DEC XIX.JUNE 12-14,2013.

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Transcription:

DEC XIX.JUNE 12-14,2013. H.Wagner History of European Integration Comment by Oleh Havrylyshyn.. > IS TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO MARKET THE SAME AS CONVERGENCE? 1

From Socialism to Market in 20 years.success! - 2

WHAT I LIKE ABOUT PAPER MOST NOVEL: FOCUS NOT ON gdp/cap, OR macro stability AS PER OCA OPTIMALITY--BUT ON INST. EVOLUTION ( call it SYSTEM CONVERGENCE?) DIFFERENTIATES COUNTRIES BY DEGREE OF INTEGRATION : EZ member;eu Accession; candidacy; potential candidacy ; good neighbours THIS IS BETTER WAY TO INVESTIGATE NEW OCA ENDOGENEITY THESIS: THAT ADVANCE EU ENTRY MOTIVATES FASTER CATCH-UP, because -- as I infer Wagner hypothesizes,good INST BASIS FOR GOOD MACRO POLICIES, AND GOOD gdp PERFORMANCE Evidence of this hypothesis seen in Next slide.. 3

Institutional reform principal component CORRELATION OF GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT [from EBRD Figure 3. Growth Transition and Institutional Report, Reforms 2000] 2,0 CZE 1,5 EST HUN POL 1,0 0,5 0,0 MOL ARM LAT RUS LIT BUL ROM CRO SLK SLA -0,5-1,0 UKR GEO KAZ KYR BLR ALB -1,5 TAJ TUR AZE UZB -2,0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1998 GDP (Index 1990=100) 4

WHAT I DON T LIKE ABOUT PAPER...?? Tried and failed here. SORRY 5

WHAT I THINK COULD BE RECONSIDERED/ADDED/REVISED 1. ALMOST ALL SAMPLE TRANSITION COUNTRIES! IS THERE AN EFFECT SEPARATE FROM EU STATUS? i.e.- reform commitment varies 2. EXPLAIN MORE ON WHY BEST-PERFORMING NOT IMPROVED FURTHER (slide 16) 3. MANY CLEAR POLICY IMPLICATIONS, BUT SOMEWHAT JUMBLED : WHAT EU SHOULD DO, WHAT COUNTRY SHOULD (OR SHOULD NOT )DO, SAFER TO WAIT FOR EZ ENTRY, POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION IMPORTANT,ONE DEPENDS ON THE OTHER, AND SO ON. 6

1.REFORM COMMITMENT EXOGENOUS? TRANSITION LIT. ( esp. POLSCI)SHOWS INHERENT REFORM COMMITMENT DIFFERS (CE& BALT more committed than CIS, in latter 3-4 like BEL,TKM, virtually no commitment ) MANY CASES OF COMMITMENT WITHOUT /OR BEFORE EU PROSPECT ( Balt. < 95 Assoc Agree; CRO even longer; SVK, BG sharp change after elections 97-98) ABOVE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS ON EBRD REFORMS: COUNTRIES DOING MACRO STAB, AND LIB. REFORMS EARLY, WERE ALSO THE FASTEST ON INST. REFORM ( the EBRD 2 nd, generation reforms) NEXT SLIDE THE LAST FACT ALSO SUPPORTS WAGNER S UNDERLYING HYP. THAT GOOD INSTITUTIONS,GOOD POLICY, GOOD PERFORMANCE ALL PART OF SAME PACKAGE OF SYSTEM CONVERGENCE 7

EBRD Transition Progress Index Liberalization (LIB) Institutions (INST) 1994 1999 2005 Central Europe LIB 3.7 4.2 4.3 INST 2.7 3.1 3.3 Baltics LIB 3.7 4.1 4.3 INST 2.3 2.9 3.2 S.E. Europe 1/ LIB 3.0 (n.a) 4.0 (3.9) 4.1 (4.0) INST 1.7 (n.a) 2.2 (1.9) 2.5 (2.3) CISM LIB 2.2 3.7 3.9 INST 1.4 2.1 2.2 CISL LIB 1.9 2.0 2.3 INST 1.4 1.6 1.5 8

2. BEST NOT IMPROVED FURTHER AN INTERESTING QUESTION ; LIT. OFTEN NOTES NEW MEMBERS SLOW DOWN AFTER ENTRY WAGNER SAYS THIS TOO. BUTCOULD THERE BE OTHER EXPLANATIONS? Some institutions take more time, are technically, legally and politically more difficult How is speed measured? Virtually all metrics of INSTQUAL are asymptotic curves either by definition or in practice ; 1 st difference may not be right measure ( Roncza and Cizkowicz,2003)-one alternative: % change of absolute distance from asymptote This + my slide 8-- may help understand some of uncertainty of Wald tests( Wagner #20) 9

3. SORT OUT POLICY LESSONS.a EASY TO CRITICIZE, HARDER TO DO. EACH OF POLICY PROPOSALS SENSIBLE, BUT TOO MANY WITHOUT CLEAR PRIORITY, SEQUENCE, LINKS. PERHAPS END THIS PAPER AT CONCLUSIONS FROM EVIDENCE? DO A SEPARATE PAPER ON FEASIBLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES? first best, second bests, doable by some not others 10

3.SORT OUT POLICY LESSONS. b I infer Wagner considers 1 st Best for EU to fix architecture so entrants not tempted to act irresponsibly BUT if EU does not 2 nd Best is then to delay EZ entry. OK makes sense, but he recognizes many countries HAVE been able to resist the temptation even after EZ ( EST,SVK, FIN, AUS) The alternative, to avoid temptation, he tantalizingly dangles on #27 : will Croatia be like Finland..?-- Surely this deserves more analysis i.e. what are conditions leading to self-discipline? 11

12

and THE REWARD FOR SELF-DISCIPLINE AT DEC the post-dec DECK!! 13