits with having a security institution is that they cooperate by making credible promises, reducing costs and providing security. Another benefit from establishing a security institution is that the institution can more easily adapt and respond to international changes, than individual states can. This is 40 Andrén. 2002. P 59 60. 41 Keohane. 2012. P 125 127. 42 Van de Haar. 2009. P 38. 43 Westberg. 2015. P 51 53. 16

especially true if the security institution has hybrid qualities. Keohane and other liberals view NATO as an example of a hybrid security institution that has changed from just focusing on joint defence for its members to also focusing on international crisis management. 44 2.3.1. Liberalism Fundamental goals/values The significance of liberalism s goals and values is the normative understanding of the importance of protecting and promoting freedom, human rights and democracy. The goal for liberals becomes to promote these values which will improve the possibilities for a peaceful world. To promote liberal values cooperation is needed and thus cooperation is an important goal where interdependence between states are a key goal and of great value for liberalism. Cooperation and forming of alliances is valued due to their goal of mutual benefits in various areas, such as trade and security. Furthermore, a liberal goal is that the relations between states in the international system is based on moral principles, norms and international law, thus states should act as how individuals should treat each other. Thus, standing up for moral principles in the international arena is a goal and a value for liberalism where the rule of international law should prevail over power. Participating in international institutions is a goal since by participation/membership in international institutions states also participates in cooperation and cooperation is seen to reduce tensions and the risk of conflicts. 45 44 Keohane. 2002. P 12. 45 Keohane. 2002. P 10 13. 17

3. Research Methodology 3.1 Design and case selection This study is designed as a descriptive study. A descriptive study does not explain why something, or a specific phenomenon has occurred, but it reveals and explore what these phenomena are. The value of a descriptive study is to add something to the understanding of the subject of study and to analyze and draw conclusions on the material. 46 This study is also designed as a comparative study of the political parties world views and fundamental goals/values from the basis of the theories of realism and liberalism. As mentioned in the introduction, realism and liberalism have been among the most dominant international politics theories over time. 47 Thus, the reason for the choice of theories. The results for the different parties will be presented in one coherent unit of the period from 1989-2018. A coherent unit within the framework of what changes have taken place in terms of content and meaning can be registered over time. It would of course be possible to have a division of time, such as parliamentary terms or decades for example. However, a division of that kind is regarded by Brodin as not beneficial for the presentation of results since there is a risk of having unmotivated repeats instead of focusing on the main findings. 48 The choice of years for the study is based on the years from the end of the Cold War until present time of this study, hence 2018. These years are particularly interesting to study due to the dramatic foreign and security happenings that have taken place during this time, including the end of the Cold War, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Sweden s EU-membership etc. Of course, interesting things occurs all the time, but this period is in a Swedish perspective relevant due to the dramatic changes of Swedish security strategies. 49 The political parties in this study are: S, M, C, & L. These parties have been chosen due to them having in between 1989-2018 represented the main governmental alternatives for foreign and security policy in Sweden. 50 Thus, these parties have all been represented in governments from 1989-2018. These parties have also been represented in the Riksdag of the studied period. 51 For these reasons, no other parties are included in this study. By including a focus on the political parties 46 Beckman. 2005. P 48 49. 47 Edström. 2016. P 529 530. 48 Brodin. 1971. P 25. 49 Westberg. 2015. P 200 201. 50 Brommesson & Ekengren, et al. 2017. P 42. 51 SCB. 2014.11.19. 18

arguments, thus the actors, we can learn something about how the Swedish foreign and security policy has been over time, and what ideas that have been present in the debates. 52 This study will not try to answer questions on why these parties arguments and ideas have changed. Nor will this study aim at studying the effects of these changes. Finally, this study will not try to explain why the content of Sweden s foreign and security policy has changed. All these interesting questions will be available for future studies to answer (more on this in chapter 5). However, although a descriptive study of this kind does not answer why, it serves a purpose to know how the changes have been and what have been the main arguments for these changes. Hence, before it is possible to answer the questions of why, we need to study what has happened to understand the changes and positions. 53 3.2 Qualitative content analysis & descriptive idea analysis To answer the research question and fulfill the purpose, this study will be conducted as a descriptive study based on a qualitative content analysis and an idea analysis. To find the political parties fundamental goals/values and world views, a descriptive qualitative content analysis will be conducted of the parties arguments and more specifically, for analyzing the political parties ideas from the perspectives of realism and liberalism, a descriptive idea analysis will be conducted. The combination of these two methods comes down to a qualitative text analysis of the political parties ideas and argumentations made in the annual foreign and security policy debate. 54 A qualitative content analysis strives at interpreting the meaning and importance of the studied material. 55 For this study the focus will be on analyzing the meaning and importance of the political message that the parties present in the foreign and security policy debate. Since several different persons can give parts of the same messages/arguments at different times and from different angels, it thus becomes a task for the qualitative analysis to merge these expressions of ideas into an overall general picture of the important political message. To analyze these political ideas/arguments we need an analytical framework that is centered around the central terms and classification to capture the central features in the debates. 56 This means that the focus will be on the most prominent arguments and ideas of the political parties over time, instead of presenting all the years. 52 Beckman. 2005. P 18 19. 53 Beckman. 2005. P 9. 54 Brodin. 1977. P 22. 55 Bergström & Boréus. 2012. P 50. 56 Vedung. 1977. P 34 36. 19

Political ideas are according to Evert Vedung a very broad definition that can include everything from world views to simple every day political statements. It can also be arguments, doctrines, ideologies, opinions etc. 57 What is relevant for this paper are the world views and fundamental goals/values that the political decision-makers possess. Thus, the point of departure for a descriptive idea analysis is to analyze the presence of ideas, where in this paper the presence of ideas in the foreign and security policy debate is what will also be studied from the bases of realism and liberalism. 58 Furthermore, a descriptive idea analysis enables the possibilities for comparison, which is relevant for this paper, the comparison between the political parties over time. With a descriptive idea analysis, it is possible to compare how and if a political party has changed their views or values in certain questions over time also in comparison to other parties. 59 The implication of the idea analysis for this study will be more discussed below in section 3.4.2 Ideal types. 3.2.1 Advantages & disadvantages with the study One of the most prominent advantages of a qualitative analysis is that it enables the possibilities for a better understanding of details and context of the material than a quantitative approach would. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis is better at providing the reader with the important and central aspects of the studied material, thus being able to say something about the meaning of the findings and how to interpret it. Hence, a qualitative analysis can give a nuanced view of the studied material s content and meaning. The risk of any qualitative study is that it gives room to the subjective interpretations by the researcher whereas a quantitative approach normally increases the reliability of studies if the specific study s approach is clearly presented the results should be more easily replicated. Hence, a quantitative study can be described as more objective and systematized than a qualitative study. 60 Regarding the validity of a qualitative study, it can be argued that it increases due to that the qualitative study includes a focus on the meaning and context of the findings where the importance of the message in the material is the important factor rather than the number of times something has been said. 61 The study of official foreign and security policy is based on the decision-makers public and openly presented ideas and values. Thus, the study of official foreign and security policy disregards any potential underlying motives, objectives and preferences. The reason for this is that potential underlying motives are difficult to account for in relation to the publicly announced 57 Vedung. 1977. P 15 16. 58 Bergström & Boréus. 2012. P 146. 59 Beckman. 2005. P 51 53. 60 Brodin. 1977. P 298 302. 61 Bergström & Boréus. 2012. P 80 82. 20

standpoints, that are often equally guided by tactical considerations just as the motivation for clarity regarding the issue. Hence, official foreign and security policy is interesting to study in its own capacity, regardless if the arguments represent the politicians true opinions and beliefs, since these publicly made arguments creates expectations on future political action and thus restrains the politicians room to maneuver. 62 For those who would argue that the officially given standpoints on foreign and security policy in reality is different from the so called real beliefs of the decision-makers, have a difficult task of validating these claims. Unless the researcher has access to classified material or can read the decision-makers minds, it is not possible to be certain about this claimed difference. However, the opposite is also true, that it is hard to claim any certain correlation between the thoughts and actions of the decision-makers. Meaning that it is not possible to know for certain that officially made actions corresponds to the real intention and beliefs of the decision-makers. 63 According to Nils Andrén, the studies of security policies are in general a difficult topic to study, where Andrén argues that no single theory can explain nor properly describe how the international system works. However, the classical theoretical division between liberalism and realism has given many valuable insights in how we can understand the world and the driving forces in the international system. 64 3.3 Operationalization & Definitions 3.3.1 Operationalization To present this study in a clear manner, an operationalization of the most important concepts will be presented here. Giovanni Sartori has argued that the operational requirement means that the operationalization should be in line with the theoretical meaning of the concepts that are being operationalized. Thus, it is important not to totally change the meaning of the concepts that are being operationalized. 65 This paper will be based on the operationalization made by Katarina Brodin, Nils Andrén and Jacob Westberg. Fundamental goals/values: refers to basic goals and values for the foreign and security policy that the official decision-makers hold, such as peace, power, wealth, freedom, democracy, independence etc. 62 Brodin. 1977. P 7 8. 63 Brodin. 1971. P 6 7. 64 Andrén. 2002. P 56 57. 65 Sartori. 1970. P 1045. 21

World View: refers to the official decision-makers understanding of reality, thus the sum of their Universal word view & the Regional world view. The idea is that the world view of the official decision-makers has a strong influence on their decision-making alternatives. 66 By focusing on their world views, in terms of foreign and security policy, it will provide information about the world view of the political party the decision-maker represent. World views are built around theories and assumptions on how the international system works. For example, the reasons for war, peace, tensions, détente, power and influence, how threats are regarded and reasons for joining military alliances or not. World views are based on relatively stable understandings of how the international system works. 67 Universal world view: This represents the overall understanding of reality and the international system and how it works on the global level. Regional world view: descriptions of states and regions that are relevant for the own country s security, thus Sweden s security in this paper. 68 The regional world view in this study will be defined as to Europe and more specifically the Baltic Sea region and Russia. Security strategy: Consists of a combination of the ends, ways and means that a state have, aiming for the state to achieve their basic security policy goals. 69 Security policy: The general understanding of this term is that it comprises of actions that the actors in the international system can take to neutralize or face external threats. This can for example be done by preventive political measures such as deterrent measures or through military defensive measures. 70 Official foreign and security doctrine: represents the values and perceptions of the decision-makers officially made claims on what they would like to achieve by their taken actions. An official foreign and security policy doctrine can be defined as one of the official decision-makers openly declared system of general understandings and perceptions, including normative, with respect to the international system and the role of the own state in this system. 71 Official decision-makers= foreign ministers and the parties spokespersons for foreign and security policy. It is important according to Brodin, that the study of decision-makers is targeted on 66 Brodin. 1977. P 12 & 56 57. 67 Brodin. 1971. P 19. 68 Brodin. 1977. P 56 57. 69 Westberg. 2015. P 17 18. 70 Andrén. 2002. P 13 14. 71 Brodin. 1977. P 292. 22