Climate Change Policy After Copenhagen

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Climate Change Policy After Copenhagen Robert N. Stavins Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements IAEE/AEA Joint Session Climate Policy for a Post-Kyoto World ASSA Meetings, January 3, 2010 Atlanta, Georgia The Global Climate Policy Challenge Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005, with first commitment period, 2008-2012 Even if the United States had participated, the Protocol s direct effects on climate change would be very small to non-existent Science and economics point to need for a credible international approach Climate change is a classic global commons problem so it calls for international cooperation 2 1

Can the Kyoto Protocol Provide the Way Forward? The Kyoto Protocol has been criticized because: The costs are much greater than need be, due to exclusion of most countries, including key emerging economies China, India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Mexico (conservative estimate: costs are four times cost-effective level) The Protocol will generate trivial climate benefits, and fails to provide any longterm solution Short-term targets are excessively ambitious for some countries So, the Kyoto Protocol is too little, too fast Nevertheless, can structure of the Kyoto Protocol provide the way forward? 3 Searching for the Path Forward for Post-2012 The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Mission: To help identify key design elements of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic post-2012 international policy architecture for global climate change Drawing upon research & ideas from leading thinkers around the world from: Academia (economics, political science, law, international relations) Private industry NGOs Governments 4 2

Developing Insights for Post-2012 Climate Regime 35 research initiatives in Europe, United States, China, India, Japan, & Australia Outreach with governments, NGOs, and business leaders throughout the world (working with heads of governments & ministers in many countries) Summary for Policymakers builds upon lessons emerging from research initiatives Key principles for a new international agreement Promising global climate policy architectures Key design issues and elements 5 Potential Global Climate Policy Architectures Harvard Project does not endorse a single approach Decision to adopt particular architecture is ultimately political, and must be reached by nations of the world, taking into account complex factors Promising policy architectures under three categories Targets & Timetables (as in Kyoto Protocol) Formulas for Evolving Emission Targets for All Countries Harmonized National Policies Harmonized Domestic Carbon Taxes, Cap-and-Trade, or Other Regulations Independent National Policies Portfolio of Domestic Commitments Linkage of National & Regional Tradable Permit Systems 6 3

Portfolio of Domestic Commitments Each participating nation registers to abide by its domestic climate commitments Australia, EU, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and U.S. announced domestic commitments or plans prior to Copenhagen (December 2009) Support for Portfolio (or Schedules) Approach prior to Copenhagen from a diverse set of counties, including Australia, India, and the United States But can this bring about sufficient stringency? An effective bridge to further steps? 7 Linkage of National & Regional Tradable Permit Systems Cap-and-trade systems are preferred approach in many countries and regions Linking these cap-and-trade systems reduces overall costs, market power, and price volatility But linking causes automatic propagation of cost-containmentcontainment design elements: banking, borrowing, and safety valve Therefore, advance harmonization required The Emerging International Regime If cap-and-trade systems link with common emissionreduction-credit system, such as CDM, the cap-and-trade systems are indirectly linked All the benefits of linking are achieved cost savings, etc. But propagation of design elements across systems greatly diminished May be evolving as part of de facto post-kyoto architecture 8 4

Placing Copenhagen in Perspective Cliché about baseball season applies to international climate change policy: it s a marathon, not a sprint Scientifically: stock, not flow environmental problem Economically: cost-effective path is gradual ramp-up in target severity (to avoid unnecessary capital-stock obsolescence) Economically: technological change is key, hence long-term price signals Administratively: creation of appropriate international institutions is essential International climate negotiations i will be an ongoing process much like trade talks not a single task with a clear end-point. Bottom-Line: sensible goal for Copenhagen was progress on sound foundation for meaningful long-term action, not some notion of immediate success 9 Definitions of success at COP-15 It would have been possible, even easy but actually unfortunate to achieve what some people would have defined as success in Copenhagen: A signed dinternational i agreement, glowing press releases, & photo opportunities i Such an agreement could only have been the Kyoto Protocol on Steroids More stringent Annex I targets, & no meaningful action by key developing countries Signature but no ratification by U.S. (just like Kyoto) No real progress on climate change Remarkably, some groups would actually have applauded such a step Fortunately, some key nations including the United States were more interested in real progress than symbolic action 10 5

What were reasonable hopes for COP-15? Political agreement on some key principals underlying next architecture, such as making common but differentiated responsibilities meaningful through All countries recognize their historic emissions; and all countries responsible for their future emissions. Vast improvement over QWERTY keyboard of international climate negotiations: Annex I dichotomous distinction Replace the Annex I dichotomy with a continuous spectrum of participation Bring all important countries under the umbrella of action Political agreement on a Portfolio of Domestic Commitments Including the EU, the United States, and the key emerging economies So, what happened in Copenhagen? 11 What happened in Copenhagen? Organizational failure Political grandstanding & lack of consensus But last-minute, direct negotiations among key national leaders President Obama with leaders of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa Virtually unprecedented in international negotiations Saved COP-15 from complete collapse Produced a significant political framework, the Copenhagen Accord Accord is a portfolio of domestic commitments approach Addresses two key deficiencies of Kyoto Protocol: (1) expands coalition of meaningful commitments to include all major emitters; and (2) extends timeframe of action 12 6

The Copenhagen Accord The good news Provides for real cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by all major emitters Establishes a transparent framework for evaluating countries performance against their commitments Initiates a flow of resources to help poor, vulnerable nations carry out both mitigation and adaptation The bad news Announced commitments not sufficient; uncertainty regarding future Annex I/non-Annex I distinction remains, in words (but blurred in action) Future of UNFCCC threatened; G-77 spent as a unified force (bad news?) 13 Another Consequence of Copenhagen: Reflecting on the Institutional Path Forward Copenhagen illustrated problems with process under United Nations (Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC) Size: 197 countries, when 20 account for about 90% of global emissions UN culture polarizes factions: industrialized vs developing world UNFCCC voting rule: unanimity required Lack of consensus behind Copenhagen Accord due to just 5 countries (not major emitters), and their accusations of undemocratic procedures: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Venezuela Problematic leadership (substantively and administratively) 14 7

Alternative Institutional Venues Going Forward Major Economies Forum accounts for 90% of global emissions; initiated and led by U.S. Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States G20 finance ministers; since 1999; have met on climate change Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States Other multilateral; bilateral, including China-U.S. UNFCCC too soon for obituaries Kyoto Protocol continues at least through 2012; CDM, annual reporting functions likely to continue Substantial constituency International legitimacy, and potentially key for implementation 15 The Way Forward: Research Active areas of work by Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements research teams Metrics for evaluating commitments; compliance mechanisms Afforestation & deforestation policy mechanisms Facilitating international market linkage Fostering technology transfer Methods of negotiating & updating agreements Incentives for developing country participation; carbon finance Making climate policy compatible with international trade rules Climate and cost implications of alternative architectures & designs Institutional venues for international climate policy 16 8

For More Information Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements www.belfercenter.org/climate Harvard Environmental Economics Program www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/heep/ www.stavins.com Appendix U.S. Policy Action and the International Process 9

Core of Anticipated U.S. Action: Economy-wide Cap-and-Trade System Meaningful legislation (HR 2454/Waxman-Markey) with cap-and- trade passed by House in June by small margin Senate action Boxer-Kerry and other bills Politics difficult: 60 of 100 votes required Bi-partisan opposition (coal & rural states) Major substantive issues remain Ambition, allocation, offsets, cost-containment mechanisms, international competition protection, regulatory oversight, nuclear power provisions, offshore oil & gas provisions 19 Other Important U.S. Climate Policy Developments Carbon Tax some real interest and some phony interest Cap & Dividend CLEAR Act (Sen. Cantwell) Stimulus Package $80 billion for renewables and energy-efficiency Automobile and Appliance Energy Efficiency Standards Court-Ordered Regulation under the Clean Air Act U.S. Supreme Court decision & Obama endangerment finding Regulation would be ineffective and costly but will it force hand of Congress? 20 10

U.S. Political Timing: A Challenge for the International Process Relatively new administration Recession (and unemployment) Other U.S. domestic policy priorities: health care and financial regulation Public perceptions Congressional deliberation, difficult politics, and challenging numbers U.S. mid-term elections (November, 2010) can work against bipartisanship, and make it more difficult to vote to raise energy prices 21 11