Rainer Thiel. Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion

Rainer Thiel Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion

Rainer Thiel Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion The United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980 1989

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Zugl. Dissertation an der Freien Universität Berlin, 2009 1st Edition 2010 All rights reserved VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2010 Editorial Office: Dorothee Koch / Tanja Köhler VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is a brand of Springer Fachmedien. Springer Fachmedien is part of Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Print and binding: STRAUSS GMBH, Mörlenbach Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-531-17769-4

Acknowledgements This publication is a revised version of the PhD dissertation that I submitted at the Freie Universität Berlin in February 2008 and defended in June 2009. I gratefully acknowledge financial support received in the form of a PhD scholarship from the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (German National Academic Foundation), which also covered my research in the United States. In Berlin, most of all I would like to thank my supervisor Eberhard Sandschneider. Even though he was at the time on leave from the Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science, he encouraged me to pursue my dissertation and gave me the opportunity to complete my thesis. Over the course of years, his great enthusiasm and trust in my capacity and skills were constant motivators which, as the life of a Stipendiat, has its particular meaningfulness. During his time at Heidelberg University, Wolfgang Merkel kindly accepted the role of my second supervisor, and eventually became an external member of my PhD commission (from Humboldt University Berlin). His critical remarks were much appreciated, and his truly supportive and pleasant manner facilitated this thesis completion to a large degree. The dissertation profited from the invaluable comments by Dirk Leuffen. He not only commented on large parts of the thesis, but helped shape and formulate the ultimate research design my most sincere thanks. I owe many thanks to Thomas Sattler for commenting on the design of my model and to Manuel Schmitz for proof-reading key sections and providing an anchor to the nonformal world of political science. Without Stefan Petri s excellent coaching, this lengthy enterprise might not have proceeded as smoothly as it had. His time management consulting and coaching support were of immense significance, especially considering the degree of freedom both my supervisor Eberhard Sandschneider and the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes granted me. Helpful were the comments of the discussants at the research colloquium of Wolfgang Merkel at Heidelberg University, the participants in three PhD colloquia of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, and in the postgraduate Conference on Central and Eastern Europe, University College London. In Washington, D.C., I am grateful for the assistance and comments of the following individuals: to Helga Flores-Trejo, for hosting me as guest researcher at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, special thanks; to Thomas Carothers from the

6 Acknowledgments Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for sharing with me some of his unmatched knowledge about democracy promotion; to Carl Gershman from the National Endowment for Democracy for providing me with internal documents; to Marc Plattner, Michael Szporer, Michael Domber, and Vojtech Mastny for lengthy discussions about democracy and Poland; and finally to Zerxes Spencer for having made my stay in Washington, D.C., as always, a real pleasure. Radek Sikorski recommended that I read Nathan Sharonski s book about how he survived psycho-torturing KGB interrogations by applying game theory in his mind. This book truly inspired the pursuit of this thesis, both theoretically and historically. Arch Puddington provided me with a personal copy of his then unpublished biography about Lane Kirkland; Ronald Bachman at the US Library of Congress offered excellent research guidance on Poland. I am much obliged to Ambassador John R. Davis Jr for having received me for an interview at his home in Charlottesville, VA. During the final draft, the Europa Library at the University of Edinburgh provided me with an outstanding workspace. Much of the reasoning behind this book emerged into a full picture in Edinburgh. I also wish to thank my interviewees for their interest in my research topic, for providing me with documents and sharing their insights with me. Yet I alone am responsible for any errors of fact and of the opinions expressed herefrom. My wife Ana did not only read the entire manuscript, safeguarding a spotless text, and improving my English, but she also deserves the sole credit for this work having ultimately come to completion. Without her unlimited support and energy this lengthy and, at times, troublesome enterprise could have taken a very different road. Words are not sufficient to express my gratitude. My sincere and special thanks finally goes to my father, Richard Thiel, without whom neither my entire studies nor the idea and realisation of this work would have been possible. This book is devoted to them both. Rainer Thiel Bonn, January 2010

Contents List of Figures and Tables...13 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms...15 1 Regime Transitions and External Democracy Promotion...17 1.1 Research Design and Summary of the Argument...18 1.2 The Nested Games Model...21 1.3 Central Contribution...26 1.4 Outline...33 2 The International Dimension of Regime Change...35 2.1 Domestic Causes of Regime Transitions...36 2.2 International Framework...39 2.2.1 The Internationalist Argument...40 2.2.2 Outside Conditions: Diffusion Effects, Contagion and Socialization...43 2.3 External Democracy Promotion...45 2.3.1 Strategies, Instruments and Targets...45 2.3.2 Democracy Promotion versus Democracy Protection...50 2.4 Quantifying International Factors...52 2.5 Democratization and International Relations Theories...54 2.5.1 International Organizations and Domestic Politics...54 2.5.2 Uncertainty and Crises: Deterring Authoritarian Repression...58

8 Contents 3 Strategic Transitions...63 3.1 The Positional School...64 3.1.1 Transition Politics as Rational Choice...64 3.1.2 Formal Theories of Democratization...68 3.1.3 A Question of Life and Death? Uncertainty about Government Repression...74 3.2 Transitions as Distributional Conflict: The Economic School...78 3.3 Rationality and Democratization Actors...80 3.3.1 Why Game Theory?...80 3.3.2 Rationality and its Critiques...83 3.3.3 Limitations...86 4 Nested Games of External Influence on Strategic Regime Transition...91 4.1 Modeling the International Dimension...92 4.1.1 Internal-External Linkages: Scope of Theory and Analysis...92 4.1.2 Constructing Games...96 4.1.3 Basic Assumptions of the Nested Games Approach...100 4.2 Regime, Opposition, and Foreign Power...106 4.2.1 Principal Arena I: Game of Transition...106 4.2.2 Principal Arena II: Outcomes...112 4.2.3 International Arena I: Foreign Pressure Game...117 4.2.4 International Arena II: Outcomes...122 4.3 Nested Games of Transition and Foreign Pressure...130 4.3.1 Formalization...130 4.3.2 Discussion and Interpretation...138

Contents 9 4.4 The Model s Implications and Generating of Hypotheses...146 4.4.1 Preference Change of the Regime...147 4.4.2 Weighing the Games...149 4.4.3 Temporal Dimension...153 4.4.4 Impact on the Opposition and the Democracy Promotion Dilemma...154 4.4.5 Summary...158 5 Methodology...161 5.1 Empirical Research Design...161 5.2 Case Selection...167 5.3 Data Basis...172 5.4 Structure of the Empirical Part...176 6 U.S. Democracy Assistance in the Polish Liberalization Process, 1980-1989...179 6.1 The United States Policy Toward Poland...180 6.2 Poland s Path to the Round Table Negotiations...185 6.2.1 The Birth of Solidarity, Strikes, and Martial Law, 1980-1981...185 6.2.2 Underground and Ostensible Stability, 1982-1988...187 6.2.3 Induction and Negotiations of the Round Table, 1988-1989...192 6.3 Supporting Solidarity...194 6.3.1 Sustaining the Underground...195 6.3.2 Communications and Propaganda...199 6.3.3 The Logistics of External Influence...202 6.3.4 Advice and Influence on Opposition Strategy...206 6.3.5 How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for him?...212

10 Contents 6.4 Pressuring the Jaruzelski Regime...216 6.4.1 Sanctions as Policy Instrument...216 6.4.2 The Post-Martial Law Sanctions Regime...219 6.5 Sub-Actors and Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion in Poland...222 6.5.1 National Endowment for Democracy...222 6.5.2 Waging Underground Political Warfare: The CIA...227 6.5.3 A Foreign Service of Its Own: The AFL-CIO...230 6.5.4 Department of State and USIA...233 7 Correspondence between Theory and Facts...237 7.1 Effect on Communist Regime...237 7.2 Effect on Solidarity...242 7.2.1 Professionalizing the Underground...243 7.2.2 Underground Press...244 7.2.3 Morale Boosting...246 7.3 Costs of Repression...250 7.3.1 Impact of Opposition Assistance on the Regime s Cost Structure...250 7.3.2 Timeline: Nested Costs of Authoritarianism...253 7.4 Strategy Shifts and Trajectories of External Influence...255 7.4.1 Repression 1981...257 7.4.2 Opening 1986...257 7.4.3 Negotiations 1988/1989...260 7.4.4 The Juncture of Jaruzelski s Election to President in 1989..262 8 Conclusion...265 8.1 Democracy Promotion as Nested Games...266 8.2 Key Implications for External Democracy Promotion...271 8.3 Future Research...275

Contents 11 Bibliography...281 Appendix 1: Derivations Repeated Play of Non-nested Games...311 Appendix 2: Derivations of Nested Game with Varying Frequencies...315 Appendix 3: List of Interviews...317

List of Figures and Tables Figure 1: Przeworski s Model of Political Liberalization...72 Figure 2: Internal-External Linkage in Regime Changes...94 Figure 3: Simple Tripartite Interaction...102 Figure 4: Nested Games Approach...103 Figure 5: Simple Two-Level Game...103 Figure 6: Strong and Weak Degree of Pressure by the External Actor...118 Figure 7: Changing of Preference Structure in Transition Game...137 Figure 8: Development of Reform and Discount Factor...142 Figure 9: Asymmetry of Frequencies in Foreign Pressure Game...144 Figure 10: The General Theory s Chain of Causality...145 Figure 11: Timeline Correspondence of U.S. Sanctions with Regime Moves...241 Figure 12: Effect of U.S. Move on Regime s Cost Structure...252 Figure 13: Timeline Nested Costs of Authoritarianism and Level of k...254 Table 1: Scope of Theory and Analysis...30 Table 2: Generic Payoff Matrix Transition Game...111 Table 3: Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game...112 Table 4: Instruments of the External Actor s Moves...120 Table 5: Generic Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game...122 Table 6: Numerical Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game...122 Table 7: Costs of Suppression and Costs of Toleration...125 Table 8: Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game with Updated Preference Structure...137 Table 9: Financial Aid Funneled through Solidarity Office Abroad...198 Table 10: Empirical Indicators for Morale Boosting...249 Table 11: Effect of U.S. Move Strong Pressure and Testable Implications...251

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms AFL-CIO C3I CC CIA CPSU CSCE/OSCE DGB EC EU EU FPG FTUI GAO GDR IDEA IDEE IGO IMF INGO IPA KGB American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Central Committee Central Intelligence Agency Communist Party of the Soviet Union Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe/ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) Federation of German Trade Unions European Community Expected Utility European Union Foreign Pressure Game Free Trade Union Institute General Accounting Office German Democratic Republic International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Institute of Democracy in Eastern Europe International Governmental Organization International Monetary Fund International Non-governmental Organization International Polish Agency (Komitet Gossudarstwennoy Besopasnosti) Committee for State Security, Russian Intelligence Service

16 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms KOR KPN MFN NATO NED NGO NSC NSDD NSZZ S ODIHR OKNO OKP OSS PAC PO PZPR RFE SB TASS TG TKK NSZZ S USAID USIA USSR VoA (Komitet Obrony Robotników) Workers Defence Committee (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleg ej) Confederation for an Independent Poland Most-favored-nation (Status) North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Endowment for Democracy Non-governmental Organization National Security Council National Security Decision Document (Niezale ny Samorz dny Zwi zek Zawodowy Solidarno ) Solidarity Independent Self-governing Trade Union Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (O wiata, Kultura, Nauka) Education, Culture, Science (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny) Citizens Parliamentary Club Office of Strategic Services Polish-American Congress Payoff (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) Polish United Workers Party Radio Free Europe (S u ba Bezpiecze stwa) Security Service (Telegrafnoe Agentstwo Sowjetskowo Sojusa) Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union Transition Game (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ Solidarno ) Temporary Commission of Coordination NSZZ Solidarno United States Agency for International Development United States Information Agency Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Voice of America