A Change in Finland s Security Policy? A Critical Interpretation. 1

1 Kari Laitinen University of Tampere Department of Political Science and International Relations P.O. Box 607, 33101 Tampere tel. 358-(0)3-2156183, fax 358-(0)3-2156552 email: ptkala@uta.fi 15.3.1999 A Change in Finland s Security Policy? A Critical Interpretation. 1 Introduction Traditional security concept can be considered too violent; a concept that directs thinking towards state-centric security organisations and towards armed security 2. Is the constructivist integration-based security a realistic possibility for the security of Europe? 3 What does Finland say and mean, when the government states that Finland takes the problems of extended security into account? What is said explicitly and what is being implied? What kind of a Finnish identity does the present security concept express, produce and sustain? Finland s security policy sends a message about the kind of security that is aspired and a conception of the future this policy is based on. The reality of the text is not unambiguous and coherent with the announced, but it includes partly controversial assumptions and certain practices which maintain narration, which, again, constitutes the reality that surrounds us. 1. Finland and the understanding of security: starting points The history itself, and especially W.W.II and the Cold War as different kinds of factors have shaped the national security policy of Finland. This humble and wise policy takes account of the geographical facts and cold realities of international politics. The essential content of this policy has been and still is 1 Paper prepared for ECPR Meeting Joint Sessions of Workshops in Mannheim, 26 th -31 st March 1999. DRAFT, not to be quoted without permission. 2 See e.g. Booth 1991. 3 Cooperation based on spillover and ramification, see e.g. Mitrany 1966.

2 to avoid new wars and conflicts and maintain independence and integrity 4. In different kinds of circumstances policy has been conducted in a way that shows and proves statesmanship in a sense described by Morgenthau 5. The prevailing principle has been raison d etat. Foreign policy has been and still is the main tool for increasing and sustaining security while defence policy has been seen as the final resort 6. What was significant in terms of the Finnish defence policy during the Cold War was the lack of reaction to external changes and events, but at the same time Finland constantly tried to influence and control potential threats in advance 7. Now, Finland is able and willing, especially through integration (but also bilaterally), to participate and influence security of her neighbouring regions. Finland and the Baltic states are peripheral areas of Europe in two senses; firstly, they are in the western border region of Russia s social development and influence, and secondly they are peripheral in the sense of western integration 8. After the collapse of Soviet Union the border question and the direction of Finland s security policy remained open issues, which have subsequently been partly solved and have gained some new meaning and dimensions. But still we can conclude that unresolved security issues are sensitive, even exposed to both external and internal effects, and may therefore cause regional instability. 9 A certain dichotomy is characteristic of the Finnish security political reality; Finland can adapt to the realities of power politics, if it serves her sincere interests and political aspirations. 10 This means most importantly that there is a difference between linguistic and factual endeavours; in this sense, the credibility of the actor (the President) is the crucial factor 11. In the Finnish (cold war) context, this means the separation of two things; patriotic appeasement policy, and treasonable co-operation. So, both involve co-operation, but the final difference must be deducted from the conclusions of the 4 See Finland s defence policy during the Cold War, Möttölä 1993, 66-83, Apunen 1991 and 1984. 5 See Morgenthau 1966. 6 See Finland s present defence policy Report by the Council of State to the Parliament 17.3.1997. Report contains an assessment of the security development of Europe and the goals of development of armed forces 1998-2008. 7 In domestic politics this development lead to self-censorship. See About Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, Vesa 1998. 8 Apunen 1991, 14. 9 See Apunen 1991, 15. On the other hand is relevant to reflect, whether the openness of security policy mean that it is sensitive (liable or exposed) to external influence in a sense of insecurity? 10 Apunen 1991, 16. Are the non-alliance, Nato-cooperation, EU membership only means to survive as independent state? In what point the meaning and essence and the idea of state s existence disappear how much one can be allied before it dies away? Then again, is there any relevant tools to measure to level of independence? 11 There is an ongoing constitutional process where the dominating role as leader of foreign policy is weakening.

3 ultimate intentions and motives 12. The emphasis lies on the wisdom shown by history, which gives the verdict of the choices made. After a dramatic change in the political climate, Finland faces a situation where clear order should be maintained in an environment where transition and fluctuation are the prevailing elements. The break-up of Soviet Union and (thus) Finland s joining the EU have given a whole new perspective on the security policy situation in Finland. Moving ever closer to West seems a realistic and tempting opportunity while the sense of history underlines the meaning of deliberation and reflection. 13 J.V. Snellman 14 said that small states like Finland should not make solutions and reach for goals that they can t hold on to when international relations take a turn to an unfavourable direction from their angle. In terms of the liberation of the Baltic states, it can be argued that history has its own laws (logic) which will produce a certain outcome, even though the political leaders steer the wheel of history in a certain direction. 15 Since 1991 the overall situation has (of course) altered, but we can still say that the basic setting has remained the same: will Europe see the emergence of new borders and hostilities, and make short-sighted decisions, or will we see an ongoing process of comprehensive (common) security where no one and nothing will be excluded from the possibility of security. When it comes to Finland, it is vital to remember that democratic Russia, as we well know, can t be taken for granted in the context where total commitment to the West would mean a political and military gap on our Eastern (EU) border. 16 1.1. Finland and the Cold War The need to redefine threats after the conclusion of Cold War does not differ from the practices during the period of antagonism. 17 New challenges are presented in a way that makes them external and elements of the anarchic environment; therefore they pose a threat to internal, domestic, society. We must ask what roles difference, danger and otherness play in Finland s international identity, which is not separate from its internal identity. The deconstruction of foreign and security policies of a state the analysis of the prevailing practices is needed in order to explain why the prevailing truth is 12 Apunen 1991, 17. Trans. K.L In Baltic states and Eastern Europe they understood the Finlandization differently as it was understood in the West, because for them it meant certain kind of ability to act and self-determination thus the context of understanding was quite different. 13 Finland s situation can be compared to a crime: the end of Cold War provided an opportunity, she already had a motive and consequently the actual crime was easy(?) to accomplish. The participation in integration can also be interpreted as an effort to overcome geopolitical realities. 14 A Finnish statesman from 19 th century. He saw that history is repeating itself, and emphasised that nations do not sacrifice themselves for other nations. Snellman 1928, 265-280. 15 Apunen 1991, 17, see also Forsberg&Vaahtoranta 1993, 9-11. 16 Apunen 1991, 19 underlines how we have no knowledge of what the democratic Russia means.

4 exactly what it is. The constant articulation of danger is not a threat to the identity of a state or its existence, but the question is, what are the possible circumstances for a state s being. The nature of threats changes, but techniques and the ways of exclusion used to create threats remain the same. 18 Meaning and identity are the consequences of a relationship between me and other that emerges from the interpretation and is not product of some pre-identity. The source of danger and threat does not remain unaltered, neither does the identity which is said to be threatened by Europeanization. Texts that guide national security politics do not only produce strategic analysis of the reality which they encounter, but they function as manuscripts for the (security political) identity of Finland. 19 The discourse of danger has been particularly essential in this process as it has told us who we are and who are not. Even though the meaning of foreign and security politics is significant in building national identity, the state is not a permanent foundation for the security of identity 20. In what ways does the Cold War explain Finland s present foreign and security politics and make it understandable? What is the true foundation of this Finland s assumed new opportunity, and what kind of security political view is realistic and reasonable? Will the fate of Finland be always decided by others EU, Russia, USA, Sweden.? To what extent do the Cold War practices continue in international relations and especially in the politics of Finland? What kind of security models do these practices produce? 1.2. Security policy report Neo-normative idea 21 provides a starting point for the new security policy which states that the relationship with Russia is based on the security influence of a value community (EU) and international organisations. According to Apunen, this signifies a rupture in a long foreign policy line: Finland is giving up selfishness which is the cornerstone of political realism; in Finland s case this has meant refraining from disputes and preserving her self-determination at any price. Being part of the value community means compulsory participation, system identity and ideologizing the relations with Russia. 22 According to realism the particular problem is how to be prepared for the worst possible scenario and what it actually might mean in this new post Cold War context? 23 According to the neo-normative approach, states seek and understand common interests, understand institutionalisation and integration as means, values and norms as factors affecting international 17 Euroopan unionin 1996. 18 See here Hobsbawm 1995, Der Derian 1995 and Krause & Williams 1997. 19 Who is the enemy? Must Finland as nation separate herself from Russia in order to really integrate West? 20 Identity itself can t be safe, if safe means stable and familiar, because the identity is in a state of flux. 21 Apunen 1994, 66-71. 22 Apunen 1994, Möttölä 1998, 329 ja Väyrynen 1993, 35-37. 23 Worst case scenario: disintegration of EU, Russia turning inwards and becoming expansionist.

5 system and thus control anarchy, and finally these common interests create readiness to co-operate in order to overcome security problems. Parochial forces contain the idea that states are still selfishly pursuing for relative gains; balance of power and hierarchy are means of survival and competition; mistrust for institutions and escape from commitments, isolation and separate politics are the solutions for conflicts. 24 Finnish security can best be guaranteed in a unified Europe where there are no dividing lines, either old or new. Security problems must be resolved in co-operation, according to jointly agreed rules of behaviour and on the basis of sovereign equality between all states. 25 Amid changing circumstances, Finland is pursuing a security policy founded on a broad and comprehensive view of security and expanding and deepening international co-operation. 26 Finland supports common and undivided security with no juxtaposition. Furthermore, Finland sees extended security based on co-operation as a goal. Finland also believes that her international position has strengthened and clarified after the Cold War. Finland underlines the importance of EU membership for her security policy, and believes that further expansion of the integration process is the key for the unity and security of Europe 27. The meaning of international co-operation is also crucial. In the core of co-operation are UN, OSCE, and CoE. The very goal is democratic security, which is approached from the Nordic perspective and also from the idea of common foreign and security policy of EU. Democracy, human rights and market economy are major elements both as means and as goals. 28 Finland calls this post Cold War era as age of transition, where economic, environmental and other social problems are remarkably relevant. The focus is on Finland s neighbouring regions and Russia whose emerging democratic process is supported. Bilateral relations and regional co-operation are essential when it comes to Finland s security aspirations. Russia s position is historically, geographically and politically always present, and this report emphasises its importance. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, managed by UN or OSCE, are major tools in international co-operation. Finland does not, however, take part in crisis management calling for 24 Apunen 1994, 54-71, Möttölä 1998, 330-331 and Forsberg&Vaahtoranta 1993, 19-21. The break-up of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created opportunity which has lead to the membership of EU. Since W.W.II there has been, in one form or the other, a constant striving for West and in this sense the membership was logical outcome. 25 Council of State 1995, 5. 26 Council of State 1995, 10. 27 See Council of State 1995, 55, Finland emphasises Union s ability to practice common policy as significant aspect of security, but it requires deepening and enlarging integration. 28 Council of State 1995, 5.

6 peace enforcement or the use of military force against other states or parties involved in conflict. All in all, the European Union plays a major role in Finland s approach when it comes to increasing her security political influence. 29 Military security has gained new element as well. Threat of a major war has receded and consequently military power is dismantled and openness increased. Finland stresses the credibility of her defence and the ability to protect her own area. This independent defence is seen in Finland as a stabilising element in the international security environment, and Finland has no plans to change her militarily non-aligned stance. From the military perspective, the most relevant aspects at the moment include the commitment of United States to defend Europe, Russia s military stability and the security of Baltic states. 30 While developing a more efficient army, Finland is improving her ability to receive military aid from outside 31. In practice Finland has standardised her army with Nato and when the new military technology is bought mainly form USA it is obvious that aid is coming from West and threat is in the East. 1.3. The Foundation of Finland's present security policy Security policy is a tool, which serves Finland as a civil society, independent state and as a member of the international community. This instrumentality is enhanced by the demand that security policy should offer possibilities to influence solutions that directly involve Finland as nation and thus provide protection for risks and threats. 32 Therefore, security policy is designed for national purposes. History is also an important element because Finland underlines how she has learned that foreign policy and defence must be in order. 33 The report emphasises the meaning of these above mentioned principles as a continuum of Finland s security policy, which is primarily meant to other states. 34 This report divides security policy into three functional sections: stability policy, crisis management and (deterrence) defence. 35 The role of Russia is most significant for Finland as a neighbouring region as well as in a wider European context. Here again the understanding of realities and the sense of history is stressed. Finland will, in a way, try to democratise and Europeanize Russia and its practices, so that 29 Council of State 1995, 6. 30 Council of State 1995, 6 and Council of State 1997, see Ch. 1. 31 Council of State 1997 see Ch. 3.2. 32 Council of State 1995, 9. 33 When the defence is in good condition (credible)? 34 Credible defence prevents any attacks and violations of regional integrity, Council of State 1995, 45.

7 transition would be realised both at the social and political level. The objective is that Russia learns the norms and rules of international behaviour in such a way that relations between Finland and Russia could evolve in a spirit of true trust. 36 The direction in which Russia s identity will evolve is significant in every sense for Finland as well as for Europe 37. Because Russia can t be a member of Nato nor the EU, the integration border of European security arrangements will exist for a long time. Nato s future is determined mostly by the interests of USA. It has been thought that the parallel and simultaneous enlargement of Nato and EU support each other and increase stability in Europe. This would seem to be at least the short-term effect. From the military perspective the overall situation has not changed much from the days of Cold War. Nato s expansion is aimed to control those cold war relics and to prevent the possible threat made by Russia 38. The relationship with Russia does not steal the whole attention of Finland s foreign policy anymore, but the EU membership has added a second rail to Finland s security policy. One could say that relations with Russia have normalised. Finland s objectives regarding Russia seem to be ambiguous; firstly, Finland tries to tie Russia to the development of Europe with multidimensional links, and secondly, to develop and strengthen her own position so that bilateral relation is no longer as significant as it used to be during the Soviet era. Main tool at the moment is OSCE, which as security model is means to sustain Russia in co-operation based security and through organisation in the unification of Europe 39. EU membership has dramatically changed Finland s security policy. During the Cold War, avoiding military engagements was the principal objective while at the moment Finland is ready to participate in international politico-military co-operation in order to prevent conflicts. It is also noteworthy that in acceding to the Union, Finland has not made any reservations concerning its obligations under the founding treaties or the Maastricht Treaty. Finland states that her credible independent defence is an important contribution to the Union s common security. In addition, possible security policy changes are still made intergovernmentally and unanimously 40. In terms of the Union s security, Finland stresses crisis management and extended security questions such as 35 See Council of State 1997 introduction. Stability policy is about promoting democratic and economic changes and prevention security threats, conflict management means early warning mechanisms, conflict prevention and defence is deterrence against any (external) military threats. 36 Identification with West can be seen as assurance, but also as a social emancipation process, where new identity is evolving and national understanding about self is changing. 37 See Neumann 1996 and eternal debate Russia s relation towards Asia and Europe. 38 Möttölä 1998, 348. Translation K.L. 39 Möttölä 1998, 368. Translation K.L. 40 There are (growing) pressures to develop CSFP in similar way as EMU member countries joining in joint defence at their own pace.

8 crime, nuclear safety, environmental issues etc. One could even say that Finland has a mission which involves building a uniform and harmonious Europe. From this perspective, Russia and its overall development are in a key position. Another crucial nexus for Finland s security policy is Sweden. 41 Finland has broken free from its Cold War international position during the antagonism. However, as if based on this foundation, Finland has continued to pursue its responsible and constructive foreign and security policy. 42 In military respect the basic geopolitical situation has not changed that much since Cold War, even though the arms deals with the West and tying military-technical readiness to West have transferred the focus towards West. In a sense of defence and military strategy Finland aims to maintain its independence, and has, as matter of fact, strengthened its military capacity. 43 For Finland, the OSCE provides a framework (values and principles of international law) and targets for co-operative security. These security and normative principles are protected by security political institutions. 44 Finland feels that the end of Cold War has opened a possibility to create a security order which is based on co-operation and lasting security thinking. Finland emphasises the meaning of commitment and stresses the meaning of an undivided Europe for its security policy aspirations. Membership in the Union has strongly consolidated Finland s international identity, because she has finally joined with the group of peer states. However, national interests are a decisive factor when it comes to security policy arrangements. The regional and even global role has also been reinforced by the membership. In her security policy line Finland cherishes the normative dimension of international community and declares its own commitment to those jointly agreed norms and rules. 45 Furthermore, she believes that the spreading of democracy promotes and supports human rights, which again create preconditions for building security on in the individual level. Finland sees the meaning of individual security as an important goal and as a means to an end. 46 Political realism has been the dominating the view of reality in Finnish security thinking, and it is still in a strong position, despite the fact Finland has been willing to participate in international co-operation and create such structures which would even narrow its self-determination. The very 41 See Council of State 1995, 63-67. 42 Council of State 1995, 9. 43 Finland is changing its military capacity and structure towards flexibility and more high technology dependent. 44 Council of State 1995, 17. Paris Charter 1990. 45 Democracy, human rights See Speeches of President Ahtisaari 1998. 46 Council of State 1995, 16.

9 idea of Finland s security policy has been survival. Now in the age of integration the liberalism has stepped forward and gained more relevance in the Finnish thinking. We could, probably, say that there is ongoing process where we are moving from narrow individual security towards a broader common security. Through change or transition, Finland is trying to establish an environment where routine security practices transform into such that regression or returning to the old wouldn t be possible anymore. Besides realism and emerging liberalism rationality has been a significant element in Finland s security policy calculating to maximise its own vital interests. From a theoretical perspective this rationalising can be included in both neo-realism and neo-liberalism where the difference lies in the ultimate goal whether the states are seeking relative or absolute gain. Normative dimension is also very much present in Finland s current security policy. The importance of normativism for a small state is obvious, because when other strategic resources are limited, one must try to ensure that there are clear rules and they are followed. This allows a state to secure predictability, which particularly crucial for a small state. 47 Finland s security policy line involves the new security idea, the emphasis of extended security, which in narrow military security thinking means defence, openness and military stability. From a wider perspective, the question is how these new security challenges materialize in the form of economic, environmental, social, ethnic etc. security issues. For instance in relation to Russia this new security idea realises in efforts to support the democratisation process in Russia, reforming its economy and resolving its environmental problems, and on the other hand supporting the independence of the Baltic states. 48 The Union membership also changed the Finnish identity, the notion of Finnish society and Finland s position in Europe has changed dramatically. New security line is not all about change, but the geopolitical and historical continuum has been an organising element too. Membership was mostly about security, and this was key argument that persuaded people to accept this project, which was otherwise considered elitist. 49 Consequently, Finland has reviewed her security political environment and her policy in the new context. The question whether this truly involves a qualitative change in international relations or is it just about self-help realism remains to be seen. In spite of this open question membership has increased Finland s ability to practice multidimensional security policy. 2. The interpretation of security speech (text) 47 It is said that it is in the interests of small states that institutions of Union are strong. 48 Möttölä 1998, 340.

10 Regarding the security speech (text) one can ask that when it is said (written) that Finland s foreign and security policy is based on the extended security concept, is it already a fact or is it becoming a fact going towards this certain direction? If it is written reality, does it change or are these prevailing practices following, or is this certain text a consequence from factual change existing (security) practices? 50 On the other we should ask what kind of security idea (notion, concept, even perception) is the foundation of security text, and what kind of metaphors it sustains and constitutes? Geopolitical location and history and dominating circumstances create certain framework for Finnish security speech/text. In that context Finland produces, reproduces and organises its security policy. The main elements of that context are so obvious that a rupture in dominating order is needed before they produce a reaction. 51 When Finland is speaking about security and presenting its objectives and declarations, not only does she describe the reality but also creates new kind of reality and an interpretation of it. The use of metaphors is quite essential in diplomacy, where rules and procedures are emphasised. The meaning of metaphors is crucial for thinking and reasoning, because they organise new information and set the reality to a certain rational imaginative framework 52. This new security line of Finland means that she understands the security in a sense of diversity, which again is an opposite position compared with that in the Cold War era. However, the concept of extended security (goal of co-operative security) and constant increase of military expenditure together sends rather controversial signal and in a sense undermines the credibility of new security policy. 53 Finland employs a peaceful security discourse, which means that a certain principle is applied in the interpretation of reality: believing the possibility of peace, relevance of norms and rules, and believing the potentiality of co-operation in building the security of Europe. There are conventions that enable certain speeches and texts, and at the same time these conventions guarantee that the 49 Möttölä 1998, 341. Has the Finnish identity been affected by membership? 50 Helsingin Sanomat 8.1.1999, Sweden writes down the prevailing practice to her new security policy. Is Finland s membership in Nato already done only official signing is missing? See also Bleiker 1997. 51 See Habermas 1987. Habermas lifeworld (Lebenswelt) concept sets the limits for the reality and its understanding, and thus facilitates the organising and ordering of reality. Lifeworld is the space where interaction take place, because that space is familiar and thus communication is possible. When the order and predictability totters (postmodernism) the meaning of the concept loses its explanatory power. 52 See e.g. Hawkes 1972 and Chilton 1996. 53 The realities must be taken into account, but this ever lasting conflict between words and deeds in international relations do not provide any means to change those prevailing practices.

11 target audience interprets the message in the right way. In this interaction, it is crucial that participants of the dialogue have a background that allows them to understand each other. 54 2.1. Speech act theory and the context of interpretation 55 In the speech act theory the question is how language can function as a social force in different kinds of situations. Theory covers both speech and text. The essence of theory is that the words will have their meaning in use question of action in situation of interaction. The fact, that there are constitutive rules behind the speech acts means that security speech acts are significant utterances in the certain framework, which again are partly limited, but also enables playing of kind of security game. The act and speech are in a certain relation to each other of which analyse will produce the function of meaning of the sentence. 56 In a speech act it is not necessary to use term security, but for instance defence etc. mean that there is security issue involved and thus there is an option for exceptional measures. 57 In security discussion it is relevant that who is in a such position that can define security. But one must also notice that nobody has absolute power to define security. Moreover, it must be noted that securitizing involves inherently the element of future, of which follows deliberation of consequences and making a threat-analyse in a sense that one adjusts his measures in a right proportion to a threat 58. It is unlikely that complete security theory can be constructed, inasmuch as social reality involves too many variables of which taking into account doesn t seem realistic. 59 It is also noteworthy to remind that usage of certain security concept is (conscious) political choice. Austin speaks about facilitating conditions which enable speech act. 60 The methodological starting point of the Copenhagen School can be summed up as follows; successful speech act is a combination of language and society natural features of speech combined to groups which 54 The liturgy between the Soviet Union and Finland was extremely important. There were right and wrong terms and concepts, which were under constant interpretation. These terms were conventions. The way something uttered is significant. On the other hand, we need to pay attention and interpret things which are not expressed explicitly. Security speech itself contains rules which are under transition. 55 Abraham Maslow: If all you have is a hammer everything begins to look like a nail, Lipschutz 1995, 3. 56 See Austin 1981 and Searle 1995. 57 The Copenhagen School underlines the extreme conditions in the context of securitizing. However, we should question the assumption that only emergency security (question of survival) is significant. 58 Buzan et.al. 1998, 30-32. Surrounding reality produces settings where the choices are made. Thus, reality is not deterministic, but contains real alternatives. 59 Is the rhetoric of credible defence credible at all in this sense? Would Finland s defence be really credible if she had the nuclear missiles? 60 See Austin 1981 and Buzan et.al. 1998.

12 authorises and recognise the speech. 61 The circumstances which enable successful securitizing are: following the grammar of security, social conditions between speaker and audience and probability of approval of securitizing and the qualities of alleged threats, which either help or hinder the process of securitizing. 62 Consequently, this means that security is socially constructed concept, which, again, means that there are also socially constituted limits for what can be and cannot be securitized. This again means that these limits are contextually constituted and thus changeable. According to the logic of securitizing there is no objective foundation in security problematique, but, then again, it opens possibility to problematize the whole securitization process and its absence of it. It is essential how the securitizing can t be made by proving that something is a security problem, because then the role of analyst will shift to securitizing actor. Instead of that we can think the consequences of securitizing and desecuritizing. Securitizing actor is the subject who performs security speech act. Speech act theory enhance the speaker, because then what she or he represents produces meaningful logic. In terms of securitizing and speech act one must notice the role of audience and how the audience finally decides whether the securitizing was successful or not. 63 Whoever defines the ends of security policy defines in practice the necessary means a priori 64. The theory of speech act is not only focusing security as a sign, which refers something more real, but the expression (utterance) itself is seen as an act. For instance, by expressing security the representative of state transfers certain development to certain specific area and thus indicates his claim and authorization to use whatever means to meet his ends 65. In other words, the word security is an act and the utterance itself is primary reality. Interpretation Quentin Skinner emphasises that when we are interpreting a text (old or new) we organise and analyse it through metaphors, thinking practices and prevailing features of language. In other words, we cannot, for instance, interpret Finnish security speech, without some previous (one s historical) engagements of thinking. For example, the idea of sustainable (environmental) security is tied to 61 Buzan et.al. 1998, 32. How social conventions constitute? What really makes something to be a security problem? It is not just about naming something to be security issue. There must be a social convention and conception before anything can be named a security problem. Essentially it is the question about change within security practices. 62 Austin 1981, 9 and Buzan et.al. 1998, 33 63 See especially Foucault s serious speech act concept, Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982 and Buzan et.al. 1998, 40-42. 64 Cf. National security doctrine. 65 See Wæver 1995, 55. If we speak about contamination or environmental degradation as security problem does it mean that it is automatically transferred to the specific domain or area where it will be militarised/securitized?

13 present time and language and applying it to the historical texts could produce rather problematic interpretations. Skinner thinks that we should be able to understand the state of that certain society where that certain text was written. In the present situation it might be difficult to have some distance from dominating reality in a way which could help us to see more clearly. 66 Furthermore, Skinner underlines the contingency and loose nature of intentions in the context of action. The essential role of intentions is significant in performing act and utterances. In the background of every action is certain intention, which, however, is not the only reason for action. In order to comprehend that certain action we should understand this intention as far as we like to describe and understand some action. 67 Thus it is possible to understand that multiple net of meanings and dimensions which include within the security policy line of Finland. That guideline text is written by institution (bureaucracy) which contains politically and strategically different views and opinions. Looking from the wider perspective cultural differences can mean that all people do not understand the sign and utterance in a same way. In understanding text it is important to recognise both the force and the context of certain speech act. So the meaning and the process of understanding must be separated 68. Foucault s serious speech act practically combines the ideas of Skinner and Austin. So, there are procedural rules and community, which shares the language, concepts and logic of Finland s security speech. Then the very interest of Finland is how other parties react to the speech. 69 The relationship between the speaker and object (audience) is functional, it conveys meanings. Consequently, the changes within the security discourse and new concepts and meanings are quite relevant for research. New security ideas and concepts and even perceptions like extended security and environmental security must be placed under scrutiny in order that we can analyse the formation of these discourses and concepts. In practice the question is who can be taken into account seriously and under what conditions. 70 The European (lasting) undivided security needs to be constituted also in discursively so that it can materialise in action too these dimension support each other. 66 Skinner 1988. Who did foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union? The report itself and the interpretations of it should be looked at the light of those events which have lead to the present situation; the process of becoming independent, geopolitics, civil war, Winter War, Cold War 67 Skinner 1988, 60-64. 68 Skinner 1988, 61-64. According to Skinner we should try to understand the intentions of the text and how these certain meanings are meant to understand. Secondly, the context of the text is essential. Understanding these intertwined dimensions enables us to make a interpretation of the text. 69 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 48-53. Whoever cannot make serious speech act. It requires authority and wide acceptance from the audience. 70 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 67-69. Status of the speaker can be based on politics, science etc., and this status combines the objects of the discourse so, that those claims regarding the objects gain serious content and meaning. Discourses include

14 2.2.The speech of the report The context of the speech act is relevant. The interpretation of the text is contextual, which means that there is not only one right truth. In this sense we can ask whether the security policy line has been accepted and understood in the way that Finland originally wanted? 71 The effect of the report is not only one-way street, but the contents of the report also reaches its influence to the speaker. While writing the report Finland has anticipated the reactions of audience and observed them in the report, so it involves a hermeneutic circle. The security speech is also for the domestic purposes. It creates a framework for the right policy and kind of foundation for the security discourse. The construction of security policy is mainly about credibility and assurance. In addition, the cold realities like the number of troops and level of technology etc. and geography are the factors which either increase or decrease this rhetorical credibility dimension. 72 In other words much of the security politics is created illusions, which are supported and realised by practices and (discursive) conventions. Thus, the consequential speech acts (perlocutionary acts) have essential role when assuring someone or when A wants B to do something. Finland sees the overall international situation in a way that there is an opportunity to build lasting security. Therefore Finland presents a certain truth or value judgement stating that international community (Europe) as whole should commit itself like Finland to stability and security. Simultaneously when Finland is obliging or urging others to follow her lead, Finland is committing herself to this line of policy too. This security report is a framework for Finland and according to it other states can anticipate Finland s behaviour. On the one hand the report reflects what Finland is expecting from other parties and from the community as whole. 73 For s single state it is significant that her message will be understood as originally intended. Interplay between states is tied to certain tradition and language. For Finland there is a emerging conflict; whether to continue careful policy that notices especially Russia s interests or whether to join Nato and finally (even permanently?) change her political position in Europe? The aim of Finland to westernise Russia or integrate her to Europe will be endangered as far as Finland is ready to create a military concepts, thus the security can be thought to be a certain linguistic convention, which exists as according and under those formation rules of the discourse. 71 There are no clear indicators which would tell if the speech act has been successful or not. 72 Everyone understands what Finland s geographic position means in the context of crisis; if we are member of Nato we are at the frontline if assuming that hostilities will take place between East and West. If we are not member of Nato, it may mean that we survive as non-participant (outsider) and/or we can only rely on our own defence. The nature of possible conflict is essential. 73 During the Cold War the situation was complicated, because the security speech of Finland need to include two (opposite) elements; commitment to friendly relations with Russia, and commitment to democratic (Western) values and to the policy of neutrality.

15 chasm between her and Russia 74. In this context we can see how the consequences of speech have their own logic of which breaking may mean severe credibility problem. In this sense prudence has its point. 75 If we don t question the given reality the limits of our imagination will prevent potential opportunities to come up. Explicitly Finland wants to have Europe where security is undivided especially in a sense of extended security. 76 Supporting integration process means inherently deepening and enlarging cooperation, because integration is above all about continuation (continuum). It is quite possible that this present integration process will (finally) lead a federal state (at least some version of it) which has normal characteristics of sovereign state. 77 Integration is for Finland security political tool. 78 However, Finland commits herself to independent defence and emphasises her regional integrity. This means the continuation of realist tradition. On the one hand, Finland is willing to give up its self-determination and move towards common European security and CFSP, and on the other hand she states behaving within the traditional model of international system, where there is no authority above sovereign state. The security language of the report can be seen the physical essence and history, and cultural background which are intertwined and supported by each other. All in all, this combination or synthesis underlines the strong role of security in Finnish society. The undertone of the report is that Finland will, in all times, look after herself. Finland, like other nations, will strive for security solution which is desired to be sustainable and firm, but then again these post-modern(?) times are first of all about change and transition. 79 74 Thinking security as space raises a question if Finland wants to estrange herself from Russia? And thus to europeanize Russia so that the historic-cultural sense of Russia as unpredictable and absurd (irrational) would change and finally disappear? 75 When it comes to speech act the aim is to perform a right act, present a true argument (claim) and express things truthfully so, that the listener will believe the message. Circumstances where states speak about their security policy are quite often (compare to crisis situation) stable and organised. Speakers and listeners have their roles and expectations according which the text and speech is produced. In this context those controversial discussions of Nato membership by members of Finland s present government have serious meaning. 76 Image of the extended security concept can be interpreted as follows; covers and protects everyone and everything, good and flexible security. In the context of Europe integration and democracy are attached also to the extended security conception, and then images are; overall welfare, (eternal) peace etc. But if we, for instance, look at whose interests are at stake in the Union then we will have different answers. And if the extended security includes the environmental security dimension then the question of the subject of security will have new meaning. 77 Will the integration process stop to the borders of Europe? 78 Membership in the Union was first of all security act. See Council of State 1995, 56-60. 79 If Finland s aim to have extended and undivided integration based security will materialize, it means a significant change in Finnish security identity. Consequently, Finland is not only by herself responsible for her defence, but part of the greater entity, and thus dependent of it too. This will only be emphasised as far as Finland decides to join Nato, because then the (assumed) ultimate defence (nuclear weapon) is behind the Atlantic Ocean. Assumed, because it is difficult to see what kind of true protection nuclear weapon can provide in the crisis situation. However, this is an clear indication of Finland s aim (acknowledging realities) to be able participate those organisations which will finally decide the future security order of Europe.

16 2.3. The security idea of the report Active adaptation to the new surroundings has been characteristic for Finland during this period of post Cold War. The goal is a responsible and loyal European security order. Finland has obtained tools; to control traditional security problems of the national basis, to participate into instutionalized cooperation in order to promote extended security; to construct common security in the context of deepening integration 80. This approach describes the security policy idea of Finland, because it combines somewhat idealistic aspirations with cold realism, which again is expected to produce solid foundation in the case of being left alone. European security order is ambiguous at the moment 81. Partly due to this uncertainty Finland s policy is also bifurcated; based on independent defence and solidarity (loyal) security. The integration based security (loyal) requires serious commitment so that one can influence on the designing of policy and in the same it requires flexibility in order to achieve long term goals. Finland is striving to the very of core of integration process. One particular domain which is vital for Finland is Union s policy of Russia. It must be developed on the basis of cooperation and mutual trust it is in the interest of all Europeans. 82 Finland s relation to Nato crystallises in a effort to gain control to those open security questions which emerge as the influence of the organization is enlarging (expanding). The aim is to contain potential confrontation in Finland s neighbouring areas. In this sense Finland should be able to influence Nato s decisions, but without full membership Finland s capabilities are limited. 83 Present Nato-solution shows how Finland is looking at the membership in the light of traditional security thinking. Possibility to influence on Nato s decisions is not as important as the possible consequences which would follow from the full membership. 84 3. Concluding remarks The basis of Finland s present security policy is in the Cold War tradition of which she is shifting away or at least the limits of interpretation are widening. In a certain sense this means that Finland is also moving away from materially based security towards non-material security. The feminist orientation emphasizes that one should not base her security on other s insecurity 85. Finland is striving 80 Möttölä 1998, 363.Translation K.L. 81 Union s role in the Europe s (hard) security issues is quite open, even though it seems that there are great pressures to complete Union in this respect too. 82 Nokkala 1998, 67-71 and Möttölä 1998, 363-367. 83 To what extent Finland could really influence on Nato s decisions? 84 Möttölä 1998, 369-370. So, primarily, if Finland decides to join Nato, she is after deterrence and military aid in case of crisis. On the other hand, it seems that Finland would like to see the Union developing as major security organisation within Europe. 85 See Steans 1998 ja Tickner 1992.

17 for that, but simultaneously is preparing herself to the worst case scenario, when the issue of credibility of the security policy is questionable. 86 The European Union is for Finland a source of security. Idea is based on integrationist (loyal) security thinking and Deutsch s idea of (interdependent) security community and complex. 87 Thus, there is again traditional security thinking, but also a comprehension of the idea how security do not solely locate in the state. In this light the armed security is more like problem than solution. In the level of foreign policy Finland realises how security is what we are making of it. Consequently, security is not deterministic natural law which cannot be influenced on. The change (Glasnost & Perestroyka) before the break-up of the Soviet Union, showed that changes are possible to make. Three dimensions; the constructivist (and normative) security, change in dominating practices and right or authority to define security can be detected from the history of Finnish security thinking. It shows how strongly the fear of Russia (ryssänpelko) is embedded to the consciousness of Finnish nation (identity), and on the other hand, it can be seen in the way the attitudes (public opinion) towards Nato are changing. In official politics, together with the rhetorical(?) change of Nato Finland is approaching the point where Nato, instead of being threat, is becoming the source of security and stability. However, we must bear in mind that security is not only in one location. The definitions of security are part of the constructed reality which is why we need to find out how these concepts are constituted and based on. Uncertainty and contingency are basic elements of security, but in spite of that we are striving for continuity and stability. The predictability and familiarity are major elements in building security identity, that is why otherness becomes so easily a enemy. The relationship between Russia and Finland and Russia s position in the Finnish identity is in transition also. This continuing change of identity is not only between Russia and Finland, but also between European Union and Russia. 88 For instance, the emerging Northern Dimension initiative constantly realizes Union s relation to Russia in a way, which differs dramatically from formal relations during the Cold War 89. Post-modern geopolitics 90, which is about flows of space, time, technology and power, will also change, at least partly, the foundation of Finnish geopolitical thought and imagination. 86 Security dilemma. 87 Council of State 1995, 15. Finland also sees how environmental dimension increases interdependence between states and thus produces (common) security problems. On the one hand these problems across state borders and thus the limits of security community, but on the other hand these problems create opportunities to expand that community. 88 Möttölä 1998, 374-375. 89 See Jobb & Warjovaara 1998. 90 See Dalby 1998 ja O Tuathail 1998.