Sample Syllabus 1 Freedom and the Limits of State Intervention Suzie Kim Fall 2019 soojk@princeton.edu In this course, we examine the conceptual question of what limits, if any, the state could impose on individuals freedom of choice for their own good. Many of our current laws, which few would wish to repeal, are grounded in the state s concern to prevent harm to ourselves. Consider, for example, laws invalidating consent as a defense to mutilation and killing for reasons other than terminal illness, laws aimed at ensuring food and drug safety, and laws prohibiting consensual transactions deemed dangerous or excessively disadvantageous to one of the contracting parties. Yet, allowing the state to pass laws aimed at preventing harm to the actors themselves is often equated with endorsing the nanny state an overprotective state that interferes unduly with personal choices at the cost of individual freedom. In light of these conflicting views, how should we decide when (if ever) the state may legitimately restrict the liberty of its citizens to prevent physical, psychological, or economic harm to themselves? This course examines this question from the standpoint of various different conceptions of individual freedom. First, we will start by examining different conceptions of individual freedom throughout the history of Western political thought, and then transition to contemporary discussions of the legitimate limits on individual freedom in self-regarding matters. During the final two weeks of the course, we will consider the question of whether the state could legitimately restrict individuals choices to prevent harm to themselves in more applied contexts. We will draw on classical works of political theory and philosophy, including, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty Benjamin Constant, Political Writings Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom John Rawls, Political Liberalism Jurgen Habermas, A Theory of Communicative Action Charles Taylor, What s Wrong with Negative Liberty? In addition to reading works from these canonical figures, we will also examine a wide range of contemporary writings related to the question of the legitimate limits of state power over the individual. 1
By the end of the course, students should have a substantive knowledge of the concepts and debates relating to individual liberty and its legitimate limits in key historical and contemporary texts. They should also have learned how to apply some of the methods and techniques of analysis that are important in political theory, such as rigor, precision, textual interpretation, critical thinking, and clarity of expression and communication. The course is accessible to students with no previous background in political theory or philosophy. Students who have studied, in a survey course, some or all of the major texts to be covered are also welcome in the course. In addition to the primary texts by canonical authors you may have encountered elsewhere, the syllabus also includes a number of important secondary works, as well as important contemporary articles on freedom, rights, and paternalism. Course Requirements Essay #1 (15%) (1500 words maximum) In-Class Quiz (15%) Essay #2 (20%) (2000 words maximum) Precept participation (10%) Final Exam (40%), during May exam period. The 3-hr exam will be closed-book and inclass. It will include a mix of short answer and essay questions, and will test you on your understanding of the readings and lectures, and on your capacity to formulate and defend your own position on the issues discussed in the course. Note on medical excuses: Late papers will be subject to a penalty of 1/3 letter grade per two-day period. Requests for the waiver of late penalties will be considered if they are made in a timely fashion and supported by a valid, documented reason (typically of a medical nature). Lecture time table is below. Week 1: Mill s Harm Principle 1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, chs. 1-5. 2. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. 5. 3. Daniel Jacobson, Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000), 276-309. 4. Piers Norris Turner, Harm and Mill s Harm Principle, Ethics (2014). Richard Arneson, Mill Versus Paternalism, Ethics 90:4 (1980), 470-489. David Brink, Mill s Progressive Principles. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, The Monist, 56:1 (1972), 64-84. John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Lectures on Mill. C.L. Ten, Mill on Liberty. 2
Week 2: Individuality 1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, chs. 1-5. 2. Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Individuality, ch. 1 of The Ethics of Identity. 3. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance. 4. John Gray, Mill s Conception of Happiness, and the Theory of Individuality, in John Gray and G.W. Smith (eds.), J.S. Mill On Liberty. John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence. (London: Routledge, 1983). Week 3: Rousseau on Freedom 1. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques., On the Social Contract, Books 1-2 (entire); Book 3 chs. 1-7, 10-18; Book 4 chs. 1-2; 7-8. 2. Joshua Cohen, Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy, Philosophy and Public Affairs 15:3 (1986), 275-297. 3. Frederick Neuhouser, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy, Inquiry 54:5 (2011), 478-493. 4. Frederick Neuhouser, Freedom, Dependence, and the General Will, Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), 363-395. Week 4: Constant and Berlin on Liberty 1. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, Henry Hardy (ed.) 2. Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, in: Benjamin Constant, Political Writings (CUP edition, editor B. Fontana) Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism. Ch. 2 Quentin Skinner, The idea of negative liberty: Philosophical and Historical perspectives, in Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (eds.) Philosophy in History. Week 5. Questioning Negative Liberty 1. Charles Taylor, What s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. 2. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 1-19; 148-157; 288-313 (stop at Section 6); 340-345; 367-429. 3
Joseph Raz, ed. Authority, Introduction. Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz s Morality of Freedom, Southern California Law Review 62:3-4, (1988), 1097-1152. Michael Sandel. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Rainer Forst. Contexts of Justice. chs. 1,2, 4 Week 6. On the Priority of Liberty 1. H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority, in Reading Rawls, Daniels, N. (ed.) pp. 230-252. 2. John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in Political Liberalism, 289-340. 3. T.M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:2 (1972), 204-226. Suggested Reading: Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy, 223-267. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, Philosophy and Public Affairs, (2017). Week 7. Recent Work on Autonomy 1. Gerald Dworkin, Theory and Practice of Autonomy, chs. 1-2. 2. Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, ch. 2. 3. Andrea Westlund, Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? The Philosophical Review, 112:4 (2003), 483-523. Suggested Reading: Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, ch. 4, Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique. Diana Meyers, Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 619-628. Natalie Stoljar, Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-autonomy/ Week 8. Habermas s Discourse Ethics: Realizing a Free Community of Equals 1. Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1., pp. 1-43, 102-143; Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 43-115. 2. Forst, Rainer. Discourse Ethics, in The Habermas Handbook. Brunkhorst H., Kreide R., Lafont C. (eds.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). 4
Suggested readings: Forst, Rainer. Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chs. 1, 2, pp. 121-131. Baynes, Kenneth. Rational Reconstruction and Social Criticism: Habermas s model of Interpretative Social Science, The Philosophical Forum, 21 (1989): 122-145. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy, 16-37. Week 9. Paternalism 1. Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 2. Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34:1 (2006), 68-94. 3. Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 3. 4. Seana Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29:3 (2000), 205-250. Richard Arneson, Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism, Legal Theory 11 (2005): 259-284. Kleinig, John. Paternalism. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984). Shafer-Landau, Russ. Liberalism and Paternalism, Legal Theory, 11 (2005): 169-191. Week 10. Libertarian Paternalism (Nudge) 1. Sunstein, Cass. Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014). 2. Riccardo Rebonato. Taking Liberties: A Critical Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). Suggested readings: Sunstein C. Social Norms and Social Roles, Columbia Law Review, 96 (1996): 903-968. Hausman D. and Welch B. Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge? The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18 (2010): 123-136. Week 11. Applications: For or Against Legalization of Drugs? 1. Peter DeMarneffe and Douglas Husak. Legalization of Drugs: For and Against. 5
2. Pickard, Hanna. The Puzzle of Addiction, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction. Ahmed S. and Pickard H. (eds.) 3. Elster, Jon. Strong Feelings. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999), Chs. 3, 4, 5. 4. Nagel, Thomas. Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 16 (1987): 215-240. Suggested readings: Husak, Douglas. Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29 (2000): 43-80. De Marneffe, Peter. Vice Laws and Self-Sovereignty, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 7 (2013): 29-41. Week 12. Applications: Should Boxing be Legal or Not? 1. Wacquant, Loïc. Whores, Slaves, and Stallions: Languages of Exploitation and Accommodation among Boxers, Body and Society; The Social Logic of Boxing in Black Chicago: Towards a Sociology of Pugilism, Sociology of Sports Journal, 9 (1992): 221-254. 2. Anderson, Jack. The Business of Hurting People: A Historical, Social, and Legal Analysis of Boxing, Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 7 (2007): 35-60. 3. Dixon, Nicholas. Boxing, Paternalism, and Legal Moralism, Social Theory and Practice, 27 (2001): 323-344. 6