Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties

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Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties Brian Burgoon University of Amsterdam 4 June, 2013 Final GINI conference

Net Gini score. (post-tax post-transfer inequality) 38 36 34 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 Sweden Norway 1980 2007 Denmark Belgium Finland Netherlands Luxembourgh France Germany Ireland Spain Canada New Zealand Australia Italy United Kingdom Portugal United States

Does domestic income inequality affect anti-globalization backlash among political parties? Income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) - / Ø / + Antiglobalization Backlash

Does domestic income inequality affect anti-globalization backlash among political parties? Income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) - / Ø / + Antiglobalization Backlash + Ex ante openness (e.g. Trade, investment, migration flows)

Does domestic income inequality affect anti-globalization backlash among political parties? Income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) - / Ø / + Antiglobalization Backlash

Hypothesis 1: Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark scapegoating of out-groups that includes anti-globalization position-taking among political parties. Net income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) Subjective economic risk among voters (e.g. Self-interested or Sociotropic concern about + + + + economic position) + Partisan blameavoidance and scapegoating + Distrust national political institutions more than international institutions + - Antiglobalization Backlash among parties

Hypothesis 2a: Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Left political parties than among non-left parties. Hypothesis 2b: Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Right political parties compared to non-right parties. Net income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) - / Ø / + Antiglobalization Backlash Predominance of economic rather than cultural voting + - + Left partisanship /identity of a political party

Hypothesis 3a: Pre-tax, pre-transfer income inequality should, all other things equal, spark less anti-globalization position-taking to the extent that tax-transfer social policies and taxation systems are generous and redistributive. Pre-tax pretransfer Income inequality (e.g. Pre- or post-taxtransfer Gini score) - / Ø / + - Antiglobalization Backlash Social policy generosity and redistributive orientation

Hypothesis 3b: Greater redistribution, as shown by the difference between preand post-tax-and-transfer income inequality, should, all other things equal, diminish anti-globalization position-taking. Redistribution Gross - Net income inequality Subjective economic risk among voters (e.g. Self-interested or - Sociotropic concern about + - - economic position) + Partisan blameavoidance and scapegoating + Distrust national political institutions more than international + - Antiglobalization Backlash among parties

Party Manifestos (22 countries, 1960-2008): Anti-globalization position-taking (+) per406 Protectionism: Positive Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions. (-) per407 Protectionism: Negative Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative. (-) per107 Internationalism: Positive Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN. (+) per109 Internationalism: Negative Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative. (-) per108 European Community: Positive Favourable mentions of European Community/European Union in general; desirability of expanding the European Community/European Union and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member. (+) per110 European Community: Negative Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative. Net anti-globalization (broad) =(per109+ per406+per110) - (per107+ per407+per108)

Figure One: Anti-globalization positions (national distributions, 2000-2008) Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States LPA (Liberal Party) ÖVP (People's Party) PS (Francophone Socialists) LP (Liberal Party) SF(Soc.People's Party) RKP/SFP (Sw. People's Party) PS (Socialist Party) Greens ND (New Democracy) VGF (Left Greens) LP (Labour Party) DS (Democrats of the Left) JSP (Socialist Party) PvdA (Labour Party) LP (Labour Party) SV (Soc. Left Party) PSD (Soc. Dem. Party) EA (Basque Solidarity) Green Ecology Party SPS/PSS (Soc. Dem. Party) LDP (Liberal Dem. Party) Democratic Party NPA (National Party) FPÖ (Freedom Movement) VLD (Flemish Lib.and Dem.) NDP (New Democratic Party) DF (People's Party) PS (True Finns) FN (National Front) CDU/CSU KKE (Communist Party) Samfylkingin Alliance Sinn Fein Ourselves AN (National Alliance) JCP (Communist Party) LN (Livable Netherlands) Green Party of Aortearoa FrP (Progress Party) CDU (Unified Dem.Coalition) PAR (Aragonese Regionalist Party) CP (Center Party) SVP/UDC (People's Party) DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) Republican Party -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Net anti-globalization score (narrow) (party-system mean, 2000-8)

50 60 70 80 United States Netherlands United Kingdom Sweden Norway Austria Germany Spain Switzerland Canada Denmark Belgium Luxembourg Finland Italy New Zealand Australia Portugal France Greece Iceland Ireland -6-4 -2 0 Net anti-globalization score (sample average)

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark 20 25 30 35 40 20 25 30 35 40-15-10-5 0 5-15-10-5 0 5 20 25 30 35 40-15-10-5 0 5-15-10-5 0 5 20 25 30 35 40-15-10-5 0 5 20 25 30 35 40 Finland France Germany Great Britain Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden 1960 1980 2000 2020 1960 1980 2000 2020 1960 1980 2000 2020 Switzerland United States 1960 1980 2000 2020 1960 1980 2000 2020 year Net anti-globalization (mean) Net gini score (post-tax-transfer ineq.)

Figure Two: Anti-globalization positions and Income Inequality (national means, 1980-2008) -8-6 -4-2 0 Finland Sweden Denmark Austria Luxembourg Belgium Norway Netherlands Germany Australia France Switzerland Canada Japan Spain Greece New Zealand Portugal Ireland Great Britain Italy United States 20 25 30 35 Net Gini score (Post tax-transfer inequality), Sample average (1980-2008)

Appendix: Summary Statistics Variable name Obs. Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Net protection 1481 0.148 1.315-8.5 27.9 Net anti-internationalism 1481-2.345 3.264-26.829 42.631 Net anti-eu 1481-0.984 2.881-25.698 32.500 Net anti-globalization (narrow) 1481-2.198 3.501-21.951 42.758 Net anti-globalization (broad) 1481-3.182 4.795-28.492 40.291 Gini index (post-tax post-transfer) 1481 27.937 4.105 19.7 37.24769 Nationalist-right 1481 0.057 0.231 0 1 Conservative 1481 0.146 0.353 0 1 Liberal 1481 0.131 0.338 0 1 Christian Democratic 1481 0.122 0.328 0 1 Social Democratic 1481 0.232 0.422 0 1 Green 1481 0.053 0.225 0 1 (Former) Communist 1481 0.127 0.333 0 1 Trade openness t-1 1478 64.895 33.976 9.309 238.561 Social transfers t-1 1481 13.575 4.262 3.7 27.286 Unemployment t-1 1477 6.503 4.470 0.084 22.964 GDP Growth t-1 1481 2.826 2.184-3.9 12.8 Dependent population t-1 1481 0.341 0.023 0.300 0.424 Seats t-1 1479 0.168 0.172 0 0.748 Women in Parliament t-1 1481 16.806 11.770 0 47.3 Effective number of parties t-1 1481 4.524 1.662 1.967 10.289 Service employment t-1 1481 0.605 0.096 0.362 0.795 Percent uncoded 1481 11.824 23.384 0 99 Total sentences (log) 1481 5.689 1.271 2.485 9.210 Year 1481 1987.353 11.925 1961 2008 Gini uncertainty 1481 0.634 0.691 0.008 9.834

Table One: Net anti-globalization position-taking and Net Income Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Net anti-eu Net trade protection Net antiint lsm Anti-glob. Narrow (1)+(2) Anti-glob. Broad (1)+(2)+(3) Anti-glob. Broad (1)+(2)+(3) Gini index 0.067** 0.026* 0.116*** 0.157*** 0.221*** 0.179*** (post-tax post-transfer) (0.031) (0.014) (0.037) (0.040) (0.052) (0.062) Nationalist-right 1.338*** 0.215 0.932** 1.167*** 2.508*** 2.108*** (0.337) (0.167) (0.388) (0.412) (0.556) (0.584) Conservative -1.056*** -0.234* -0.218-0.429-1.533*** -1.854*** (0.273) (0.137) (0.313) (0.333) (0.451) (0.541) Liberal -1.302*** -0.254** -1.089*** -1.293*** -2.624*** -3.187*** (0.259) (0.129) (0.298) (0.316) (0.428) (0.473) Christian Democratic -1.145*** -0.043-1.240*** -1.258*** -2.420*** -2.912*** (0.281) (0.140) (0.323) (0.343) (0.464) (0.512) Social Democratic -0.785*** 0.020-1.157*** -1.117*** -1.925*** -2.364*** (0.250) (0.125) (0.288) (0.306) (0.414) (0.497) Green 0.380-0.099-1.837*** -1.927*** -1.553*** -2.077*** (0.351) (0.175) (0.403) (0.429) (0.579) (0.629) (Former) Communist 1.375*** 0.045-0.149-0.085 1.282*** 0.876* (0.268) (0.133) (0.308) (0.328) (0.443) (0.487) Log-likelihood -3446.5-2430.4-3652.7-3744.6-4185.3-3406.2 Observations 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,190 Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 17 All models: Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure Two: Anti-globalization positions and Income Inequality (predicted values) 0-1 10th % 50th % 90th % Net anti-globalization score (broad) -2-3 -4-5 -6-7 15 20 25 30 35 40 Gini index score (Post-tax post-transfer)

Table Two: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Inequality-Partisanship interaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Gini index 0.225*** 0.178*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.227*** 0.210*** 0.205*** 0.221*** 0.196*** (post-tax post-transfer) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.067) Nationalist-right 5.462 (3.514) Conservative -5.149** (2.369) Liberal -3.037 (2.427) Christian Democratic -1.183 (2.408) Social Democratic 1.228 (1.936) Green 1.390 (3.479) (Former) Communist 1.916 (2.246) Left parties (Soc.Dem., Green, Communist) 1.612 Right partisanship (L-R) -0.077* Gini Party measure. -0.072 0.174** 0.047-0.010-0.072-0.081 0.023-0.037 0.003** (0.126) (0.082) (0.089) (0.086) (0.068) (0.126) (0.079) (0.059) (0.002) Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad) All models: All non-partisan controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown). Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (1.611) (0.043)

Importance of economic factors in voting on parties* 0.2 Explanatory power of. economic opinions on partisanship 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 Ireland Germany Austria Belgium Switzerland Norway France Great Britain Italy Netherlands Finland Denmark Sweden Source: Henjak 2010 * Pseudo-R-squares for explanatory power of economic issues (government versus individual responsibility for economic fortures; value of competition; regulation of firms) in multinomial logit models of party choices of EVS/WVS respondents

Appendix Five: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) as a function of Economic-voting system, Partisanship, and Inequality Gini index (post-tax post-transfer) Nationalist-right Conservative Liberal Christian Democratic Social Democratic Green (Former) Communist Left (SocDem,Green, Comm.) Right partisanship (L-R) Economic-voting system. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 0.193*** 0.155** 0.209*** 0.185** 0.169** 0.182** 0.175** 0.159** 0.166** -0.075 (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.080) (0.075) 3.344 (3.977) -6.995* (4.086) 3.456 (3.090) -0.144 (3.194) -2.152 (2.919) -2.591 (4.887) 2.582 (3.604) -1.698 (2.476) 10.440 10.645 14.272 9.962 8.866 8.234 6.539 4.539 9.374-0.044 (0.055) (8.711) (8.964) (8.864) (8.774) (8.775) (9.014) (8.913) (9.010) (9.112) Gini Party measure. -0.033 0.236* -0.130-0.026 0.023 0.010-0.054 0.020 0.004** (0.137) (0.132) (0.109) (0.112) (0.100) (0.171) (0.118) (0.084) (0.002) Gini Party measure. Economic-voting system Constant 0.766** -0.031-0.876*** -0.377 0.113 1.374** 0.414 0.63*** -0.017*** (0.385) (0.362) (0.248) (0.330) (0.261) (0.597) (0.300) (0.215) (0.004) 121.03*** 108.7*** 117.7*** 104.5*** 112.5*** 106.7*** 104.97*** 104.*** 111.33*** (27.394) (28.023) (27.651) (27.930) (27.963) (28.244) (27.737) (27.986) (27.686) Observations 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 Number of countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 All models: All non-partisan controls not shown. Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table Three: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Social policy Redistribution (1) (2) (3) (4) Gini index 0.200** 0.198** 0.175*** (pre-tax pre-transfer) (0.088) (0.099) (0.062) Social transfers t-1 0.446* (0.258) Gini Social transfers -0.013** (0.006) UI+ALMP t-1 2.495** (1.244) Gini UIALMP -0.064** (0.028) Vocational trainees t-1 0.183** (0.080) Gini Vocational trainees -0.006*** (0.002) Redistribution t-1-0.065*** (Reduction in Gross Gini) (0.025) Observations 1,472 832 1,239 1,136 Number of groups 22 22 19 21 Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad) All models: All non-social-policy controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown). Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure Three: How Social-security transfers reduce the effect of Gross Inequality on Anti-globalization -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Mean of Social-security transfers Kernel Density Estimate of Soc.-sec.transfers 0.02.04.06.08.1 5 10 15 20 25 30 Social-security transfers (t-1) (%GDP) Thick dashed lines give 90% confidence interval. Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of social-security transfers

Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties Brian Burgoon University of Amsterdam 4 June, 2013 Final GINI conference

Table One: Net anti-globalization position-taking and Net Income Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Net anti-eu Net trade protection Net antiint lsm Anti-glob. Narrow (1)+(2) Anti-glob. Broad (1)+(2)+(3) Anti-glob. Broad (1)+(2)+(3) Gini index 0.067** 0.026* 0.116*** 0.157*** 0.221*** 0.179*** (post-tax post-transfer) (0.031) (0.014) (0.037) (0.040) (0.052) (0.062) Nationalist-right 1.338*** 0.215 0.932** 1.167*** 2.508*** 2.108*** (0.337) (0.167) (0.388) (0.412) (0.556) (0.584) Conservative -1.056*** -0.234* -0.218-0.429-1.533*** -1.854*** (0.273) (0.137) (0.313) (0.333) (0.451) (0.541) Liberal -1.302*** -0.254** -1.089*** -1.293*** -2.624*** -3.187*** (0.259) (0.129) (0.298) (0.316) (0.428) (0.473) Christian Democratic -1.145*** -0.043-1.240*** -1.258*** -2.420*** -2.912*** (0.281) (0.140) (0.323) (0.343) (0.464) (0.512) Social Democratic -0.785*** 0.020-1.157*** -1.117*** -1.925*** -2.364*** (0.250) (0.125) (0.288) (0.306) (0.414) (0.497) Green 0.380-0.099-1.837*** -1.927*** -1.553*** -2.077*** (0.351) (0.175) (0.403) (0.429) (0.579) (0.629) (Former) Communist 1.375*** 0.045-0.149-0.085 1.282*** 0.876* (0.268) (0.133) (0.308) (0.328) (0.443) (0.487) Trade openness t-1 0.000-0.002 0.015** 0.011 0.013 0.009 (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) Social transfers t-1 0.002-0.000-0.036-0.031-0.019-0.031 (0.029) (0.014) (0.035) (0.037) (0.049) (0.054) Unemployment t-1-0.091*** -0.013 0.053 0.023-0.052-0.071 (0.027) (0.012) (0.032) (0.035) (0.045) (0.048) GDP Growth t-1 0.053 0.025-0.015 0.008 0.059-0.018 (0.036) (0.018) (0.041) (0.044) (0.059) (0.070) Dependent population t-1-1.001 5.625*** 8.423 15.426*** 12.099 9.817 (4.619) (2.109) (5.527) (5.943) (7.753) (8.943) Seats t-1-0.447-0.736*** -0.179-0.861-1.341-1.168 (0.496) (0.248) (0.569) (0.605) (0.819) (1.033) Women in Parliamentt-1-0.020-0.015*** 0.001-0.010-0.035-0.056** (0.014) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) Effective number of partiest-1-0.084 0.011-0.240** -0.241** -0.258* -0.149 (0.080) (0.034) (0.099) (0.107) (0.136) (0.147) Service employmentt-1 5.807** 2.253** 1.456 8.377** 8.032* 1.726 (2.464) (0.912) (3.402) (3.841) (4.355) (5.147) Percent uncoded 0.002-0.002 0.012** 0.012** 0.012* 0.017** (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) Total sentences (log) -0.321*** -0.085** -0.341*** -0.416*** -0.739*** -0.779*** (0.076) (0.036) (0.089) (0.095) (0.126) (0.144) Year -0.023-0.008-0.028-0.065** -0.054 0.012 (0.019) (0.008) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.038) Gini uncertainty -0.110-0.072-0.300** -0.387*** -0.498** -0.514** (0.121) (0.059) (0.140) (0.149) (0.200) (0.212) Constant 42.709 12.255 48.269 117.104** 94.930-28.665 (36.801) (15.575) (47.695) (52.938) (63.421) (73.577) Log-likelihood -3446.5-2430.4-3652.7-3744.6-4185.3-3406.2 Observations 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,190 Number of groups 22 22 22 22 22 17 All models: Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-4-2 0 2 Net protectionism Net anti-eu Net anti-internationalism Net anti-globalization composite (broad) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010