Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 1 of 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION SHANNON PEREZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-00360-OLG-JES-XLR STATE OF TEXAS et al., Defendants. RESPONSE TO CONGRESSPERSONS OPPOSED MOTION TO COMPEL During his recent deposition, non-party Chairman Drew Darby asserted legislative privilege in response to questions related to the 2013 legislative session. 1 Counsel for the African-American Congresspersons ( Congresspersons ) asserts that the assertions of privilege were improper because (1) the privilege was asserted by Chairman Darby s counsel rather than Chairman Darby himself, and (2) the claims of privilege violated this Court s order of January 8, 2014 (ECF No. 952). Chairman Darby properly invoked the privilege, and once he had done so, his counsel properly advised him on the scope of the privilege and instructed him not to answer questions that sought to discover privileged information. The manner in which Chairman Darby and his counsel invoked and defended the privilege complied with both the letter and the spirit of this Court s order. Moreover, Chairman Darby s assertion of privilege was consistent with legal precedent regarding the nature and scope of legislative privilege. The State Defendants previously filed briefs outlining the contours of legislative privilege as it applies to state legislators. See Def. s Motion to Modify the Court s Legislative Privilege Order (Nov. 22, 2013), ECF No. 930 (hereinafter Motion to Modify No. 930 ); Def. s Motion for Protective Order 1 Chairman Darby previously waived legislative privilege as to the 2011 session, and was responsive to questions relating to 2011. 1
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 2 of 15 (July 21, 2011), ECF No. 62 (hereinafter Motion No. 62 ). In those motions, counsel for the State Defendants advised the Court that, absent waiver by the individual holder of the privilege, the State Defendants would oppose any discovery efforts that seek to invade or circumvent legislative privilege. Further, the State Defendants advised the Court that, in the event an individual office holder asserted privilege, the privilege would protect against discovery of (1) the legislator s subjective intent or motivation with respect to a particular legislative act; (2) the legislator s mental impressions of pending legislation, including proposed amendments; (3) the legislator s thought process in considering proposed legislation; (4) investigative efforts undertaken for the purpose of informing the legislator s consideration of pending legislation; and (5) communications about pending legislation. Motion to Modify No. 930 at 9-10. Chairman Darby fully incorporates those motions herein, and will set forth only the law directly applicable to the Congresspersons Motion to Compel. It is important to note that this is the first time in this round of litigation that legislative privilege has been an issue. The only legislator witnesses for the State Defendants to assert the privilege at deposition were Chairman Darby and Chairman Seliger, and these two witnesses asserted legislative privilege as to 2013 legislation only. Several of Plaintiffs witnesses have asserted legislative privilege 2, but the parties have thus far been able to resolve all privilege-related concerns without intervention by the Court. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES I. Chairman Darby Asserted Legislative Privilege Only On Questions Seeking Information Properly Within the Scope of the Privilege. As this Court has previously recognized, federal common law recognizes a legislative privilege for state legislators. Order. No. 952 at 2-3. The legislative privilege is a personal one to be waived or asserted by each individual legislator. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court has long recognized a legislative 2 For example, Sen. Royce West, Rep. Abel Herrero, Rep. Dawnna Dukes, all asserted legislative privilege in response to one or more questions at their 2014 depositions. In each case, the privilege was asserted and argued by counsel for the witness. 2
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 3 of 15 privilege that protects anyone acting in a legislative capacity, including staff, from incurring civil liability for, or testifying about, legislative acts. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-16 (1972). For members of Congress and their staffs, this privilege is grounded in Article I of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, 6, cl. 1. While State legislators lie beyond the reach of the Speech or Debate Clause, they hold a similar (though less expansive) privilege under federal common law. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32 (1980). The rationale behind the legislative privilege is that [r]egardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998); see also id. at 55 (noting that it is not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators ) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)). Because judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government, a decision to plac[e] a decisionmaker on the stand is usually to be avoided. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The same rule applies when a litigant asserts that a state law was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose state legislators cannot be compelled to testify except in extraordinary instances. Id. at 268. And even in such extraordinary instances, state legislators testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. Id. Numerous courts have recognized that the common-law legislative privilege protects state legislators from testifying about legislative acts. 3 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 3 See, e.g., Schlitz v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 854 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1988) ( Where, as here, the suit would require legislators to testify regarding conduct in their legislative capacity, the doctrine of legislative immunity has full force. ); Florida v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1304 (N.D. Fla. 2012) ( [T]he legislators have a federal legislative privilege at least qualified, if not absolute not to testify in this civil case about the reasons for their votes. The privilege is broad enough to cover all the topics that the intervenors propose to ask them and to cover their personal notes of the deliberative process. ); Miles-Un-Ltd., Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, 917 F. Supp. 91, 98 (D.N.H. 1996) ( Effectuating the intentions of the legislative immunity doctrine, legislators acting within the realm of legitimate legislative activity, should not be required to be a party to a civil action concerning legislative activities, 3
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 4 of 15 for example, recently confirmed that the legislative privilege can be invoked in Voting Rights Act cases even where proof of invidious purpose is an element of the plaintiff s claims. Guided by the reasoning in Arlington Heights, the court shielded all evidence relating to legislative acts and found that legislative privilege objections were appropriately asserted as to questions that sought evidence regarding a legislator s motivations with respect to a bill (e.g., why a legislator voted a particular way, why a legislator supported or opposed different amendments, why a bill sponsor included different language in various bills, what factual information a legislator did or did not consider in supporting or opposing a bill, etc.) and questions about legislative acts legislators engaged in with respect to a bill (e.g., voting, drafting, debating, information gathering, etc.). Exhibit A, Order at 11, No. 12-167-RMC-DST-RLW (D.D.C. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 167. 4 The order in Texas v. Holder followed existing precedent establishing that the legislative privilege extends to (1) a legislator s subjective motivation regarding a bill or other legislative activity, see, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) ( The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. ); Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47 (D.D.C. 2007) ( Inquiry into individual Members motivations for engaging in [legislative] acts is prohibited, even if those motivations are unworthy or improper. ); see also Jeff D. v. nor should they be required to testify regarding those actions ); 2BD Assocs. Ltd. P ship v. County Comm rs of Queen Anne s County, 896 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D. Md. 1995) ( [T]he effect of the [common-law legislative privilege] doctrine is twofold; it protects [state] legislators from civil liability, and it also functions as an evidentiary and testimonial privilege.... [I]f immunity from civil liability attaches to a given action, then such testimonial immunity applies as well. ); Suhre v. Board of Comm rs, 894 F. Supp. 927, 932 (W.D.N.C. 1995) ( Because the commissioners are entitled to legislative immunity, they are protected from testifying concerning their motives for refusing to remove the [Ten Commandments display].... Where the defense of the case would require the commissioners to testify about their legislative conduct and their motives, legislative immunity precludes the suit. ), rev d on other grounds, 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292, 297 (D. Md. 1992) ( Legislative immunity not only protects state legislators from civil liability, it also functions as an evidentiary and testimonial privilege.... The immunity enjoyed by legislative staff derives from the individual legislators themselves: to the extent a legislator is immunized, his staffers are likewise cloaked. ). 4 The State Defendants do not suggest that the order in Texas v. Holder is binding on this Court or that it establishes any contested legal proposition in this case. Because it provides a recent, comprehensive analysis of legislative privilege in a case involving the Texas Legislature, however, it informs the State Defendants understanding of privilege as reflected in Chairman Darby s deposition and its response to the Congresspersons motion to compel. 4
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 5 of 15 Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 288-90 (9th Cir. 2011); Butnick v. McLean, 76 F.3d 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1996); (2) legislative acts such as investigation and communications about pending legislation, see, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 ( [The Speech or Debate] Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts. ) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Otter, 643 F.3d at 288-90; Butnick, 76 F.3d at 613; Jewish War Veterans, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 47; and (3) a legislator s thought process regarding pending legislation, including materials that were or were not considered, see, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ( [I]ndications as to what Congress is looking at provide clues as to what Congress is doing, or might be about to do and this is true whether or not the documents are sought for the purpose of inquiring into... legislative conduct or to advance some other goals.... ). Most of Chairman Darby s assertions of legislative privilege were made in response to questions that expressly called for the disclosure of his own thought process, information that he reviewed, and the process by which he analyzed specific issues related to pending redistricting bills. In one exchange, the Chairman was asked to disclose the reason why certain decisions were made during the legislative process: 4 Q. Okay. The -- can you explain to me why it was 5 determined to allow changes to one of the maps but not 6 the -- to the -- to the House map but not to the 7 Congressional map? 8 MR. SWEETEN: In 2013, Gary? 9 MR. BLEDSOE: 2013. 10 MR. SWEETEN: Okay. Yeah. I m going to 11 object. It s a matter of legislative privilege. 12 A. Again, it -- the question goes to the matter 13 of process, and I assert my legislative privilege on 14 advice of counsel. Exhibit B, Deposition of Drew Darby, 152:4-14 (May 20, 2014). In another exchange, the Chairman was asked to disclose the steps he took to evaluate a legal claim about a particular district: 8 Q. Okay. And the -- and if you see under the 9 final No. 1 on Page 1, do you see that where we complain 10 about how CD 23 was dismantled? 11 A. Yes. I see the second Paragraph 1 on your 5
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 6 of 15 12 letter. 13 Q. Okay. Can you -- can you tell us all actions 14 that you took to investigate whether or not that 15 allegation was true and accurate? 16 MR. SWEETEN: Objection. It calls for 17 legislatively privileged information. 18 A. I assert my legislative privilege on the 19 advice of counsel. Id. at 142:8-19. In this instance, as in many others, the question itself provided facts to support the assertion of legislative privilege it asked directly for disclosure of the Chairman s investigative process regarding pending legislation. This was explained by Chairman Darby s counsel, see id. at 142:24-143:3, and Chairman Darby responded to other questions by noting that they called for disclosure of his own investigative process: 5 Q. Okay. And can you tell us every action that 6 you took to investigate whether or not those allegations 7 were correct? 8 MR. SWEETEN: Same objection, same basis, 9 legislative privilege. Instruct not to answer. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. Your question goes to the matter of process, 12 and I assert my legislative privilege -- 13 Q. Okay. 14 A. -- and will not answer. 15 Q. So if I ask you what -- what facts support 16 your contention that this would violate the privilege, 17 then you re saying that because of the process? 18 A. The process.... 15 Q. Okay. Can you tell us any action that you 16 took to investigate whether or not that was correct? 17 MR. SWEETEN: Same objection, legislative 18 privilege. Instruct not to answer. 19 A. The question asks that -- about the process, 20 and as such I refuse to answer on advice of counsel and 21 as a matter of legislative privilege. Id. at 146:5-18; 147:15-21. Whether Chairman Darby looked at certain documents and how he weighed those documents falls within the core of legislative privilege. Yet in the deposition, and now through their motion to compel, the Congresspersons have attempted to force disclosure of this very information. See, e.g., Motion to Compel at 7 ( Whether he looked at certain documents obviously 6
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 7 of 15 raises the issue about what is said in those documents and whether he disregards them. ). Chairman Darby properly followed his counsel s instruction not to answer these questions on the basis of legislative privilege. Similarly, the Congresspersons allege that something changed during a recess during the debate, and amendments were no longer permitted. Any statements made during this recess are privileged communications among legislators relating to pending litigation. The Congresspersons are inquiring into legislative acts associated with the bill and motivations therefor, which are protected by legislative privilege. The legislative privilege exists independently of any applicable attorney client privilege. The State Defendants and Chairman Darby do not concede that any applicable attorney-client privilege was waived during the recess in debate. Any communications between legislators and representatives of the Texas Attorney General s Office ( OAG ) that occurred during this recess were in the nature of legal advice given as counsel for the individual legislators involved. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a privilege is not, however, waived if a privileged communication is shared with a third person who has a common legal interest with respect to the subject matter of the communication. Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. U.S. Gov t, Dept. of the Treasury, I.R.S., 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985). To the extent Chairman Darby communicated with his attorney in the presence of other members of the Republican Caucus, such members had a common legal interest in seeing the maps upheld, and the attorney-client privilege was not waived. II. The Process By Which Chairman Darby Asserted Legislative Privilege was Proper Under Order No. 952 and Recognized Principles of Privilege. A. Order 952 Explicitly Authorizes A Witness to Decline to Answer A Question. The Congresspersons complain that, by refusing to answer questions which he believed were covered by the legislative privilege, Chairman Darby did not follow the Court s procedures for asserting 7
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 8 of 15 the privilege. Mot. Compel at 7. However, this Court s Order outlined two methods for asserting privilege: Any legislator, legislative aide, or staff member that asserts the privilege will be afforded the opportunity to comply with the protocol established by the August 1, 2011 Order. Under this scenario those portions of the deposition would be sealed and submitted for in camera review. Alternatively, the deponent may choose not to answer specific questions, citing the privilege. In that event, Plaintiffs may thereafter file a motion to compel. Order No. 952 at 4 (emphasis added). Chairman Darby elected not to answer the question, and the Congresspersons have elected to file their motion to compel. Chairman Darby and his counsel provided as much information as possible without disclosing matters they believed were protected by legislative privilege. B. While the Privilege Belongs to the Legislator, the Legislator s Attorney Can Provide Counsel About When and How to Assert the Legislative Privilege. The legislative privilege belongs to Chairman Darby, and Chairman Darby himself made the decision to assert legislative privilege as to legislative acts and communications during the 2013 session. Exhibit C, Affidavit of Drew Darby. That the privilege belongs to Chairman Darby does not, however, prevent his counsel from asserting the privilege on his behalf during a deposition. Virtually all recognized privileges are personal privileges, yet privileges are commonly asserted by attorneys on behalf their clients. This practice is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which anticipate that a person other than the deponent will give instructions not to answer in order to preserve a privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2) ( A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3). ). Following this practice, counsel for Chairman Darby instructed him on the applicability of the privilege and defended the privilege by instructing him not to answer questions that called for the disclosure of privileged information. Counsel for the Congresspersons provided similar privilege instructions during the deposition of at least one non-party 8
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 9 of 15 legislative witness he defended. Exhibit D, Deposition of Royce West 72:1-4; 139:22-25 (Mar. 10, 2014). Counsel for Rep. Abel Herrero and Rep. Dawnna Dukes also asserted legislative privilege on behalf of their clients during their depositions. Exhibit E, Deposition of Abel Herrero at 9:14-10:22, 172:20-173:17 (Feb. 21, 2014); Exhibit F, Deposition of Dawnna Dukes at 46:16-19 (Feb. 12, 2014). That Chairman Darby s counsel also represents the State of Texas does not preclude him from asserting personal privileges on the Chairman s behalf when serving as his attorney. The OAG is acting both as counsel to the State Defendants in this case and as counsel for certain individual legislators. Chairman Darby was represented at his deposition by his attorney from the OAG. In defending a deposition of a legislator who is represented by the OAG, the attorney-client relationship permitted Mr. Sweeten to advise Chairman Darby about the scope and contours of the legislative privilege, and to defend Chairman Darby from improper questions and argument by counsel for the Congresspersons. III. The Relief Sought By The Congresspersons Is Overbroad And Unwarranted. In their conclusion, the Congresspersons ask the Court to compel Chairman Darby to answer questions seeking privileged information or to exclude any future testimony that would have been responsive to those questions or any testimony from questions propounded by the State that will have a bearing on the issue of intentional discrimination. Motion to Compel at 9. While it is unclear exactly what the Congresspersons are asking for, such relief appears to be both overbroad and unwarranted. 5 The requested relief is overbroad in that it appears to prevent the State Defendants from introducing any evidence that bear[s] on the issue of intentional discrimination. Chairman Darby is entitled to testify about non-privileged matters regardless of whether such testimony bears on the issue 5 Because the Congresspersons attached the entire deposition transcript and did not include page numbers when setting forth the questions it seeks to have answered, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Congresspersons are seeking to compel answers to questions asked by counsel for the Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force. To the extent the Congresspersons seek to compel answers to any questions other than those asked by counsel for the Congresspersons, Chairman Darby objects. The Congresspersons are entitled to seek testimony in response only to questions asked by their own counsel. 9
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 10 of 15 of intentional discrimination. For example, Chairman Darby s assertion of legislative privilege as to the 2013 plans does not prevent him from providing factual testimony about: The general legislative purpose of the legislation; Matters of public record; The timing and sequence of events relating to the legislation; Amendments publicly offered; Factual matters related to the makeup and procedural functioning of the Redistricting Committee; Whether hearings were held, as well as when and where those hearings were held; Bills filed; Public statements made in committee hearings and during floor debates; Foundational facts about privileged matters that would be appropriate in a privilege log, e.g., when, where, and with whom he communicated during the redistricting process; and Other relevant topics which are not protected by the legislative privilege. The requested relief is unwarranted because the State Defendants do not intend to offer testimony by Chairman Darby on privileged matters. The State Defendants understand the potential sword-andshield nature of legislative privilege. Because he has asserted legislative privilege at his deposition, Chairman Darby cannot voluntarily change his position and testify about privileged matters at trial. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER For these reasons, Chairman Darby respectfully asks the Court to deny the Congresspersons Motion to Compel. 10
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 11 of 15 Dated: June 11, 2014 Respectfully submitted. GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General DAVID C. MATTAX Deputy Attorney General for Defense Litigation J. REED CLAY, JR. Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General /s/ Patrick K. Sweeten PATRICK K. SWEETEN Chief, Special Litigation Division Texas State Bar No. 00798537 P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711-2548 (512) 463-0150 (512) 936-0545 (fax) ATTORNEYS FOR NON-PARTY CHAIRMAN DREW DARBY ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS, RICK PERRY, AND NANDITA BERRY 11
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 12 of 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this filing was sent on June 11, 2014, via the Court s electronic notification system and/or email to the following counsel of record: DAVID RICHARDS Richards, Rodriguez & Skeith LLP 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200 Austin, TX 78701 512-476-0005 davidr@rrsfirm.com RICHARD E. GRAY, III Gray & Becker, P.C. 900 West Avenue, Suite 300 Austin, TX 78701 512-482-0061/512-482-0924 (facsimile) Rick.gray@graybecker.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS PEREZ, DUTTON, TAMEZ, HALL, ORTIZ, SALINAS, DEBOSE, and RODRIGUEZ JOSE GARZA Law Office of Jose Garza 7414 Robin Rest Dr. San Antonio, Texas 78209 210-392-2856 garzpalm@aol.com MARK W. KIEHNE mkiehne@lawdcm.com RICARDO G. CEDILLO rcedillo@lawdcm.com Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza McCombs Plaza 755 Mulberry Ave., Ste. 500 San Antonio, TX 78212 210-822-6666/210-822-1151 (facsimile) JOAQUIN G. AVILA P.O. Box 33687 Seattle, WA 98133 206-724-3731/206-398-4261 (facsimile) jgavotingrights@gmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN ggandh@aol.com DONALD H. FLANARY, III donflanary@hotmail.com Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley 310 S. St. Mary s Street San Antonio, TX 78205-4605 210-226-1463/210-226-8367 (facsimile) PAUL M. SMITH, MICHAEL B. DESANCTIS, JESSICA RING AMUNSON Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20001 202-639-6000 J. GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street, # 405 Alexandria, VA 22304 703-628-4673 hebert@voterlaw.com JESSE GAINES P.O. Box 50093 Fort Worth, TX 76105 817-714-9988 gainesjesse@ymail.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS QUESADA, MUNOZ, VEASEY, HAMILTON, KING and JENKINS LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. 1325 Riverview Towers San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260 210-225-3300 lrvlaw@sbcglobal.net GEORGE JOSEPH KORBEL Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. 1111 North Main San Antonio, TX 78213 210-212-3600 korbellaw@hotmail.com 12
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 13 of 15 NINA PERALES nperales@maldef.org MARISA BONO mbono@maldef.org Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-224-5476/210-224-5382 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFF LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS MARK ANTHONY SANCHEZ masanchez@gws-law.com ROBERT W. WILSON rwwilson@gws-law.com Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, PLLC 115 East Travis Street, Ste. 1900 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-8899/210-222-9526 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, CARDENAS, JIMENEZ, MENENDEZ, TOMACITA AND JOSE OLIVARES, ALEJANDRO AND REBECCA ORTIZ JOHN T. MORRIS 5703 Caldicote St. Humble, TX 77346 281-852-6388 Johnmorris1939@hotmail.com JOHN T. MORRIS, PRO SE MAX RENEA HICKS Law Office of Max Renea Hicks 101 West Sixth Street Suite 504 Austin, TX 78701 512-480-8231/512/480-9105 (facsimile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX SERNA, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, and SANDRA SERNA 13
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 14 of 15 STEPHEN E. MCCONNICO smcconnico@scottdoug.com SAM JOHNSON sjohnson@scottdoug.com S. ABRAHAM KUCZAJ, III akuczaj@scottdoug.com Scott, Douglass & McConnico One American Center 600 Congress Ave., 15th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512-495-6300/512-474-0731 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX SERNA, BALAKUMAR PANDIAN, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, ELIZA ALVARADO, JOSEY MARTINEZ, JUANITA VALDEZ-COX, LIONOR SOROLA-POHLMAN, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, NINA JO BAKER, and SANDRA SERNA CHAD W. DUNN chad@brazilanddunn.com K. SCOTT BRAZIL scott@brazilanddunn.com Brazil & Dunn 4201 FM 1960 West, Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 281-580-6310/281-580-6362 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-STATE DEFENDANTS TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY and BOYD RICHIE ROLANDO L. RIOS Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios 115 E Travis Street, Suite 1645 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-2102 rrios@rolandorioslaw.com ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFF HENRY CUELLAR GARY L. BLEDSOE Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe 316 W. 12 th Street, Ste. 307 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-9992/512-322-0840 (facsimile) garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, ALEXANDER GREEN, HOWARD JEFFERSON, BILL LAWSON, and JUANITA WALLACE VICTOR L. GOODE Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-5120 410-580-5120/410-358-9359 (facsimile) vgoode@naacpnet.org ATTORNEY FOR TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES 14
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 1084 Filed 06/11/14 Page 15 of 15 RONALD C. MACHEN, JR., United States Attorney District of Columbia JOCELYN SAMUELS T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR. TIMOTHY F. MELLETT timothy.f.mellett@usdoj.gov BRYAN SELLS Bryan.sells@usdoj.gov JAYE ALLISON SITTON jaye.sitton@usdoj.gov DANIEL J. FREEMAN daniel.freeman@usdoj.gov MICHELLE A. MCLEOD michelle.mcleod@usdoj.gov Civil Rights Division, Voting Rights U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. NWB #7266 Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 305-4143; (202) 305-4355 ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR THE UNITED STATES ROBERT NOTZON Law Office of Robert S. Notzon 1507 Nueces Street Austin, TX 78701 512-474-7563/512-474-9489 (facsimile) robert@notzonlaw.com ALLISON JEAN RIGGS ANITA SUE EARLS Southern Coalition for Social Justice 1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101 Durham, NC 27707 919-323-3380/919-323-3942 (facsimile) anita@southerncoalition.org ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, EARLS, LAWSON, WALLACE, JEFFERSON DONNA GARCIA DAVIDSON PO Box 12131 Austin, TX 78711 512-775-7625/877-200-6001 (facsimile) donna@dgdlawfirm.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STEVE MUNISTERI KAREN M. KENNARD 2803 Clearview Drive Austin, TX 78703 (512) 974-2177/512-974-2894 (facsimile) karen.kennard@ci.austin.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF AUSTIN DAVID ESCAMILLA Travis County Asst. Attorney P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767 (512) 854-9416 david.escamilla@co.travis.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TRAVIS COUNTY /s/ Patrick K. Sweeten PATRICK K. SWEETEN 15