: Military Gov & the United States 1. Background to Changes in US Korea Policy (1) Why Walt Rostow? Rostow (1919-2003) 1
Economist - Take-off model as economic guide for SK in 1960s & 1970s - Stages of Economic Growth: Non-Communist Manifesto - Born in New York to Russian-Jewish immigrant family (1916) - Ph.D. (28 yrs) from Oxford - deeply involved in formulating US policy towards Asian nations & Vietnam War - He found Marxist theory = inadequate - Influenced by George Kennan's containment policy while working at State Dept. - Psychological containment using economic aid to prove superiority of capitalism 2
Center for International Studies at MIT 1 Center worked with CIA - CIA covert operations in Philippines, Iran, Nicaragua with college research centers - His 2 books (A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, 1957; An American Foreign Policy in Asia, 1955) 2 scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds worked together - Rostow believed economics not sufficient, political, social, cultural & others essential 3
John F. Kennedy (V1) 평화봉사단 - Kennedy Gang : scholars from Harvard, MIT - Kennedy-Cooper (Ambassador to India) Resolution : provided aid to India : US previously understood India's non-alignment = unfriendly to US : But based on Rostow's advice, Kennedy passed legislation to aid India 4
President Truman & President Johnson -Both laymen in foreign policy needed foreign policy specialists - national security advisor (1966) : When criticism against Vietnam War he offered optimistic reports on the war : argued for bombing North Vietnam (1961) + greater mil pressure : sweeping full-scale bombings against North Vietnam even when Robert McNamara (V2)(Defense Sec.) expressed skepticism - His role ended when Johnson's announcement of not running again in 1968 5
(2) Let's Use Nationalism 1 Rostow theory = modernization theory -His economic growth occurs in 5 basic stages (V3) (total about 200 yrs) a. Traditional society b. Preconditions for take-off c. Take-off d. Drive to maturity e. Age of High mass consumption - sweeping reconstruction of society & politics - He accepted both Kennan's expressed need for containment using economic means + Paul Nitze's domino theory - domino effect : spreading of communism on a global scale inevitable unless it is globally contained - Stability that modernization brings will only come in long run - Instability will exist until then 6
- Econ development will dismantle established society create instabilities - Modernizing society exposed to communist threats eliminate such danger through active intervention against communist guerrillas in Vietnam (= take-off stage) ex) active intervention necessary for Vietnam late 1960s, for SK early 1960s 7
Instabilities - modernization process must inevitably go through instabilities - If society cannot overcome instabilities, it cannot muster social + psychological strength & defeat communism - Prioritization of econ development over democracy -Nationalism = effective cohesive force to unite society 2 Rostow's emphasis on psychological factor - instabilities of modernization process produce favorable conditions communism can exploit - Only psychological remedy can stop communism - criticize grant-type aids of Eisenhower administration - grant-type aids not inspire confidence among 3 rd world people but only lethargic environment 8
(5) Rostow, SK & Japan - visited SK several times 1960s - Gave a speech to students, Seoul National Uni (1965) - SK society was already at take-off stage Huge impact on SK people + instilled trust & confidence - He mentioned SK, Taiwan + Vietnam before = cases of his model could not effectively applied. - But SK development followed his model when he began to play important role in Washington - He convinced President Kennedy to reconsider Korean mil gv when Kennedy unsure about it. - Initially US strongly opposed SK mil gov's econ plans(1961-63) because it emphasized use of domestic capital instead of foreign one. - Rostow called for use of large foreign capital & links with advanced nations through unbalanced growth - Asian nations pursue export development to Japan & receive additional loans for national development purposes 9
(6) No Aid without Economic Development : Changes in US Korean Policy during Kennedy Administration - Hugh Farley (US Operation Mission in Korea; USOM/K) : marked 1961 = beginning of change in US Korea policy : Despite corruption reduction, SK needed fundamental reform : reform of US aid distribution : Create national movement for reform : pressure SK gov - Rostow (before Coup) : suggested to Kennedy that fresh look toward SK necessary after receiving Farley report : labor-intensive & light industry-oriented economic reconstruction plan 10
-Presidential Task Force on Korea (headed by Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs; Walter McConaughy) during 483 rd meeting of NSC (May 15, 1961) : submitted official US Korea policy (June 13, 1961) : US should establish national development plan : reorganize American Mission in Korea : reduction of SK mil personnel despite higher unemployment for economic development But never achieved : importance of labor-intensive industry to make use of human resources = the only major industrial resources 11
- US = elder brother : active US intervention = essential : US failed (1950s) because of US focus on SK mil establishment instead of self-sustaining econ : Now focus on econ development : materialization of Rostow's policy contentions 1 econ development plan with US support 2 sweeping social reform (corruption) - reform of officialdom through salary increases - institutional change - mental reform - enhancement of Korea's national image - change SK's ways of thinking through top-down reform 12
*Former assessment of Korean society & history - very negative - nationalistic prejudices, historic dependency, factionalism - rampant slandering of others - agitations by intellectuals US efforts - dispatching Peace Corps SK gov - Citizenry Headquarters for National reconstruction of mil gov 재건국민운동 (V4; 10 min) : improving living conditions, promoting diligence, advancing production & constructive attitudes, raising level of culture, encouraging thought refinement 13
3 normalization of relations with Japan - US wants Japan to take larger role in development of underdeveloped countries - pass US burden in SK to Japan - Japanese capital & market for SK goods 14
2. May 16 Coup d'etat & the US (1) Was US behind the Coup? (V5) - US armed Forces commander in Korea = commanding authority - Only 3,500 men mobilized at Coup - US involvement in Coup suggested from beginning Kreper incident - US effort to overthrow Jang Myeon gov before Coup - Colonel Kreper, 장면 's political adviser & Jang Doyeong 장도영 ) = center of the scheme -US tried coup before May 16 = decisive breakthrough US = no relation with Coup - Poor relationship between Kim Jongpil (JP) & US - US considered JP as radical nationalist or socialist 15
(2) US gov & Jang Myeon( 장면 ) s Knowledge of the Coup - Words about Coup in circulation in April already. - Why didn't they respond to Coup? - Wouldn't this be a simple question to answer if the very people capable of arresting conspirators? The blame goes to Army chief of Staff(Jang, 장도영 ), UN Command, US intelligence agency - but US gov continued to support Jang Myeon - Helped strengthened Jang regime while also discussing possible new leadership -Although not actively supporting Coup, US gov might have had a link with conspirators 16
(3) Prime Minister Jang's Call to US Embassy in Seoul - UN Commander did not mobilize US forces to suppress Coup - Not mobilizing US forces does not mean that UN commander approved Coup. - Korean Army chief of staff = not part of Coup forces - Nonetheless his willingness to negotiate instead of suppression - No Korean commander except First Army commander Yi Hanrim ( 이한림 ) expressed firm intention for suppression, even after US agencies publicly spoke against coup. - After seeking refuge in nunnery, Prime Minister called US embassy & passed on his authority to UN commander. 17
(5) Is there Possibility that Washington Approved the Coup? - US suffered from aftershock of Bay of Pigs invasion (V6) - US failed to overthrow Cuban gov of Fidel Castro - US hesitant to actively intervene elsewhere The New York Times (on May 17, 1961) - Under Secretary of State Bowles : stated to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Coup leaders want to eliminate corruption + hope that US will recognize new mil leaders. What was his basis of reasoning at the time when UN commander was leaning towards suppression? He may have seen Coup as new hope for SK Rostow later recollected that he had advised Kennedy not to suppress the Coup 18
(7) A Successful Coup with just 3,000 Men - 3,500 men (= 1% of 600,000 soldiers) succeeded - succeeded only in Seoul concentration in Seoul - No resistance from mil police - The forces that successfully carried out Coup = Koreans - After the Coup, most Koreans = quiet - Korean president grumbling that his regime destined to fall 19
3. Taming of the Coup Forces & Park Chung Hee's Tug-of-War (1)Using President Yun Boseon( 윤보선 ) - After Coup, prime minister disappeared - UN Commander statement in support of Jang Myeon( 장면 ) gov - Yun against suppressing the Coup - Yun for fall of Jang gov - Probably thinking of supra-partisan national cabinet - Sinmindang P ( 신민당 ) urging Yun to create supra-partisan gov (17th of May) - Yun expected 6 months for transfer of power to civil gov - US = American-style democracy as important moral cause, could not publicly support illegal coup. Using Yun's stance in justifying US stance towards SK + Coup - US not need to recognize new gv if highest ranking official of current gv retained his position new gv uniting civilians & coup forces by using authority of President (current gv) 20
(2) Forcing Backroom Boys to Resign - US & SK conflict on econ policy (1962) 1 US strong dissatisfaction with SK mil econ plan - too unrealistic & socialist : froze bank savings to mobilize domestic capital US strongly opposed SK mil gv forced to release frozen bank savings Setting of Economic Planning Board 21
(3) Forcing Kim Jongpil(JP 김종필 ) to Resign - For US, fundamental cause of SK mil gv's instability centered around KCIA (its leader Kim JP) - 8 th military class of Korea Military Academy : will to power + willingness to be ruthless : frequent rejection of US advice on political matters : unsound econ policies conflict between highly cohesive 8th class & their enemies US saw Park Chung Hee as only one to stabilize SK 22
(4) The First US Intervention Surrounding Transfer of Power to Civilian Gv - With huge effort of US Embassy & State Dept, President Park decided that Kim JP & his young colonels leaving mil gv & Democratic Republican P (DRP) - They informed Park of JP's withdrawal from politics = best hope for pol & econ stability Park's February 18 Declaration (1963) - He would not be part of civilian gv - Kim would leave politics + go to USA. 23
(5) Construction of Moderate Political Party Alaska(=Hamgyeong 함경 ) Suppression - In March (1963), KCIA arrested several generals & admirals & civilians for participating in coup conspiracy - targeted anti-jp figures who grew up around Hamgyeong -fabricated affair to overturn Park's decision to withdraw from pol 24