Outcome of IKV Pax Christi Recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference

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Outcome of IKV Pax Christi Recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference The window of opportunity for significant progress in nuclear disarmament remains open at the conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference with the adoption of a consensus action plan. For the first time ever, the Review Conference agreed on concrete actions under each of the three pillars of the treatydisarmament, non proliferation and peaceful uses- as well as agreed actions on implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This balanced outcome of the Review Conference demonstrated the willingness of States parties to present their positions, but to still negotiate compromises to advance the disarmament and non proliferation agenda. While the Action Plan was agreed by consensus, the review portion of the document was not. Instead, it was adopted with a footnote, stating that the review is the responsibility of the President and reflects to the best of his knowledge what transpired with regard to matters of review. The explanation given at the conclusion of the Review Conference was that, after four weeks of discussion, there was not enough time to achieve consensus on this part of the document. The Action Plan presents sixty-four (64) points of action, described as achievable before the next Review Conference in 2015. Some actions request reports on progress sooner than that, and the actions related to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East have a much shorter time-frame attached (a Conference in 2012 of all states in the region). IKV Pax Christi invested a lot of time and effort towards achieving a balanced outcome to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, with the result that progress is possible on each area of substantive concern: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses. This document reviews the recommendations published by IKV Pax Christi in March 2010 and distributed to disarmament delegations in advance of the Review Conference. It assesses how these recommendations were or were not addressed through the conference and in the consensus Action Plan. IKV Pax Christi is the joint peace organization of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands. IKV Pax Christi works for peace, reconciliation and justice in the world. We join with people in conflict areas to work on a peaceful and democratic society. We enlist the aid of people in the Netherlands who, like IKV Pax Christi, want to work for political solutions to crises and armed conflicts. IKV Pax Christi combines knowledge, energy and people to attain its objectives. More information about IKV Pax Christi can be found at www.nonukes.nl. For more information on this paper, and IKV Pax Christi s work on nuclear disarmament, contact Susi Snyder, Programme Leader- Nuclear Disarmament at: snyder@ikvpaxchristi.nl. 15 June 2010

Contents Disarmament Russia and the United States All Nuclear Weapons States- Action Plan All Nuclear Weapons States- Transparency Europe's responsibility Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Fissile Materials Treaty Nuclear Security Doctrines & Strategies Positive Security Assurances Negative Security Assurances Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO Nuclear Weapons Free Zones De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons Modernization Non Proliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Materials Trade & Export Controls Additional Protocol Universalisation Peaceful Uses Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Middle East International Conference Special Coordinator Strengthening the NPT Withdrawal from the Treaty (Article X) Institution Building- shifting the meeting pattern Engagement with Civil Society 2

Disarmament Russia and the United States The two states holding the largest arsenals have made significant reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War, however, the time has come for the Russian Federation and the United States to reduce their arsenals to 500 or fewer weapons each. This will create the conditions necessary for other nuclear weapons states to engage in negotiations towards zero nuclear weapons. The conclusion of negotiations on a START follow-on treaty is a very positive step. As the process for national ratifications is moving forward, a new round of negotiations should begin on the next step in deep reductions. This next round should end the logic of the Cold War that distinguished between strategic nuclear weapons and battlefield nuclear weapons, also known as theatre or tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Today these weapons are often referred to as non-strategic or sub-strategic. During the Cold War only definitions and counting rules related to strategic nuclear weapons were established for the purpose of negotiations. TNW have never been subject of negotiations. The next round of bilateral negotiations should bring the total number of all categories of nuclear weapons between the two states down to 1,000. This will then also create the conditions for other nuclear weapons states to engage in multilateral disarmament negotiations. The START follow-on agreement should be ratified as soon as possible. The United States and Russian Federation should begin the next round of negotiations for deep reductions, with the goal of no more than 500 total weapons each. Russia and the United States have both submitted the new START treaty to their respective legislatures for ratification, and their chief negotiators are working to ensure ratification by the Duma and the Senate at the earliest opportunity. During the Review Conference, in a side event to present more information on the new START agreement, chief negotiators Rose Gottemoeller and Anatoly Antanov demonstrated that, at least their personal relationship, has been strengthened during the year of negotiations on the new START. A joint statement issued by the two countries indicated that all efforts now would be put towards achieving ratification of the agreement and its early entry into force. The next round of negotiations is not likely to happen soon. Russia has indicated that it needs to see further action on conventional weapons issues, including a re-examination of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and the withdrawal of U.S. forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons before the next set of negotiations can begin. The U.S. has indicated that it also needs to see greater transparency, at a minimum, from the Russian Federation before they are willing to come back to the negotiation table. However, in a press briefing on 6 June 2010, Gottemoeller said When we go on to the next stage of negotiations we will be looking to begin constraints for the first time in history on non-deployed warheads. She also indicated that these negotiations would include verification mechanisms beyond the already negotiated national technical means of verification. 1 All Nuclear Weapons States- Action Plan There is a need to not only reaffirm the commitments made in the 2000 consensus outcome document (also called the 13 Practical Steps) at this Review Conference but to go beyond them. While maintaining a commitment to the core principles of disarmament- transparency, verifiability and irreversibly. A simple reaffirmation of the 13 Practical Steps is not enough. However, the 13 Practical Steps are important and 1 Press Briefing, Geneva Switzerland 6 June 2010 3

this Review Conference has recognized that by including the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference in the agenda. UN Security Council Resolution 1887 which resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons 2, and the UN Secretary General s Five Point Plan for nuclear disarmament both demonstrate that the political climate for global nuclear disarmament has never been as favourable as it is now. The review conference must take these, as well as recommendations put forward by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Blix Commission, 2006) and the International Commission on Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament (2009), into consideration when developing an action plan for nuclear disarmament. This Review Conference should decide on an action plan for nuclear disarmament that goes further than the 2000 13 practical steps and takes into consideration the UN Secretary General s five point disarmament plan and recommendations from other international commissions. The 22 Action Points agreed, by consensus, in the final document go further than the 13 Practical Steps agreed in 2000, while reaffirming the importance of those steps. The nuclear-weapon States agreed to engage with one another, and to report on their engagement in 2014, on their efforts to achieve the following: a. an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; b. address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location; c. to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; d. discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons; e. reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; f. reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and g. further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence. 3 Nuclear weapon States are called upon to submit reports to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, and the 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI. 4 All Nuclear Weapons States- Transparency Increasing the transparency of nuclear weapons holdings will build confidence among non nuclear weapons states that this obligation under the 13 steps is being met. It is not necessary for states to report all locations of their nuclear weapons, but it is important to set a baseline for disarmament by having an accurate count of how many nuclear weapons there are in total among the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the NPT. In order to avoid potential problems associated with counting rules, the nuclear weapons states could simply present a total number of nuclear weapons they currently possess without going into detail about strategic vs. sub-strategic (tactical) weapons, again departing from a logic that stems from the Cold War but is no longer relevant. The Cold War policy of neither confirming nor denying the storage of US nuclear weapons in Europe should also be ended. This would increase the level of accountability by providing a baseline for comparison in future reporting, so that demonstrable reductions towards zero can be honestly assessed. 2 S/RES/1887 (2009) 3 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 5- this is a summary, not the full text. 4 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 5 4

Nuclear weapons states should provide an accurate count of the numbers of nuclear weapons they possess; in calculating reductions, nuclear weapons states should not make a distinction between strategic and sub-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. Two nuclear-weapon States, the US and the UK released the number of nuclear warheads in their nuclear arsenals during the Review Conference. The UK released information about both their deployed and nondeployed holdings (225 in total), while the U.S. released information that their stockpile 5, as of 30 September 2009, consists of 5,113 warheads. In both cases, this is the first time that this information has been publicly available directly from the governments concerned, rather than through the compilation of open source information by nuclear sleuths. Other nuclear weapons states have not yet released this information, and should continue to be urged to do so. Europe s responsibility Half of the states in the world that hold nuclear weapons on their territory are in Europe and are member states of the European Union (EU) and/or NATO. The UK and France are nuclear weapon states recognized in the NPT, but some 200 to 240 U.S. tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons continue to be deployed in five host countries: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. These weapons are a relic of the Cold War, when thousands of such battlefield nuclear weapons were stored in Europe. This anachronism, as it was called in a resolution by the European Parliament in March 2010 6, is increasingly seen as violating the spirit if not the letter of Art. I and II of the NPT, which prohibit any transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear weapon states. EU statements for NPT conferences tend to focus on the nuclear disarmament steps that other countries should make. Instead, the EU should recognize that it is part of the proliferation problem and that both the EU and NATO must take responsibility for changing the semi-nuclear status of these five countries. Moreover, the EU has not yet expressed its endorsement of President Obama s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The EU must recognize that it is lagging behind and must reinvent its own role to support the new dynamic. 7 The EU should wholeheartedly support U.S. statements calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. European states must also recognize their non proliferation responsibilities and take transparent, irreversible steps to reduce the number of states with nuclear weapons on their territory. Where the EU is unable to speak with one voice, individual member states must express their views. EU Wholehearted support for the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons While most of EU members have expressed support for President Obama s vision- there are exceptions, specifically France. France argued during the Review Conference that they were obliged to ultimately achieve the object and purpose of the treaty, as opposed to achieve a world free of 5 The nuclear stockpile includes both active and inactive warheads. Active warheads include strategic and nonstrategic weapons maintained in an operational, ready-for-use configuration, warheads that must be ready for possible deployment within a short timeframe, and logistics spares. They have tritium bottles and other Limited Life Components installed. Inactive warheads are maintained at a depot in a non-operational status, and have their tritium bottles removed. - http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05- 03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency FINAL_w_Date.pdf, viewed 11 June 2010 6 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getdoc.do?type=ta&reference=p7-ta-2010-0062&language=en 7 For an European ecumenical statement with detailed proposals for the EU policy to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, see http://csc.ceceurope.org/fileadmin/filer/csc/nuclear_disarmament/final_csc_of_cec_statement_on_the_eu_policy_to_the_npt _RevCon_2010.pdf 5

nuclear weapons. Statements made in Main Committee 1 (on disarmament) demonstrated their unwillingness to compromise on this specific language, and they negotiated to keep language in the outcome document which reiterates the goals of the treaty, to pursue nuclear disarmament as opposed to language to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. European recognition of non-proliferation obligations Germany on behalf of a group of 10 states, delivered a statement which called for strong action by the Review Conference calling for dealing with both forward deployed U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as their related infrastructure. Germany, in their opening statement went further than this and said called for the role of nuclear weapons to be further scaled down in NATO s Strategic Concept as these weapons no longer serve a military purpose and do not create security. 8 EU states going beyond the common position A number of EU states went beyond the agreed Common Position in their statements to the Review Conference. Ireland s Foreign Minister, Micheál Martin, urged nuclear-weapon States to work speedily for further substantial reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, including non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons. 9 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The CTBT was opened for signature 13 years ago, and despite global calls for an early entry-into-force, the failure of 9 Annex II states to ratify the treaty have prevented this from happening. There has been great progress made during the most recent CTBT Article XIV conference, including adopting ten specific and practical measures to promote the early entry into force of the treaty. States Parties should encourage the remaining Annex II States required for Entry-Into-Force to ratify the CTBT as soon as practicable. States should also commit to refrain from any action whatsoever which would defeat the object and purpose of the test ban treaty. In addition, support should be given for the ongoing work of the CTBT Provisional Secretariat. There were five actions in the outcome document related to the issue of nuclear testing. In Action 10, all nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the CTBT with all expediency. In Action 11, States reaffirmed their moratorium pending the entry into force of the CTBT, and also committed to refrain from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT. The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO was encouraged, in Action 14, to fully develop the CTBT verification regime, including early completion and provisional operationalisation of the International Monitoring System. Fissile Materials Treaty Currently, negotiating a treaty to ban fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices, is meant to take place in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament, and a program of work is currently being discussed which would allow for these negotiations to begin. NPT states agreed that this was the next logical step towards disarmament in 2000 (it is one of the 13 Practical Steps). The EU, in a working paper to the NPT said a Fissile material cut-off treaty is the next logical multilateral instrument to be negotiated for the cessation 8 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/4may_germany.pdf 9 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/3may_ireland.pdf 6

of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT 10. It is important that these negotiations begin, and the NPT Review Conference can recommend a deadline and request that negotiations be completed by 2013. There are a number of issues related to a fissile materials treaty that will need to be dealt with in the negotiations including stocks and the intrusiveness of inspections in creating a verification mechanism. The problem is that under the current rules of procedure, the Conference on Disarmament cannot seem to agree to begin the negotiations. The NPT Review Conference should therefore recommend that if the CD cannot enter into negotiations within the next year, then negotiations should be established through another fora- either diplomatic conferences (as with the Anti-Personnel Landmine treaty or Ottawa Process and the Cluster Munitions Convention or Oslo Process) or under the auspices of a group established for that purpose in the General Assembly. Negotiations on a Fissile Materials (Cutoff) Treaty should be completed by November 2013; Failure to enter into negotiations before May 2011 should lead to the establishment of a new forum or mechanism for negotiations under the auspices of the General Assembly. The Conference reaffirmed the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material. Unfortunately, it did not agree to set a timeline for these negotiations to begin in the Conference on Disarmament or suggest an alternate negotiating venue. Early drafts of the Action Plan included a recommended date by which the Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations before the matter was brought to the General Assembly to consider. The final consensus text however, was much weaker and does not include a specific deadline for negotiations to begin, although it does include an invitation to the UN Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. As this meeting was already suggested and planned by the UN Secretary General, this is not a new action but rather demonstrates the Review Conference s support for this meeting. Nuclear Security Doctrines & Strategies Reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons in national security strategies is one of the necessary steps in moving towards zero nuclear weapons. When nuclear weapons are not seen as a primary guarantor of security, or as the glue that holds alliances together, then there is less reluctance in disarming them. When nuclear weapons are recognized as a 20 th century weapon, not applicable to 21 st century security threats, their elimination becomes much more possible. It is not clear if (or to what extent) Russia has been reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national military doctrine, and the United States Nuclear Posture Review presents a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in countering non-nuclear threats. These actions can be further strengthened by no first use declarations on the part of all nuclear weapons states. Currently, only China maintains a no first use policy. This unilateral measure is one that can be taken rather easily, and can build confidence among non nuclear weapons states in order to reduce the risks of proliferation. Nuclear weapons states should declare no first use policies. No nuclear-weapon States used the opportunity of the Review Conference to make declaratory no first use policies. Action 5c does commit the nuclear-weapon States to engage with a view to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. 10 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.26 7

The Preparatory Committee meeting in 2014 will have a report on these efforts, and the 2015 Review Conference will assess their implementation. Positive Security Assurances Non-nuclear weapons states who rely on positive security assurances from nuclear weapons states can also reduce the role that nuclear weapons play in their national security strategies. They can demand that a no first use policy be put in place regarding their nuclear umbrella and can make it clear to the global community that their reliance on nuclear weapons only applies in relation to a strike on their territory with a nuclear weapon, as opposed to large scale conventional attack, or chemical or biological weapons attacks. Non- nuclear weapons states with bilateral positive security assurances should declare that their umbrella agreements apply ONLY in response to nuclear attacks. There was a shift away from US positions by some states who live under the shadow of the US nuclear umbrella. However, no specific requests or statements were made by these states, in public meetings at the Review Conference, to declare that their umbrella agreements apply only in response to nuclear attacks. The US Nuclear Posture Review, in changing the conditions in which the U.S. would be willing to use nuclear weapons, does issue a new declaratory policy on negative security assurances. The Nuclear Posture Review says that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 11 This is also understood to apply to U.S. nuclear weapons potentially used on behalf of U.S. allies. Negative Security Assurances The non nuclear weapons states and especially the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) have been calling for legally binding negative security assurances for a long time. This would be a further guarantee that those states who have willingly given up the option to develop nuclear weapons, and remain in good standing with their arms control and disarmament agreements, will not have nuclear weapons used against them. Many nuclear weapons states argue that the assurances proved in UN Security Council Resolutions 255 and 984 should be enough to make the non nuclear weapons states feel at ease. However, these resolutions do not in fact guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used against a country that does not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, they offer positive security assurances wherein a country possessing nuclear weapons will use them to respond to the use of nuclear weapons on an unarmed state. In advance of the NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states should, at the very least, make no first use policy declarations, in order to provide this kind of security assurance. While these declarations are not legally binding, they do provide the political space to begin negotiations on negative security assurances in the near future, and demonstrate political will to do so. States should declare their willingness to negotiate a legally binding international arrangement on negative security assurances. Security Assurances were addressed throughout Section C of the outcome document which recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances and that these could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 11 http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf 8

States parties agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should begin discussions on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. 12 Nuclear weapon States also committed to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. 13 And those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty 14. This does not commit nuclear weapons states to go much further than the positive security assurances 15 they provided in 1995 with UNSCR 984, but it does provide an opportunity for unilateral declarations, bilateral arrangements, and as discussed later in this paper, regional assurances through nuclear weapon free zones. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO While the NATO Strategic Concept is currently being reviewed, and latest reports suggest that it will be adopted in November 2010. NATO states currently hosting nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) have a key role to play in the broader disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In October 2009, the new German government committed itself to working in NATO for the removal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany. In November 2009, four Dutch elder statesmen called for the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from non nuclear weapons states and for an end to their task in NATO. In February, a Belgian group of prominent former political leaders recognized what an important signal the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons hosted in Europe would send to the non nuclear weapons states at the NPT Review Conference, and encouraged their government to follow the German example and call for an urgent withdrawal. Following a Dutch initiative, in their letter of 26 February 2010, the Foreign Ministers of five NATO member states (Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Norway) recognized the coming Review Conference as a crucial milestone for strengthening the international regime for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In light of that they have called for the inclusion of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in subsequent steps towards nuclear disarmament in NATO discussions in 2010. 16 NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has agreed to include a discussion at the next Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn on how NATO can contribute to arms control and disarmament, including with an eye to our new Strategic Concept. 17 This discussion took place on 22 April and was a first opportunity to discuss, on a NATO level, the role of sub-strategic weapons in NATO with a view to their removal. Statements should be issued by NATO governments acknowledging their responsibilities under the NPT and declaring their willingness to eliminate the role of tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons in NATO and supporting the removal of American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. A group of European states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Germany) delivered a statement to Subsidiary Body 1 of Main Committee 1 (the subsidiary body that designed the disarmament action plan) in which they focused on the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In the statement they recalled the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991/2, 12 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section C, Action 7 13 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section C, Action 8 14 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section C, Action 8 15 Positive Security Assurances are a guarantee that nuclear weapons will be used in retaliation for a nuclear weapons attack, whereas Negative Security Assurances are a guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used against a non-nuclear attack. 16 http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:200434&type=org 17 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_61803.htm 9

noting however that the status of implementation of these commitments has never been subject to any accountability or verification. 18 The statement encouraged the United States and the Russian Federation to reaffirm and commit themselves to further develop the unilateral 1991 and 1992 Presidential nuclear initiatives and to include negotiations on effectively verifiable and legally binding reductions of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons in their further arms control and disarmament process. The Report section of the final document contains some items that related to tactical nuclear weapons. In Paragraph 3 of the Report section, the Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control of such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly,. In Paragraph 6, The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty remain central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty s vital contribution to peace and security. The key language in this paragraph are the words under any circumstances, as it is often cited that the treaty does not apply during times of war, when, for example NATO s Article V would be implemented. States parties achieved consensus on Action 5b in which the nuclear weapons States agree to engage to address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; The original text in this particular action was weakened considerably through the negotiations process. In an earlier draft, this action was meant to address the question of all types of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure stationed on the territories of nonnuclear-weapon States 19. However, the deadline included on this action item, to report on the way that the nuclear-weapon States have engaged on these issues by 2014 provides an opportunity to further address these actions at the next Review Conference. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones The entire southern hemisphere is currently covered by nuclear weapons free zone agreements, yet when nuclear weapons states have not yet signed or ratified the relevant provisions in these agreements, they are not as effective a guarantor of security as they were designed to be. All nuclear weapons states should sign and ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear weapons free zone agreements, and the Review Conference should call on them to do so in a timely manner. Nuclear weapons states who have not agreed to all articles of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaties should discuss their concerns with a view to finding a compromise at the meeting of states parties to Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreements on 30 April 2010 at UN Headquarters. The 30 April meeting of States parties to nuclear weapon free zone treaties issued a final document which urged on the nuclear-weapons States, and any other State mentioned in the relevant protocols to the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties to sign and ratify those protocols as a matter of priority, and urged those who have signed and ratified, but with reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations, to withdraw such reservations/ declarations. 20 18 Statement issueddeliverd on 12 Maty 2010 19 NPT/Conf.2010/CRP.2/Rev.1 20 Statement by Chile, on behalf of States participating at the NWFZ conference. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/5may_nwfz-eng.pdf 10

In the joint statement by the nuclear-weapon States, the P-5 said they would welcome dialogue to resolve the outstanding issues related to nuclear-weapon-free zones. 21 One of the disarmament actions (action 9), encouraged states to review any related reservations to existing nuclear weapon free zone agreements. It did not call for the withdrawal of these reservations. De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons It is estimated that the US can launch 1,600 nuclear warheads within a few minutes. Russia can launch around a thousand. Keeping these nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is unacceptable. This calls for measures such as removing nuclear warheads from missiles, storing nuclear bombs and cruise missiles away from airports, keeping submarines in seaports and when these ships sail establishing alerts that last at least one full day. Such measures reduce the chance of errors and of the risk that can occur during a coup or an attack on nuclear facilities. The NPT Review Conference should encourage nuclear weapons states to take weapons off hair trigger alert and encourage the decoupling of warheads from their delivery systems. The Review Conference was not able to agree to encourage nuclear weapons states to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons states, but did consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclearweapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security. 22 Earlier drafts of the outcome document included a reference to how reducing operational readiness of nuclear weapons contributed to nuclear disarmament and towards international peace, safety and security. No direct decisions were taken on the issue of decoupling of warheads from their delivery systems. Modernization A number of nuclear weapons states continue debating the issue of nuclear weapons modernization. The very debate undermines the credibility of their commitment to the NPT, and specifically their disarmament obligations under Article VI. This was explicitly recognized by a group of non nuclear weapons states in a working paper presented to the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, in which they stated the development of new types of nuclear weapons...and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty 23. Modernization of nuclear weapons systems, including missiles and launch platforms, also undermine the credibility of states calling for strengthening of the non proliferation aims of the NPT. Nuclear weapons states should declare that they will not modernize their weapons and weapons delivery systems, and these declarations should be supported and encouraged by states hosting or protected by nuclear sharing or umbrella agreements. Defining modernisation is a challenge. Most nuclear weapon States say they are not modernizing their arsenals. Their refurbishment plans however, bring this into question. Some NGOs claim that these 21 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/5may_p5-full.pdf 22 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 5e 23 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30 11

refurbishments are in fact, modernisation under a different name, because they provide for new capabilities on existing warheads and are more than simple component replacements. The Review Conference did not pronounce clearly on the issue of modernisation of warheads, though it did recognise that the cessation of all nuclear test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. 24 Non Proliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in inspecting non-nuclear weapon states. The agency is responsible to make sure that non-nuclear weapon states do not abuse their right to peaceful use of nuclear energy to obtain nuclear weapon state status. However, the IAEA is subject to restrictions. The verification system has several weaknesses. The introduction of a voluntary additional protocol has increased the IAEA s access to locations and information, but not all countries have ratified the protocol. That puts a restriction on its operation. The Additional Protocol 25 is understood as the international standard in verification of non proliferation and should become a requirement under the NPT. All NPT member states should negotiate Additional Protocol Agreements with the IAEA without delay. The IAEA should report on progress with universalizing the Additional Protocol at the next NPT meeting of states parties. The Review Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force. (Action 28). Additionally, the Conference called for the wider application of safeguards to the facilities in nuclear-weapon States, and stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. (Action 30) The IAEA reports at all Review Conferences and associated Preparatory Committee meetings, including on the status of Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Protocol agreements that have been negotiated. In Action 32, the Conference also recommended that IAEA safeguards be assessed and evaluated regularly, providing an opportunity to increase the robustness of the safeguards regime as technological capacity to do so develops. NPT states parties and the EU should seek to increase their regular contributions to the IAEA in order that the agency can significantly increase its budget and remove the zero real growth constraint placed on it. The agency is continually being asked to take on more responsibility, yet is only able to do this through extra-budgetary support for key functions. NPT states parties should significantly increase their contributions to the IAEA. 24 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section D, paragraph i. 25 http://www.iaea.org/ourwork/sv/safeguards/sg_protocol.html 12

The Conference recognized that the IAEA needs political, technical and financial support in order to effectively meet its safeguards application responsibilities, and called on States parties to ensure this (Action 33). The Conference also encouraged all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extra-budgetary contributions to IAEA activities (Action 55). Materials Trade & Export Controls Articles I and II of the NPT require effective nuclear export controls. Nuclear control regimes, namely the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group exist and should be more transparent. Increased transparency on the parts of these regimes would be an effective tool for developing further cooperation around trade of these materials. European nuclear utilities do not generally require that customer states give up their national development of proliferation sensitive technologies including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. European companies need to exercise more restraint in selling nuclear technology. European nuclear utilities should insist that customer states renounce the development of proliferation sensitive technology. There was no mention of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or of the Zangger Committee in the outcome document, although both have been referenced in previous Review Conference outcomes. The Conference did encourage States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls. 26 Many states who are not part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Zangger Committee have indicated concerns with these smaller groups setting the export control standard in a way that is not always transparent. It will be through discussions in Euratom between regulators and the nuclear energy industry that the next step can be taken towards encouraging the industry to increase their responsibilities for nuclear nonproliferation. Additional Protocol The Additional Protocol is the recognized safety and verification standard in regards to weapons usable materials. Bilateral trade agreements for nuclear materials, with states who have not negotiated an additional protocol with the IAEA should be reconsidered. Additionally, there are current loopholes in the existing safeguards system which should be closed through an amendment of Annex II of the Additional Protocol. This amendment could, inter alia, deal with changes in technology, and the proliferation sensitivity in existing procurement practices. NPT states parties should agree to close current loopholes in the safeguards system through the negotiation of an amendment to Annex II of the Additional Protocol. Negotiating an amendment to Annex II of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) would need to take place in the IAEA directly. However the NPT Review Conference did note that the implementation of measures specified in the model additional protocol provides, in an effective and 26 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 36 13

efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. 27 The Conference also encouraged all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force. 28 Universalisation There has been discussion among some nuclear armed states (states who possess nuclear weapons but may not necessarily be part of the NPT regime) that maybe the time has come to start negotiating nuclear disarmament outside of an NPT framework, in a broader and more inclusive context. This also follows the UN Secretary General s Five Point Plan for disarmament, which states: All parties to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, especially the nuclear-weapon States, should fulfill its requirement to enter into negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which could focus on either a convention or framework of agreements banning nuclear-weapons. 29 The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non proliferation regime, but the time has come to build the foundations of a nuclear disarmament regime that can carry the original goal of the NPT the elimination of all nuclear weapons - to completion. NPT states parties should encourage ongoing discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. 30 Early drafts of the outcome document contained much stronger language about further negotiations for disarmament. An earlier draft suggested that based on the outcome of disarmament consultations the Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to convene an open-ended high-level meeting to take stock and agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including by means of a universal, legal instrument. 31 Peaceful Uses Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle An international authority must be established to control fissile materials. This body must hold final authority to regulate the fissile materials cycle- both civilian and military and the size of nuclear capacities. All existing enrichment and breeder conversion reactors and heavy water factories must be placed under the authority of this international authority. This includes factories and reprocessing facilities located in the nuclear weapon states. The authority will be authorized to grant production licenses to existing sites and, where needed, regulate the expansion of production capacity. It will also be authorized to work with the IAEA, that will serve as operator, to set up verification and security measures to prevent misuse of fissile materials. The manufacturers will remain accountable for the sound commercial operation of their business. Putting the nuclear fuel cycle under international control in this way will reduce proliferation 27 NPT/Conf.2010/50 (Vol. I), Para 17 28 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 28 29 http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2009/sgproposal.shtml 30 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 6 31 NPT/Conf.2010/CRP.2/Rev.1, Action 6 14

risks, while allowing for states who do not yet have an indigenous fuel cycle capacity to develop peaceful nuclear uses if they so choose. Mohamed ElBaradei, then director of the IAEA, argued in early 2008 for putting the entire fissile material cycle, including the monitoring and control of nuclear waste, under supranational supervision, so that no one country has the exclusive capability to produce the material for nuclear weapons. Ruud Lubbers, former Dutch prime minister, has lent his support to this call. He, and IKV Pax Christi urge that the IAEA like the European Atomic Energy Community be given a supranational status as legal owner of all the fissile material used for peaceful purposes. The IAEA is already in place as a regulatory body for some fissile materials for weapons use under agreements with nuclear weapons states. NPT states parties should agree to establish the IAEA as the international authority to control the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The Conference called on all States parties to Respect each country s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements 32 and did not agree to take further concrete measures to make the fuel cycle a multilateral one. However, the conference did agree to continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. 33 Middle East International Conference The NPT Review Conference should ask the UN Secretary General to convene a meeting of all states in the region to discuss the conditions necessary to negotiate an international and effectively verifiable treaty for the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. This conference should be required to report back to the UN General Assembly on its progress, and a secondary report should be sent by the UN Secretary General to the next meeting of NPT states parties. NPT states parties should agree to urge the UN Secretary General to convene a conference of all states in the region to discuss a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. Section IV of the Consensus Action Plan dealt exclusively with implementation of the 1995 Resolution on a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. The Conference agreed, as a practical step towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full 32 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 47 33 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Action 58 15

support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution 34 Special Coordinator The NPT Review Conference should give serious consideration to appointing a special coordinator, working from the UN Secretary General s office, who would be responsible for coordinating the international conference, consulting with states in the region and providing regular updates to the UN General Assembly on progress made. The NPT Review Conference should appoint a special coordinator to engage with states parties in the Middle East. States parties agreed that the Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings. 35 Strengthening the NPT Withdrawal from the Treaty (Article X) Currently, withdrawal from the treaty triggers UN Security Council action. This should be modified, so that the power to negotiate with states who are considering withdrawal is held by states in good standing with the treaty not only those in the UN Security Council where the recognized nuclear weapons states hold veto power. The Review Conference should decide that any invocation of Article X triggers an immediate meeting of NPT states parties, with decision making powers. There was no consensus on strengthening or in any way elaborating on Article X questions. Discussions about the issue were reflected in the Reporting section of the Final Document, under the President s authority. The President did report that numerous States were of the view that States parties should undertake consultations immediately, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives in case of a notice of withdrawal. Institution Building- shifting the meeting pattern The NPT Review Conference should seek to establish a new meeting pattern to reflect on the new spirit for disarmament. Replacing the current 14-day Preparatory Committee meetings with annual General Conferences of States parties lasting 7 days and reducing the Review Conference from 20 days to 10 days would afford greater continuity and focus to states parties. The total duration of meetings in a five-year cycle would thus be 12 days shorter than under the current process, which would yield budgetary savings 34 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section IV, Paragraph 7 (a) 35 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), Section IV, Paragraph 7 (b) 16