UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 1 of 24 PageID: 591 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY RIFLE & PISTOL CLUBS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. GURBIR GREWAL, et al., Defendants. Hon. Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J. Hon. Lois H. Goodman, U.S.M.J. Civil Action No. 18-cv-10507 Oral Argument Requested Motion Date: July 12, 2018 CIVIL ACTION (ELECTRONICALLY FILED PLAINTIFFS REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION David H. Thompson* Peter A. Patterson* Haley N. Proctor* J. Joel Alicea* COOPER & KIRK, PLLC 1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202 220-9600 (202 220-9601 (fax dthompson@cooperkirk.com Daniel L. Schmutter HARTMAN & WINNICKI, P.C. 74 Passaic Street Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450 (201 967-8040 (201 967-0590 (fax dschmutter@hartmanwinnicki.com *Admitted pro hac vice Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 2 of 24 PageID: 592 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... ii ARGUMENT... 1 I. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Second Amendment Claim.... 1 II. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Equal Protection Claim.... 13 III. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Takings Claim.... 15 IV. The Remaining Factors Favor Injunctive Relief... 20 CONCLUSION... 20 i

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 3 of 24 PageID: 593 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Akins v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619 (2008... 17 AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2008... 17 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979... 18 Binderup v. Attorney Gen. United States of America, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016... 6, 8 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014... 13 Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016... 1, 3 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988... 13, 14 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008...passim Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2017... 1, 9, 12, 17, 19 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011... 2, 19, 20 Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1979... 18 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015... 12 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015... 5, 12 Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2013... 20 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011... 12 Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015... 10 Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015... 17, 19 Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014... 1 K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2013.... 20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967... 4 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005... 18 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017... 2, 12 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982... 15 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992... 16, 17, 18 ii

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 4 of 24 PageID: 594 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014... 13, 14 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887... 16, 17 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009... 20 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007... 12 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2017... 20 Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003... 5 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994... 7 United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011... 6 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010... 7, 13 Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990... 15, 17, 19 Statutory Provisions 18 U.S.C. 926C... 15 A2761 3... 19 5(a... 19 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(g... 19 N.J.A.C. Other 13:55-4.1... 15 13:55-4.2... 15 James Alan Fox & Monica J. DeLateur, Mass Shootings in America, 18 HOMICIDE STUDIES 125 (2014, available at https://goo.gl/bz4jv7... 9, 11 NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY (2018, https://goo.gl/wbojwc... 5 CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, ET AL., AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN VIOLENCE, 1994 2003, REP. TO THE NAT L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE (2004, https://goo.gl/44v3zp... 11 Nick Wing, Banning High Capacity Magazines Should Absolutely Be a Winnable Issue, HUFFPOST (Mar. 14, 2018, https://goo.gl/rbiqmw... 8 iii

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 5 of 24 PageID: 595 The Second Amendment elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008 (emphasis added. The State does not dispute that standard-capacity magazines are arms, and there is no doubt that its magazine ban forbids law-abiding, responsible citizens the right to use an entire category of commonly possessed arms in defense of hearth and home. Id. That is sufficient to hold that Act A2761 violates the Second Amendment. Furthermore, the statute s exception for retired law enforcement officers and indifference towards private property rights violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Takings Clause. ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Second Amendment Claim. [T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582; see also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016 (per curiam. The State does not dispute that standard-capacity magazines are Arms within the meaning of the Second Amendment. 1 The 1 The Giffords Law Center contends that standard-capacity magazines are accessories rather than Arms because their function is to enhance[ ] ammunition capacity far beyond what is needed. Giffords Br. 16 18. But ammunition is necessary to the exercise of the Second Amendment, see Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014; Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2017, and limiting magazine capacity limits the amount of ammunition that can be used. If New Jersey had a law 1

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 6 of 24 PageID: 596 magazines are therefore presumptively within the Second Amendment s protection, and the burden shifts to the State to prove that an exception to the Second Amendment applies. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 03 (7th Cir. 2011. The State offers two possible exceptions: the exception for dangerous and unusual weapons and the exception for longstanding regulations supported by historical tradition. Neither argument succeeds. First, the State contends that Heller establishes an exception [to the Second Amendment] for dangerous weapons, State Br. 9, and it invokes the Fourth Circuit s opinion in Kolbe v. Hogan for the notion that the dispositive test is whether an arm is most useful in military service, 849 F.3d 114, 137 (4th Cir. 2017. But this free-floating dangerousness test is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court s approach in Heller. Id. at 155 (Traxler, J., dissenting. Heller did not leave the scope of the Second Amendment up to judicial determinations of whether an arm is too dangerous to warrant constitutional protection. See 554 U.S. at 634 (Judges do not have the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. (emphasis in original. Thus, even though handguns were the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals, and even though crimes committed with handguns were 7 times more likely to be lethal than limiting the number of books its citizens could read, that would infringe the First Amendment, even if the State thought its citizens wanted to read books beyond what [the State thought was] needed. Id. 2

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 7 of 24 PageID: 597 a crime committed with any other weapon, id. at 682, 695 (Breyer, J., dissenting, Heller nonetheless held that handguns were protected by the Second Amendment and invalidated the D.C. handgun ban, id. at 636. Indeed, Heller was clear about the test for determining whether arms are within the Second Amendment s scope: the sorts of weapons protected are those in common use. Id. at 627; see also id. at 624 25. The Court acknowledged the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons, but it did so in contrast with those arms in common use. Id. In other words, if an arm is in common use, by definition it cannot be dangerous and unusual. See Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1031 (Alito, J., concurring. Therefore, so long as standard-capacity magazines are in common use, the dangerous and unusual exception does not apply. Because the State does not (and could not plausibly dispute that standard-capacity magazines are in common use, 2 the State s assertions regarding the dangerousness of such magazines are irrelevant, see State Br. 9 12, and the magazines receive full constitutional protection. The State and Everytown for Gun Safety respond that the common-use test is circular and illogical, id. at 12 13; Everytown Br. 9 12, but the Supreme Court 2 The Giffords Law Center suggests that the relevant standard is whether standard-capacity magazines are in common use in New Jersey, but Heller looked nationwide to determine common use. See 554 U.S. at 628. In any event, standardcapacity magazines are in common use in New Jersey. See Bach Decl. 13. 3

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 8 of 24 PageID: 598 rejected those arguments when Justice Breyer raised them in his Heller dissent, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 22 (Breyer, J., dissenting. In any event, the common-use test is not circular. Just as the scope of the Fourth Amendment is tied to the People s reasonable expectation of privacy, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967 (Harlan, J., concurring, the Second Amendment relies on the People s exercise of sound judgment as to which arms to use for lawful purposes. The State falls back to asserting that, even if standard-capacity magazines are in common use, there is no evidence that they are typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes. State Br. 13 14 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. But it would be implausible to claim that the approximately 133 million standard-capacity magazines in the United States approximately half the magazines in circulation are typically possessed for unlawful purposes. One would have to believe that America was overrun by armed criminals. Undaunted, the State demands that Plaintiffs show how many households possess, or what type of person has, standard-capacity magazines. Id. at 14. Yet the Supreme Court in Heller provided no such information in holding that handguns were in common use and typically possessed for lawful purposes. Nor did it matter to the Court that gun ownership... is concentrated. Id. And the Court spent no time examining how often handguns were actually used in self-defense. 3 See id. at 14 15. Rather, the fact 3 The relevant question is whether arms are possessed for lawful purposes, see 4

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 9 of 24 PageID: 599 that handguns were an extremely popular firearm was sufficient for the Court to conclude that they were typically possessed for lawful purposes. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 29. The same is true here. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 2015 (Manion, J., dissenting. Next, the State and its amici assert that New Jersey s standard-capacity magazine ban is a longstanding regulatory measure that is presumptively lawful. State Br. 16 18; Everytown Br. 4 9; see also Giffords Br. 24 26. In addition to the states noted in Plaintiffs opening brief, New Jersey and its amici have identified two jurisdictions (California and Virginia that enacted laws restricting magazine capacity during the Prohibition Era. 4 But both states like Rhode Island and Michigan had repealed those laws by the 1970s. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 529 (2018, https://goo.gl/wbojwc. It remains undisputed that the few laws Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, not how often citizens are forced to use them for lawful purposes, see Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003 (Kozinski, J., dissenting ( The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision..... And the fact that the State exempts retired police officers (who are civilians shows that it believes it will often-enough be necessary for civilians to lawfully use standard-capacity magazines. Compare Kleck Duncan Decl. 9 18 (Exhibit A to Schmutter Decl. with Allen Decl. 7 19. 4 The State also cites laws from Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas, but as Everytown for Gun Safety correctly points out, these laws only prohibited certain types of automatic firearms. See Everytown Br. 6 n.11. They were not broadly applicable laws restricting magazine capacity. 5

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 10 of 24 PageID: 600 regulating magazine capacity were recent and short-lived. Even if the type of magazine ban at issue in this case were longstanding and were not a minority position, that would only establish a presumption in favor of its constitutionality, and the presumption may be rebutted. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011; see also Binderup v. Attorney Gen. United States of America, 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016 (en banc (Ambro, J.; id. at 358 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments. Heller made clear that any such presumption must be based on historical justifications, 554 U.S. at 635, and it likewise made clear that [c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, id. at 634 35. For those reasons, the Third Circuit looks to our founding era for any historical justifications that support a presumption of constitutionality. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 49 (Ambro, J.; id. at 367 74 (Hardiman, J.. And Heller establishes what founding-era justification exists for banning a certain type of weapon: that it is dangerous and unusual. Standard-capacity magazines are neither. There is, therefore, no historical justification for New Jersey s magazine ban, and any presumption of its lawfulness is rebutted based on uncontested evidence. Alternatively, the State argues that its standard-capacity magazine ban survives applicable scrutiny. It argues that Act A2761 is not a ban and does not severely burden the Second Amendment because the law allows citizens to possess 6

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 11 of 24 PageID: 601 other types of magazines. State Br. 19, 26. But the handgun ban invalidated in Heller permitted D.C. residents to own other types of firearms, yet the Supreme Court nonetheless held that this was no answer to the reality that handguns were banned despite being in common use. 554 U.S. at 629. In the same way, the fact that other types of magazines are permitted is no answer to banning a class of magazines in common use. Under Heller, that suffices to invalidate the State s ban without resorting to a tiers-of-scrutiny analysis. See Pls. Br. 15 18. As the State acknowledges, if a law burdens the core of the right conferred upon individuals by the Second Amendment, strict scrutiny is required. State Br. 19 (quotation marks omitted. The State mischaracterizes the core of the right as limited to handguns, id., but because Act A2761 is a ban on possession of standardcapacity magazines even in the home, it implicates [citizens ] interest in the defense of hearth and home, which indisputably is part of the core protection of the Second Amendment, Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94; see also Pls. Br. 19 20. But even if intermediate scrutiny applies, the magazine ban must fall. The State downplays its burden under intermediate scrutiny by cherry-picking quotes from various cases, see State Br. 20 21, but the State must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994 (emphasis added. Notwithstanding the deference owed to 7

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 12 of 24 PageID: 602 legislatures, the State must present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its predictive judgments. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 354 (Ambro, J. (alteration omitted; id. at 378 79 (Hardiman, J.. Here, the State s burden is especially onerous because the question is not whether any limitation on magazine capacity passes scrutiny; the question is whether changing the State s limitation from 15 rounds to 10 rounds passes scrutiny. This is a critical point that the State overlooks in its brief. The State offers no evidence at all that its interest in public safety will be advanced by lowering the magazine limit from 15 rounds to 10. The State does not claim, let alone prove, that any of the mass shootings surveyed by its experts would have been prevented or made less deadly by a 10-round limit rather than a 15-round limit. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the State s brief undercuts any such assertion, since all of the mass shootings it cites either involved magazines exceeding New Jersey s previous 15-round limit or compliant with the new 10-round ban. 5 This failure of proof is decisive. The State and its amici make several assertions in favor of the ban s constitutionality, but none of them holds up. First, they claim that there is a correlation between standard-capacity magazines and mass shootings. See State Br. 9 10, 23; Everytown Br. 13 15; Giffords Br. 3 4, 10 11. There are serious issues 5 It is unclear whether the Parkland shooter used 10- or 30-round magazines. See Nick Wing, Banning High Capacity Magazines Should Absolutely Be a Winnable Issue, HUFFPOST (Mar. 14, 2018, https://goo.gl/rbiqmw. 8

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 13 of 24 PageID: 603 with this claim, but it is irrelevant in any event. Heller struck down D.C. s handgun ban even though handguns were the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed criminals, 554 U.S. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting, so a correlation between a particular arm and criminal behavior cannot save the State s ban. Of course, correlation does not prove causation, and there are significant problems with the State s evidence. For example, Lucy Allen s correlation relies on a Mother Jones database, Allen Decl. 20 22, whose methodology has been described by scholars as hard to defend, see James Alan Fox & Monica J. DeLateur, Mass Shootings in America, 18 HOMICIDE STUDIES 125, 129 (2014, available at https://goo.gl/bz4jv7; see also Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1122; Kleck Duncan Decl. 25 27. A sounder analysis showed no correlation between mass shootings and the use of standard-capacity magazines. See id. 28 29. Second, the State and its amici assert that forcing mass shooters to use lowercapacity magazines will result in fewer shots fired and create reloading pauses that will allow victims to escape or subdue their attackers. 6 See State Br. 10 11, 22; Everytown Br. 13 16; Giffords Br. 2 4, 11. But the State never explains why 10 rounds, versus some other number, is the proper limit. And this argument proves too 6 The State also asserts that it is dangerous to entrust average citizens with standard-capacity magazines because they could shoot indiscriminately and hurt someone. State Br. 10 11. There is no evidence that this is a real risk as demonstrated by the State s own assertions about the average number of rounds fired by citizens in self-defense. See Kleck Duncan Decl. 19 22; State Br. 14. 9

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 14 of 24 PageID: 604 much. If the State s ban could be justified by its assertion that reductions in magazine capacity lead to fewer deaths, there is no logical reason why the State could not ban magazines altogether, yet that plainly would be unconstitutional. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2015. Moreover, the State never addresses Dr. Kleck s analysis demonstrating that reloading generally will not slow a mass-shooter s rate of fire or provide pauses that enable victims to escape. 7 Kleck Decl. 23 25, 30 31; see also Kleck Duncan Decl. 30 44. Nor has the State disproven Dr. Kleck s conclusion that between 1984 and 2013 there was only one known instance of a victim subduing a mass shooter who used a standardcapacity magazine. Kleck Decl. 24 29. Instead, the State and its amici rely on misleading calculations 8 and contestable 9 or irrelevant 10 anecdotes. 7 Everytown for Gun Safety asserts that Dr. Kleck s analysis has been refuted by an expert in Duncan, see Everytown Br. 19, but the District Court in that case did not question Dr. Kleck s conclusions. Rather, the court questioned the credibility of the expert that Everytown relies upon. See Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1128 29. As for the alleged debunking of Dr. Kleck s defensive-gun-use statistics, see Everytown Br. 18, Kleck has debunked the debunkers, see Kleck Duncan Decl. 1 8. 8 See, e.g., Allen Decl. 23 (using Mother Jones database; compare Everytown Br. 13 (alleging correlation between standard-capacity magazine use and number of deaths, with Kleck Duncan Decl. 35 44 (finding no causation. 9 Compare Donahue Decl. 30 (asserting that children escaped during a reloading pause at the Newtown massacre and that a bystander tackled the Tucson shooter when he was reloading, with Kleck Duncan Decl. 32 (unclear if children escaped during a reloading pause, and Kleck Decl. 27 (unclear if Tucson shooter tackled during a reloading pause. 10 See, e.g., Giffords Br. 4 n.2 (citing the reloading pause of the Washington 10

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 15 of 24 PageID: 605 Third, the State and the Giffords Law Center assert that the number of mass shootings has increased over time, especially since the lapse of the federal ban on standard-capacity magazines. 11 See State Br. 24; Giffords Br. 12 14. That is simply false, see Fox & DeLateur, supra, at 128 30, and even if it were true, it would not prove that standard-capacity magazines cause mass shootings. 12 Fourth, the State contends that Act A2761 will reduce criminals access to standard-capacity magazines. State Br. 21 22. But even if that were true, the State does not dispute that criminals almost never fire more than 10 rounds in a gun crime, see Kleck Decl. 20, and because the mass shooters who do would generally be unaffected by the need to reload, see supra pp. 9 10, the magazine ban would do little for the State s interest in public safety even if it succeeded in depriving criminals of access. Of course, the reality is that the ban will not deprive them of Navy Yard shooter, even though a shotgun would be unaffected by a magazine ban. 11 The State notes that Christopher Koper, who authored the official report concluding that the federal ban could not be credited with any of the drop in gun violence, also said that the effects of the law would occur only gradually. State Br. 24. But Koper went on to say that, even with the benefit of more time, the ban s impact on gun violence is likely to be small at best, and perhaps too small for reliable measurement. CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, ET AL., AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN VIOLENCE, 1994 2003, REP. TO THE NAT L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE 97 (2004, https://goo.gl/44v3zp. 12 The State also asserts, without any evidence, that a state-level ban is more likely to be effective than the federal ban. See State Br. 25 n.9. That is implausible, since a state ban can be circumvented by criminals purchasing magazines legally in other states. See KOPER, supra, at 81 n.95. 11

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 16 of 24 PageID: 606 access, since standard-capacity magazines remain legal in 43 States and, in any event, criminals have no problem breaking the law to obtain their arms of choice. 13 The State s last rationale is that every federal appellate court to address the issue has upheld a standard-capacity magazine ban. See State Br. 23 24. This argument-from-authority is thin. Kolbe, Friedman, and Heller II were contrary to Supreme Court precedent and elicited forceful dissents, see Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 155 57 (Traxler, J., joined by three other judges, dissenting; Friedman, 784 F.3d at 413 14 (Manion, J., dissenting; Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 82 (D.C. Cir. 2011 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting, and Friedman earned a dissent from the denial of certiorari, see Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari. The courts of appeals do not have a great track record in this area. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2007 (listing nine courts of appeals that had rejected the individual-right interpretation of the Second Amendment vindicated by Heller. Moreover, a California district court has issued a preliminary injunction against a standard-capacity magazine ban, so this Court would not be the first. See Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 40. 13 Puzzlingly, the State responds by pointing to the allegedly widespread theft of law-abiding citizens firearms as a source for criminals, but even if true, this fact actually proves that criminals are willing to break laws like the magazine ban to obtain the arms that they want. See State Br. 21. 12

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 17 of 24 PageID: 607 Finally, the State s ban can only be upheld under intermediate scrutiny if it burdens no more conduct than is reasonably necessary. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98. The State has offered no explanation for why its ban extends to possession of standard-capacity magazines in the home the core of the Second Amendment right given that the alleged harm that it seeks to remedy (mass shootings typically occurs outside the home. That alone suffices to invalidate the ban under intermediate scrutiny. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2014. The unduly broad reach of the State s ban is further demonstrated by additional alternatives the State could have pursued but did not, including a licensing requirement, a training requirement, and requiring magazines to be stored in a secure way when not in use. 14 II. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Equal Protection Claim. The State has failed to provide a justification for the retired law enforcement officer exception that can survive heightened scrutiny. The State asserts that, if Plaintiffs Second Amendment challenge fails, Act A2761 is subject to rational-basis review. That is incorrect. So long as standard-capacity magazines are in common use (as they undoubtedly are, they are protected by the right to keep and bear arms, and even if the ban does not violate that right, it certainly affects and limits that right, which is all that is required for strict scrutiny to apply. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 14 Plaintiffs do not take a position on the constitutionality of these alternatives, but this Court can nonetheless take the State s failure to pursue them into account. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 82 (2014. 13

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 18 of 24 PageID: 608 456, 461 (1988. The State s sole basis for distinguishing between retired police officers and average, law-abiding citizens is that the retired officers are better trained, but even assuming that 15-round magazines require specialized training that 10-round magazines do not (an implicit premise of the State s argument that it never acknowledges or defends, it is radically disproportionate to address that problem by banning standard-capacity magazines. An obvious and far less burdensome solution could have been to require citizens to undertake mandatory training in order to possess such magazines, yet the State gives no hint that it even considered that solution. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. The State s training rationale fares even worse as applied to retired members of the armed forces. The State claims that the firearms training of its law enforcement officers is vastly different than the equivalent training in the armed forces and that military officers receive little, if any, handgun training. Stanton Decl. 22 23. But Act A2761 bans the use of standard-capacity magazines, not handguns in particular or firearms in general, so any specialized handgun training is irrelevant. The only potentially relevant distinction the State offers is that its officers are accountable for every round fired and are instructed to avoid the indiscriminate destruction of property. Id. 24. But does the State truly believe that members of the armed forces are not trained to avoid the indiscriminate destruction of 14

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 19 of 24 PageID: 609 property? The suggestion is as astonishing as it is implausible. 15 The import of civilian training is further undermined by the failure to exempt security guards, who are required to undertake ongoing training. See N.J.A.C. 13:55-4.1, -4.2. III. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on Their Takings Claim. By dispossessing owners of their lawfully-acquired property without compensation, Act A2761 violates the Takings Clause. Supreme Court precedent forecloses the State s primary response: that the State may confiscate property without compensation if it acts pursuant to its police power. State Br. 27 28. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982, the Court held that a law requiring physical occupation of private property was both within the State s police power and an unconstitutional taking, id. at 425. The Court expressly stated that whether a law effects a taking is a separate question from whether the State has the police power to enact it, for an uncompensated taking is unconstitutional without regard to the public interests that it may serve. Id. at 425 26. The Government s proper exercise of regulatory authority does not automatically preclude a finding that such action is a compensable taking. Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990. The State nevertheless insists that there is an exception to this rule for state 15 The State suggests that Plaintiffs argument would require invalidation of 18 U.S.C. 926C, but concealed carry laws raise a distinct set of justifications and equal-protection questions. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 27. 15

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 20 of 24 PageID: 610 laws prohibiting the possession of dangerous products. State Br. 27. In support, the State cites a line of cases beginning with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887, upholding regulations on the use of property. State Br. 27. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the argument that Mugler carved out a noxious use exception to the Takings Clause in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992. There, the Council argued unsuccessfully that its uncompensated per se taking was permissible because it involved an exercise of South Carolina s police powers to mitigate the harm to the public interest that petitioner s use of his land might occasion. 505 U.S. at 1020 21. Cabining Mugler and its progeny as early formulation[s] of the police power justification necessary to sustain... any regulatory diminution in value, the Court found it self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish takings that require compensation from regulatory deprivations that do not. Id. at 1026. The Takings Clause would afford little protection to property rights if the government could evade its compensation requirement by claiming it is taking property not to provide for public use but instead to protect the public from some danger. Because the distinction between harm-preventing and benefitconferring regulation is often in the eye of the beholder, a wide range of confiscations could be justified under this rubric. Id. at 1024. Critically, the Lucas Court pointed out that it had never employed the logic of harmful use prevention 16

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 21 of 24 PageID: 611 to sustain an uncompensated per se taking. Id. at 1026. Neither should this Court. 16 In any event, unlike the laws at issue in Mugler and its progeny, A2761 does not simply regulate the use of Plaintiffs property. Instead, it prohibits Plaintiffs from continuing to possess their lawfully-acquired property, thereby working a physical taking of that property. See Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015. Apart from recent decisions analyzing takings challenges to arms bans in a preliminary injunction posture, 17 the State s cited decisions do not involve bans on the continued possession of lawfully acquired property. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669 (restriction on the use of property for particular purposes; Akins v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619, 622 23 (2008 (registration requirement; AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008 (confiscation of 16 The State seeks to limit Lucas to real property. State Br. 29 30. True, Lucas allowed that uncompensated restrictions on the sale of personal property were more likely to be upheld under the Court s regulatory takings analysis in light of the State s traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, but it never suggested that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for State regulation of personal property under the police power. To the contrary, [n]othing in the text or history of the Takings Clause... suggests that the rule is any different when it comes to appropriation of personal property. Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015; Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1541 (regulatory takings. 17 Courts have divided on the status of confiscatory magazine bans under the Takings Clause. Contrary to the State s contention, however, the district court in Duncan squarely confronted and rejected a police-power exception to takings, and its analysis did not rely on its separate conclusion that magazines are protected by the Second Amendment. 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1136 37. 17

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 22 of 24 PageID: 612 property in connection with criminal proceeding. The sole exception a forty-yearold D.C. Court of Appeals decision that predated Loretto, Lucas, and Horne summarily rejected a takings challenge based on the now-discredited assumption that exercises of the police power are categorically exempt from the Takings Clause. Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 866 (D.C. 1979. 18 Next, the State also argues that A2761 does not effect a taking because Plaintiffs may choose to be dispossessed of their property by means other than a direct appropriation. State Br. 31. For the reasons set out in Plaintiffs opening brief none of which the State addresses these options do not render the law anything other than a taking. Forcing Plaintiffs to transfer their property to a third party is no less a taking than if the State seized it. The gravamen of a physical taking is the dispossession of property. Whether the government edict forces the owner to hand the property over to the government or to a third party, there is still a taking. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 75 (2005. Affording Plaintiffs the opportunity to alter or destroy their property does not save the law, either. It is 18 The power to abate nuisances is not a justification for the ban. Governments may act to abate nuisances without paying compensation only to the extent consistent with preexisting, background principles of nuisance law inhere in the title itself. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 30. The State makes no argument that A2761 expressly prohibit[s] that which was always unlawful, id. at 1030 31, and a duty to compensate arises when the State criminalizes continued possession of lawfullyowned property. This is likely why governments often exempt existing owners from possession bans. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979. 18

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 23 of 24 PageID: 613 often the case that parties can evade a confiscatory regulation by altering their property, but the Supreme Court has admonished that property rights cannot be so easily manipulated. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (quotation marks omitted. A2761 fares no better when analyzed as a regulatory taking. The State insists that it does not deprive Plaintiffs of all economically beneficial use of their property. But even if it does not result in a complete loss in value, regulatory action may constitute a taking if it interferes with a property owner s reasonable, investmentbacked expectations. Whatever else property owners may expect, they do not expect their property, real or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427; see also Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1138. Nor do they expect to be forced to sell, destroy, or alter property. See Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1540. Finally, even if Plaintiffs may obtain some compensation for their property by selling it, A2761 does not secure Just Compensation, which is what the Constitution requires. To the contrary, A2761 virtually guarantees that any sale would return less than just compensation by providing for an influx of magazines into a limited market of those entitled to own or possess them. A2761 5(a. That is a narrow class, consisting primarily of retired and active police officers and active military personnel and dealers who sell to them. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(g; A2761 3. 19 19 To the extent an out-of-state sale is possible, New Jersey cannot justify its ban by the less restrictive laws of other jurisdictions. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697. 19

Case 3:18-cv-10507-PGS-LHG Document 39 Filed 07/09/18 Page 24 of 24 PageID: 614 IV. The Remaining Factors Favor Injunctive Relief. While Plaintiffs need only show that irreparable harm is more likely than not, Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017, here it is certain for a prospective violation of a constitutional right constitutes irreparable injury. Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013; see also Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699. The remaining two factors merge when the Government is the opposing party, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 455 (2009, and they favor Plaintiffs because the enforcement of an unconstitutional law vindicates no public interest, K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 2013. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter a preliminary injunction. Dated: July 9, 2018 David H. Thompson* Peter A. Patterson* Haley N. Proctor* J. Joel Alicea* COOPER & KIRK, PLLC 1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202 220-9600 (202 220-9601 (fax dthompson@cooperkirk.com Respectfully submitted, /s/daniel L. Schmutter Daniel L. Schmutter Hartman & Winnicki, P.C. 74 Passaic Street Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450 (201 967-8040 (201 967-0590 (fax dschmutter@hartmanwinnicki.com * Admitted pro hac vice 20