The Diverse Impacts of Politically Diverse Networks: Party Systems, Political Disagreement, and the Timing of Vote Decisions By Amy Erica Smith

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By Amy Erica Smith Online/Reviewer Appendix The following parties and candidates were coded in each country. In many cases, the original vote choice variables for respondents and discussants did not follow the same coding scheme, and the schemes were reconciled for this study. Table A1. Parties/Candidates Coded in the CNEP II and CNEP III Country (Wave) Election ENC Parties and Candidates Coded Bulgaria (II) 1996 2.80 I. Marazov; P. Stoyanov; A. Tomov; G. Ganchev; Other Chile (II) 1993 1.90 A. Alessandri; E. Frei; M. M. Neef; J. Piñera; E. Pizarro; C. Reitze Chile (III) 1999 2.14 S. Larrain; G. Marin; T. Hirsch; R. Lagos; J. Lavin Germany (II) 1990 2.98 CDU/CSU; SDP; FDP; Grün/B90; REP; PDS; DSU; Other Greece (II) 1996 3.60 PA.SO.K.; New Democracy; Politiki Anixi; Communist Party (KKE); Left Coalition; Democratic Social Movement; Other Hong Kong (II) 1998 3.16 Democratic Party; Liberal Party; DAB; The Frontier; HKADPL; Citizens Party; 123 Democratic Alliance; New Territories Alliance; independent candidate; Pioneer; Chow Kit Bing Jennifer; Fok Pui Yee; Leung Yiu Chung; Ting Yin Wah; Andrew Wong Wang-Fat; Kan Brian Ping-Chee; Chong Chan Yau Hungary (II) 1998 3.27 Fidesz; FKGP; KDNP; MDF; MDNP; MIIP; MSZDP; MSZP; Munkaspart; Lszdsz; Zj Szvvetsig Hungary (III) 2006 2.42 MSZP; FIDESZ KDNP; SZDSZ; MDF; MIEP; Munkaspart; Other Italy (III) 2006 4.42 Rifondazione Comunista; Comunisti Italiani; I Verdi; L Ulivo (composto da DS e Margherita); Socialisti democratici e Radicali; Lista (Pietro); UDEUR (Mastella); UDC (Casini); Forza Italia; Alleanza Nazionale; Nuova DC+Psi (De Michelis); Lega Nord; Alternativa sociale (Alessandra Musselini); Partito Pensionati; Other Japan (II) 1993 2.11 LDP; JSP; KOMEI; JCP; DSP; SDF; Other Mexico (III) 2006 3.07 Calderon (PAN); Madrazo (AM); AMLO (PBT); Campo (NA); Mercado (ASDC); Other Mozambique (III) 2005 1.19 Frelimo; Renamo; PDD; PIMO; UD Portugal (III) 2005 3.09 Bloco de Esquerda; CDS-PP; CDU (PCP/PEV); PPD-PSD; PS; Other

Country (Wave) Election ENC Parties and Candidates Coded South Africa (III) 2004 1.65 African Christian Democratic Party; African Muslim Party; African National Congress; Afrikaner Unity Movement; Azanian People's Organisation; Democratic Alliance - Democratic Party; Freedom Front; Independent Democrats; Inkatha Freedom Party; Minority Front; New National Party; Pan Africanist Congress; United Christian Democratic Party; United Democratic Movement; Other Spain (II) 1993 3.05 PSOE CDS; PP; IU; CIU; ERC; PNV; EA; HB; BNG; PA; PAR; UV; Verdes; UA; PSE-EE; ADE (Ruiz Mateos); LV-Verdes; Partido Andalucista; PCPE; Partido Reg. Cantab; UPCA; Other Spain (III) 2004 2.97 PP; PSOE; IU (ICV); CiU; ERC; PNV; Eusko Alkartasuna ; Coalición Canaria; Bloque Nacionalista Galego; Partido Andalucista; Chunta Aragonesista; NA Bai; Verdes; Unión Valenciana; PAR; CHA; Other Taiwan (III) 2005 3.08 KMT; DPP; NP; PFP; TAIP; TSU; Independent Alliance; Independents; Pan-Blue; Pan-Green United Kingdom (II) 1992 3.05 Conservative; Labour; Liberal Democrat; Scottish NP/Plaid Cymru; Other United States (II) 1992 2.65 B. Clinton; R. Perot; G. Bush United States (III) 2004 2.10 J. Kerry; G. Bush; R. Nader; Other Uruguay (II) 1994 4.71 P. Nacional (other/unspecified); P. Nacional (Ramírez); P. Nacional (Volonté); P. Colorado (other/unspecified); P. Colorado (Sanguinetti); Encuentro Progresista/Frente Amplio; Nuevo Espacio; Other (Multiple presidential candidates were permitted from a party in this election.) Uruguay (III) 2004 2.32 P. Nacional; P. Colorado; Frente Amplio; Independent/Other Rules for coding respondents and discussants parties/candidates in all countries: 1) A vote choice of other is treated as a party/candidate. If both a respondent and a discussant are coded as voting for other, the dyad is set to missing, since it is impossible to determine agreement or disagreement. 2) Recorded vote choices of Don t Know, No Response, Didn t Vote, and Voted Blank are coded as missing, for the purpose of determining disagreement. 2

Table A2. Determinants of Agreement and Disagreement with Spouse, and of Time to Make a Vote Decision Spouse Vote Time to Make Decision None/ Unreported Different Characteristics of Dyad Same Vote as Spouse -0.065*** 0.028 (0.008) (0.036) Different Vote from Spouse 0.008 0.361*** (0.011) (0.052) Freq. of Discussion with Spouse -0.062*** -0.048*** (0.011) (0.010) Cross-Level Interactions ENC X Agreement with Spouse -0.030* (0.013) ENC X Disagreement Spouse -0.116*** (0.017) Eff. Num. of Candidates 0.302*** 0.531*** 0.065** 0.124*** (0.049) (0.056) (0.022) (0.011) Compulsory Voting -0.557*** 0.914*** -0.015 0.019* (0.087) (0.097) (0.041) (0.010) Uncertainty Avoidance 1.986*** 0.041-0.565*** -0.730*** (0.114) (0.151) (0.084) (0.018) Confucian Culture 0.919*** 0.183-0.043-0.016 (0.082) (0.110) (0.052) (0.013) Female -0.065 0.02 0.026*** 0.025*** (0.035) (0.051) (0.006) (0.006) Aged 30-44 -0.534*** -0.160* -0.001-0.012 (0.054) (0.078) (0.010) (0.010) Aged 45-65 -0.788*** -0.481*** -0.026* -0.037*** (0.056) (0.083) (0.010) (0.010) Aged 65 + -0.839*** -0.769*** -0.043*** -0.063*** (0.060) (0.093) (0.011) (0.011) News from newspaper -0.325*** 0.158* -0.007-0.017* (0.043) (0.062) (0.008) (0.008) TV news -0.311*** 0.195* -0.020* 0.013 (0.050) (0.077) (0.010) (0.009) Political interest -0.389*** -0.163*** -0.004-0.009** (0.018) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) SES Index -0.029 0.144*** -0.016*** -0.018*** (0.019) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) Constant -1.611*** -3.072*** 0.604*** 0.542*** (0.159) (0.189) (0.065) (0.034) Number of Observations 18054 12435 12435 Number of Countries 22 18 18 Log likelihood -15747.112 R-Squared 0.17 0.17 Note: Hierarchical multinomial regression and hierarchical regression, using random effects at the countryelection level. Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 3

Table A3. Determinants of Agreement and Disagreement (Spouses and non-spouses), and of Time to Make a Vote Decision Discussant Vote Time to Make Decision None/Unreported Different Characteristics of Dyad Discussant is Spouse -0.383*** -0.210*** 0.002-0.008 (0.033) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004) Same Vote -0.071*** -0.020 (0.005) (0.023) Different Vote -0.022** 0.253*** (0.007) (0.033) Freq. of Discussion -0.059*** -0.062*** (0.007) (0.007) Cross-Level Interactions ENC X Agreement -0.014 (0.008) ENC X Disagreement -0.088*** (0.011) Eff. Num. of Candidates 0.188*** 0.525*** 0.063 0.113*** (0.020) (0.026) (0.043) (0.007) Compulsory Voting -0.980*** 0.250*** -0.008 0.020** (0.038) (0.047) (0.078) (0.007) Uncertainty Avoidance 1.422*** -0.527*** -0.549*** -0.727*** (0.065) (0.087) (0.160) (0.012) Confucian Culture 1.277*** 0.290*** -0.035-0.002 (0.042) (0.065) (0.099) (0.009) Female -0.076** -0.061 0.024*** 0.021*** (0.024) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004) Aged 30-44 -0.294*** -0.08-0.020** -0.022*** (0.033) (0.046) (0.006) (0.006) Aged 45-65 -0.524*** -0.350*** -0.044*** -0.045*** (0.036) (0.049) (0.006) (0.007) Aged 65 + -0.588*** -0.533*** -0.060*** -0.068*** (0.038) (0.055) (0.007) (0.007) News from newspaper -0.223*** 0.219*** -0.007-0.016** (0.030) (0.041) (0.005) (0.005) TV news -0.365*** 0.186*** -0.023*** 0.012 (0.034) (0.050) (0.007) (0.006) Political interest -0.373*** -0.122*** -0.004-0.011*** (0.013) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) SES Index -0.063*** 0.106*** -0.014*** -0.016*** (0.013) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) Number of Observations 36594 26570 26570 Number of Countries 22 22 18 18 Log likelihood -33790.712-21954.771 R-Squared 0.17 0.18 Note: Hierarchical multinomial regression and hierarchical regression, using random effects at the countryelection level. Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. Constant included but not shown for ease of presentation. 4

Table A4. The Electoral Environment as a Determinant of Frequency of Discussion Freq. of Political Index of Discussion Discussion in Dyad Eff. Num. of Candidates 0.024-0.024 (0.054) (0.037) Compulsory Voting 0.091 0.047 (0.103) (0.068) Uncertainty Avoidance -0.189-0.055 (0.297) (0.134) Confucian Culture -0.194-0.205** (0.144) (0.073) Discussant is Spouse -0.034*** (0.003) Female -0.020*** 0.010*** (0.003) (0.003) Aged 30-44 0.003 0.032*** (0.005) (0.004) Aged 45-65 -0.009 0.031*** (0.005) (0.005) Aged 65 + -0.038*** 0.006 (0.006) (0.005) News from newspaper 0.061*** 0.047*** (0.005) (0.004) TV news 0.153*** 0.080*** (0.005) (0.005) Political interest 0.056*** 0.067*** (0.002) (0.002) SES Index 0.017*** 0.026*** (0.002) (0.002) Constant 0.381* 0.607*** (0.184) (0.115) Number of Observations 18904 35389 R-Squared 0.14 0.13 Note: Models are estimated using hierarchical regression, with random effects at the country-election level. Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 5

Table A5. Impact of Discussion on Time to Make a Decision: Interactions by Discussion Frequency Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Same Vote as Spouse 0.001 0.013 Different Vote from Spouse 0.053* 0.022 Freq. of Discussion with Spouse 0.032 0.018 Same Vote as Discussant 1-0.009 0.014 Different Vote from Disc. 1 0.010 0.020 Freq. of Discussion with Disc. 1-0.020 0.017 Disc. Freq. X Agreement -0.126*** 0.022-0.095*** 0.022 Disc. Freq. X Disagreement -0.086* 0.034-0.060* 0.030 Eff. Num. of Candidates 0.087*** 0.006 0.091*** 0.005 Compulsory Voting 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.009 Uncertainty Avoidance -0.731*** 0.018-0.724*** 0.016 Confucian Culture -0.007 0.013 0.018 0.013 Female 0.025*** 0.006 0.018** 0.006 Aged 30-44 -0.013 0.010-0.029*** 0.008 Aged 45-65 -0.038*** 0.010-0.049*** 0.009 Aged 65 + -0.062*** 0.011-0.067*** 0.009 News from newspaper -0.015 0.008-0.014 0.008 TV news 0.018* 0.009 0.014 0.009 Political interest -0.008* 0.003-0.013*** 0.003 SES Index -0.018*** 0.003-0.015*** 0.003 Constant 0.615*** 0.020 0.648*** 0.019 Number of Observations 12435 14135 Note: Models are estimated using hierarchical regression, with random effects at the countryelection level. Coefficients are significant at * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 6

Table A6. Heckman Selection Model Assessing Determinants of Time to Make a Decision Coefficient p Outcome Equation Country-Election Level Eff. Num. of Candidates 0.024** 0.004 Compulsory Voting -0.020* 0.044 Uncertainty Avoidance -0.003*** 0.000 Confucian Culture 0.150*** 0.000 Same Vote as Discussant 1-0.032 0.209 ENC X Agreement with Disc. 1-0.015 0.086 Different Vote from Disc. 1 0.227*** 0.000 ENC X Disagreement Disc. 1-0.055*** 0.000 Freq. of Discussion with Disc. 1-0.057*** 0.000 Female 0.019** 0.005 Aged 30-44 -0.049*** 0.000 Aged 45-65 -0.078*** 0.000 Aged 65 + -0.109*** 0.000 News from newspaper -0.043*** 0.000 TV news -0.001 0.960 Political interest -0.018*** 0.000 SES Index -0.011** 0.006 Constant 0.514*** 0.000 Selection Equation: Reports discussant s vote Eff. Num. of Candidates -0.093*** 0.000 Compulsory Voting -0.031 0.297 Uncertainty Avoidance -0.005*** 0.000 Confucian Culture 0.086 0.062 Female 0.089*** 0.000 Aged 30-44 -0.251*** 0.000 Aged 45-65 -0.301*** 0.000 Aged 65 + -0.475*** 0.000 News from newspaper 0.207*** 0.000 TV news 0.188*** 0.000 Political interest 0.160*** 0.000 SES Index 0.103*** 0.000 General Discussion Index 1.056*** 0.000 Constant 0.473*** 0.000 Number of Observations 16888 Note: Models are estimated using a Heckman selection model. Chi-Square of the Likelihood Ratio Test of independent equations is 0.65 (p=.420); thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence. Coefficients in standard errors are significant at * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 7