T O PUB L I C A D M INIST R A T I O N R E F O R MS IN A F RI C A N C O UN T RI ES

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O R G A NI Z A T I O NS A ND D E V E L OPM E N T T W O APPR O A C H ES T O PUB L I C A D M INIST R A T I O N R E F O R MS IN A F RI C A N C O UN T RI ES To be presented at Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årsmöte Göteborg 30/9-2/10, 2010 Maria Gustavson PhD Candidate School of Public Administration, University of Gothenburg maria.gustavson@spa.gu.se IN T R O DU C T I O N In literature on development, 1 there is a widespread assumption that it is not possible, or desirable, to transfer organizational practices and ideas from industrialized, i.e. Western countries to developing countries. According to these scholars, developing countries ought primarily to develop their own organizational models and frameworks in line with their local traditions and their own local circumstances (e.g. Abrahamsen, 2001; Abutudu, 2001; Ake, 1996; Dia, 1996; Jones & Blunt, 1993; Leonard, 1987; Morrison 1 where western societies represented modernization, and other countries were to follow their paths (Hettne 2009). This critique, I argue, now constitute a dominant part of the literature, where the view of implementing western models and structures without considering the local context is disserted by scholars as well as practitioners. 1

Knowles, 2010; Zhang & Thomas, 2009). If Western models are to be implemented in developing countries, they would have to be adjusted and changed to fit into the local contexts in these countries (e.g. Diamond, 2004; Grindle, 1998a; Hettne, 2009; Hyden, 1983; 2006; World Bank, 2005) In another body of literature, a line of organizational scholars try to explain organizational behavior and why organizations commonly show similar characteristics (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Deephouse 1996; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; Greenwood, et al. 2002; Haveman 1993; Kennedy & Fiss 2009; Meyer, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997; Slack & Hinings, 1994, Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) These scholars argue that the same kind of organizations regardless of where they are located, strive to imitate each other. Due to various mechanisms, organizations occupied with the same tasks will eventually end up harmonized in structure, policies as well as in practice. Organizational scholars claim this behavior is valid for organizations world wide, i.e. they do not separate developing from industrialized countries. However, the empirical studies on which they base their assumptions are mainly conducted in industrialized countries. As a consequence, there is little knowledge of whether the theories are valid for public organizations in developing countries. The two bodies of literature create different understandings of how public organizations in developing countries respond to foreign ideas and practices. According to organizational theorists, there would be no major differences in how organizations in developing countries would handle foreign structures compared to organizations in various industrialized countries. In contrast, according to development scholars public organizations in developing countries face a context so different that it would be difficult to implement foreign organizational models. In particular it would be difficult to implement the administrative structures and models which originate in Western countries. If there was a try to implement such models, they would have to make major adjustment to make them fit local circumstances in these contexts. This paper is a chapter in my dissertation, where the focus is the relationship between international public audit standards and an African context. In the review of the two bodies of literature, the picture given of how such standards would be handled by African auditors is very different. The aim with this chapter is to provide an overview of the two contrasting bodies of literature. Moreover, in line with the literature, I outline 2

two contrasting propositions of how international standards in public auditing would be handled in an African context. T H E B E H A V I O R O F O R G A NI Z A T I O NS A ND W H Y T H E Y C O M M O N L Y SH O W SI M I L A R F E A T UR ES In research on organizations, the new institutional approach 2 has provided various explanations for organizational behavior. Unlike earlier theories of organizations this approach has primarily focused on cultural cognitive aspects of organizations instead of technical aspects and resources as explanations of how organizations act. Within this field of research, a line of scholars have focused on explaining why organizations to such a large extent show such similar characteristics. The work of two sociologists, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), has within this tradition become very influential. DiMaggio and Powell started out by questioning the mainstream organizational theory, which then mainly focused on explaining why organization were so different in structure and in practice. Since several empirical studies had proved significant similarities among organizations, they turned the focus to why this homogenization occurred. DiMaggio and Powell claimed that when new types of organizations are created, they may start out in being diversified in modes of organizing. However, when several other organizations in the same category, i.e. within the same organizational field 3, eventually are established, they all would eventually end up strikingly similar. To explain this behavior they categorized various forces affecting organizations within the same organizational field to become homogenous in structure and practice. Their famous work largely influenced the organizational theory, and since then the theoretical as well as the empirical scope of this research has been well extended (For a review, see Greenwood et al., 2008). In their analysis of why organizations show noticeably similarities, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three different forces: a coercive, a mimetic and a normative 2 I am aware of the diversity of institutional approaches within social sciences; institutional theories are for instance used in fields like economics, history and political sciences. Some institutional theories are labeled old institutionalism others new, or neoinstitutionalism (For a review, see for instance Scott, 2001). To clarify my approach, I mainly based the theoretical framework on the sociological neoinstitutional ideas. This direction has largely influenced modern studies of organizations, within public administration as well as management studies. 3 Later in the chapter, there will be a longer discussion of the understandings of fields 3

pressure which all drive homogenization among organizations. They label these processes institutional isomorphism, stressing the pressure of adaptation to key institutional elements, instead of competition for resources and profit as the primary reason for change in organizations. Coercive isomorphism is defined as imposed pressure on organizations, for instance binding regulation issued by the government. Since organizations within the same field often are subjects to the same laws and regulations, coercive isomorphism will consequently lead to the same structures within the same kind of organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Even though coercive isomorphism has proved to influence organizational behavior, I argue that it is not a main mechanism here. The focus in the study is audit standards, and as we will see standards are a certain form of regulation. Standards are a kind of rule which is voluntary to follow. They are not imposed, nor are there any sanctions connected to them (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000). Accordingly, the focus here will be on mechanisms which make organizations adapt structures and practices without coercive pressures. Imitation When organizations due to their own insecurity imitate the structures or practices of other organizations, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe it as a case of mimetic isomorphism. They argue that imitation among organizations may occur intentionally, when organizational models are spread and introduced by for example consulting firms, as well as unintentionally, when diffusion occur more randomly (p. 151). Since their article, a number of studies have been conducted on how organizations conform to mimetic isomorphism (see for instance Deephouse, 1996; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Haveman, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Slack & Hinings, 1994; Wedlin, 2007). A reason for organizations to conform to mimetic isomorphism is their urge for legitimacy in their institutional environment. Alignment with isomorphic pressures was argued already by Hannan and Freedman (1977) to create natural competition, where unfit organizational structures and practices eventually would vanish. Also Meyer and Rowan argued for the importance of legitimacy for organizations, claiming that without such legitimacy it will be difficult for organizations to survive (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Survival in this sense, it not only about attaining resources, even though that may be an important factor (see Sauder & Lancaster, 2006), rather it is about how 4

the surrounding environment accept and valid certain organizational structures as legitimate. The environments acceptance for certain practices makes the organizations conform to such, without necessarily any financial incentives or regulatory obligations being involved. However, as pointed out by Kennedy and Fiss (2009) organizations aim to become legitimate do not have to contradict their wish to become more efficient. In addition to social motives, performance improvements were in their study proved to be important motives to why certain practices were adopted by the organizations (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Imitation is to a large extent an identification process, where organizations imitate who they identify themselves with. Or as Sevón (1996) expresses it illustratively, (p. 61). Through such an identification process, the organizations strengthen their own identity as a part of a community of similar organizations, i.e. their organizational field. They also identify themselves with organizations they would like to resemble (Sevón, 1996; see also Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). So, when imitation occurs among organizations, they do not imitate just any organization. They tend to imitate organizations which are perceived as the most successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993). What is perceived as success in organization may be in how much profit that organization has made (Haveman, 1993) but success may also be defined by actors like the state (Deephouse, 1996), consultant agencies (Slack & Hinings, 1994; Deephouse, 1996) their own associations (Wedlin, 2007) or the general public (Deephouse, 1996). In their study, Slack and Hinings (1994) show how national sports organizations changed their organizational structures and became more like a traditional bureaucracy. This kind of structure, with a professionalization of the staff and an increased number of employees, was initiated by the state and then spread through a number of consultants traveling among the organizations. The consultants hosted seminars and work shops, where personnel from all organization attended and where representatives from organizations perceived as more successful were invited as speakers. The consultants also created guidelines which were based on the practices of the more successful organizations. These guidelines were universal and supposed to be applicable to all the organizations around the country. Consequently, the organizations ended up becoming 5

more alike, and came to resemble what was considered the more successful organizations (Slack & Hinings, 1994). The knowledge of which of the organizations are the most successful is spread through various ways, through ranking lists (Wedlin, 2007; Sauder & Lancaster, 2006) through guidelines and handbooks of (Deephouse, 1996; Slack & Hinings, 1994) or just facts on which organizations are the most profitable (Haveman, 1993). Wedlin (2007) discusses the impact of ranking lists on business schools, in the following way, s are also specific in the sense that they provide clear guidance of the expectations and demands placed on organizations in the field ng lists the schools got information of what was perceived as the best behavior of their kind of organizations. The responses from the schools on this information were various efforts to comply with the requirements, Among the most immediate responses to rankings in the three business school cases included to establish and enhance external relations functions that are considered to support and promote the employability features and the customer perspective stressed in many ). In addition, the schools also named the most famous and successful business schools as their role models, which they would like to become more alike (Wedlin, 2007). What is perceived as appropriate behavior for organizations also spread through associations and networks. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) showed in their results that networks and personal connections were important when organizations decided who to imitate. When it was not clear for the organizations how to act, and there were no clear guidance in terms of guidelines or ranking lists, managers and persons in decision-making positions used their networks and personal connections to find the perceived appropriate practices, to which they eventually conformed. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman describe their, boundary-spanning personnel that they come to know The role of networks and associations have in particular been highlighted when professionals conform to norms and standards which are viewed as legitimate among their professional peers, i.e. the normative isomorphism 6

Professional norms Professions and professional associations are by several scholars considered to be an influential part in understanding the behavior of organizations (for instance see, Meyer et al., 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott, 2001). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that in particular two aspects of professions are important for normative isomorphism. First, professionals often share the same educational background. The common ground in the same formal education is argued to socialize professionals into a common cultural cognitive framework. Second, professionals often participate in professional networks and associations, which create arenas for ideas and norms to spread and to be reinforced. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that the socialization taking place in such professional environments will likely affect the professionals in a way which will make them receptive of ideas and views of their professional peers. In research on non-binding regulation such as soft law, soft regulation and standards, peer pressure, is often highlighted as a significant mechanism to why these regulations are adopted by organizations (e.g. Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004; Collier, 2008; Mörth, 2008). For instance, Scott (2001) argues that the possibility to spread and maintain practices is depending on the extent to which socializing processes have been successful. The more similar a group is, the easier they will adopt the practices. c In their description of socialization processes, Berger and Luckmann (1967) stress the identification with significant others as a central part when identity of individuals is formed. Such identification is dual process between the subjectively experienced identity and the identification of the individual made by others (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). More recent research also stresses the relationship between the work carried out and the subjective identity, as important when professional identities are constructed. Professional individuals tend to change their self experienced identity to better fit into the work they carry out, whenever there is a conflict between the two (Pratt et al., 2006). To maintain the identity, there is a need for continuous confirmation of the role as being the appropriate one (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Reconfirmation of the identity as a professional occur not only during education, but also continuously through meetings and activities within their professional associations. Since professional associations create interaction among the professionals, they are important in creating 7

and maintaining a collective identity. Greenwood et al. (2002) make the following comment on how professional collective identities are created, seen as emerging from processes of repeated interactions between organizations. Organizations develop categorizations (or typifications) of their exchanges, which achieve the status of objectification and thus constitute social reality (p. 59). This collectively constructed social reality is through normative influences as well as regulatory processes continuously sustained (ibid). Moreover, professions are often self-regulated, where professional associations often have self-remedial mechanisms. Through these mechanisms, professionals are monitored and it is made sure that they comply with the norms and standards (Greenwood et al., 2002). How normative pressures affect organizations been examined by several scholars (e.g. Gibbons, 2004; Casile & Davis-Blake 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Pratt et al., 2006). In their study of accreditation standards, Casile & Davis-Blake (2002) investigate how organizations are linked to their normative environment. Their results showed that the closer the connection was to the association which issued the standards, the more likely it was for organization to respond to the new norms by adopting the new standards. Similar results was found by Reagans and McEvily (2003) when they show that networks with strong ties made knowledge transfer easier. The intense in the networks as well as the range, in terms of how far the networks reach influenced the performance in the organizations. The impact on networks for professional norms is (2004) study on teachers, where networks in terms of personal networks, based on friendship, networks, based on (p. 241) played a significant role, both in sustaining and changing professional norms. What groups may then be regarded as a profession? Evidently, all occupations are not professions. Typically, professions are constituted of occupations like doctors, teachers, and auditors. The boarder of which groups should be considered professions is however not distinctive, rather they are constantly changing. Professionalization may be an important strategy for a group to increase the status and legitimacy of their work. But even if all kind of groups would like to, it is unlikely that all kinds of work will be regarded as professions. Confusing? A clarifying definition of professions is made by Abbot (1988). He argues that to be a profession three parts have to be at place, the exclusiveness and the claim for abstract knowledge and the 8

application of the abstract knowledge to practical cases, occupational groups The exclusiveness in an area of knowledge is an important part of professions. Normally, they claim the monopoly of knowledge and practice in one specific area. Within this area, the profession constitutes the legitimate authority in defining problems as well as providing appropriate solutions. This connection between the work conducted and the monopolized area in which the professionals operate is by Abbot defined as the jurisdiction. According to Abbott there are three parts in how professions claim their jurisdiction, to classify a problem, to reason about it, (ibid p. 40). The claim of jurisdiction on its own would allow any kind of specialized skill to be defined as a profession. The difference lies in the claiming of abstract and provision of solutions are not only practical; they are also made on an abstract level. Furthermore, to be regarded as a profession, not only abstract knowledge is enough. Professionals should also apply their abstract knowledge on practical cases. Professions and their associations do not normally issue binding regulations in society. Naturally, professionals may have decision-making positions where they, through formal authority, issue binding regulation. However, that kind of position is not included in the construction of the profession, i.e. belonging to a profession does not per se imply this type of authority. Despite lack of formal authority to formulate binding regulations, professions and professional associations still possess high authority in our contemporary society (Drori & Meyer 2006). Their authority however derives from another source, as act (1997, p. 165). Across national boundaries According to the theory of isomorphism, organizations within the same organizational field would be subject to similar isomorphic pressures, and eventually end up similar in structures and practices. But how far does an organizational field actually reach? Should it be view as a national phenomenon or should the same kind of organizations across the world be viewed as being part of the same organizational field, and thereby being subject to the same isomorphic pressures? A fundament in the theory of isomorphism is 9

that these mechanisms work due to organ or legitimacy from key elements their environment. It may then be asked what should be considered key elements providing legitimacy for individual organizations, which face both a national and an international context. Kostova et al. (2008) argues that individual organizations which are part of larger multinational corporations are facing an institutional environment so complex that it is not useful to speak of isomorphism and organizational fields. They give examples like language and culture barriers as well as the lack of interaction among the organizations, which makes the institutional environment fragmented and conflicting. This complexity allows the individual organizations to more freely choose to which pressures they will respond (p. 998-999). Another solution would be to view the organizations as embedded in several organizational fields, international as well as national and regional fields (Phillips & Tracey, 2009). To view organizations as embedded in several fields does not however provide any answer of where the organization will seek for legitimacy. Consequently, it will not provide any answer of how various isomorphic pressures will affect individual organizations in what is claimed to be conflicting, ambiguous and fragmented institutional environments. The solutions provided by Kostova et al. (2008) that organizations facing these institutional conditions will have more agency does not either provide a comforting answer of how these organizations actually will respond to the claimed conflicting institutions. That is, how organizations would balance an international idea in relation to their national context. The definition provided by DiMaggio and Powell does not give a clear answer to how organizational fields should be viewed in an international context: By organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of organizational life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services (p. 148). Further in their article they explain that fields are difficult to define in advance, rather it is an empirical observation whether or not an organizational field exists (ibid). Even if the question of how far organizational fields reaches is not explicitly discussed in the article by DiMaggio an Powell (1983), the examples given about mimetic isomorphism concern how Japanese companies imitated European and American companies, as well as how American companies at the time of the article imitated successful Japanese and European models of organizing (p. 151). The examples given 10

indicate that the authors considered organizational fields and isomorphic mechanisms to be prevalent also on an international level. Despite a national identity, several national public authorities also face an international context through membership in large international associations. These international organizations are by scholars pointed out as being influential for understanding similarities across the world (see for instance, Boli & Thomas 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). Sahlin-Andersson (2000) highlights international organizations as arenas, where professionals from different countries meet and share ideas, practices and experiences. Through such arenas, ideas and practices are spread among organizations on a global level (Scott, 2001). Since public organizations do not face market competition and customer orientation to the same extent as private companies, they are likely to be more receptive towards these normative and mimetic pressures (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). However, being a national public organization, there is also a national context to consider, which may to a larger extent influence the behavior of the organization than would be the case for a private company. Despite recent attention to the lack of clarity of how organizational fields should be defined on an international level (Kostova et al., 2008; Tracey and Phillips, 2009), a large numbers of scholars have identified as well as explained similarities among organizations across national boundaries, where mimetic as well as normative pressures are found to make organizations more similar, also on a global scale (for a review, see Dobbin et al., 2007). What is a standard and how is it spread The empirical focus of the thesis is international standards of auditing in the public sector. In addition to what is argued above on how similarities among organizations are created, there is also a need to clarify what here is defined as a standard, as well as discussing the dynamics of how standards are spread and followed. A standard may be explained as a kind of rule, since they outline boundaries of how we ought to behave. As other rules, standards are general, i.e. they included everyone towards whom the standards are directed, as well as they are valid for a repeatedly number of occasions (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 1998 p 13; 2000 p. 1). To distinguish standards from other rules, Brunsson & Jacobsson (1998) classify all rules into three different categories; directives, norms and standards. They argue that standards are explicit, mostly written down and have a distinct sender. This makes 11

standards different from both norms and directives. Norms, they argue, do not have a distinct sender and are mostly not written down, instead norms are common sense knowledge rules we follow even though they are not mandatory. Directives on the other hand are mandatory to follow, explicit and most commonly written down, such as legislation issued by states (ibid). In empirical cases, the difference Brunsson and Jacobsson (1998) make between norms and standards may not always be clear, rather it may be viewed as a process in different stages. A norm could most likely become a standard, and there may be a range of policy documents more or less explicitly expressing these norms such as policy documents of international organizations (e.g. Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The sender of the standard does not either have to be the actor where the norm has emerged. For instance, the emergence of norms could start in activist organizations su would eventually gain response on an international level, and end up in being expressed in various international policy documents (Finnemore, 1993). Thus, in some cases the difference between norms and standards should rather be viewed as a scale of formalization of norms. Standards are created by a wide range of standard setting organizations, national as well as international, nongovernmental as well as inter-governmental organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). The emergence of these international nongovernmental and inter-governmental organizations have since the Second World War, increased exponentially (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). On an international level it is through these organizations standards are spread globally (Scott, 2001) but they may also be the actor formulating explicit standards out of more diffused norms (c.f. Finnemore, 1993). In this way, international standard-making organizations impact political and administrative behavior, on a global level. Some scholars even claim that international organizations and standards per se are essential to understand the similarities among countries, organizations and individuals across the world (Loya & Boli, 1999; Boli & Thomas, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). Sahlin-Andersson (2000) highlights that some of the international organizations have the purpose of constituting arenas, although they are not formally standard-making organizations they still undertake activities that generate standards. Arenas, according to Sahlin-Andersson are organizations which, information and comparisons, report and propose initiatives for change, and generally 12

-Andersson, 2000 p. 100) Moreover, she argues, particularly international organizations have had the objective of constituting such arenas where exchange among people from different countries takes place. Although it is not their purpose, in general these kinds of exchanges generate guidelines, recommendations and other non-binding regulations (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Characteristic for the international standard making organizations is voluntarism, in membership as well as in the regulations they issue (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008; Knoke, 1986). No organization, individual or state is forced to become a member as well as they are allowed to leave the organization whenever they wish. Furthermore, there is no payment or profit is attached to membership (Knoke, 1986), rather it is common that organizations pay membership fees to participate (Tamm Hallström, 1998). Boli and Thomas (1999) claim that international nongovernmental organizations also are strongly founded on principles of universalism, i.e. the needs and desires are considered to be the same regardless of where in the world the member is located. Thereby, the same regulation is regarded as universally applicable. Similar to standards per se, standard making organizations are normally directed towards a certain group, where membership is based on some kind of similarity among the members (Ahrne, Brunsson & Garsten, 2000). The associations are often established to strengthen the similarities among the members and thereby strengthen their identity (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008; Knoke, 1986). Weaker organizations, which are in greater need for legitimacy, have proved to more willingly become members of these associations. As well as they to a larger extent also comply with the international standards (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). As a consequence, even if membership as well as regulation provided is voluntary, it may be experienced as more or less compulsory for those organizations, due to their larger need of legitimacy (Tamm Hallström 1998). Standard-making organizations are in general not able to impose any sanctions if their regulations are not followed. Nor is exclusion a realistic alternative, it is rare that members are excluded in these contexts (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). The dependence of membership makes it difficult for the organizations to keep a central authority, which is the normal base for compliance with rules in organizations. Rather, the autonomy of the members and the aim of the organization have to be balanced. Consequently, the solution has become to issue non-binding regulation (ibid). This does not imply that the decision-making process is free of conflicts. A wide range of 13

standards within an area, as well as vaguely formulated standards may prove that various interests have been compromised (Botzem & Quack 2006). To accept a commitment there is always a certain degree of uncertainty, in terms of how much it would cost as well as what it actually implies. Strength with the issue of non-binding commitment is that it makes it easier for the committing parties to deal with such uncertainty. They may agree and accept and then think more in detail about the consequences, this makes it easier to accept the commitment (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Summary and outline of a first proposition In sum, research on organizations has shown that organizations of the same kind over time end up harmonized in structures and practices. Since standards are voluntary regulation, the focus has been on normative and mimetic mechanisms. Organizations have proved to imitate each other when they face uncertainty, most of all they imitate the structure and practice of what is perceived as more successful organizations. When organizations are constituted by professionals, not only mimetic but also normative influence creates similarity. Professionals tend to be receptive of the views of their professional peers, and thus adopt practices accordingly. Professionals also have their own associations, on national as well as international level, where they share their ideas and practices which reinforces their common identity, as well as it facilitates the spread of their practices. Studies of isomorphism have mainly been conducted within and among European countries, the United States and other industrialized countries, i.e. Western countries. Little studies of these mechanisms are made on African countries specifically. As we will see in the following part, in literature on African countries focus has primarily been on coercive pressures, made by actors like the World Bank, the IMF and donor countries. There is little discussion about the role of normative and mimetic pressures, which could affect these organizations, as research has shown to be the case for organizations in industrialized countries. Despite the lack of empirical studies, there are no restrictions made in this body of literature that normative and mimetic processes would be specific for Western countries. Rather the base of the theory is that all organization within the same field, regardless of where they are located will subject of the same isomorphic mechanisms and become similar. 14

In line with theories of isomorphism and organizational fields, I outline the following proposition of how the auditors in African countries would respond to international standards of auditing: Proposition 1 Auditors in African countries would express the importance of conducting audit according to international standards. They would primarily try to gain legitimacy from the professional audit community, and imitate more successful audit organizations. Furthermore, the auditors would view the way prescribed in the international standards as the most appropriate way of conducting audit. The audit organization would adopt the practices with as little adjustment as possible. PUB L I C A D M INIST R A T I O N R E F O R MS IN A N A F RI C A N C O N T E X T Turning to the literature on developing countries, in particular African countries, the picture of how organizations would respond to new structures and practices is very different. Here, public organizations would (and should) rather develop their own organizational practices based on their local circumstances, than wanting to imitate similar organization within their field 4. In this part, there will be a short overview of various foreign administrative reforms which have been introduced in African countries in modern history 5.The history of efforts to introduce foreign, or Western, models in the African public administration, I argue, affects the way this is viewed by scholars in contemporary literature. Secondly, I will outline the various arguments which are used by scholars to argue why implementing Western models is not a desirable idea. Finally, there will be a proposition of how public auditors in African countries would respond to international standards in auditing, corresponding to this body of literature. Since the colonial period there have been various efforts to introduce foreign structures and models to African societies. During colonialism, the European colonizing powers introduced their governmental structures to the African colonies. The European 4 Few scholars within this field provide a different picture, such an exception is Montgomery (1987). In his study he showed how managers in African countries acted in similar ways as managers in Western countries. The majority of the literature does however not follow the arguments by Montgomery, 5 Naturally this overview is brief. It is made to create a frame in order to understand the context of the discussion of public administration reforms in African countries today. 15

public administration had its roots in the formation of state structures in Europe during nineteenth century. The character of this administration is often referred to as a weberian bureaucracy, due to its base in professionalism by the public officials and legalism in terms of how the public affairs were supposed to be handled. The difference between the structures established in Europe and the ones transferred to the colonies was that in the colonies the structures were also racist (Young, 1994). Africans had to comply with European laws and administrative regulations, although they had no access to any rights as European citizens had. Within this direct rule, where the European structures were established, over the colonies, none of the traditional African institutions were recognized (Mamdani, 1996). In addition to the direct rule, the colonial powers also exercised their control indirectly, through the use of existing traditional structures and through controlling the local chiefs. The two ways of ruling were often used in parallel, where indirect ruling was common in the rural areas and the direct ruling was practiced in the larger towns and capitals (ibid). A breakpoint for the colonial administrations was the Second World War, where Africans participated on the side of their colonizing powers. After the war there was no possibility of returning to the conditions before the war. Africans had made important contributions to the war and their expectations had changed. There was also a change of attitudes within the colonizing powers. Since the Africans helped to win the war they should also be rewarded for their contributions. Consequently, the colonial powers started to expand the rights for the Africans in their colonies. For instance, the British established ways for educated Africans to work in the central and local administrations as well as extended their possibilities to education (Young, 1994 p. 182-186). The expansion of rights was not only due to generosity of the colonial powers. In the African countries at that time, there were growing nationalist movements, demanding expanded rights as well as independence. In addition to extended political and civil rights, economic progress and welfare in the African countries was highlighted by the colonizing powers in the era after the war (ibid) The period after the Second World War is viewed as the starting point for larger amounts of aid to developing countries. With inspiration of the Marshall plan and how well it proved to work out in Europe the aim was to create the same success in the developing world. The main focus of the Marshall plan in Europe was infrastructural progress, which also became a large part of the development programs in African countries. In addition to infrastructural programs, the first period of aid was also 16

characterized by technical assistance programs to strengthen the capacity of institutions in the developing countries (Riddell, 2007 p. 24-29). At that time, the predominant thought was that administrative state structures in African countries could be developed mainly through transferring and replicating models from industrialized, i.e. Western, countries. There was no account taken of possible specific characteristic of the African context, what had been proved be successful in western countries was assumed to have the same effect in these countries (Hyden, 2008, see also Turner & Hulme, 1997). After independence, during a short period in the 1970s there was an attempt to reform the governmental administrations in African countries into development administrations. The character of the colonial administration had been a stiff, bureaucratic organization, which in the 1970s was viewed to have difficulties of handling the new challenges of development after independence. The new development administration was supposed to be more flexible and more like an entrepreneur in the role of developing society (Hyden, 1983 p. 76). The new development administration approach did not last very long. Neither was it possible to return to the old bureaucratic structures, even though there were African public officials arguing for a more weberian bureaucratic structure. Since these structures were viewed as representing the old colonial system, such voices were in general ignored. As a consequence, there was room for new patrimonial structures to be established, where public officials do not separate private from public and where reliance was on informal relationships instead of formal institutions (Hyden, 1983 p. 75-79, 2008 p. 65-66, see also Young, 1994 p. 290-292). This parallel system with formal structures and informal rules was established already during the colonial period. Since the public administration represented a western colonial system, the loyalty of African public officials was instead directed towards the informal networks, in terms of family ties or tribe affiliation. This created a situation with two structures existing in parallel (Ekeh, 1975). The changed situation after independence, however, created new informal rules and networks based on new loyalties (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). Structural adjustment programs Due to the deep economic crisis in many African countries in the late 1970s and 1980s, the international community encouraged the introduction of economic reforms, in terms of structural adjustment programs, to several of the African countries. These economic 17

reforms were defined and created by the IMF and the World Bank and in brief they implied demands for a diminished state and public administration, as well as a more limited state regulation of markets (Van de Walle, 2001). Similar reforms had been implemented with the expected results in Latin America and Asia and consequently the programs were thought to have the same effects in Africa (Hyden, 2008). The adjustment programs did not turn out well in the African countries. Their effects were by critics viewed as increasing poverty and make living conditions for many Africans harsher (Abrahamsen, 2001). However, the IMF and the World Bank defended their programs and claimed that failure and negative effects of the programs was not a fair description, since the adjustment programs were never fully implemented in many of the countries (Van de Walle, 2001). The critics claim that the structural adjustment programs were not the appropriate solutions for economic problems in Africa. For example, it was argued that they made the markets more inflexible through the decreased ability for the state to use economic instruments (Van de Walle, 2001). Furthermore, it was also argued that in Africa it was not an over-dimensioned public administration which was problematic; rather its lack of efficiency (ibid). Thus, despite the success of the programs in other regions, the critique underlined that these programs to a large extent lacked in taking the specific features of the African societies into account (Olowu, 2003; Hyden, 2008; Van de Walle, 2001). In the words of Hyden (2008): may have worked in Latin America or Asian economies, the structural conditions in Africa are sufficiently different that it is necessary to consider the problem of design of his lack of taking the context into consideration contributed to the failure of the reforms, regardless of the degree of their implementation. Good governance Poor governance became an explanation for the failure, or lack of implementation, of the structural adjustment programs by the international community (Van de Walle, 2001). Soon poor governance also became an explanation for the overall weak development in the African countries, by actors like the World Bank: fundamental in many countries is the deteriorating quality of government, pervasive rent seeking, weak juridical systems, and arbitrary decision- World Bank, 1989 p. 3). The solution became to increase capacity and improve quality in the public 18

administrations. Although the importance of governance was brought up the report in 1989, it was not until the late 1990s the international community started to focus more heavily on the importance of good governance. Evans and Rauch (1999) states, that the World Development Report in 1997 constituted a change in the view of development. Now the importance of the state and the administration was much more focused on in the development discourse. The World Bank (1997) express their view as follows, reforms tend to produce their effectiveness lead to higher standards of living, in turn paving the way for more reforms and futu p. 15). How good government is described and measured, in terms of improvements in the public sector, resembles much of the bureaucratic systems in western countries. Good government is characterized by meritocratic recruitment (Evans & Rauch, 1999), professionalism (World Bank, 1997) as well as efficiency and effectiveness (Grindle, 1998b), which is usually also is how the traditional Western bureaucracy is described. A way of realizing good governance in developing countries has been through various capacity building programs in the public sector. In donor countries, several public authorities have development cooperation programs with their counterparts in African countries. Authorities conducting such programs are for instance, The Swedish Tax Administration, The Swedish Board of Fisheries, the Swedish Transport Administration as well as the Swedish National Audit Office. The idea is not to increase the capacity merely through technical solutions and an increase of resources. Rather the focus is on the transfer knowledge and practices between the authorities. One could argue that these efforts of reform and capacity building programs are similar to the efforts of introducing western structures made throughout history. There is however a change in the discourse, now there is an idea that structures and practices should be adjusted to fit into the local circumstances. In the World Bank reports, they claim that if good governance should be realized, it has to be built on local traditions and be adjusted to the prevailing circumstances in the country (World Bank, 1989; 2005). This view is also mirrored in the donor community through their increased focus on partnership and ownership. In the 2005 Paris Declaration where the donor community agreed upon terms of increased aid effectiveness, ownership and alignment 19

were recognized as main concepts upon which development aid should be built (OECD, 2005). Ownership is in the declaration understood as leadership. Leadership of developments programs should be taken by the developing countries. The developing countries should incorporate the development programs into their national plans, as well as coordinating them between different donors. Furthermore, all projects should be aligned to the national institutions and practices, i.e. development programs should be based in the countries own views of development, and follow those directions (OECD, 2005; see also Sida, 2005). Despite the attention to ownership, alignment and adjustments to local circumstances, critics claim that the international community is still just interested in introducing their own ideas of what constitutes good government. Abrahamsen (2001) expresses it as follows: almost common- than imported ones, would today be endorsed by both the political left and right (p. 49). (2001) critique, she however claims that this approach is problematic since it decouples this new agenda from earlier efforts of introducing foreign structures in the African societies. She argues that the international community and African societies (ibid). Furthermore, Abrahamsen (2001) claims that the good government imperative is problematic since its model, the Weberian bureaucracy, is -led Other scholars are more nuanced saying that reforms to improve the public institutions in these countries are necessary for development in African societies. However, despite their positive view of these reforms, they also focus on the necessity of taking the context into consideration and adjust the reforms to the local circumstances (e.g. Hyden, 2008; Diamond, 2004; Grindle, 1998a; Olowu, 2003) Diamond (2004) points out, that - Furthermore, he argues that coercive pressure on developing countries to adopt certain policies and practices will not be sustainable. Instead, he underlines, to create long term sustainable reforms it is important for the country themselves to create, a package of reforms that is unique to and owned by the country (ibid). 20

In sum, when reforms of the public administration in African countries is discussed, scholars within the development literature draw the same conclusions, i.e. that it is not possible or desirable for organizations in developing countries to converge to the same practices which are used in Western countries. If they would borrow models, these models have to be adjusted to prevailing context in the country. To argue for this conclusion, various arguments of different character are used in the literature. The arguments are often mixed and combined. However to clarify why this conclusion is drawn by scholars (as well as by practitioners) within this field, I have separated the arguments into different categories. Avoid imperialism each society should develop on its own terms A first argument of why foreign or western structures should not be implemented in African countries is mainly the idea that each society should decide on its own development. This argumentation is primarily moral, and constitutes a general critique against the thoughts of development and modernization. The claim for moral superiority from western countries in particular on the African continent has a long history. Ekeh (197 es on how the missionaries claimed their moral superiority over the Africans. The missionaries claimed to save the Africans from their ancestor worship, as well as form the rest of their past and their culture. Africans were supposed to forget about their past and openly, in the words of Ekeh: (p. 97). Modernization is within this line of argument viewed as a part of Western world wide cultural hegemony, where being modern implies being like the Western countries (e.g. Hettne, 2009; Ake, 1996; Abrahamsen, 2001). As a consequence, modernization in terms of what Western countries define as good government, or other reforms, are viewed as unmoral ways of imposing western life styles to other societies. Ake describes this line of argument illustratively, Without exception, modernization theory used an evolutionary schema that regarded the When modernization theory came in conflict with the divergent social structures in the third world, the modernization theorists talked simply of making the structures of the backward country 21