Dynamics of Conflict

Dynamics of Conflict

Ronald A. Francisco Dynamics of Conflict 123

Ronald A. Francisco Department of Political Science University of Kansas 1541 Lilac Lane Lawrence, KS 66044 USA ronfran@ku.edu ISBN 978-0-387-75241-9 e-isbn 978-0-387-75242-6 DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-75242-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008941246 c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed on acid-free paper springer.com

For my favorite mathematicians, Christopher and Cynthia

Acknowledgments This project is wholly dependent on data, so my first debt is to the institutions who provided the funds to code European and American data. The National Science Foundation (SBR-9631229), the University of Kansas General Research Fund and the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas were all important contributors to the data collecting effort. Equally as critical to the development of our data were the students who worked on the project. The original four graduate students did the needed basic technical work as well as coding: Phil Huxtable, Astrid Obst, Uwe Reising and William Yarrow. Later graduate students coded: David Brichoux, Federico Ferrara, Steve Garrison, Taehyan Nam and Alana Querze. In addition, several (then) undergraduates coded as well: Amanda Boatright, Aimee Cox, Ian Ostrander and Erin Simpson. See the project codebook for more information: http:\\web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html. Several colleagues have aided my effort in crucial ways. Paul Johnson provided invaluable help in virtually every aspect of the project, from estimation to formatting and bibliographic assistance. Erik Herron read the chapter on dictatorships and provided meaningful improvements. Philip Schrodt helped enormously in the early stages of data coding and with dynamic models. Michael Lynch in my department and Ted Juhl in economics helped to unravel knotty econometric problems. Mark Lichbach and Christian Davenport at the University of Maryland encouraged the data collection and this project and I am indebted to them. Two editors at Springer Verlag were critical to this project. Barbara Fess initiated the project and brought it to fruition while Jon Gurstelle saw it to completion. I thank both of them for their contributions. Our son, Christopher Francisco, helped me to render Chapter 1 mathematically correct. It was he also who provided the solution insights into lower and upper triangle mysteries in Jacobian matricies. I could not have done this on my own and remain in his debt. For over a decade my wife Deborah has been stalwart through time-consuming data collection efforts and this project. She is an able editor who has eased the plight of every reader, as she eases every day for me. I take responsibility for all errors contained in this volume. Lawrence, Kansas, USA Ronald A. Francisco vii

Contents 1 Introduction to the Problem Set... 1 1.1 Introduction......... 1 1.2 ASummaryofObjectives... 3 1.3 Model and Equilibrium Estimation........ 4 1.4 Model of Choice I: Lotka Volterra........ 5 1.5 Model of Choice II: The Competing Species Model..... 6 1.6 Model Identification......... 7 1.7 Dynamic Estimation......... 7 1.8 MathematicalOutcomesArisinginEstimation... 8 1.9 Institutional Theory......... 9 1.10 The Dynamics of Conflict.... 10 Bibliography... 10 2 The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression in Democratic Countries... 13 2.1 Introduction......... 13 2.2 Salient Differences Among Formal Theorists... 14 2.3 Assumptions... 14 2.4 Cases... 14 2.5 The Relationship Between Protest and Repression in Differing Contexts... 15 2.5.1 When Does Protest Generate Repression?....... 15 2.5.2 When Do Protest and Repression Interactively Accelerate EachOther?... 15 2.5.3 What Happens When Repression Is Absent?..... 16 2.6 Analytic Results in Democratic Countries...... 16 2.7 Survey of the West European Democracies and Illinois...... 27 2.8 Discussion... 30 Bibliography... 31 ix

x Contents 3 The Dynamics of Protest and Repression in Dictatorships and Democratic Transitions... 33 3.1 Introduction......... 33 3.2 CasesandtheContextofDictatorship... 34 3.2.1 Mobilization Under Dictatorship and Harsh Repression...... 34 3.2.2 What Happens to Repression When Mobilization Grows to a High Magnitude?...... 35 3.3 EmpiricalResultsonDictatorshipPeriods... 36 3.4 Empirical Results from Transition Periods...... 43 3.5 Conclusion.......... 48 Bibliography... 49 4 Varied Dynamics of Bandwagon Mobilization... 51 4.1 Introduction......... 51 4.2 Cases... 52 4.3 Results... 53 4.4 Discussion... 62 Bibliography... 64 5 Dynamics and Stability in Civil Wars... 65 5.1 Introduction......... 65 5.2 TheCases... 67 5.3 TheData... 69 5.4 Models...... 70 5.5 Results... 71 5.6 Discussion... 76 Bibliography... 78 6 Conclusion: Stability in Conflict... 81 6.1 Stability is the Norm......... 81 6.2 VarietiesofRepressioninDemocraciesandDictatorships... 82 6.3 Convergence in Estimations... 84 6.4 CorrectionofTime-SeriesPathologies... 84 6.5 WhenRepressionisAbsentorRare... 84 6.6 What Have We Learned?..... 85 Bibliography... 85 Index... 87