Spanish-Turkish Relations: In Tune Despite the European Stalemate

Spanish-Turkish Relations: In Tune Despite the European Stalemate Eduard Soler i Lecha, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOB* Throughout 2010, relations between Spain and Turkey continued to enjoy excellent good health. This was manifested in February with the holding in Madrid of the Second High-Level Meeting (RAN), thus giving continuity to the summit that the two governments had held in Istanbul one year earlier. This upgrading of bilateral relations to the highest level, which represents the culmination of a gradual process of intensifying diplomatic relations, has advanced concurrently with the protracted and controversial process of Turkey s accession to the EU. It is based on increasingly diversified and robust economic relations, and has been constructed thanks to the exceptionally good relations between the elites of both countries. A Historical Overview: From Indifference to Collaboration The times in which the Spain of Charles V and Philip II competed with the Ottoman Empire for Mediterranean hegemony have been left far behind. The signing of the 1782 Constantinople Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Trade signalled the beginning of a new phase of diplomatic normalisation, but also indifference. With the exception of some travellers, diplomats and the Sephardic community of the Ottoman Empire and with an absence of disputes between them, together with the need to deal with the decadence and break-up of both empires, Spaniards and Turks turned away from each other. One sees some parallels in the process of imperial disintegration (loss of Crete in 1897 and Cuba in 1898, both events having a traumatic impact on the contemporary history of the two countries) and in the search for European references of modernisation and progress by some enlightened elites with a view to recovering lost ground vis-à-vis the great powers of the time. Halfway through the twentieth century, one observes the commencement of a tentative but steady rapprochement between Turkey and Spain. Both countries had stayed out of the Second World War and had to adapt to a new and hostile international context. Franco s Spain and Turkey, then governed by Adnan Menderes, elevated their diplomatic delegations in Ankara and Madrid to the status of embassy. In 1959 they also signed the Friendship Treaty, which followed the 1930 Spanish-Turkish Treaty on Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration, the 1956 Agreement on Cultural Affairs and a series of trade agreements. Meanwhile, visits at ministerial level were taking place, starting with those of Alberto Martín Artajo and Fatin Zorlu, followed in 1965 by the first visit to Spain of the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü. 1 The nineteen-eighties were highly significant years in this slow build-up of relations. Notable among the factors favouring the process are the facts that Spain had consolidated its democratic transition, had joined NATO and, in 1986, entered what was then the European Communities. Turkey, in turn, had started to leave behind the coup d état of 1980 and, led by Turgut Özal, was committed to political liberalisation in both domestic and international spheres. It was at this point that Turkey began to amplify its commercial and diplomatic activities with its neighbouring countries in a process that anticipates the significance that the trade links between Turkey and the countries surrounding it have acquired today. Meanwhile, for the first time, Turkey requested full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Hence, as a result of political transformation in the domestic sphere and European-focused, western-leaning foreign policy, the two countries came to participate in the same military alliance and the same trading block. 2 In other words, the conditions for the two countries taking a step forward in their bilateral relations were optimal. The formalisation of a new momentum in this collaboration began with visits such as that made to Turkey in 1987 by the then Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, that of Narcís Serra as Defence Minister in 1988 and that of Turgut Özal himself to Madrid in 1989. This state visit saw the signing of some of the first major contracts with Spanish companies, CASA for example, and was the setting in which, through Felipe González, Spain expressed its support for Turkey s European vocation. 3 201

Turkey, Country Profile CIDOB International Yearbook 2011 Spain s Support for Turkey s Candidature Since the nineteen-eighties all Spanish governments, whatever their political hue, have supported Turkey s desire to accede to the European Union. This situation is completely different from what has happened in other European countries where the Turkish accession has been controversial and has given rise to clashes between different political groupings and where, therefore, where any change in government can mean an about-turn in policy concerning Turkey. Public opinion, a determining factor in many European countries, plays a neutral role in Spain. There is no debate about Turkish accession to the EU and when Spanish citizens are asked about the matter they move between support and indifference. Equally or more significant is the fact that the existence of a sector of some 30% or 35% claiming to be opposed to accession has not led to any political debate or discussion among citizens. 4 One of the reasons underlying the absence of controversy is the small size of the Turkish community in Spain, which amounts to a little more than 1,700 Since the nineteen-eighties all Spanish governments, whatever their political hue, have supported Turkey s desire to accede to the EU residents. 5 This is a determining factor if one is to understand why there is no speculation in Spain about an eventual massive influx of Turkish workers, when such debate is present in other European countries which have more numerous Turkish communities. A second reason is that, in Spain, politicians and intellectuals have not made an issue of the Turkish question. Neither the Turkish nor any other accession to the EU has been a subject of debate among politicians or citizens. Hence, the definition of policy towards Turkey has been shaped in small political and bureaucratic nuclei that are always connected with foreign relations. Within the discourse of these circles, moreover, it is a well-established opinion that it would be very difficult for Spain to oppose another country s access to the EU, when this has been so positive for the modernisation and development of Spain. Support for furthering relations between Turkey and the EU has been a constant in Spanish foreign policy. Nevertheless, one observes some nuance at the level of discourse or of the interests behind this support. Predominating in the years of the first socialist governments (1982 1996) was the standpoint that combined a decided pro-european position and a commitment to building up trade relations with Turkey. It was in this period that some of the pioneering agreements, for instance in the arms and aeronautics industries, were ratified. With the Popular Party Government (1996 2004) a strategic dimension was added since support for the Turkish candidature was in line with the stance of the United States and its European allies, United Kingdom and Italy. With José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the pro- NATO dimension waned and was replaced by discourse that was more based on values and the need to demonstrate that the European project is not confined to a single cultural or religious identity. In brief, although with each government and in each context the argument might have varied, what has not changed is the fact that Ankara has found firm support in Spain for its wish to join the European Union. With what results? Different Spanish governments have become actively involved in attempting to unblock the process of integration at certain critical points, in particular when Spain has occupied the rotating Presidency of the EU. In 1995, for example, Spain exerted pressure to achieve approval for the Customs Union s coming into force. In 2002, efforts were focused on negotiating an agreement between Turkey and Greece that would permit EU and NATO collaboration in launching the first military missions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 6 In 2010 Spain once again occupied the six-month Presidency of the EU, a period described by analysts and observers as invisible, the stormiest, crisisridden, transitional and as having paved the way to a waning Presidency. 7 Neither the European and Spanish economic situation nor the need to work within an institutional impasse made things any easier for a Spanish executive that had planned an ambitious agenda. The Spanish government created great expectations about this Presidency and, among its objectives, indicated the goal of making progress with the Turkish candidature. This was no easy task if one bears in mind the state of standoff in the negotiating process, the lack of any advance in Cypriot reconciliation and reunification, and the position taken by leaders like Sarkozy and Merkel who openly opposed Turkish accession to the EU. At the Second High-Level Meeting between Spain and Turkey in February 2010 and despite this hostile climate, Zapatero declared that Spain aspired to open four chapters of negotiations in the six-month period. Some months earlier, Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos had stated that featuring among the aims of the Presidency was that of confirming the irreversibility of the process of Turkey s EU accession process. 8 On the Turkish side, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his firm belief that Spain would be able to change the dynamics of the accession process while it occupied the Presidency. 9 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, asserted that Spain would preside over the EU in such a way as to benefit both the EU and Turkey. 10 The promises and expectations turned out to be overblown since, in the end, it was only possible to open up one chapter, that on food security and veterinary and phytosanitary policy. This was a very modest advance which was not going to change the general perception 202

14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 1,000 0 11,486 Germany 7,238 UK 6,508 Italy Graph I. Main destinations for Turkish exports 2010 (millions of dollars) Source:Turkstat Produced by CIDOB 6,041 Iraq 6,055 France Graph III. Evolution of Spanish-Turkish trade 4,631 Russian Fed. 3,770 US 3,563 Spain 3,043 Iran 2,259 China (2001-2010) (millions of euros) 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 0 33,955 France 19,452 Germany 16,577 Portugal Graph II. Main destinations for Spanish exports 2010 (millions of euros) 16,296 Italy Source: DataComex. Spanish foreign trade statistics Produced by CIDOB 11,496 UK 6,529 US 5,807 The Netherlands 5,221 Belgium 3,752 Turkey Graph IV. Spain's net direct investment in Turkey (2001-2010) (millions of euros) 3,448 Morocco Spanish-Turkish relations: In Tune Despite the European Stalemate 5,000 4,000 Source: DataComex. Spanish foreign trade statistics Produced by CIDOB 1,200 1,000 Source: Secretaria de Estado y Comercio / Secretariat of State and Trade Produced by CIDOB 3,000 800 2,000 1,000 Exports Imports Balance of trade 600 400 200 0-1,000 100 0 29.7 36.1 2.5-8.0 106.3 195.4 1,057.6 1,097.6 202.2 139.1-2,000-200 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 203

Turkey, Country Profile CIDOB International Yearbook 2011 that the negotiation process verged on paralysis. Even so, it must be remarked that, without the Spanish determination to open this chapter in the final days of the Presidency, the chances of making any progress at all would have been still slighter. Indeed, in the second half of 2010, now with Belgium occupying the Presidency, no further negotiating chapter was opened. In other words and to resort to a recurrent simile with regard to European integration, Spain opted to keep pedalling, although slowly and wobbling, so that the bicycle wouldn t fall over. The Spanish incumbency of the Presidency, an event that marked the state of Spanish-Turkish relations in 2010, demonstrates two things. First, Spain continues to be a country that backs Turkey s EU candidature. Second, Spain has limited capacity for changing the state of play of relations between the EU and Turkey. The Spanish government cannot stand up to countries like France and Germany on this issue and probably has no wish to do so either. The Private Sector: Taking the Lead in the Build-up of Relations Besides the upgrading of political dialogue and collaboration between ministries, the excellent understanding in the interna- The private sector and the economic agenda have been both actors and a central factor in the shaping of present relations between Spain and Turkey. It is in the field of trade where one observes more spectacular results and where the commercial complementarity between the two countries has borne fruit. Then again, since 1996, the framework of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey has facilitated exchanges between the two countries. For all the growing importance of other markets such as those in Russia, Iraq, Egypt, and the Gulf monarchies, the EU continued to constitute in 2010 the main market for Turkish exports, with Spain in eighth place as a buyer of Turkish goods, representing 3.13% of these relations (see Graph I). 11 Turkey, in turn, occupies ninth place in the ranking of Spanish exports and is only surpassed by the United States among the non-eu countries (see Graph II). 12 Moreover, Spain presently shows a trade surplus with Turkey (see Graph III). Proof of the leap ahead in trade relations over the last decade is the fact that in 2001 Turkey only occupied the eighteenth slot among Spanish export destinations. Data supplied by the Spanish authorities indicate that the sector heading the ranking of imports from Turkey is that of fashion, where companies like Inditex and Mango are very well established. Another of the more active sectors is that of industrial technology, in both exports and imports, since this is one of the areas most benefited by the Customs Union. 13 tional sphere is also striking As for investment, while the amount involved can be deemed limited, it has been steadily increasing over recent years, rising from 29 million euros in 2001 to more than 1,000 million euros in 2007 and 2008, when it reached an all-time peak. Although the economic crisis in Spain brought on a dramatic downturn in investment in 2009, Turkey has consolidated as a market that is increasingly attractive for Spanish investors (see Graph IV). 14 Infrastructure plays a prominent role here with names like OHL, which has been contracted to renovate the Istanbul-Ankara railway line. In the same sector, another Spanish company, CAF, was awarded the tender of constructing a high-speed railway line between Istanbul and Ankara. The country s urban growth is emerging as a business opportunity for Spanish constructors who are faced with saturation in the sector within Spain. In this regard, in 2009 Seopan, the representative organ of the Spanish construction sector signed a memorandum of cooperation with its Turkish counterpart with a view to gaining a decisive foothold in the Turkish market. Finally, it should be emphasised that Turkey has begun to stimulate the investment appetite of the service sector. This was highlighted in 2010 in the banking sector, with the acquisition by the BBVA (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argenteria) of a 25% stake in Turkey s Garanti Bank. Insurance companies such as MAPFRE have also found a space for their project of internationalisation in the Turkish market. Bilateral Cooperation and the International Agenda As with the commercial and investment spheres, political and institutional cooperation between Spain and Turkey has shown an upwards trend. After Turgut Özal s visit to Spain in 1989 relations between the two governments have been intensifying through official visits, treaties and sectorial agreements, and more frequent contacts between government officials. Institutional presence in the two countries has also expanded, in particular with the opening of the Cervantes Institute in Istanbul and the Turkish Consulate in Barcelona in 2008. Nonetheless, the clearest proof of the desire to give more substance and regularity to bilateral relations has been the establishment of High-Level Meetings (RAN) between Spain and Turkey. High-Level Meetings are regular summits held by the Spanish government with governments of countries with which it wishes to institute a relationship of preferential cooperation and is reserved for a limited number of countries (the big EU countries, neighbouring countries and some countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean). Turkey, in turn, has similar relationships with such 204

countries as Italy, the Russian Federation and Syria. The meetings propitiate dialogue and cooperation not only between heads of state or Foreign Affairs ministers but also between sectorial ministries. For example the first High-Level Meeting, held in Istanbul in April 2009, was attended by the ministers of Defence, Public Works, Interior, and Industry, Trade and Tourism. They were joined at the second meeting, held in Madrid in February 2010, by the ministers of Health and Social Policy. Besides the upgrading of political dialogue and collaboration between ministries, the excellent understanding between Spain and Turkey in the international sphere is also striking. The first display of this rapport between the two countries was Recep Tayyip Erdogan s agreement to act as co-sponsor of the Alliance of Civilisations, an initiative launched by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the United Nations General Assembly in 2004. Turkey s co-sponsorship was a decisive factor in the Alliance s being approved by the United Nations and the subsequent involvement of dozens of countries. The good relations between Erdogan and Rodríguez Zapatero were once again highlighted with such initiatives as a jointly-authored article they published in the International Herald Tribune following the cartoons controversy of 2006, the drafting of a joint communiqué following the Israeli operation in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, 15 and Zapatero s trip to Istanbul two years later when he was invited to participate in Iftar, the fast-breaking meal of the month of Ramadan. 16 The Mediterranean is another of the areas of shared interest. Each country has its own approach to the region and it is evident that, while the Maghreb is Spain s chief interest, Ankara is mainly focused on the Middle East. However, both countries participate in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), have been involved to different extents in NATO s operation in Libya in 2011, are following with close attention the development of the peace process in the Middle East, and are particularly alert to the situation in the Arab world, which is presently in upheaval with widespread social revolts and processes of political change. Relations between the two governments have intensified, they have jointly launched such initiatives as the Alliance of Civilisations, they participate in joint military operations and they have shared strategic interests but this is no guarantee against their becoming rivals at certain points. Hence, for example, Turkey has announced that it aspires to occupy a seat in United Nations Security Council from 2015-2016, thus competing with Spain whose government had previously announced its candidature. 17 Nevertheless, competition does not necessarily mean conflict and, hence, such episodes need not give rise to major repercussions in Spanish-Turkish relations as a whole, in their cooperation in the domain of foreign policy and security and, much less, in the economic sphere. To conclude, in a few decades Spain and Turkey have left behind low-intensity relations and mutual indifference to work on forging increasingly substantial political and economic relations. In spite of the present stalemate of the process of Turkey s accession to the EU, the relations between the two countries are notable for their considerable vitality. It would have been difficult to take them any further starting out from such modest foundations and in such an unpropitious European context. * The author wishes to express his gratitude to the CIDOB research assistant Ana Almuedo for her help in writing this article. Notes 1. Monografía sobre Turquía (Monograph on Turkey, 2008) Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación Español, 133/2008. See online: http://www.maec.es/es/ MenuPpal/Paises/ArbolPaises/Turquia/Monografia/ Documents/TURQUIA.pdf [last accessed 28 April 2011]. 2. By virtue of the Ankara Agreement of 1963 Turkey attained the status of associate member of the EEC. Within this framework it had been taking steps to reduce trade barriers with a view to constituting a Customs Union, which came into force in 1996. The Customs Union was deemed to be a prior requisite for contemplating Turkey s full membership in the EEC. 3. El País, 15 September 1989. 4. Not all the Eurobarometer surveys contain specific questions on Turkey since respondents are sometimes asked about further enlargement in general terms. In any case, the Standard Eurobarometer number 69 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Standard Eurobarometer 69/Spring 2008-TNS Opinion & Social) offers data from 2008 and 2006. 5. Data from 31 December 2010 supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, Government of Spain, which may be found at: http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/informacionestadistica/informes/extranjeros31diciembre2010/index.html [last accessed 5 May 2011]. 6. In spite of the measures taken and advances achieved by the Spanish presidency and the United Kingdom, the agreement was not finalised until December 2002, at which point Denmark occupied the Presidency. 7. See, inter alia, A Stumbling Spain Must Guide Europe, Financial Times, 5 January 2010; Spain Ends Invisible EU Presidency, Euobserver, 30 June 2010; Spanish-Turkish relations: In Tune Despite the European Stalemate 205

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